it must be said, in this connection, that the weight of authority is, however, the other way.1 (2) Residence, Inhabitancy, etc.—(See also INHABITANT, vol. 10, P. 770; RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 122). The statutes often provide that taxation of personalty shall be at the residence of the owner. The definition of the term "residence," is elsewhere given. It must be a fixed and permanent home, as distinguished from a temporary abiding place.3 One may have two places of residence,4 in which case the assessors, unless restrained by the terms of the statute, may choose between them.5 If the owner lives on a farm lying in two counties, his only residence is in the county where his house is situated. The question of residence, like that 1. Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89; 42 Am. Rep. 427; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62. An inhabitant of the commonwealth who removes from the town of his residence, with the intention of never residing there again, and of removing to another state, is still, so long as he remains in the commonwealth, liable to taxation in that town, until he acquires another domicile. Bulkley 7'. Williamstown, 3 Gray (Mass.) 493 An inhabitant of A left that place on March 30, with the intention of residing in C. On April 1, he arrived at B and the next day reached C, where he established his residence. It was held that, for the purpose of taxation, he was to be deemed an inhabitant of A on April 1, and was liable to taxation there. Littlefield v. Brooks, 50 Me. 475. Under a Minnesota statute in force in 1876, imposing a tax upon "all personal property of persons residing" within the state, in reference to the quantity of property held or owned by such residents on May 1st, 1876, it was held that the personal property of one who had been a resident of the state, but who was in itinere on May 1st, for the propose of making New York City the place of future residence, was subject to taxation under the statute. McCutchen v. Rice County, 2 McCrary (U.S.) 337 2. See RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 122. In New Jersey, the residence required to make one liable to a personal tax in a particular township or ward, is precisely the same in kind as that which will entitle him to vote there. State v. Casper, 36 N. J. L. 367. In Douglass v. New York, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 110, the plaintiff resided during a part of the year in New York, and was there taxed upon his personal property. The statute provided that every person should be taxed in the town or ward where he resided, for all his personal property. The court held that the plaintiff had a residence in New York for the purpose of taxation, although his domicile was elsewhere. This case is almost identical with Bartlett v. New York, Sandf. (N. Y.) 44. 3. Culbertson v. Floyd County, 52 Ind. 361. 4. See RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 124. 5. Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 16, affirming 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 51. A person taxable in a city under the New York statute declaring a person's residence, if he resides in two or more places during any one year, to be where his principal business is transacted, is taxable in the ward in the city where he resides. Bowe v. Jenkins, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 458. also Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 132; 26 Am. Rep. 650; Wade v. Matheson, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 158; Mann v. Clark, 33 Vt. 55; Church v. Rowell, 49 Me. 367. See 6. Personal property of one owning a farm lying partly in two counties, is taxable only in the county where the house in which he lives is located, under Illinois Revenue Act, ch. 120, § 7, making such property taxable in the county, town or district where the owner resides. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. In Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me. 386, the town line passed through the house of the plaintiff, and the court held that he was a resident of, and taxable in, that town in which the larger, as well as the most indispensable part of his house was situated. In Cheney v. Waltham, 8 Cush. of domicile, is one of fact to be proved by competent evidence. The assessor's list is not admissible against the party taxed.1 The home of the taxpayer is his residence-not his place of business.2 If one's residence is in a certain place for all other purposes, it is his residence for taxation purposes also.3 Taxes are often imposed on "inhabitants." The term "inhabitancy" is broader than domicile. This question, like that of domicile, is one of fact, the burden of proving which is on the corporation taxing.5 "Actual place of abode," is another phrase often used in the tax laws.6 b. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY—(1) In General.—Tangible personal property is assessed sometimes at the domicile of the owner; sometimes at the place where it is situated.8 Money, while a mere medium of exchange, is, so far as taxation (Mass.) 327, where a dwelling house was divided by a boundary line, the court held that the owner would be considered a resident of that town in which he performed those offices which mainly characterized his home (such as sleeping, eating, sitting, and receiving visitors), and that he had no right to elect to reside and to be taxed for his personal property in the other town. 1. Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480. 2. Nugent v. Bates, 51 Iowa 77; 32 Am. Rep. 117. 3. Meserve v. Folsom, 62 Vt. 504. 4. Welty on Assessments, § 36; Bur roughs on Taxation, p. 44. A stranger coming into a town, becomes liable to a license tax as an "inhabitant and member of the corporation." Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 254. 5. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 231; 28 Am. Dec. 293. To recover in an action of debt for taxes assessed upon personal property under Maine Rev. Stat., ch. 6, § 12, it must be established that the defendant was an inhabitant of the plaintiff town at the time of the assessment. Rockland v. Farnsworth, 83 Me. 228. 6. "Actual place of abode " is where one has his home and family irrespective of business absences. Arnold v. Davis, 8 R. I. 341. Under the Rhode Island statute, providing that "all ratable personal property shall be taxed in the town in which the owner shall have had his actual place of abode for the larger portion of the twelve months next preceding the first day of April in each year,"-the "larger portion of the twelve months," means more than half of them in duration of time. Ailman v. Griswold, 12 R. I. 339. See also Green v. Gardiner, 6 R. I. 242. Where one moves from his own farm to the town farm in an adjoining district, under contract to carry it on for a year, intending to make it his home for the year and so continue two years thereafter, he is a resident of the latter district, even though he carries on his own farm and expects to return. Woodward v. Isham, 43 Vt. 123. 7. See cases in preceding notes. 8. People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 30; Oakland v. Whipple, 39 Cal. 112; Powell v. Madison, 21 Ind. 335; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; 79 Am. Dec. 377; Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 45; Com. v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489; Chauvenet v. Anne Arundel County, 3 Md. 259; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292; Colbert v. Leake County, 60 Miss. 142; State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J. L. 320; State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517; Barnes v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 383; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I. 317; State v. Charleston, 2 Spears (S. Car.) 719. See also Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 521. Thus, property consisting of oxen and a portable sawmill, which has been located and used in a certain county for nearly three years, has acquired a situs and will be taxed in that county. Trammell v. Connor, 91 Ala. 398. Coal sent by the owners to their agents in another state, to be there sold upon its arrival, becomes a part of the general mass of property in that state, and will be taxable. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622. questions are concerned, a form of tangible personal property.1 It may be taxed at the owner's domicile, but is generally taxed where it is actually situated.2 (2) Animals.-The statutes often provide for the taxation of cattle and other animals where they are herded or usually kept.3 1. State v. Earl, I Nev. 397. 2. People v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; McCutchen v. Rice County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 337. "It is property within the state and subject to taxation, it is visible and tangible, and expressly made taxable by statute, and is taxable where situated." Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Board, 44 La. Ann. 91. But see Culbertson v. Floyd County, 52 Ind. 361. Money invested in business will be taxed, although the owner is a nonresident. Matter of McMahon, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 190. And a law providing for the taxation of the capital of a nonresident is constitutional. Duer v. Small, 4 Blatchf. ( U. S.) 263. In Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. Y. 155, the court held that banking capital will be subject to taxation in the place where the business of such bank is located, treating this as an exception to the general rule mobilia sequuntur personam. Where a resident of one state has exclusive control and management of money for investment of foreign capitalists, some of which is invested in his state, and the securities are made and held by him in his own name in such state, they are taxable in that state. Hutchinson v. Board of Equalization, 66 Iowa 35. Where a foreign insurance company deposits, with the comptroller of the state, the funds required by statute to enable it to do business, it is liable for taxes upon them. International L. Assurance Soc. v. Com'rs of Taxes, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 318. 3. Smith v. Mason, 48 Kan. 586; Ford v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446; Whitmore v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 451. Where cattle were owned, herded and managed at the owner's "home ranch" in one county, but were turned out to graze in another county during a part of the year, it was held that they properly belonged in the county where the owner's ranch was for the purpose of taxation. The court in this case said: "But, by assigning to this class of personal property a situs forthe purpose of taxation, independent of the mere residence of the owner, it does not necessarily follow that the property can be legally assessed in whatever county it may first be found during the period of assessment." Barnes v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 383. To the same effect is Ford v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446. The case of Graham v. Chautauqua County, 31 Kan. 473, presents a different state of facts. In this case the Kansas statute provided for the listing and taxing of cattle where they were usually kept. The cattle taxed were kept about an equal time in each township. There was nothing in the case showing that the owner had a "home ranch" in either township, and nothing to indicate that the cattle were to be taken from the township in which they were assessed, back to the township where the owner claimed they should have been assessed. The court held that the assessment was properly made in the township in which the cattle were found. In People v. Townsend, 56 Cal. 633, the court declared void an act taxing migratory cattle, basing its decision upon the principle that one local community cannot be taxed for the benefit of another, even though all personal property is required to be listed and assessed in the county where it is situated. Nevertheless cattle ranging across the line will be taxed in the county where the owner resides. Court 7. O'Connor, 65 Tex. 334. But under subsequent legislation, where pastures lie upon county boundaries, cattle are to be taxed in proportion to the pasture land situated in each county. Nolan v. San Antonio Ranch Co., ŠI Tex. 315. In Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395, under a statute which provides that all property, real and personal, except such as is required to be listed and assessed elsewhere, shall be listed and assessed in the county where it is situated, it was held that where cattle ranged across the line and were within the state for five months, they were taxable there. In Colorado, cattle and horses purchased outside of the state by residents, and driven into the state for the purpose of pasturage in the month of (3) Water Craft.-The principles governing the taxation of vessels are not essentially different from those controlling the taxation of other personal property. A vessel may be taxed at the domicile of the owner, or at the place where it has its situs. This situs is at its home port. This will generally be, as well, the place where it is registered or enrolled, but not necessarily so, the location of the home port being a question of fact.5 October of a certain year, are not liable for the taxes of such year under Colorado Gen. Stat., ch. 94. Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90. In Illinois, live stock belonging to the owner of a farm which lies in two counties, in one of which he lives, and between the portions of which in each county there is no fence, so that the stock may be pastured in either county, is taxable only in the county of his residence under Illinois Revenue Act, ch. 120, § 7, making personal property taxable in the county of residence. Section 8, which makes such stock taxable where the farm with which they are connected is situated, when the owner does not reside thereon, does not affect the case. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. In Massachusetts, horses kept in the only barn upon a farm which lies in two towns, are taxable in the town where the barn is situated, under Massachusetts Pub. Stat., ch. 11, § 20, cl. 3, providing that "horses kept throughout the year in places other than those where the owners reside . shall be assessed to the owners in the places where they are kept," although the residence of the owner is on the same farm, in the other town, and the horses are used for work upon all parts of the farm. Pierce v. Eddy, 152 Mass. 594. In Nevada, cattle are to be taxed in the county where they remain permanently and have their home. State v. Shaw, 21 Nev. 222. In Wyoming, horses owned within the territory of the Shoshone Indian Reservation by a white person holding no official position, are taxable by the authorities of Wyoming in the county within which they are kept, under U. S. Rev. Stats., § 839, and the treaty of July 3d, 1868. Torrey v. Baldwin, 3 Wyoming 430. 1. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423. 2. In Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, the owner of a vessel resided in Baltimore County and the vessel was registered at the port of Baltimore, from whence she sailed. This was the nearest port of registration and the only one at which she could have been registered. The court held that the ship could not be taxed by the city for municipal purposes. See also Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co., 37 Ohio St. 450. 3. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th ed.), § 787; Irvin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 94 Ill. 105; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 62; 29 Am. Rep. 712; The Blanchard v. Martha Washington, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 466; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471; Hill v. The Golden Gate, Newb. (U. S.) 308; St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co., 113 Mo. 83; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160; Wheeling, etc., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Irvin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 94 Ill. 105; St. Joseph v. Saville, 39 Mo. 461; Gunther v. Baltimore, 55 Md. 457; Wheeling, etc., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va. 170; 27 Am. Rep. 552. Boats owned by an unincorporated company in Ohio, and used in that state, are taxable in the district in which the company's principal office is located, and in which the managing agent resides. Pomeroy Salt Co. v. Davis, 21 Ohio St. 555. 4. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596. 5. The question of the location of the home port is one of fact. It depends wholly upon the locality of her owner's residence and not upon the place of her enrollment. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Boat Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423. But see Roberts v. Charlevoix Tp., 60 Mich. 197, where the court held that a vessel enrolled and licensed or registered under the United States navigation laws, and owned by a nonresident of the state, does not become subject to the taxing power of the state by engaging in business therein. The statute may provide, however, that the vessel shall be assessed where it is permanently employed,1 or where it is registered or enrolled.2 If the vessel, under the law, is taxable in any one of several places in the same jurisdiction, it can be taxed in one of them only, and any subsequent assessment will be void.3 It cannot in any event be taxed at a point at which it merely touches or where it remains temporarily only. (4) Logs and Lumber—(See also LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1018).-Logs and lumber are liable to taxation like other personal property. If in transitu, however, they are not taxable 1. A dredge boat, a tug boat, and mud scows owned by a foreign corporation and brought into Alabama for use in fulfilling a dredging contract with the national government, of indefinite duration, with a probability of other contracts to complete the improvement, are taxable within the state, although they are floating property, and although the tug is registered at the port of the owner's domicile. National Dredging Co. v. State (Ala. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 720. 2. Boats. Under a statute providing that "all persons . . in the state owning water-craft, shall be required to list the same for assessment and taxation in the county, township, city, or town in which the same may be enrolled, registered or licensed, or kept when not enrolled, registered or licensed," it was held that an assessment at the domicile of the owner was illegal where the boat was kept and used elsewhere. Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222. 3. The Illinois statute provided for the taxation of sailing vessels, steamboats, etc., in the county, town, village or district in which the same may belong or be enrolled, registered or licensed, or kept when not enrolled, registered or licensed. It was held that after a vessel has been rightfully listed in one place, it is not subject to taxation elsewhere. Halstead v. Adams, 108 Ill. 609; Vogt v. Ayer, 104 Ill. 583. 4. State v. Haight, 30 N. J. L. 428; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471; Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596; New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 480; 56 Am. Dec. 522; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; 29 Am. Rep. 712; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 431, reversing 40 Mo. 580; People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160. But see Oakland v. Whipple, 39 Cal. 112. In Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596, Nelson, J., said: "We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the personal property of the state; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid." 5. Logs and Lumber.-Posts, ties, and poles, kept for sale, are taxable as "merchant's goods, wares and commodities "under the Wisconsin statute, in the county where kept for sale, irrespective of the residence of the owner, although sales thereof are actually made in another county where the owners reside and do business as merchants. Torrey v. Shawano County, 79 Wis. 152; Mitchell v. Plover Tp., 53 Wis. 548; Sanford v. Spencer, 62 Wis. 230; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453. In Michigan, logs in camp are taxable at the place where the camp is located, if there is an office there receiving funds and making returns to headquarters. Ryerson v. Muskegon, 57 Mich. 383. Logs left by an Iowa company in a bayou on the Illinois side of the Mississippi river for safe-keeping are taxable in Illinois. Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill. 559. Fire wood, pulp wood and kiln wood cut from wild land in a town, by a resident thereof, and carried prior to April 1st to a landing situated on the track, to stay there till sold, and which is in part shipped to other parts and in part sold to local parties in the course of the year, is "personal property employed in trade," and taxable in such |