fessor's residence erected on the land of the institution of learning was held not exempt. In the latter case it was intimated that if the college had not rented the house to the professor, but had permitted him to occupy it in part return for his services, it would have been exempt; and it was held in Northampton County v. Lafayette College (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 516; Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275; and so in State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497; Ramsey County v. Macalester College, 51 Minn. 437, that professors' residences owned by the college were exempt.

Use of Part of the Building as a Residence for Teachers.-A building used by the owner as a family residence, was held not exempt as one used exclusively for school purposes, although the main building was a school, and the owner and family were all engaged in the school as teachers or pupils. Red v. Johnson, 53 Tex. 284. But see Red v. Morris, 72 Tex. 554, where the same property, under slightly different circumstances, was held exempt.

And the occupation of the top floor of a building, otherwise entirely devoted to furnishing instruction to scholars, by teachers having immediate charge of the school, will not deprive it of the exemption. St. Monica v. New York, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 160. See also Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202.

In Blackman v. Houston, 39 La. Ann. 592, it was held that the fact that the owner and principal of a school lives upon the premises with his family, does not forfeit the property's right to exemption.

Dormitories and Boarding Houses.-In Northampton County v. Lafayette College (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 516, the college dormitories were held exempt. And see Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, where certain buildings occupied as a students' boarding-house, professor's residence, and students' club-house were held exempt.

1. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 202; Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio

110; Cleveland Library Assoc. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253; Wagner's Free Inst., etc., Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 555; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 193; Ottawa University v. Franklin County (Kan. 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 599; Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445; State v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 668; State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497; County Com'rs v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 497; Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 154 Mass. 15.

But in North St. Louis Gymnastic Soc. v. Hudson, 12 Mo. App. 342; aff'd 85 Mo. 32, a school building exempted from taxation "so long as it is used only for the purposes of education," was held not to be made taxable by the renting of a room therein for other purposes, where the proceeds thereof were used exclusively for the benefit of the school.

The charter of a school provided that it might "receive, hold, or convey any estate, real or personal, that may be conveyed to it, or that it now possesses, and said property while so used for the promotion of science, shall be free from taxation." This was held to include property, the income of which alone was used by the school. New Haven v. Sheffield Scientific School, 59 Conn. 163.

2. Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 212; People v. Board of Assessors, 27 Hun (N. Y.) 559; Young Men's Christian Assoc. v. Donohugh, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 12; Baltimore v. Grand Lodge, 60 Md. 280; Frederick County v. Sisters of Charity, 48 Md. 34; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698; Detroit Young Men's Soc. v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 172; Philadelphia v. Ladies, etc., Soc., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 346.

An intention at some future time to occupy the land is not sufficient. Boston Soc., etc., v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178. See also Enaut v. McGuire, 36 La. Ann. 804; 51 Am. Rep. 14. Šo disused property is subject to taxation. Philadelphia v. Jewish Hospital Assoc. (Pa. 1892), 23 Atl. Rep. 1135.

1. New Orleans v. St. Anna's Asylum, 31 La. Ann. 292; New Orleans v. Congregation, etc., of Judah, 15 La. Ann. 390; State v. Board of Assessors, 34 La. Ann. 574; Appeal Tax Ct. v. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 321; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Grand Lodge, etc., 50 Md. 421; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Baltimore Academy, 50 Md. 437; Redemptorists v. Howard County, 50 Md. 449; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Regents of University of Maryland, 50 Md. 457; Fort Des Moines Lodge v. Polk County, 56 Iowa 34; Chapel of the Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212; Indianapolis v. Grand Master, 25 Ind. 518; Cleveland Library Assoc. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 258; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698. Compare New Orleans Female Orphan Asylum v. Houston, 37 La. Ann. 68. But see People v. Purdy, (Supreme Ct.), 12 N. Y. Supp. 307, and Mt. Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, where farms, the products of which were used in the charitable institutions, were held exempt. And see also State v. Chatham Tp., 52 N. J. L. 373.

2. What Institutions are Purely of Public Charity.-A hospital maintained by voluntary gifts, and not conducted for profit, though some of the patients pay, was held an institution of purely public charity, in Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 72; aff'd 154 Pa. St. 9; Hennepin County v. Gethsemane Brotherhood, 27 Minn. 460; 38 Am. Rep. 298; Hennepin County v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503; State v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263; Applications Against Certain Lots (Minn. 1881), 8 N. W. Rep. 595. See also Philadelphia v. Women's Christian Assoc., 125 Pa. St. 572; and compare In re Vanderbilt's Estate (Surrogate's Ct.), 10 N. Y. Supp. 239. But a hospital long disused is not exempt. Philadelphia v. Jewish Hospital Assoc. (Pa. 1892), 23 Atl. Rep. 1135. An orphan asylum, Burd Orphan Asylum v. School Dist., 90 Pa. St. 21; an asylum for destitute men and women, Humph ries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201; Gerke v. Purcell, 25

Ohio St. 229; Cincinnati College υ. State, 19 Ohio 111; St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362; a parochial school, Hennepin County v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503; and a church publishing house, Book Agents, etc. v. Hinton (Tenn. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 321, have been held institutions of purely public charity; and so a publie library, Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 306; Cleveland Library Assoc. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253; though it is otherwise where the benefits are confined to its members. Delaware County Inst. v. Delaware County, 94 Pa. St. 163.

What are Not Institutions of Purely Public Charity.-In Illinois, it has been held that the statute of that state exempting such institutions, applies only to corporations created under the laws of Illinois. People v. Western Seaman's Friend Soc., 87 Ill. 246.

Lands devised to trustees to appropriate the annual products to the erection of a poorhouse and the support of its inmates, are not exempt. Academy of Richmond v. Bohler (Ga. 1887), 7 S. E. Rep. 633.

An academy supported by tuition fees, though free scholarships are established with part of its surplus income, Philadelphia's Appeal (Pa. 1888), 15 Atl. Rep. 683; and an incorporated college, whose chief object is to furnish education at a reasonable rate, but without granting absolutely free tuition, and into which neither the public nor any class has an absolute right of admission, are not exempt. Thiel College v. Mercer County, 101 Pa. St. 530; Northampton County v. Lafayette College (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 516.

Charities Confined to a Class-Mutual

Benefit Associations. The question

whether an association which confines its benefits only to its own members or a particular class, is a purely public charity, is a subject of conflict. In Ohio, in Morning Star Lodge v. Hayslip, 23 Ohio St. 144, it was held not to be. So in Pennsylvania, in Delaware County Inst. v. Delaware County, 94 Pa. St. 163, an institute of science which con

fined its benefits to its own members, was held not a purely public charity. See also Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 306, where it is said: "The essential features of a public charity are that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite, unrestricted quality that gives it its public character.' But in Burd Orphan Asylum v. School Dist., 90 Pa. St. 21, a divided court held an orphan asylum, which preferred children of a certain denomination, though admitting all, to be a purely public charity. Compare Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 151; 28 Am. Dec. 650.

A masonic lodge was said not to be a purely public charity in Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428; 40 Am. Rep. 369. And see Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 212.

1. Masonic lodges have been held entitled to exemption from taxation as charities, under the statutes of several of the states. Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge, 53 Ga. 93; Indianapolis v. Grand Master, 25 Ind. 518; State v. Board of Assessors, 34 La. Ann. 574; State v. Addison, 2 S. Car. 499.

But it was held otherwise in Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428; 40 Am. Rep. 369. And see Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 212.

utual benefit insurance associations

have been held not entitled to exemption as charitable organizations in Matter of Jones' Estate, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 603; Lee Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. State, 60 Miss. 395. But the Virginia court arrived at a different conclusion in Petersburg v. Petersburg Ben., etc., Assoc., 78 Va. 431; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 484. As to whether they are purely public charities," see the preceding

note.

66

“Charitable" and Benevolent Institutions." It may be difficult to say what a benevolent institution' is if it differs from one that is merely charitable." Maine Baptist, etc., Convention v. Portland, 65 Me. 92. See also Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen (Mass.) 446; Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267. Compare Thomson v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 524

A society for the prevention of cruelty to animals is a benevolent and charitable institution within the Massachusetts statutes exempting such institutions from taxation. Massachusetts Soc. v. Boston, 142 Mass. 24.

A biblical institute supported entirely by donations, is a benevolent institution, and is exempt under the statute. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Grand Lodge, etc., 50 Md. 442.

Vacant lots bought by the authorities of a church and held in private ownership in anticipation of the increase of the city and with the intention of possibly erecting thereon a church, school, or hospital when needed, were not exempt from taxation as a place of "public worship" or a "charitable institution." Enaut v. McGuire, 36 La. Ann. 804; 51 Am. Rep. 14. See also Boston Soc., etc. v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178.

v.

Missionary Societies. It has been repeatedly decided that missionary societies, foreign or domestic, are, in a legal sense, charitable institutions. Maine Baptist, etc., Convention Portland, 65 Me. 92; Tappan v. Dublois, 45 Me. 122; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Me. 552; Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 325; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 537; 7 Am. Dec. 99; Sohier v. St. Paul's Church, 12 Met. (Mass.) 250; First Universalist Soc. v. Fitch, 8 Gray (Mass.) 421; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539; Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107; 26 Am. Dec. 645.

Almshouses. In Association for Colored Orphans v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 146, it was held that the New York statute exempting almshouses, was not confined to almshouses owned by the public. And in Western Dispensary v. New York (Super. Ct.), 4 N. Y. Supp. 547, the building of an association extending gratuitous medical and surgical aid, and used as a hospital for the indigent sick, was held an almshouse. And see also New York Infant Asylum v. Westchester County, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 116; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 311. Compare In re Vaň

derbilt's Estate (Surr. Ct.), 10 N. Y. Supp. 242.

A social club was held entitled to the exemption under the Missouri statute. State v. Lesueur (Mo. 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 237.

Property Held in Trust.-Where a statute exempted the property of a charitable or scientific institution from taxation, it was held that the exemption did not apply to property held in trust by such an institution for an object foreign to the purposes of its incorporation. Salem-Marine Soc. v. Salem, 155 Mass. 329.

Leased ground occupied by a charitable corporation, although for its charitable purposes, is not exempt, even though the lease provides that the lessees (the corporation) shall pay the taxes. Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201.

An Exemption from Local Taxation will not Exempt Property from State Taxes. By a special act the Christian Home for Intemperate Men is exempted from local taxation or other purposes. This has been held not to exempt it from state taxation; and, therefore, a bequest to the institution is subject to the succession tax. In re Vanderbilt's Estate (Surr. Ct.), 10 N. Y. Supp. 240.

1. State v. North Bergen, 43 N. J. L. 146. But in People v. Graceland Cemetery Co., 86 Ill. 337, property not used for burial purposes was held not entitled to exemption. And so grouud rented to a sexton to use as a residence and garden, was held not exempt. State v. Lange, 16 Mo. App. 468.

In Mulroy Churchman, 60 Iowa 717, it was held that an appropriation of one acre in forty to burial purposes, would not give exemption to the whole tract. But in Pennsylvania, where

the cemetery is used as a source of profit, it is not exempt. Brown v. Pittsburgh (Pa. 1888), 16 Atl. Rep. 43. So

a

mere dedication or appropriation on paper is not enough. Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass. 354.

Where a city had authorized land to be used as a cemetery, but before any interments were made the ordinance was revoked, the land was still held exempt under the New York statute, it being of such a character that it could not be used for other purposes. People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68.

2. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Baltimore Cemetery Co., 50 Md. 432, where a corporation, in addition to its cemetery lands proper, had acquired old burial grounds with the intention of selling them to increase its funds, it was held that such grounds were exempt from taxation under the general exemption of "all property." Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199.

3. See Worcester v. Western R. Co., Met. (Mass.) 564; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 237; Charlestown v. Middlesex County, I Allen (Mass.) 199; Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; 17 Ám. Rep. 159; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Lowell, etc., R. Co., 124 Mass. 368; Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 Pa. St. 242; Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St. 465; 86 Am. Dec. 552; Schuylkill Bridge Co. v. Frailey, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 422; State v. Middle Tp., 38 N. J. L. 270; Vermont Cent. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193.

4. People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 82 N. Y. 460; Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa 112; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McLean County, 17 Ill. 296; Louisville, etc., Canal Co. v. Com., 7 B.

Mon. (Ky.) 160; Ludlow v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co., 78 Ky. 357; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 231; Cumberland Marine R. Co. v. Portland, 37 Me. 444; overruling Bangor, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 21 Me. 533; Providence, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 459; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Bayless, 2 Gill (Md.) 355; Orange, etc., Ř. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 176; Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 160; 2 Redfield on the Law of Railways, 394. See also Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 89.

1. Worcester v. Western R. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 564; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 237; McCulloch v. Stone, 64 Miss. 378; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Moseley, 52 Miss. 127; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 29; Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70; Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St. 465; 86 Am. Dec. 552; Erie County v. Erie, etc., Transp. Co., 87 Pa. St. 437; Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484; State v. Fuller, 40 N. J. L. 328; State v. Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Neary (Del. 1886), 8 Atl. Rep. 363; Wright v. Southwestern R. Co., 64 Ga. 783; Bibb County v. Central R. Co., 40 Ga. 646; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Loftin, 30 Ark. 693; Day v. Joiner, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 441; Ford v. Delta, etc., Land Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 181; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Alamance County, 76 N. Car. 212; 84 N. Car. 504; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 339; Belo v. Forsyth County, 82 N. Car. 415; 33 Am. Rep. 658; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Craw ford County, 29 Wis. 116; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271; State v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 48 Md. 49; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Lafayette, 22 Ind. 262; St. Louis County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 45 Minn. 510; Ramsey County v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Minn. 537; Todd County v. St. Paul. etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 163; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482; St. Paul, etc., R. Co. v. St. Paul (Minn. 1888), 38 N. W. Rep. 925.

Distinction Between Essential Property and that of Mere Convenience.-It has been held that property to be exempt must be essential to the corporation in the conduct of its business, and not a mere convenience. Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J. L. 557; Worcester v.

State v.

Western R. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 564; Vermont Cent. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193; Lehigh Coal, etc., Co. v. Northampton County, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 334; Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452; Todd County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 163; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482.

In State v. Newark, 26 N. J. L. 520, it is said: "The necessary appendages of a railroad and transportation company are one thing, and their appendages which may be convenient means of increasing the advantages and profits of the company, are another thing." But compare State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 545, disapproving State v. Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510. See also State v. Leggett, 41 N. J. L. 319; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford County, 29 Wis. 116.

In determining whether particular property of a railroad company is "necessarily used in operating the road" so as to be exempt under the statute, the question is whether its use is requisite for the full performance of the duty which the company owes to the public as a common carrier. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271.

Canal Property.-As to what canal property has been held necessary to the operation of the canal, see Wayne County v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 15 Pa. St. 351.

Steamboats.

- In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452, steamboats were held not essential to the operation of the road, and, therefore, not exempt. Compare Osborn . Hartford, etc., R. Co., 40 Conn. 498. In State v. Haight, 34 N. J. L. 319, boats used by the company were held essential.

Hotels owned by the railroad and used as a summer resort, are not exempt. State v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 48 Md: 49; State v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (Minn. 1889), 44 N. W. Rep. 63. In Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford County, 48 Wis. 666, it was held that a building used principally for the accommodation of the company's travelers, was exempt under the statute. In Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford County, 29 Wis. 116, an inn was held not exempt, although it was intimated that if it had been kept exclusively for the accommodation of travelers on the road it would have been.