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manufacture of other articles, intimately connected with the principal business.1

As long as the factory exists and the property and machinery are dedicated to the exempt purposes, the exemption continues, though there may be temporary interruptions in the operation of the factory. But where a lease is made of the property for the purpose of closing the factory, in order to limit production and prevent competition, the right to exemption is forfeited.2

g. STOCK-(See also CORPORATIONS, vol. 4, p. 272d).-Upon the question whether an exemption of the corporate property, franchises,or capital stock from taxation, exempts also the shares of stock in the hands of the stockholders, there has been some conflict. The determination of the question depends, in each case, largely upon the words used by the legislature in the charter or statute granting the exemption.3

On the other hand, it is very generally held that an exemption

1. State v. Board of Assessors, 41 La. L. 484; State v. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; Ann. 534State v. Jones, 38 N. J. L. 83.

In case a manufacturer of harness and saddlery, who carries with his stock of manufactured goods a small assortment of other articles, not manufactured by him, but which constitute a necessary accessory to his business, has been once assessed, and has paid the tax on such property, an additional assessment will be annulled, as one made on property which is nontaxable, under Louisiana Const., art. 207, exempting from taxation the product of materials employed in the manufacture of harness and saddlery. Smith v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 91.

2. Waterbury v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co., 42 La. Ann. 723; Hernsheim v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co., 42 La. Ann. 726.

Duration.

The statute authorizing towns to exempt manufacturing property from taxation for a term not exceeding ten years, does not confer authority to exempt the same property for a second period of ten years. Boody v. Watson, 63 N. H. 320; Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; State v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Houst. (Del.) 99; Cook on Stock and Stockholders (2d ed.), § 568.

3. Cases in which the Exemption was Held to Extend to the Shares.-Where the property of an incorporated company, or the company itself, is by its charter exempted from taxation, the shares of the company in the hands of the stockholders are also exempted from the same taxation. State v. Powers, 24 N. J. L. 400; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. 25 C. of L.-12

177

A bank charter provided that the corporation should pay "to the treasury of this commonwealth, twenty-five cents on each one hundred dollars of stock held and paid for in said bank, which shall be in full of all tax or bonus." This was held to exempt the stockholders from a tax upon the shares. Johnson v. Com., 7 Dana (Ky.) 338.

In Gordon v. Appeal Tax Čt., 3 How. (U.S.) 147, it was held that the exemption of a bank from "any further tax or burden" exempted the shares of stock.

The charter of a railroad company provided that, "all machines, wagons, vehicles, and carriages purchased with the funds of the company, and all their works constructed under the authority of this act, and all profits which shall accrue from the same, shall be vested in the respective shareholders of the company forever in proportion to their respective shares, and the same shall be deemed personal estate and shall be exempt from any public charge or tax whatsoever." This was held to exempt the shares of stock of the respective shareholders. Com. v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., Si Va. 355; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482. See also Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604.

In Tennessee v. Whitworth, 22 Fed. Rep. 75, aff 'g 117 U. S. 139, it was held that a provision that "the capital stock of said company shall be forever exempt from taxation, and the road, with all its fixtures and appurtenances," exempted the shares, the court saying,

of the shares of stock from taxation, exempts the corporate property, franchises, and capital stock.1

"Each share is a part of the whole, and as the whole is exempt from taxation it follows that each part or share must be exempt." See also New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265.

In Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, the bank charter provided that the bank "shall pay to the state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on each share of the capital stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes." It was held that the words "in lieu of all other taxes," as thus used, meant, in lieu of all other taxes that might be imposed on that subject of taxation, viz., the shares of the capital stock; and that, accordingly, it excluded a tax on those shares assessed upon them against the individual shareholder as his property. See also New Orleans v. Carondelet Canal, etc., Co., 36 La. Ann. 396; Bibb County v. Central R. Co., 40 Ga. 646; Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H. 423.

In

Cases Holding that the Exemption Does not Extend to the Shares. Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 490, it was held that a provision in the charter of a bank, "that in consideration of the privileges granted by the charter, the bank agrees to pay the state annually one-half of one per cent. on the amount of the capital stock paid in by the stockholders other than the state," operated by way of contract to restrict the state in taxing the corporation in respect of its capital stock to the rate mentioned, but not to prohibit the state from a separate and additional taxation of each stockholder upon his individual interest as a stockholder. And see Memphis . Farrington, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 539, where it was said, "Capital stock and shares of stock are two distinct properties, and an exemption of the one does not thereby necessarily exempt the other, nor the taxation of the latter operate as a tax on the former, so as to interfere with its exemption from such burdens." In Belo v. Forsyth County, 82 N. Car. 415; 33 Am. Rep. 6SS, it was held that an exemption of the corporate realty does not exempt the shares of stock. And see Appeal Tax Ct. v. Rice, 50 Md. 302; Tax Cases, 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 117; Anne Arundel County v. Annapolis, etc., R. Co., 47 Md. 592; cited in Cook on Stock and Stockholders (2d ed.), 568, as holding that an exemption of the corporate property, franchises or

capital stock, from taxation, does not exempt the shares of stock from any tax. In State v. Memphis City Bank (Tenn. 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 1045, a provision in the company's charter, that there should be a state tax "on the amount of capital stock actually paid in . . . in lieu of all other taxes and assessments," was held not to exempt the shares.

1. Cook on Stock and Stockholders (2d ed.), § 568; Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 213; Baltimore v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 6 Gill (Md.) 288; 48 Am. Dec. 531; State v. Wilson, 52 Md. 638; Frederick County v. Farmers, etc., Nat. Bank, 48 Ind. 117; Anne Arundel County v. Annapolis, etc., R. Co., 47 Md. 592; Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Scotland County v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 123; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 516. See also Middlesex R. Co. v. Charleston, 8 Allen (Mass.) 330.

In Foster v. Stevens, 63 Vt. 175, it was held that a statute providing for a direct tax upon the capital of a bank, is a tax upon the shares of stock held by its stockholders. See also Bugbee v. Stevens, 63 Vt. 185.

In State v. Union, etc., Bank (Tenn. 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 758, a charter provision that the payment of a certain per cent. on each share of stock subscribed shall be in lieu of all other taxes, was held to protect from any other taxation, the capital stock as well as the shares held by the stockholders; and, also, to protect them from any privilege or license tax.

In the case, however, of Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. Car. 226, it was held that an exemption of shares of stock does not exempt the corporate franchise from taxation. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. Car. 155. And in State v. Petwav, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 396, it was held that a charter provision that the shares of stock should be taxed a certain amount, did not prevent a tax on dividends.

Non-resident Stockholder - Foreign Corporation.-Under a statute which, like the Ohio statute, exempts from taxation shares of stock in corporations, "the capital stock of which is taxed in the name of the company," shares of

Ordinarily an exemption of the capital stock is equivalent to the exemption of the property into which the capital stock has been converted, unless a contrary intention is in some way manifested. But the mere exemption of the capital stock will not exempt the company and tangible property where the grant by its terms discriminates between the capital stock and such property.2

h. MISCELLANEOUS.-For the construction of various statutes conferring exemption from taxation upon certain classes of property and persons, see note 3.

stock in a foreign corporation, which pays taxes in the state only on that portion of its property therein situated, are not exempt. Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511. See also Worth v. Ashe County, 90 N. Car. 409; San Francisco v. Fry, 63 Cal. 470; 1 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 431.

A non-resident stockholder, who is taxed on his stock in the state where he resides, cannot defeat that tax by reason of exemptions enjoyed within the state creating the corporation. Cook on Stock and Stockholders (2d ed.), § 568; citing Appeal Tax Ct. v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; Appeal Tax Ct. v. Gill, 50 Md. 377; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300.

An Exemption May be Waived.-An exemption of stock may be waived by the company accepting a subsequent statute imposing a tax. Cook on Stock and Stockholders (2d ed.), § 568; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 551; Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 62 Ga. 463; but a corporation cannot waive its exemption as against its bonds previously issued. Hand v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 17 S. Car. 219; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 495; Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 213.

Income. An exemption of stock is an exemption of the gross income of a corporation. State v. Hood, 15 Rich. (S. Car.) 177.

National Bank Shares.-The purpose of the revenue law of 1868, in exempting "all shares of the capital stock of corporations which are required to list their property for taxation," was, to avoid the double taxation which would result from the taxation both of the property of which the capital stock consists, and the shares of stock which represent the same property. This exemption has no application to shares of the stock of a national bank, whose capital consists mainly, if not entirely, of

United States bonds, which the corporation is not required to list for taxation. McIver v. Robinson, 53 Ala. 456.

Privilege Tax License Tax. - In Grand Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246, it was held that the exemption of the stock and property of a corporation precluded a privilege tax. See also Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 264; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Moseley. 52 Miss. 127.

But in New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, etc., Co., 32 La. Ann. 105, an exemption of bank stock from taxation was held not to preclude a license tax.

1. Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; Scotland County v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 129; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 550; New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106; Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Bibb County v. Central, etc., R. Co., 40 Ga. 646; Rome R. Co. v. Rome, 14 Ga. 275; Lackawanna County v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Pa. St. 221.

2. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637.

Thus, where the railroad with its fixtures and appurtenances was exempted from taxation for only twenty years, and the capital stock was exempted forever, it is clear that the road and fixtures could not represent the capital stock for the purpose of taxation, and they are subject to taxation at the expiration of the twenty years. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; 3 Tenn. Ch. 604; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Loftin, 98 U. S. 563; 105 U. S. 158.

3. Banks. See also NATIONAL BANKS, vol. 16, p. 143; SAVINGS BANKS, vol. 21, p. 516; supra, this title, Stock.

Kentucky Gen. St., ch. 92, art. 2, § 1, providing that state and national banks, and "other institutions of loan and discount," shall be taxed in a certain manner in full of all state, county and

municipal taxes, has reference only to incorporated "institutions," and does not apply to a private unincorporated bank, which is taxable under the general law. Bowling Green v. Barclay, 91 Ky. 66.

Property of Insane Person.-Where land, owned by an insane person, and exempted, under Iowa Code, §711, from taxation, was sold by his guardian under an order of court, it was held that the land continued to be exempt until the sale and conveyance had been approved by the court. Ordway v. Smith, 53 Iowa 589.

Judge's Salary.-The article of the Louisiana Const. which declares that the judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall at stated times receive a salary which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, exempts the salary of a judge from taxation. New Orleans v. Lea, 14 La

Ann. 194.

Road Tax-Missouri Rev. St., § 5012, exempting from road tax the property of all persons residing within the limits of an incorporated village or town, embraces the property of non-residents. State v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 90 Mo. 166. Growing Crops.-(See also CROPS, vol. 4, p. 887.)

Fruit-trees are not exempt from taxation as 66 growing crops," under California Const., art. 13, § 1. Cottle v. Spitzer, 65 Cal. 456; 52 Am. Rep. 305. Mechanics' Tools.-A printer is a mechanic within the meaning of the term as used in the Iowa Code exempting the tools of any mechanic from taxation, and his press materials, etc., constitute his tools, and as such are exempt. Smith v. Osburn, 53 Iowa 474. But it has been held in Mississippi that, a printing press owned by a practical printer, editor and publisher of a newspaper, and necessary to his business as such printer and publisher, is not exempt under Mississippi Code, § 468, which provides that "the tools of any mechanic necessary for carrying on his trade" shall be exempt. Frantz v. Dobson, 63 Miss. 631; 60 Am. Rep. 68. See also ToOLS.

Mines and Mining Claims.-The constitution of Colorado provided that mines and mining claims should be exempt from taxation for the period of ten years from the date of the adoption of the constitution, “and thereafter may be taxed as provided by law." It was held that legislation was required to render such property taxable at the expiration of

the ten years. In re House Resolution (Colo. ¡886), 21 Pac. Rep. 471.

A parcel of land was entered and paid for as a placer mining claim, and entered in the United States land office as a mineral entry. But within a few months after the issuance of the patent, the land was made a subdivision of the city of Leadville, a map of such subdivision, showing its division into blocks and lots, being filed in the recorder's office of the proper county. There was no evidence that the lot was in fact a mine or mining claim. It was held that the land was not exempt from taxation under the Colorado statute exempting mines or mining claims bearing gold or silver or other precious metals. Dyke v. White, 17 Colo. 296.

An exemption of mines and mining claims does not cover the flumes or machinery necessary to work them. Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal. 148; Gold Hill v. Caledonia Silver Min. Co., 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 575.

Mortgages. An exemption of mortgages from taxation will not be held to include so-called building association mortgages, of which the sum to be paid eventually is uncertain. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Rice, 50 Md. 302.

A New Jersey statute provided that "hereafter no mortgage or debt secured thereby shall be assessed for taxation, unless a deduction therefor shall have been claimed by the owner of the land and allowed by the assessors." This was held not to apply to a mortgage upon exempt lands. State v. Lantz, 53 N. J. L. 578.

Under the Vermont statute exempting from taxation personal estate owned by an inhabitant of that state, which is situated and taxed in another state, a debt evidenced by a promissory note owned by an inhabitant of Vermont was held to be taxable there, although secured on land in another state, where the mortgagee's interest is taxed as real estate, the note and mortgage being in the possession of their owner's agent, who lived where the land was situated. Bullock v. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516.

Capital of Non-residents.-Under the New York statute exempting agents of moneyed corporations, or capitalists, from taxation “ for any moneys in their possession, or under their control, transmitted to them for the purpose of investment, or otherwise, and exempting demands belonging to the non-residents of the state sent to or deposited in this state for collection," it was held that

X. THE LEVY—1. Meaning of Term.-The term "levy "is here used to indicate the legislative act, whether state or local, which determines that a tax shall be laid,1 and is to be distinguished from the levy on property incident to the enforcement of the collection of the tax, in which sense the term is also used.2

2. How Made-a. GENERALLY.-In rare instances the constitution provides for the levy of a tax without the assistance of the legislature; but, as a general rule, a levy can be made only by legislative enactment, within the limits and in the form prescribed

foreign capital sent within the state for investment is protected from taxation, whether invested or uninvested, and whether the securities received therefor are taken out of, or remain in the state for collection. Williams v. Wayne County, 78 N. Y. 561. Under the above statute, money sent into the state for investment is exempt from taxation as well after the death of such non-resident as before. People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 560, aff'g 105 N. Y. 629; People v. Coleman (Supreme Ct.), 14 N. Y. Supp. 565.

1. State v. Maginnis, 26 La. Ann. 558; Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Maguire v. Mobile County, 71 Ala. 401.

In Morton v. Comptroller Gen'l, 4 S. Car. 430, it is said that three things are essential to the levy of a tax: first, the ascertainment of a sum certain, or that can be made certain, to be imposed upon the collective body of taxpayers; second, a legal imposition of that sum as an obligation on the collective body of taxpayers; and third, an apportionment of such sum among individual taxpayers so as to ascertain the part or share that each should bear. And see People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 256; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274.

In Moore v. Foote, 32 Miss. 469, the term "levy," when used in relation to county taxes, was held to include not only the ascertainment of the amount necessary to be raised, but also the performance of all such acts as would authorize the tax collector to proceed to collect it.

Where the levy is by a subordinate political division, it commonly consists of two distinct acts of legislation: first, that of the state giving the power to tax; and second, that of the local authority laying the tax under the power so given. Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 335; Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63

Ga. 527; Cruikshanks v. Charleston, I McCord (S. Car.) 360. And see Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Cass County, 16 Neb. 136.

A law authorizing or directing a city council to levy a tax does not execute itself. It merely enjoins a duty upon the city council, and the tax cannot be enforced in the absence of an actual levy by the council. State v. Humphreys, 25 Ohio St. 520.

Where corporate authorities are required to levy and collect a sufficient tax to pay interest annually, and to liquidate the principal of a specified debt within the time specified for its payment, it is a standing and continuing levy so long as the bonds remain. unpaid. Davis v. Brace, 82 Ill. 542.

2. Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473; Waterman v. Harkness, 2 Mo. App. 494. In Valle v. Fargo, I Mo. App. 344, the word "levy was said to be synonymous with "collect," or "raised by execution."

3. Walcott v. People,17 Mich. 68; San Francisco, etc., R. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 60 Cal. 12; State v. McEvery, 75 Mo. 530.

The Louisiana Constitution confers authority to levy a tax for levee purposes directly upon levee commissioners within their respective districts, requiring no action of the legislature, except the division of the state into levee districts, and a provision for the election or appointment of commissioners.

Davis v. Green, 40 La. Ann. 281. 4. New Orleans Cotton Exch. v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 1154; Forman v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 825; Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156; State v. Mobile County, 73 Ala. 65; Bettison v. Budd, 21 Ark. 578; Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Parks, 32 Ark. 142; Vanover v. Davis, 27 Ga. 354; Norris 7. Russell, 5 Cal. 249; Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646; State v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 74 Mo. 163: Ellis v. Peck, 45 Iowa 114; Early v. Whittingham, 43

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