fact does not affect the owner's liability on an assessment rightly made.1

b. LAND LYING IN TWO DISTRICTS.-It is competent for the legislature to provide that a tract of land extending over two or more. districts shall be taxed as a whole in one of them.2 Such provision is often made by enacting that the whole shall be assessed at the residence of the owner or occupant,3 or in the district in

which the greater part of the improvements are.1 Such a provision will apply to the land of a partnership2 or corporation, as well as to the land of an individual. The benefit of such an enactment cannot be claimed as a right by the owner; it merely grants a privilege to the public authorities, who may, if they see fit, assess each piece in the district in which it lies. They must, however, follow the law closely. If they assess the land as a whole in the wrong county, the assessment will be void.

3. Taxes on Personal Property-a. GENERAL RULE.-In the taxation of personal property, two inconsistent doctrines often come into conflict; the one, mobilia sequuntur personam, demanding that the property shall be taxed at the owner's domicile, on the theory that personalty has no other situs; the other, that it shall be taxed like real property, where it is situated. Ordinarily the first rule will prevail, and, as a general rule, personal property is taxable at the domicile of its owner.

assessed in the township where the occupant resides. State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 246.

1. The Georgia Code, § 829, provides that a plantation lying on the line between two counties shall be taxed in the one where the most improvements are. But where land belonging to the estate of a decedent and lying across the line had been divided into parcels by the executors, the court held that the land was not cultivated and carried on as one plantation, so as to come within this section of the act. Robson v. Du Bose, 79 Ga. 721.

2. In case of a partnership association formed under New Jersey Act of 1880, the residence in question is that of its principal office. If that is in neither county in which the land lies, the provision does not apply and the land cannot be taxed as a whole under New Jersey Revision, p. 1152, pl. 65, even though two of the members of the partnership association reside on the land. Stewart v. Flummerfelt, 53 N. J. L. 540.

3. State v. Warford, 37 N. J. L. 397. 4. Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St. 260. 5. Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, reversing 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 597.

6. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), pp. 56, 372; Burroughs_on_Taxation, § 40; Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; 56 Am. Dec. 493; Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464; Phelps v. Thurston, 47 Conn. 477; People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543; Salem Iron Factory Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 514; Amesbury Woolen, etc.,

This is often so provided

Mfg. Co. v. Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461; Wilson v. New York, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 675; State v. Bishop, 34 N. J. L. 45; People v. Chenango County, II N. Y. 563; State v. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; State v. Rahway, 24 N. J. L. 56; Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J. L. 13; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Com. v. American Dredg ing Co., 122 Pa. St. 386; Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.) 366.

In Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 514, the court held that a building, owned by a non-resident but standing by license upon land in the state, could not be assessed and sold as personal property by the county in which it was situated, and that a purchaser entering under such sale would be a mere trespasser. Compare Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equalization, 84 Iowa 407.

Personal property not in the possession of a tenant, is to be taxed in the town in which the owner resides. And it makes no difference that the person assessed consented that the property should be set to him in the list of a town in which he does not reside, and that he gave to the listers, in such town, a list specifying the particular property therein. Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609.

A statute, requiring the owner of personal property moving into a state, to list his property in the town in which he resides, refers to the moving of the owner, and not of the property, into the state. Johnson v. Lyon, 106 Ill. 64. But see, as holding the view that the personal property of residents situated without the state cannot be

by statute.1 The state, may, however, and often does, make it taxable at its actual situs.2 The fact that double taxation may result from assessment in two states does not affect the validity of the assessment.3 If the property has no situs-either actual or constructive-within the state, it cannot be taxed. If it has a double situs, the legislature may choose between them.5 domicile at the time of the completion of the assessment rolls determines the place of taxation of property taxable at the place of the domicile; similarly, the location of the property on that day, if the property is taxed at its situs. Neither removal from

the district, taking the property out of the district, nor changes in the lines of the district after that time, will divest the liability for the tax.1

(1) Domicile (See also DOMICILE, vol. 5, p. 857).-The question of domicile in matters of taxation, as in other connections, is one of fact, the burden of proving which rests on the public body seeking to collect the tax.3 If the facts show that the domicile is in a given place, it is there presumed to remain, although the taxpayer has formed an intention to remove, an actual removal being necessary to a change of domicile. If a removal

v. Portland, 2 Oregon 81; Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90.

Cotton shipped out of the state prior to the date of the assessment is not taxable. Colbert v. Leake County, 60 Miss. 142. See also Templeton v. Levee Com'rs, 16 La. Ann. 117. And where the owner removed all his stock of goods and closed up his store prior to the date of the assessment, he was held not taxable. Field v. Boston, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 65.

In Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90, the court construed the Colorado statute which provided for the assessment of horses and cattle run

ning at large in the county in which they are being herded or kept upon a certain day.

1. If, after a tax has been raised and assessed on the inhabitants of a district, part of the district is set off into another district, the inhabitants of such remain liable to pay the tax, the liability being fixed by the assessment. Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323. But a removal of the property from the taxing district after the assessment has been made, will not relieve the owner from liability to pay the tax already imposed, even though the owner subsequently pays a tax elsewhere. People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 300; DeArman v. Williams, 93 Mo. 158. Nor after a levy thereon under the provisions of a statute. State v. Easterbrook, 3 Nev. 173. And in Warren v. Werner, 14 Wis. 366, where, after due service of the notice required by law to be given by the assessor, the owner of personal property, within the ten days thereafter allowed for listing his property, removed to another town, he was not thereby relieved from his liability to pay the tax imposed in the former town. See also Barber v. Potter, 8 R.

I. 15.

2. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 234; 28 Am. Dec. 293. Hence, for the

jury, Bailey v. Buell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 158. The facts sufficient to constitute' domicile have been stated under the head of DOMICILE, vol. 5, p. 857. Some additional cases are here noted. One residing in Rhode Island from April to December and there voting and taxed, cannot be taxed on personal property in New York, although he lives there in a hired house from December to April. People v. Barker, 70 Hun (N. Y.) 397. See also Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623; Carnoe v. Freetown, 9 Gray (Mass.) 357.

An unmarried man is properly taxed in the county where he spends most of his time, and where his interests are, notwithstanding the fact that he keeps trunks and clothing in another county. King v. Parker, 73 Iowa 757. See also Cabot v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 52; Lee v. Boston, 2 Gray (Mass.) 484; Cochrane v. Boston, 4 Allen (Mass.) 177. 3. A town which taxes a man as a resident, takes upon itself the burden of showing that he is such, if the right is questioned. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 372; Hurlburt v. Green, 41 Vt. 490.

Consent to be not to affect the in fact a resident. Vt. 609.

taxed has been held matter, if he is not Blood v. Sayre, 17

4. Stoddert v. Ward, 31 Md. 562; 100 Am. Dec. 83; Pickering v. Cambridge, 144 Mass. 244.

In Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381, Lowrie, C. J., said: Clearly the liability to taxation does not depend upon the intention of any one relative to his domiciliation, for this would make the state's power of taxation dependent, in numberless cases, on the pleasure of the persons proposed to be taxed. Residence is a definite and obvious fact, and is of itself a sufficient ground of liability Otis v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 44.

The fact that a person was taxed in

with intention to remain is shown, it is immaterial what the purpose of the person removing was, even though his only object was to secure a lower rate of taxation.1 One who has thus removed cannot, by still considering himself a resident at his old. home and putting in a list there, avoid acquiring the new domicile.2 A mere transient cannot be taxed.3 A man's home, not his place of business, determines his domicile. It is undoubtedly true, as a general principle, that a person must have some domicile, and that a domicile once acquired remains until a new one is secured. As far as taxation purposes are concerned, however, some courts have made an exception and held that one, by removing with intention to acquire a new domicile in another state, and having actually left the former state, loses his domicile, although he has in fact not acquired another. This doctrine doubtless rests upon the ground that the state has lost jurisdiction by the removal. But

the town to which he has removed, is not competent evidence to show that he did not continue to be taxable in the town of his former residence. Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 362.

1. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. 2. One who has removed from one township to another, and for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes in the latter, mails a schedule of his personal property to the assessors of the former township and pays taxes thereon in such township, is not relieved thereby from liability to taxation on such property in the township to which he has removed. Mahany v. People, 138 Ill. 311.

3. An individual is to be taxed in the place of his domicile or home, and not where he is personally residing for a mere temporary purpose, having a home in some other place. Moore v. Wilkins, 10 N. H. 452.

A person having a permanent residence, where he votes and pays taxes, is not subject to taxation in another place merely because he spends a few months there during the year visiting relatives. People v. Barker, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 630.

One coming to a state with his family and servants for a part of the year to reside in a house owned by him, does not thereby become a resident. State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517.

A, who had emigrated to Canada many years before, after living there five years became a peddler, and as such traveled through Ohio, where he loaned money. To look after his interests, and as peddler, he visited the state as often as once a year, but car

ried his securities with him wherever he went. It was held that he was not a resident of Ohio. Grant v. Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506.

The hiring of a yard, storage and sale of lumber therein, and erection of a small building thereon, for use of employés, does not subject a tenant to taxation there. Loud v. Charlestown, 103 Mass. 278.

4. Welty on Assessments, § 37-
5. See DOMICILE, vol. 5, p. 859.
6. Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 66.

Where a taxpayer removes from one taxing district to another, and claims to have acquired a domicile in the latter district, the burden rests upon him to establish a residence therein so permanent as to exclude the existence of an intention to make a domicile elsewhere. Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268.

7. One who abandons his residence in the commonwealth before the first of May, with the fixed intention not to return, and has actually left the commonwealth, is not taxable on his poll and personal property there, although he may be still on the way to his new domicile. Colton v. Longmeadow, 12 Allen (Mass.) 598. To the same effect is Briggs で。 Rochester, 16 Gray (Mass.) 337. The above criticised in Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89; 42 Am. Rep. 427.

cases are

The case of Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 362, held that if an inhabitant of a town removes to another town in the state, not intending to remain there permanently nor to return to his former home, he loses his domicile in such former home.