struction is placed upon the ground that such an assessment is not properly a tax, but a majority hold that no other reason is necessary for confining the exemption to other taxes than assessments for benefits, than the general principle that exemptions are to be construed strictly.1 c. RESTRICTED TO EXEMPT USES.-Where a statute exempts from taxation property devoted to religious, educational, or other purposes, or exempts the property of a corporation, the exemption will be confined in the former case to property used exclusively for such purposes; in the latter, to property necessary to the objects of the company's incorporation.2 It has been held that when any part of the property is devoted to other than the In St. Joseph v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 39 Mo. 476, it was held that an exemption from county and state taxes, did not exempt from city taxes. “In Louisiana, an unqualified exemption from taxation during the period of fifty years' was held to imply an immunity from municipal as well as state taxes. When the sovereign emancipates, he does so munificently.' Per Bermudez, C. J. New Orleans v. Carondelet Canal, etc., Co., 36 La. Ann. 396. Yes, but to no greater extent than he plainly expresses." 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), § 776, n. But where the exemption was from any charge or tax whatsoever," it was held to cover municipal as well as state taxes. Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J. L. 557. And so of an exemption " from all taxation of any kind except as herein provided for." Neustadt v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 31 Ill. 484. See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McLean County, 17 Ill. 291. And where the exemption was worded as follows: "in lieu of all taxes which may hereafter become due from said company in each year as aforesaid under any and all laws of this state," it was held to exempt from county taxes. Neary v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Čo. (Del. 1887), 9 Atl. Rep. 405. In Elizabethtown, etc., R. Co. v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush (Ky.) 236, it was said: "The municipal officers of the town insist that the exemption relied on applies only to taxation by the state for the purpose of raising general revenue. The language quoted implies no exception. To exempt from taxation' means to exempt from all taxation imposed by the authority of the state government, whether for general or local purposes, and municipal tax 2. Kendrick v. Farquhar, S Ohio 189; Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio 110; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 611; South Congregational Meeting House v. Lowell, I Met. (Mass.) 538; Old South Soc. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 378; Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335; Washburn College v. Shawnee County, 8 Kan. 344; St. Mary's College v. Črowl, 10 Kan. 442; Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 214; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Louisville v. Louisville Board of Trade, 90 Ky. 409; St. Peter's Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn. 395; State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 39 Minn. 25; Ramsey County v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Minn. 537; Todd County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 163; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482; St. Paul v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 39 Minn. 113; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Detroit, 81 Mich. 562; Detroit Young Men's Soc. v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 172; Com. v. Mahoning, etc., Mill Co., 129 Pa. St. 360; Appeal of Com. (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 133; New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn. 160; Connecticut Spiritualistic, etc., Assoc. v. East Lyme, 54 Conn. 152; State v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 54 Ga. 423; Wright v. Southwestern R. Co., 64 Ga. 783; State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497; State v. Newark, 26 N. J. L. 519; State v. Haight, 31 N. J. L. 400; State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537; State v. exempt purposes, the whole becomes taxable.1 But the weight of authority seems to be, that there may be a due apportionment of values in the assessment, confining the exemption to so much of the value as that part of the premises used for the privileged purposes represents. 3. Customary Exemptions-a. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.--In many states, property of religious organizations is exempt, the exemption extending uniformly to the property of all religious sects and denominations. The exemption is confined to property actually, Woodruff, 36 N. J. L. 94; State v. Love, 37 N. J. L. 60; State v. Cleaver, 46 N. J. L. 467; State v. Betts, 24 N. J. L. 555; De Soto Bank v. Memphis, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 415; 32 Am. Rep. 530;. Vermont Cent. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493; Frederick County v. Sisters of Charity, 48 Md. 34; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Grand Lodge, etc., 50 Md. 421: Appeal Tax Ct. v. Baltimore Academy, 50 Md. 437; State 7. Board of Assessors, 34 La. Ann. 574; Armand v. Dumas, 28 La. Ann. 403; New Orleans v. Russ, 27 La. Ann. 413; Lee v. New Orleans, 28 La. Ann. 426; State v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 668; Enaut v. McGuire, 36 La. Ann. 804; 51 Am. Rep. 14; Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; 42 Am. Rep. 589; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698; First M. E. Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 482. In addition to these cases, many instances illustrative of the principle will be found under the subsections of this article upon Educational, Religious, Eleemosynary, etc., Exemptions. Thus, under an exemption of property devoted to religious purposes, buildings used partly for religious and partly for secular purposes are not exempt. Detroit Young Men's Soc. v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 172. Nor would a residence belonging to a college, when rented to one of its professors, fall within an educational exemption, although it seems it would be otherwise if the right to occupy the building formed a part of the professor's emoluments. Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 611. Compare Kendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189. But in State v. Leester, 29 N. J. L. 541, where the charter of a library association was very full and explicit, exempting in express terms all the stocks and estate, real or personal, which should become vested in the association, the court reluctantly held that an entire building was exempt which was used only in part by the association, the remainder being leased for stores and other purposes. Permanent Improvements upon Land. The exemption of lands from taxation necessarily embraces also an exemption of the permanent improvements thereon, used for the purposes contemplated in the charter of the corporation. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Baltimore Cemetery Co., 50 Md. 432; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251; Hardy v. Waltham, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 108; Matheny v. Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361; Kumler v. Traber, 5 Ohio St. 442. 1. Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335; Red v. Johnson, 53 Tex. 284; St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. 451; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698. 2. State v. Board of Assessors, 34 La. Ann. 574; Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 212; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Grand Lodge, etc., 50 Md. 422; Frederick County v. Sisters of Charity, 48 Md. 34; St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors of Taxes, 12 R. I. 19; 34 Am. Rep. 597; County Com'rs v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 497. And see instances given under the sub-heads, Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious Exemptions, etc. 3. New Hampshire.-In Franklin St. Soc. v. Manchester, 60 N. H. 342, it was held that the constitution of New Hampshire does not exempt church property from taxation. In Connecticut, it has been held that society should be local in its nature. Mauresa Institute υ. Norwalk, 61 Conn. 228. Leased Property.-In Hebrew Free School Assoc. v. New York, 99 N. Y. 488, it was held that property used by a religious society, of which it was simply the lessee and not the owner, is not exempt from taxation. And so in People v. Anderson, 117 Ill. 50, where the property was owned by an individual. exclusively, and directly used for religious purposes, and cannot be extended to that used for secular objects. Thus, a general exemption of property devoted to religious purposes does not exempt a parsonage. When a church ceases to be used as a place See also Salem Marine Soc. v. Salem, 155 Mass. 329. But see Howell v. City, 1 Leg. Gaz. (Pa.) 242, where a leased church was held exempt. In New York, it has been held that it is only an incorporated society that is entitled to exemption. Church of St. Monica v. New York, 119 N. Y. 91. Exemption of Church Property Purchased After Assessment.-Property held not exempt for the current year. First Congregational Church v. Linn County, 70 Iowa 396. A Jewish synagogue has been held entitled to the exemption. Shaarai Berocho v. New York (Supreme Ct.), 18 N. Y. Supp. 792. 1. Trinity Church v. New York, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 138; Congregation v. New York (Supreme Ct.), I N. Y. Supp. 35; Young Men's Christian Assoc. v. New York, 113 N. Y. 187; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 492; Lefevre v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Mulroy v. Churchman, 60 Iowa 717; Kirk 7. St. Thomas' Church, 70 Iowa 287; Frederick County v. Sisters of Charity, 48 Md. 41; Connecticut Spiritualist, etc., Assoc. v. East Lyme, 54 Conn. 152; Mauresa Institute v. Norwalk, 61 Conn. 228; Green Bay, etc., Canal Co. v. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587; Old South Soc. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 379. Thus, where part of a building is rented for other purposes, it is taxable, though the profits be applied to religious purposes. First M. E. Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 482; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; South Congregational Meeting House v. Lowell, Met. (Mass.) 538. So land separated from the lot upon which the church edifice stands and not necessary to the use of the church, is not exempt. Boston Soc., etc., v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 492. Personal Property.-Money invested in bonds is not exempt, though the income is applied to the support of the church. Presbyterian Church v. Montgomery County, 3 Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 245; Appeal Tax Ct. v. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 345. But in Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; 16 Am. Dec. 46, it was held that such money was exempt under the wording of the Connecticut statute. See, however, First Ecclesiastical Soc. v. Hartford, 38 Conn. 278. And so in New Jersey, State v. Silverthorn, 52 N. J. L. 73, where a mortgage held by a church as security was held exempt. An occasional secular use will not deprive the property of its exemption. St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 307; Ramsey County v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 229. Land upon which a church is erecting, or intends immediately to erect, a house of worship, is exempt. Trinity Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164; Washington, etc., Church v. New York, 20 Hun (N. Y.) 297; St. James Church v. New York, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 309. But in Pennsylvania, it has been held otherwise. Erie County v. Bishop, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 509; Mullen v. Erie County, 85 Pa. St. 288. And in Massachusetts, the work must have been begun upon the church edifice to entitle it to the exemption. Boston Soc., etc., v. Boston, 129 Mass. 182. Janitor Residing on Premises.- Where a janitor resided on the premises, paying no rent, the property was still held entitled to the exemption under the New York statute. Shaarai Berocho v. New York (Supreme Ct.),18 N. Y. Supp. 792. But where the basement of a synagogue was used for baths, the synagogue deriving profit from them, the property was held not exempt. Congregation v. New York (Supreme Ct.), 1 N. Y. Supp. 35. 2. St. Peter's Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn. 395; Hennepin County v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503; St. Mark's Church v. Brunswick, 78 Ga. 541; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229; State v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117; State v. Lyon, 32 N. J. L. 360; State v. Krollman, 38 N. J. L. 574; M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; First Presbyterian Church v. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 259; 31 Am. Rep. 224. And this is true though religious services are held in the parsonage. Ramsey County v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 229: St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors of Taxes, 12 R. I. 19; 34 Am. Rep. 597. of religious worship, its exemption from taxation ipso facto ceases.1 Sometimes the salaries of ministers of the gospel are exempt in whole or in part from taxation.2 b. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.-In general, an exemption of educational institutions from taxation will not be extended to school property used for private gain merely, and entirely devoid of a public or charitable character. And in some states the exemption applies only to those schools which are established, maintained, and regulated by the state. Ordinarily, however, the property of schools or colleges which are not established or maintained with the object of private or corporate gain, is exempt. The mere use or occupancy for school or educational purposes of the property of a private owner, sustaining merely the relation of lessor to a school or seminary, does not create an exemption in his favor. Unless the terms of the statute. Bishop's Residence.-In Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 214, a bishop's residence owned by the diocese was held not exempt. But in Bishop's Residence v. Hudson, 91 Mo. 671, the bishop's house was held exempt as used for purposes purely charitable. Parsonage Held Exempt.-If, however the legislative intent to include parsonages within the exemption can be clearly shown, they will, of course, be exempt. See Gray v.. La Fayette County, 65 Wis. 567. 1. Moore v. Taylor, 147 Pa. St. 481; New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn. 160; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; 4 Am. Rep. 41; Old South Soc. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 378. See also Black v. Brooklyn, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 581. 2. As to what ministers are entitled to these exemptions, see Prosser v. Secor, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 607; People v. Peterson, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 421; Com. v. Cuyler, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 275; Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 29 Pa. St. 226; Ruggles v. Kimball, 12 Mass. 337; Gridley v. Clark, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 403; Plumer v. Com., 3 Gratt. (Va.) 615. 3. Henderson v. McCullagh, 89 Ky. 448; Chicago University 7. People, 118 Ill. 565; Nashville v. Ward, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 27; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229; Indianapolis v. McLean, 8 Ind. 328; Chegaray v. New York, 13 N. Y. 220; Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17. But in Minnesota a private institution has been held exempt under a general exemption of institutions of learning. Nelson v. Stryker Seminary (Minn. 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1133. In State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497, it was held that under the New Jersey statute as it was then, a private institution was entitled to exemption; but under the present statute, unless school buildings are rented by the owner they are exempt. State v. Chamberlain (N. J. 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 913. So in Indianapolis v. Sturdevant, 24 Ind. 391, it was held that a school conducted as a private enterprise was exempt under the general exemption of institutions of learning. Compare the earlier case of Indianapolis v. McLean, 8 Ind. 32S. 4. Association of Colored Orphans v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 186. See also People v. Ryan (Ill. 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 694. So where the exemption was of 66 buildings for free public schools," it was held not to include parochial schools furnishing gratuitous instruction. St. Joseph's Church v. Assessor of Taxes, 12 R. I. 19; 34 Am. Rep. 597. 5. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 15 Pa. St. 565; Dickinson College v. Cumberland County, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 70; Northampton County 7. Lafayette College (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 516; Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599; Griswold College v. State, 6 Iowa 275; Detroit Home, etc., School v. Detroit, 76 Mich. 521; Hennepin County v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 216. Medical Colleges.-In Omaha Medical College v. Rush, 22 Neb. 449, a medical college was held a school, and as such, entitled to the Nebraska exemption. Compare People v. Campbell, 93 N. Y. 196. 6. People v. Board of Assessors, 32 Exemptions. are explicit to the contrary, a general exemption of the property of educational institutions will be confined to property actually and exclusively used by the institution for its legitimate purposes. If the property is used for other purposes, the fact Hun (N. Y.) 457; aff'd, 97 N. Y. 648; Hennepin County v. Bell, 43 Minn. 344; Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17; Armand v. Dumas, 28 La. Ann. 403. Compare Nazareth Literary, etc., Institute v. Com., 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 266. In Laurent v. Muscatine, 59 Iowa 404, it is held that where the legal title is in a private individual, the property is not exempt from taxation as a school. Personal Property. In Williston Seminary v. Hampshire County, 147 Mass. 427, it was held that the exemption of the personal property of the seminary of learning from taxation, included all personal property belonging to state institutions, whether in or out of possession; and that, where property is bequeathed to a seminary of learning to be held in trust as an accumulating fund, the right of interest of the seminary therein is properly described as its property, and is exempt from taxation. The Missouri exemption has been held not to extend to personal property not fixtures. Kansas v. Kansas City Medical College, 111 Mo. 141. 1. Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202; University of the South v. Skidmore, 87 Tenn. 155. The charter of a university provided that "all corporate property belonging to the institution, both real and personal, is, and shall be, free from taxation." It was held that this exempted all property which the university might lawfully acquire, whether actually used and occupied by it or not. State v. Hamline University (Minn. 1891), 48 N. W. Rep. 1119. The property, situated in Nashville, of the Davidson Academy, incorporated in 1785, and exempted for ninetynine years from taxation, is exempt in the hands of those holding by purchase from the trustees. State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 594. 2. Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio 110; St. James Educational Institute v. Salem, 153 Mass. 185; Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335; Washburn College v. Shawnee County, 8 Kan. 344; Ottawa University 7. Franklin County (Kan. 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 599; County Com'rs v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 497; State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 166 497; State v. Board of Assessors, 36 La. Ann. 347. Compare Northwestern University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; State v. New Brunswick (N. J. 1892), 25 Atl. Rep. 853; Ramsey County v. Macalester College, 51 Minn. 437; St. Edward's College v. Morris, 82 Tex. 1; Stewart v. Davis, 3 Murph. (N. Car.) 244; Presbyterian Theological Seminary v. People, 101 Ill. 578. Where buildings are exempt, the land upon which they stand is also exempt. Cassiano v. Ursuline Academy, 64 Tex. 673. Lease of School Building.-A lease of the school building during vacation will not subject it to taxation. Temple Grove Seminary v. Cramer, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 309; aff'd 98 N. Y. 121. Farms.-Farms, the products of which are used for the support of the school, have been held not exempt in the folSt. Edward's College v. lowing cases: Morris, 82 Tex. 1; Thiel College v. Mercer County, 101 Pa. St. 530; St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. 442. In the latter case, some of the products were sold, and the court intimated that but for that, the farm might have been exempt. In Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599; People v. Barber, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 27; Monticello Female Seminary v. People, 106 Ill. 398; 46 Am. Rep. 702; and State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 233, a different conclusion was arrived at in view of the exemption statutes under consideration, and farms used by schools and colleges for the support of the institution, and the pleasure and improvement of the pupils, were held exempt. Use or Ownership the Test. The use to which the property is put, not the ownership, is the test by which to determine whether it is exempt. WashCrowl, burn College v. Shawnee County, 8 Kan. 344; St. Mary's College v. 10 Kan. 442; Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; 42 Am. Rep. 589. But in Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, it was held that ownership, not use, was the test under the Vermont statute. Professors' Residences.-In Hendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189, and Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 611, a pro |