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tion of shares of national bank stock has been treated already in connection with the subject of national banks.1

d. PLACE AS AFFECTED BY OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION.— (1) In General.-The general rule as to place, stated above, presupposes that the legal title of the property and the right of possession are in the taxpayer. We are now to consider the effect of title and possession on the subject.2

(2) Corporate Property (See also CORPORATIONS, vol. 4, p. 272a). The same principles govern the taxation of the property of a corporation as that of private individuals. Its real property

is taxable where it lies; its personal property at its corporate residence or at the place where it is located, at the option of the legislature. The subject of corporate residence is elsewhere treated. It is there that a tax on the capital stock is levied, wherever the property represented by it may be.5

(3) Railroad Property.--Railroad property may be taxed in the same way as other property, namely, real property in the several districts in which it lies; personal property at the principal office of the company. Special provisions are often made for the taxation of railway property, which are elsewhere considered.8 (4) Partnership Property.-The state may authorize the taxation of the interest of a partner at his domicile, even though the business is conducted in another state. Generally, however, the place where the business is carried on is designated as the place where the personal property of the partnership is to be taxed.10 It

of banks incorporated by a state, but held and owned by non-resident stockholders, is not subject to the taxing power of the state. Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 490.

1. See NATIONAL BANKS, vol. 16, p. 187.

2. See also supra, this title, Upon Whom Imposed.

3. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 377; Baldwin v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund, 37 Me. 369; People v. Mc'Lean, 80 N. Y. 254; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 1 Bush (Ky.) 250; Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 186.

4. See TAXATION (CORPORATE), vol. 25.

5. People v. Tax Com'rs, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 312; Quincy R. Co. v. Adams County, 88 Ill. 615.

6. Dillon on Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), §789; Bakewell v. Police Jury, 20 La. Ann. 334; Morgan's Louisiana, etc., R., etc., Co. v. Board of Reviewers (La. 1887), 3 So. Rep. 507; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hamilton County, 73 Iowa 313; Railroad Co. v. Marion County, 48 Ohio St. 249.

A railroad company should be considered as a resident of the several towns through which its road extends, within the meaning of the tax laws. And its real estate should not be "assessed as non-resident lands." People v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 173.

Elevated railroads in New York City may be taxed as "lands" or "real estate." People v. Tax Com'rs, 82 N. Y. 462.

7. Mohawk, etc., R. Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 384.

8. See TAXATION (CORPORATE), vol. 25.

9. St. John v. Mobile, 21 Ala. 224; Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.) 366. 10. St. John v. Mobile, 21 Ala. 224; Hoadley v. Essex County, 105 Mass. 527; Swallow v. Thomas, 15 Kan. 66; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125; McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Fairbanks v. Kittredge, 24 Vt. 9. This is the rule adopted, under the Massachusetts statute, in regard to property employed in business. Barker V. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227. So in Michigan, under the statute, personal property cannot be taxed at a place other

has been held that if the statute is silent, personalty will be taxed at its actual situs, on the ground that a partnership can properly have no domicile. The legislature can always designate the place where the partnership is situated as the place of taxation.2 (5) Property in Trust.-Property in trust is, in the absence of a special provision of statute, taxed at the same place as though the trustee were the absolute owner.3 If there are several trustees residing in different districts, the tax must be apportioned among them.4

Property is sometimes made taxable to the beneficiary, in which case the question of place is determined in the same manner as though he held the full title.5

A fund in charge of a court is taxable in the jurisdiction in whose control it is."

than the place of business, even though it is manufactured, and some sales are made there. McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125.

A foreign firm having a resident partner in New York, there carrying on the business tributary to that abroad, is liable to taxation upon the amount invested in the business in New York. Matter of McMahon, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 190.

1. Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142. 2. The personal property of a partnership is assessable in the locality where it is, if the place of business is there. Williams v. Saginaw, 51 Mich.

120.

3. Perry on Trusts (4th ed.), § 331; Smith v. Byers, 43 Ga. 191. See also Latrobe v. Baltimore, 19 Md. 13; Baltimore v. Stirling, 29 Md. 48; People v. Board of Assessors, 40 N. Y. 154; Lewis v. Chester County, 60 Pa. St. 325.

A resident trustee cannot be taxed for securities without the state, in the joint possession of himself and his two non-resident co-trustees, held for nonresident beneficiaries, even though secured by liens on land within the city. People v. Barker, 135 N. Y. 656; 4 Silv. (N. Y.) 648.

The rule is the same as that stated in the text where the trustee is a corporation. Greene Foundation v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 54.

A state has power to tax property, real and personal, held in trust therein for a non-resident. Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. Rep. 355.

4. Academy of Richmond County v. Augusta, 90 Ga. 634; Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen (Mass.) 277

Where only two of three trustees of personal property reside in a state, only two-thirds of the trust property should be taxed in that state. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Gill, 50 Md. 377. To the same effect see People v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137; 21 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 168.

Resident and non-resident trustees. cannot be jointly assessed. Stinson v. Boston, 125 Mass. 348.

5. Hathaway v. Fish, 13 Allen (Mass.) 267; Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193.

In Massachusetts, the principal rule, as stated in the text, is substantially made the law by statutory provisions. Dorr v. Boston, 6 Gray (Mass.) 131.

But where the trustee is required by the terms of his trust to pay the income of the fund in his hands to another person, the tax must be assessed upon the trustee in the place in which such other person resides, if within the state, and if he resides out of the state, in the place where the trustee resides. Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193. See also Freetown v. Fish, 123 Mass. 355; Ricker v. American Loan, etc., Co.,140 Mass. 346.

In Rhode Island, property held in trust, the income of which is to be paid to any person, shall to that extent be assessed against the trustee in the town in which such beneficial owner resides. Greene v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313.

But

a trustee resident in another state, who holds as trustee no property in this state, is not liable to taxation in the town, in this state, where the cestui que trust resides. Antony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159.

6. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 376.

But the court of chancery is not a person having a residence in any partic

(6) Property in Hands of Guardians and Conservators. In the absence of statutory provision on the subject, the property of an infant or incapable is taxed at the same place as though no disability existed.1 The statute, may, however, provide for the assessment of personal property at the domicile of the guardian or conservator.2

(7) Property of Decedents.-There is a conflict in the cases in regard to the place where the personal property belonging to the estate of a deceased person is to be taxed. Some courts, proceeding on the theory that the title is in the personal representative, hold that it is taxable at his domicile, even though it has not in fact reached his hands, or even though the deceased resided in another state. If, however, the administrator or executor is not

ular town, within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, and cannot be taxed as trustee of its suitors, for the funds in the court. Matter of Kellinger, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 62.

1. Louisville v. Sherley, 80 Ky. 71; Kirkland v. Whately, 4 Allen (Mass.) 462; School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 568; 37 Am. Dec. 525; West Chester School Dist. v. Darlington, 38 Pa. St. 157, 159; Mason v. Thurber, R. I. 481.

2. Tousey v. Bell, 23 Ind. 423; Vogel v. Vogler, 78 Ind. 353; Baldwin 7. First Parish, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 494; Payson 7. Tufts, 13 Mass. 493; West Chester School Dist. v. Darlington, 38 Pa. St. 157.

If the statute requires that one be assessed in the town or ward where he lives for "all personal estate in his possession, or under his control as agent, trustee, executor or administrator," a committee of the estate of a lunatic is not included. People v. Tax Com'rs, 100 N. Y. 215.

3. Gallatin v. Alexander, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 475; Cameron v. Burlington, 56 Iowa 320; State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 246; State v. Holmdel Tp., 39 N. J. L. 79; Johnson v. Oregon City, 2 Oregon 327; State v. St. Louis County Ct., 47

Mo. 594.

If there be several executors residing in different districts, the tax must be apportioned between them. State v. Matthews, 10 Ohio St. 431.

This case was followed in Todd v. Hughes, 3 Ohio L. J. 206.

But in Brown v. Noble, 42 Ohio St. 405, where the administration was committed to several persons residing in different counties, the court held that moneys, credits, and investments belonging to the estate, must be listed

for taxation in the county where the administrator having actual possession and control of the property to be listed, resided.

And in New York, where the statute provides that every person shall be assessed where he resides for his personal estate, including all personal property in his possession or under his control as executor or administrator, the court held that one of several coexecutors could not be assessed for property belonging to the estate, but which was in the possession and under the control of the other executors. People v. Tax Com'rs, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 293. But this case was distinguished in People v. Tax Com'rs, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 536, in which it was held that the tax would be assessed to all of three executors, although the property assessed was in the possession and under the control of one acting executor. The court, in the language of Mr. Justice Savage, in Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 616, said: "If a man appoints several executors, they are esteemed in law but as one person representing the testator, and, therefore, the acts done by any one of them, which relate either to the delivery, cost, sale, payment, possession or release of the testator's goods, deemed the acts of all, for they have a joint and entire authority."

are

It has been held that if ancillary administration is granted, the state in which it is so granted may impose a tax on all tangible property situated in the state. Alvany v. Powell, a Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 51. But the property must have actually come to the estate; hence, where a member of a California firm, but a resident of New York, died in the latter state, his executors were held

appointed until after the assessment day, there can be no taxation to him at his residence.1

According to other decisions, the property must be assessed at the last domicile of the deceased, and this has been distinctly claimed to be the rule where no statute prescribing the place exists.3

When the estate has been distributed, the property is taxable at the domicile of the several distributees.4

4. Poll Taxes.-Taxes on polls can be levied only at the domicile of the person taxed, not at a place where he is residing temporarily.5

5. Miscellaneous Taxes.-Occupation and franchise taxes are imposed at the place where the occupation is carried on, or the franchise exercised. The subject of collateral inheritance taxation

is considered elsewhere.7

not taxable in New York before anything was due them from the surviving members of the firm. People v. Coleman, 44 Hun (N. Y.) 20.

A state cannot impose a tax upon property belonging to the estate of a deceased inhabitant, where neither the property nor the executor is within the state; the mere fact that one or more of the beneficiaries resides within the state will not render the property taxable. See Dallinger v. Rapello, 14 Fed. Rep. 32; 15 Fed. Rep. 434, where property held by a non-resident executor, in trust to pay the income for life, to residents of the state, was decided not to be liable to taxation. In Baldwin v. Shine, 84 Ky. 502, under the statute requiring that property shall be listed for assessment by the owner, the court held that stocks and bonds held by an administrator residing within the state would be taxed, although the persons beneficially entitled were non-residents, the administrator being in law the "owner" of such property. So in New Jersey under the statute. State v. Corson, 50 N. J. L. 381.

In Sommers v. Boyd, 48 Ohio St. 648, the court held that under the provisions of the Ohio statute, the situs of moneys, credits, and investments for the purpose of taxation, is the residence of the person who is required to list them; and that an administrator would be required to list credits belonging to the estate of the decedent, in the place where he resided.

As to the rule in Vermont, see Clark v. Powell, 62 Vt. 442.

1. Hayden v. Roe, 66 Wis. 288.
2. San Francisco v. Lux, 64 Cal. 481;

Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 447; McGregor v. Vanpel, 24 Iowa 436. But see Cameron v. Burlington, 56 Iowa 320; Smith v. Northampton Bank, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 1.

In Massachusetts, by statute, the personal estate of a deceased person is taxable only in the town where he last dwelt. Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen (Mass.) 277; Wood v. Torrey, 97 Mass. 321. This is the rule applicable to shares of bank stock. Revere v. Boston, 123 Mass. 375.

3. In Staunton v. Stout, 86 Va. 321, the court said: "The fact that the executors resided in Staunton when the assessment was made does not affect the case. There being no statute in Virginia to the contrary, the situs of the property is at the last domicile of the testator, and there it is taxable, and not elsewhere." See also Bur roughs on Taxation, p. 224; San Francisco v. Lux, 64 Cal. 481.

Notes belonging to the estate of a decedent will be assessed at the place where the decedent had his domicile. Stephens v. Booneville, 34 Mo. 323.

4. Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 447; Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen (Mass.) 277; Herrick v. Big Rapids, 53 Mich. 554; State v. Leggett, 40 N. J. L. 308; Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 51. Even if the administrator's account has not been settled. Carlton v. Ashburnham, 102 Mass. 348.

5. State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517. And see supra, this title, Things TaxablePolls.

6. See supra, this title, Occupation, Business, and Privilege Taxes.

7. SUCCESSION TAXES, vol. 24, p.

431.

IX. EXEMPTIONS-1. Power to Exempt.-In absence of constitutional restrictions, the power of the legislature to exempt classes of property or persons from taxation is unquestionable. It has generally been held that the constitutional provisions requiring equality and uniformity in taxation by the legislature do not prohibit the exemption of certain classes from the general law, the rule of equality and uniformity applying only to such objects as may have been selected by the legislature for taxation, and the fact that other species or classes of property are exempt, not violating the rule.2

1. Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 451; Scotland County v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 123; Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Williamson v. Massey, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 240; Probasco v. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 506; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; 60 Am. Dec. 581; Christ Church v. Philadelphia County, 24 How. (U. S.) 300; Wells v. Central Vt. R. Co., 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 426; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 36. See also Indianapolis v. Sturdevant, 24 Ind. 391.

Restrictions.

-

Constitutional The Louisiana constitution of 1879, art. 207, provided, "the following property shall be exempt from taxation and no other: viz., all public property, places of religious worship," etc., etc. So it was provided by the constitution of Kentucky that "no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And under this provision, the exemption of the board of trade from taxation was held unconstitutional. Barbour v. Louisville Board of Trade, 82 Ky. 645.

Thus, in Iowa it was provided by the constitution that corporations should be subject to the same taxation as individuals. Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County,21 Iowa 227; Dubuque v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Iowa 196.

In Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289, it was held that a constitutional provision that all real property, with a certain exception, should be subject to taxation, precluded the legislature from exempting other real property. See also Hogg v. Mackey (Oregon, 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 779. As to the Missouri provision, see State v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; Life Assoc. v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512.

Where the state constitutions provide the general classes of property

which may be exempted, such as charities, property devoted to educational and eleemosynary purposes, etc., the legislature can make no exemptions outside of such specified classes. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 19 W. Va. 408; Hogg v. Mackey (Oregon, 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 779; Croisan 7. Hogg (Oregon, 1893), 31 Pac. Rep. 782. And the provision that all property shall be taxed precludes exemption by the legislature. Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines, 3 Tenn. Ch. 604; Ellis v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 530; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; State v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; New Orleans v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 756; Chattanooga v. Nashville, etc., R. Co.,. 7 Lea (Tenn.) 561.

2. M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. L. 177; Hodgson v. New Orleans, 21 La. Ann. 301; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434; Louisiana Cotton Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 440; High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal. 363; Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Levee Com'rs, 37 Fed. Rep. 24; Williams v. Rees, 2 Fed. Rep. 882; State v. Winnebago Lake, etc., Co., 11 Wis. 42; Green Bay, etc., Canal Co. v. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587; Athens v. Long, 59 Ga. 330; Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93; People v. Auditor Gen'l, 7 Mich. 84; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; State Bank v. New Albany, 11 Ind. 139; Connorsville v. State Bank, 16 Ind. 105; King v. Machsin, 17 Ind. 48; State v. Collins, 43 N. J. L. 562; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209; Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 56 Miss. 40; New Orleans v. Davidson, 30 La. Ann. 555; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 86; New Orleans v. Fourchy, 30 La. Aun. 910; New Orleans v. Klein, 26 La. Ann. 493; Reynolds v. Police Jury, 44 La. Ann. 863; State v. Poydras, 9 La. Ann. 165; New Orleans v. Ken

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