v.

Short spurs and steam shovels were held exempt in Louisville, etc., R. Co. Taylor, 68 Miss. 361. And in State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537, reversing 33 N. J. L. 315, it was held that a short spur and the gravel land to which it led were exempt.

Branch Roads.-The charter of a railroad provided that the road and its appurtenances should be taxed at a certain rate, and that it would be exempt from other taxation. This was held to extend to a branch road. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637. But in Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 687, it was held that the exemption of the main line was not extended to branch roads. Both of these cases turned, however, upon the peculiar wording of the charters and the exemption clauses.

Section Houses.-These were held exempt in Mississippi. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Bradley, 66 Miss. 518.

Elevators.-In Detroit Union Depot, etc., Co. v. Detroit, 88 Mich. 347, and State v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 86 Tenn. 438, elevators were held necessary to the operation of the railroad. But in Re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83; 59 Am. Rep. 789; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. People, 119 Ill. 137, and Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271, a different conclusion was arrived at.

A warehouse used principally for the storage of freight, has been held exempt. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 273. Compare Berks County v. Railroad Co., 6 Pa. St. 70.

Freight and passenger depots have been held exempt as necessary to the enjoyment of the franchise of the company. Northampton Co. υ. Lehigh Coal, etc., Co., 75 Pa. St. 461; Berks County v. Railroad Co., 6 Pa. St. 70. But in Portland, etc., R. Co. v. Saco, 60 Me. 196, it was held that where the exemption was limited to "the track of the road and the land on which it is constructed," railroad depots were not within the exemption.

held not to include the superstructure or improvements. See also Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Yavapia County (Arizona, 1889), 39 Am. & Eng. R. Čas. 543.

In Republican Valley, etc., R. Co. v. Chase County, 33 Neb. 759; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 641, a right of way upon which there was no superstructure, was held subject to assessments under the Nebraska statute. For the construction of an exemption of a "right of way," see Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Almanac, 84 N. Car. 504. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 98 Ill. 351 : 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94.

Timber Lands.-In Todd County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 168; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482, timber lands owned by the company, and furnishing ties and timber for the road, were held not exempt.

Logs Cut For Sale Upon Exempt Lands. In State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 39 Minn. 25, it was held that logs cut from the exempt land of a railroad company, were not themselves exempt.

Water stations have been held exempt. Berks County v. Railroad Co., 6 Pa. St. 70.

"Road, rolling and live stock," will not include the shops, stables, etc., of a street railway company. Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 104.

"Wood yards and machine shops were held not exempt in Berks County v. Railroad Co., 6 Pa. St. 70.

Real Estate.-Under a general exemption of all the property of a railroad, the real estate of a railroad was held exempt. Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Com. v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 81 Va. 355; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482.

Franchises of the Corporation Held to be Exempt under a General Exemption of the Property of the Railroad.—Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 264; Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 269; Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 44; State v. Berry, 17 N. J. L. 80; Camden, etc., R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J. L. 11; Camden, etc., R. Co. v. Com'rs of Appeal, 18 N. J. L. 71. See also Nichols v. New Haven, etc., Co., 42 Conn. 103.

But an exemption of the roadbed, etc., does not exempt the franchise. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 87 N. Car. 129.

1. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Mil

in which the capital is invested and used, and not the purposes for which the company was formed, as expressed in its certificate of incorporation, determines its liability. Press Printing Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 51 N. J. L. 75; State v. State Board, 47 N. J. L. 36. See also Com. v. Arrott Steam Power Mills Co., 145 Pa. St. 69.

Newspaper Publishing and Printing Business.-In State v. Dupre, 42 La. Ann. 561, a newspaper publisher was held within the exemption of "all manufacturers." But in Nicholson v. Parker, 44 La. Ann. 76, he was held not entitled to the benefit of a provision exempting "manufacturers of stationery." And in Press Printing Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 51 N. J. L. 75, a newspaper publisher was held taxable as to the business of publishing the paper, but exempt as to his job printing business.

Louisiana. In Jones v. Raines, 35 La. Ann. 996, a sawmill was held not exempt under article 207 of the Louisiana constitution. So a manufacturer of wire furniture, Gast v. Board of Assessors, 43 La. Ann. 1104; and a manufacturer of shoe-uppers, Ricks v. Board of Assessors, 43 La. Ann. 1075.

The production of rice flour does not bring the producer within the exemption allowed to property "employed in the manufacture of flour." State v. Board of Assessors, 34 La. Ann. 574. So the exemption of property employed in the manufacture of articles of wood, does not apply to articles of wood which are not ready for immediate use without further manipulation, such as cabins and planks; but does apply to doors, sashes, blinds, etc. Carrie v. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 996. A cooper is exempt under this provision. New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 34 La. Ann. 596. But vessels used to convey timber for sawmill purposes are not exempt. Martin v. New Orleans, 38 La. Ann. 397; 58 Am. Rep. 194. See also Carpenter v. Brusle (La. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 483; Whitecastle Lumber, etc., Co. Browne (La. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 485; Plaquemine, etc., Imp. Co. v. Browne (La. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 485; Robertson υ. New Orleans (La. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 753.

υ.

Under the exemption of "property employed in the manufacture of textile products," property used in the manufacture of cordage, ropes, etc., is exempt, Waterbury v. Atlas Steam Cordage

Co., 42 La. Ann. 725; Hernsheim v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co., 42 La. Ann. 726; but this does not exempt one engaged in the manufacture of clothing and jeans. Cohn v. Parker, 41 La. Ann. 894.

And see upon the construction of this article 207, Benedict v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 793; Taylor Bros. Iron Works Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 554; Smith v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 91.

Ship Building and Repairing.-A corporation incorporated "for the purpose of constructing and using docks for the repairing, building, etc., of vessels," is not exempt under the New York statutes. People v. New York Floating Dry Dock, 92 N. Y. 487.

Gas Companies.-A gas company has been held to be a manufacturing corporation within the New York statute. Nassau Gas Light Co. v. Brooklyn, 25 Hun (N. Y.) 567; aff'd 89 N. Y. 409. But in Covington Gas Light Co. v. Covington, 84 Ky. 94, it was held otherwise. See also Newport Light Co. v. Newport, 89 Ky. 454.

In Pennsylvania, gas companies have been held exempt in West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Pa. St. 232, and Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester County, 97 Pa. St. 476, upon the ground that they were public corporations, and therefore not subject to taxation. See supra, this title, Railroads. Compare Com. v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 75. But see section 20 of Pennsylvania Acts of 1875, expressly excluding gas companies from the benefit of the exemption of manufacturing corporations. Held constitutional in Com. v. German Brewing Co. (Pa. 1891), 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 262.

In Williams v. Rees, 2 Fed. Rep. 882, a gas company was held not a manufacturing corporation.

Electric Light Companies.-An electric light company was held exempt as a manufacturing corporation in People v. Wemple, 129 N. Y. 543, 664. See also Beggs v. Edison Electric Light Co. (Ala. 1892), 11 So. Rep. 381.

In Com. v. Northern Electric Light, etc., Co., 145 Pa. St. 105,such a company was held not exempt under the Pennsyl vania statute. Com. v. Edison Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 131.

A mining company was held 'not a manufacturing corporation within the New York statute in Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305;

aff'd 105 N. Y. 76. See also Byers . Franklin Coal Co., 106 Mass. 131, and Greenville Ice, etc., Co. v. Greenville, 69 Miss. 86.

Produce of the State.-An exemption of articles manufactured from the produce of a state is held not to preclude a privilege tax upon the sale of liquors. Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134.

Organized Exclusively for Manufacturing Purposes.-The Pennsylvania statute of 1889 exempts corporations "organized exclusively for manufacturing purposes and actually carrying on manufacturing within the state." This was held not to include a corporation having powers to engage in coal mining, quarrying and manufacturing; Com. v. Lackawanna Iron, etc., Co., 129 Pa. St. 346; Com. v. Thomas Iron Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 654; nor a corporation authorized to speculate in the securities of other companies. Com. v. Westinghouse Electric, etc., Co., 151 Pa. St. 265.

But where a company has invested a part of its capital stock in property not used for manufacturing purposes, an apportionment may be made. Com. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 151 Pa. St. 276.

In Com. 7. Mann, 150 Pa. St. 64, reversing 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 290, it was held that where a corporation was partly engaged in other business, it was not wholly exempt, but that a tax would be apportioned.

An iron corporation leasing a mine in another state was held not exempt. Com. v. Copley Iron Co., 11 Pa. Co, Ct. Rep. 295. And in Com. v. East Bangor, etc., Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 363, it was held that a quarrying company which has invested part of its capital stock in quarry lands, is not exempt. The corporation must be bona fide engaged in manufacturing, and where it appeared that, though organized as a manufacturing corporation, it merely supplied steam to its tenants in order to rent its rooms more readily,

it

was held not exempt. Com. v.

Arrott Steam Power Mills Co., 145 Pa. St. 69.

1. People v. Horn Silver Min. Co., 105 N. Y. 76; aff'd 143 U. S. 305; State v. American Glucose Co. (N. J. 1886), 15 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 112; Norton Naval Constr. Co. v. State Board (N. J.), 53 N. J. L. 564; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 268; Standard Underground Cable Co. v. Attorney General, 46 N. J. Eq. 270; 19 Am. St. Rep. 394; State v. State Board of Assessors, 54 N. J. L. 430.

But in People v. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 323; 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 626, it was held that a foreign corporation doing business in New York, although the greater portion is done in another state, was within the exemption. By chapter 353 of the New York Laws of 1889, the exemption was restricted to corporations "wholly engaged in carrying on manufacturing within the state." See also People v. Wemple, 138 N. Y. 582.

2. Appeal of Com. (Pa. 1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 133. Buildings erected by manufacturing companies for their employés are not exempt. Com. v. Mahoney, etc., Mill Co., 129 Pa. St. 360. See also West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Pa. St. 232.

In Franklin Needle Co. v. Franklin, 65 N. H. 177, realty bought for the purpose of erecting a manufactory was held to be exempt within New Hampshire Gen. Laws, ch. 53. § 10.

A manufacturing company which withdraws from business with the intention of abandonment, is not doing business within the state. State v. State Board of Assessors (N. J. 1892), 25 Atl. Rep. 329.

An exemption of corporations having fifty per cent. of their capital stock employed in the manufacturing business, cannot be objected to on the ground that part of the capital stock is employed in disposing of the manufactured product of the plant. In re Consolidated Electric Storage Co. (N. J. 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 983.