towns under Maine Rev. Stats., ch. 6, § 14, providing that such property shall be taxed in the town where so em

ployed on April 1st. Gower v. Jonesboro, 83 Me. 142.

In Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179; 49 Am. Rep. 156, the court held that staves, purchased by a nonresident, and remaining in the state to receive a finishing process before ship ment to another state, were taxable 'within the state.

Lumber on the premises of the manufacturer, awaiting transportation to the vendee, is not taxable where it is, as in a place of "storage," although the title is passed, especially if anything remains to be done to complete the transfer. Osterhout v. Jones, 54 Mich. 228.

1. LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1049.

2. Logs, cut, hauled, and piled on the ice, to await the opening of a river, and to be floated then to another state, are not in transit, and so exempt in the state where cut and piled. C. N. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. Rep. 54.

3. In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, certain logs were cut in New Hampshire, and hauled down and deposited in and on the banks of a stream, for the purpose of being floated down the river into another state, but, by reason of low water, were delayed there nearly a year and taxed by the township in which they lay. The court held that, aside from the owner's intent to export them, the logs were not in course of commercial transportation. 4. Logs cut by contractors and delivered in a lake for convenience in storage, but for no definite time, whence the owners had contracts to transport them to another place, are in transit to the latter place, and not

taxable at the lake. Pardee v. Freesoil Tp., 74 Mich. 81. See also Corning v. Masonville Tp., 74 Mich. 177.

In Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286, the court held that logs cut and delivered on the ice on a river, where they lie temporarily waiting transportation down the river, as soon as the ice shall break up, are in transitu and cannot be taxed. And in Blount . Munroe, 60 Ga. 61, it was held that a tax could not be imposed upon lumber awaiting shipment in the hands of an exporter, which was actually shipped immediately afterwards, as such a tax would be in violation of the constitutional prohibition against a tax upon imports or exports. See also Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods (U. S.) 408.

Michigan.-Lumber piled at a railway station simply for shipment is not taxable as property in storage. Monroe v. Greenhoe, 54 Mich. 9.

Logs piled by the side of a railway track for shipment, but not actually in transit, are within the Michigan statute providing that property so piled shall not be deemed in transitu, but shall be assessed to the owner in the township where it is situated; and the fact that the contracts have been made with parties to load the logs, or that some event has occurred to prevent shipment, or that it is the owner's intention to ship in the near future, is immaterial. Maurer 7. Cliff, 94 Mich. 194.

Under the Michigan statute, property in transit is taxed at the place of destination, provided that forest products in transit are to be held destined to the sorting grounds of the booming company nearest the mouth of the stream, unless the contrary is made to appear. Brooks v. Arenac Tp., 71 Mich. 231; Fletcher v. Alcona Tp., 72 Mich. 18. 5. Fletcher v.Alcona Tp.,72 Mich. 18.

1. Property which happens to be temporarily within the jurisdiction cannot be taxed there. People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 287; Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 473; 26 Am. Rep. 87; Rhyno v. Madison County, 43 Iowa 632; Torrent v. Yager, 52 Mich. 306; People v. Tax Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 242; Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15; State v. Charleston, 2 Spears (S. Car.) 719. But see McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 252. A city ordinance which attempts to impose a license tax upon wagons of outside residents engaged in hauling in and out of the city, is void. St. Charles v. Nolle, 52 Mo. 122; 11 Am. Rep. 440.

A traveling circus and menagerie owned by a non-resident and brought into the state to be exhibited at various places, and then taken into other states for the same purpose, will not be subject to taxation within the state. Robinson v. Longley, 18 Nev. 71.

In Com. v. American Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386, the court passed upon the validity of a tax imposed upon scows, tug boats, and dredges owned by a resident of the state, but which had never been within it, and which were carried from place to place with out the state, for the purpose of dredging; and stated the general rule to be, that personal property of a visible and tangible nature, permanently located within another state, would be taxable where found; but held that the property in question, being in different localities, for short periods of time and for temporary purposes, was properly taxable by the state wherein its owner resided.

2. Ogilvie v. Crawford County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 148; 12 Fed. Rep. 196; Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor. 89 Ind.

1; Monroe v. Greenhoe, 54 Mich. 9; Boyce v. Cutter, 70 Mich. 539; Brooks v. Arenac Tp., 71 Mich. 231; Pardee v. Freesoil Tp., 74 Mich. 81; Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286; Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H. 303; Hurley v. Texas, 20 Wis. 634.

Coal belonging to a non-resident, which is being sent across the state and which is lying at a wharf awaiting assortment and shipment, has no situs within the state, and cannot be taxed. State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35. But grain which has been bought by an agent for a commission and stored in a warehouse where it lies subject to the order of the owner, is not in transitu and will be taxable. Walton v. Westwood, 73 Ill. 125.

Wood cut in California and owned by a citizen of that state, thrown into a river and passing a certain county in Nevada on its way to market in another Nevada county, is not taxable in the former county. Conley v. Chedic, 7 Nev. 336.

3. Hill v. Graham, 72 Mich. 659; Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 609. But this case is distinguished in Stand. ard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. 1, in which it was held that if goods have in any sense started on their journey, they will not be subject to taxation at a place where they are at a railroad station awaiting shipment.

Where property has been purchased by a non-resident who intends to ship, but is prevented from doing so by the fact that navigation has not opened, it is taxable in the place where it is. Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605.

4. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; 62 N. H. 303.

Corn owned by a non-resident and

temporarily in cribs awaiting transportation, has been held not liable to taxation. There must, however, be a purpose to ship immediately, or at least as soon as transportation can be conveniently obtained, followed by actual shipment within a reasonable time, to exempt the property from taxation. Ogilvie v. Crawford County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 148.

1. Burroughs on Taxation, p. 56; State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; 62 N. H. 303.

2. Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 40 La. Ann. 226; 8 Am. St. Rep. 519.

3. Duer v. Small, Blatchf. (U. S.) 263; Danville Banking, etc., Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 170; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125; McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142; Ament v. Humphrey, 3 Greene (Iowa) 255; Lemp v. Hastings, Greene (Iowa) 448; Gray v. Kettell, 12 Mass. 160; Shaw v. Hartford, 56 Conn. 351; Comstock v. Grand Rapids, 54 Mich. 641. Where one has a factory, at a state prison, in charge of an agent, and is a jobber of the goods so made at another place, his property at the prison may be taxed under a statute providing that goods of manufacturers in the hands of agents shall be listed where the agent's business is conducted. Selz v. Cagwin, 104 Ill. 647.

A private banker living in one place and having a bank in another, is to be regarded as a resident of the latter place, so far as the matter of taxation is concerned. Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. Y. 155.

4. Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197; People v. Horn Silver Min. Co., 105 N. Y. 76.

If the statute provides that non-residents "doing business" in the state shall be taxed on sums invested "in said business," a tax cannot be assessed against a manufactured article sent into the state merely for sale by an agent. People v. Tax Com'r, 23 N. Y. 242.

5. McCutchen v. Rice County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 337.

6. Property Within the State.-See People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543

Goods in Stores, Shops, etc.-In Kalkaska Tp. v. Fletcher, 81 Mich. 446, the statute provided that all goods situate in a township other than where the owner resides, should be assessed in the township where situate, if the owner hired a shop, store, etc., for use in connection with them. The defendants attached a stock of goods and rented a store in which to keep them, under the sheriff's charge, until the termination of the suit. The court held that a tax could not be imposed upon these goods, pending the attachment proceedings, for defendants were neither the owners of the goods at the time of the assessment, nor did they occupy a store within the meaning of the statute.

A building in which ice is stored is not a "store" within the meaning of a statute taxing property of nonresidents having stores within the town. Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258.

Merchandise or Stock in Trade.-Cotton cloth in process of being printed and prepared for market, is not mer

chandise" or "stock in trade," in the sense of the Rhode Island statute. Woodman v. American Print Works, 6 R. I. 470.

Trading, Mercantile, or Manufacturing Business.-A Connecticut statute provided for a tax upon such business, and further prescribed that "the average amount of goods kept on hand for sale during that year shall be the rule of assessment and taxation." It was held that a horse and wagon of a non-resident used in the business, was not liable to taxation. Shaw v. Hartford, 56 Conn. 351.

Stock in Trade, etc.-In Massachusetts, statutory provision is made for the taxation of goods or stock in trade employed in the business of manufacturing or of the mechanic arts, in the place where the owner hires or occupies any store, shop or wharf. Lee v. Templeton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 579; Salem Iron Factory Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 514; Amesbury Woollen, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292; Loud v. Charlestown, 103 Mass. 278; Barker v. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227; Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 332. But the business must be an established and not a transient one. Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258; Stinson v. Boston, 125 Mass. 348; Huckins v. Boston, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 543. This provision is applicable to foreign corporations. Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray (Mass.) 488. The stock in trade must be actually within the town where the owner occupies a store, in order to be taxable there. Hittinger v. Boston, 139 Mass. 17.

The furniture of an inn is only taxable to the innkeeper at the place of his residence. Charlestown 7. Middlesex County, 109 Mass. 270. See also Farwell v. Hathaway, 151 Mass. 242.

A law similar to that of Massachusetts has been enacted in Maine. See Ellsworth v. Brown, 53 Me. 519.

But cotton stored in warehouses and belonging to a broker who occupies only a desk and desk room, is not taxable within this statute. Martin v. Portland, 81 Me. 293. See also Campbell v. Machias, 33 Me. 419; Stockwell v. Brewer, 59 Me. 286; Desmond v. Machias Port, 48 Me. 478.

It is provided in Massachusetts that "machinery employed in any branch of manufactures" shall be taxed where situated or employed. It was held, 25 C. of L.-10

under the law, that a portable steam sawmill temporarily located in a town on the first day of May, is not so situated or employed, within the meaning of the statute, as to be there taxable; nor can its product in timber or lumber be taxed there, if the owner's temporary occupancy of land with the sawmill is the only evidence that he there occupied a "manufactory, store, shop or wharf.” Ingram . Cowles, 150 Mass. 155.

The cutting of ice is not a manufacture." Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258.

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Goods Sold.-In Shriver v. Pittsburgh, 66 Pa. St. 446, under a law imposing a tax on all articles of trade or of commerce sold in the city of Pittsburgh," the court held that a tax was properly imposed upon sales made without the state by agents of parties whose store, warehouses, and business were located within this city.

District Where the Business is Usually Done. See Munson v. Crawford, 65 Ill. 185.

Merchants' Goods.-A law taxing "merchants' goods" where situated, covers lumber kept for sale. Washburn 7. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453; Sanford v. Spencer, 62 Wis. 230.

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Place of Business.-A firm has a place of business" in a town where it has a factory in which it makes starch, which it stores in an adjoining warehouse until sold. Its starch is taxable in that town under Massachusetts Pub. St., ch. 11, § 24. Barker v. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227. See also Little v. Greenleaf, 7 Mass. 236; Little v. Cambridge, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 298.

Property Within the State.-See State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517; People v. Tax Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 224; Boardman v. Tompkins County, 85 N. Y. 359.

Property Stored. See Manistique Lumber Co. v. Witter, 58 Mich. 625; Hood v. Judkins, 61 Mich. 575. In this case the property taxed consisted of lumber piled upon land which the owners hired for that purpose and which was kept there until dried, when it was transported to the owner's place of business. Monroe v. Greenhoe, 54 Mich. 9, is distinguishable from the above case. Here the lumber was brought to the railroad station for transit, and the owners did not hire any place for storage, but it was piled in the yard of the party who sawed it, merely for the purposes of convenient shipment.