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And some courts hold that a portion of a levy cannot be held legal if another part is illegal.1

3. Conclusiveness and Effect.-The determination of the legisla ture in levying a tax is, within constitutional restrictions, conclusive and not subject to judicial review.2 The presumption is that taxes are properly and legally levied.3 The legislature may repeal a statute under which taxes have been imposed, or prohibit the collection of taxes after they have been duly levied and as

ford, 38 Conn. 274; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496; State v. Humphreys, 25 Ohio St. 520. And see Bailey v. Haywood, 70 Mich. 188.

Where a levy is made of an amount less than the limit, and afterwards another is made in excess of the balance, the former levy is valid, but the latter is void in whole, both as to the excess and as to that within the limits. Cummings v. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56.

1. See Basnett v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12; Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135; Hewitt v. White, 78 Mich. 117; Rogers v. White, 68 Mich. 10; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; 66 Am. Dec. 524; Gamble 7. Witty, 55 Miss. 26; Capital State Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 727; Gerry v. Stoneham, I Allen (Mass.) 319; State v. Hagood, 13 S. Car. 46; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Elwell v. Shaw, I Me. 339; Johnson v. Colburn, 36 Vt. 693; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt. 506.

In Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 265, it was held that where the limit allowed by law is exhausted, the levy of an additional tax is unauthorized, and such a levy being illegal, the entire levy is thereby infected and made void.

2. People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 256; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328; Gordon v. Carnes, 47 N. Y. 608; State v. Maginnis, 26 La. Ann. 559; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio 192; Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio 418; Dean 7. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 265; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 342; Beals . Amador County, 35 Cal. 632; Wheeler v. Plattsmouth, 7 Neb. 270; Stewart v. Polk County, 30 Iowa 9; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Otoe County, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 677; Wharton . School Directors, 42 Pa. St. 358.

Determination of Local Body.-The determination of a local legislative body

is, in its turn, likewise conclusive within the scope of its local authority. Wharton v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St. 358; Williams v. School District No 1, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; 32 Am. Dec. 243; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12; People v. East Saginaw, 33 Mich. 164; In re Powers, 52 Mo. 218; Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 452; Obion County Ct. v. Marr, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 634; Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362. And see Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush (Ky.) 599; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush (Ky.) 406; Teegarden v. Racine, 56 Wis. 545.

Where certain facts are to be ascertained, and the question is not whether the board shall act at all, but whether it has acted correctly, it acts in a judicial capacity, and an appeal from its determinations will lie. White County v. Karp, 90 Ind. 236.

The question as to what expenditures are proper and necessary for municipal administration, is not judicial; it is confined by law to the discretion of the municipal authorities, and no court has the right to control, usurp, or supersede that discretion. East St. Louis v. U. S., 110 U. S. 321.

3. See School Dist. No. 8 v. Garvey, 80 Ky. 159; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. People, 119 Ill. 207; Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 480; 19 Am. Dec. 243; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496; Buck v. People, 78 Ill. 560; Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11; Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 561; Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 157; Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605; State v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 101 Mo. 136; Arnold v. Juneau County, 43 Wis. 627.

It will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that at least a quorum of the board or body authorized to vote a tax was present. Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; 66 Am. Dec. 524. Where it appears that county taxes were levied at a special meeting of the board of supervisors, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the

sessed; in the latter case, the intent must clearly appear.2 A state or county, having levied a tax upon land in the name of a party, is estopped to deny his title thereto in an action to enforce the collection of the tax.3

4. Exhaustion of Power.-In general the power to tax is permanent and continuing, to be exercised whenever the public good

contrary, that the meeting was rightfully held, such meetings being authorized by law. Brigins v. Chandler, 60 Miss. 862. But an unmutilated record of the proper board or body containing no record of such levy, is sufficient to rebut the presumption. Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605. See also infra, this title, Record of the Levy.

1. Augusta v. North, 57 Me. 392; 2 Am. Rep. 52; U. S. v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358. And see Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37.

2. Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 605; Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan. 83. And see Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329; Bank of Newberry Stigall, 41 Miss. 142.

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The repeal of the statute under which a tax is assessed does not affect it, if the assessment was completed at the time the repeal took effect. Appeal Tax Court v. Union R. Co., 50 Md. 274; Appeal Tax Court v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; Appeal Tax Court v. Baltimore Academy, 50 Md. 437; Appeal Tax Court v. University of Maryland, 50 Md. 457; Warren R. Co. v. Belvidere, 35 N. J. L. 584.

But inferior boards and bodies deriving their power from statutes, have no authority to reconsider and reverse their own official action, unless the statute so provides. People v. Schenectady County, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 408. And see infra, this title, The Assessment.

Change of Constitution.-Taxes legal. ly levied but not collected before a change in the constitution takes effect, are not invalidated, although they are not imposed upon the basis directed by the new constitution. Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Saunders County, 9 Neb. 507. 3. Brandriff v. Harrison County, 50 Iowa 164; Adams County v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 507; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Story County, 36 Iowa 48; Audubon County v. American Emigrant Co., 40 Iowa 460; Austin v. Bremer County, 44 Iowa 155; Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart, 39 Iowa 267; Lamb 7. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 333. And see Gibson v. Howe, 37 Iowa 168; Sully v. Poorbaugh, 45 Iowa 25 C. of L.-13

453; Calhoun County v. American Emigrant Co., 93 U. S. 124.

But the mere collection of taxes upon lands of which a municipality still claims to be the owner, does not estop it to assert its ownership against the party paying the taxes, if he was not thereby induced to pay them and did not rely thereon in making the payment, but did so believing he had title, and relying upon his own judgment. Buena Vista County v. Iowa Falls, etc., R. Co., 46 Iowa 226.

The assessment of a tax, without enforcing its collection, will not estop a county from setting up a claim that the land was its own property at the time of the levy. Page County v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 40 Iowa 520.

In American Emigrant Co. v. Iowa R. Land Co., 52 Iowa 323, it was held that the bringing of an action by a county, to set aside a conveyance of land made by it, will not estop the county to levy taxes upon property during the pendency of the action.

But estoppels against the state are not favored, and though they may arise from its express grants, they cannot grow out of laches of its officers. State v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287; Rossire v. Boston, 4 Allen (Mass.) 57; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. People, 46 Mich. 193; Lee v. Sturges, 46 Ohio St. 153. And see U. S. v. Hazard, 3 Cent. L. J. 653; U. S. v. Halloran, 14 Alb. L. J. 279.

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A municipality that has collected taxes under an unconstitutional statute, is not thereby estopped to dispute the correctness of the valuation, and make a reassessment. Cincinnati Southern R. Co. v. Guenther, 19 Fed. Rep. 395. Nor does an unconstitutional act remitting a tax, bar its subsequent assertion. Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546.

It has been held that a negligent assessment and sale of public lands as private property does not estop the state from setting up its title. St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593; Ellsworth v. Grand Rapids, 27 Mich. 250; Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303. And

may require it; though a single levy is sometimes deemed to exhaust the power for the time being, as where the custom is to tax but once within a certain period of time.2 A levy of the full amount limited by law precludes an additional tax,3 but an unsuc

see Buena Vista County v. Iowa Falls, etc., R. Co., 46 Iowa 226.

1. Municipality No. 2 v. Dunn, 10 La. Ann. 57; People v. Dutchess County, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 50; Davis v. Brace, 82 Ill. 542; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 561; Reithmiller v. People, 44 Mich. 280; Wells v. Board of Education, 20 W. Va. 157. And see Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179; Sheridan v. Fleming, 93 Mo. 321; Rice v. Walker, 44 Iowa 458; Calhoun County v. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214; Oliver v. Carsner, 39 Tex. 396; Mason County v. Huidekoper, 134 U. S. 332.

2. St. Louis Bridge, etc., Co. v. People, 127 Ill. 627; State . Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435; Cope v. Collins, 37 Ark. 649; Graham v. Parham, 32 Ark. 685; Brodie v. McCabe, 33 Ark. 696; Oliver v. Carsner, 39 Tex. 396; Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 265; Wells v. Board of Education, 20 W. Va. 157; Cummings v. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56.

In People v. Waynesville, 88 Ill. 469, it is said that, as a general rule, where the law confers a power, and the persons upon whom it is conferred act under it, the power is exhausted, unless the same authority authorizes its subsequent exercise.

When once a levy for general purposes has been made, whether of less than the maximum rate or not, no special levy, even for a part that might be classed properly under the head of general purposes, can be made, in the absence of a provision of law authorizing it. State v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530. But the omission to levy a tax on licenses, in making a general levy, may be subsequently cured. State v. Maguire, 52 Mo. 420.

In Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Portland, 2 Oregon 81, it was held that after the assessment of all the taxable prop. erty had been made and a tax levied therein, the council had no power to order an additional assessment of property subsequently coming within the city limits.

Where the proceeds of a special assessment levied for the purpose of constructing public improvements, become insufficient for the purpose indicated, by reason of a failure to collect the

amount assessed upon particular property, there can be no new assessment upon other property embraced in the original assessment which is not delinquent to supply such deficiency. Chicago v. People, 56 Ill. 327; Workman v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 463.

3. Cummings v. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Atchison County, 47 Kan. 722; Osborne County v. Blake, 25 Kan. 356; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Woodcock, 18 Kan. 20; National Bank v. Barber, 24 Kan. 546; Dumphy v. Humboldt County, 58 Iowa 273; Sterling School Furniture Co. v. Harvey, 45 Iowa 466. And see Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich. 624; State v. Cage, 34 La. Ann. 506; Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569; Ballentine v. Pulaski, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 633.

That the first levy which exhausted the limit, was compelled by mandamus, furnishes no ground for a new levy in excess thereof. Vance v. Little Rock,

30 Ark. 435.

Under the Illinois statutes, two different methods are provided for raising money for repairing roads, bridges, etc.; money may be raised for a road tax by either mode, and in case of failure to raise money in one mode the other may be adopted; but when a levy is made in one mode it cannot be made in the other, the statute contemplating but one tax. Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill. 597.

In Osborne County v. Blake, 19 Kan. 299, it was held that where only a small amount of tax was levied for the current expenses of previous years, county commissioners may be allowed to levy an additional amount of tax for the current expenses of those years, provided the two levies for any one year shall not exceed in the aggregate the maximum rate allowed by law. See also People v. Waynesville, SS III. 469.

In Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 265, it was held that where a commissioners' court has exhausted its power in making a levy to pay ordinary debts of the county, it exceeds its authority in making an additional levy partly for the same purpose, and that the whole levy is illegal, and is not cured by an order

cessful attempt to lay a tax does not exhaust the power, and a new and valid levy may be made afterwards.1

5. Compulsory Levy.-See MANDAMUS, vol. 14, p. 88.

6. Record of the Levy.-Every essential proceeding in the course of a levy of taxes should appear in some written and permanent form in the records of the bodies authorized to act upon it; 2 the record being usually the only evidence to show that the tax was duly levied, and ordinarily conclusive as to all matters therein

afterwards made declaring a part of the levy to be illegal.

1. Himmelmann v. Cofran, 36 Cal. 411; Society for Savings v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; People v. Waynesville, S8 Ill. 469; Bangor v. Lancey, 21 Me. 472; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; 3 Am. Dec. 131; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; Monroe v. Fort Howard, 50 Wis. 228. And see State v. Maguire, 52 Mo. 420: Wells v. Board of Education, 20 W. Va. 157; Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358.

A school district meeting voted a tax for a schoolhouse. No action was taken upon the vote, and it was neither reconsidered nor rescinded. Four months afterwards a like tax was voted at a special meeting. It was held that the last vote was valid. Randall v. Smith, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 214.

2. Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59; Folkerts v. Power, 42 Mich. 283; Power's Appeal, 29 Mich. 504; Hodgkin v. Fry, 33 Ark. 716; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337: Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182; Athens County v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 37 Ohio St. 205. And see Nalle v. Fenwick, 4 Rand. (Va.) 585.

In Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224, it was held that school directors are not required to keep a record of their proceedings, in levying a school tax, although it is advisable that they should

do so.

In Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Tontz, 29 Kan. 460, a tax was held to be valid, notwithstanding the fact that the county clerk and the county commissioners neglected for six months to enter the levy of the tax upon the county commissioner's record. See also Jefferson County v. Johnson, 23 Kan. 717.

In Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11, it was held that when the law requires a county board to cause a tax to be levied, it will be presumed that the tax, having been actually levied, was levied by proper authority, although no record of the action of the board is made to appear.

In State v. Saalmann, 37 N. J. L. 156, it was held that an order of a township for raising money for the payment of an existing indebtedness of the township, need not be in writing.

3. Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182; Williams v. Mears, 61 Mich. 86; Moor v. Newfield, 4 Me. 44; Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397; Halleck v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469; Andrews v. Boylston, 110 Mass. 214; Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605; Moore v. Cooke, 40 Iowa 290; Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293; Paul v. Linscott, 56 N. H. 347; Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268; State v. Hardcastle, 26 N. J. L. 143; Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. Car. 1; Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyoming 368. And see Nalle 7. Fenwick, 4 Rand. (Va.) 585; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; In re Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. (U. S.) 287; Casady v. Lowry, 49 Iowa 523.

A grant of a city tax is proved by the statute book; the grant of a county tax must be proved by the record of the doings of the county convention. Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to prove the transactions of a school district meeting, the only legal evidence being the record itself or an attested copy. Moor v. Newfield, 4 Me. 44: And it is not competent to prove by oral testimony, the existence of facts to be ascertained by public commissioners, preparatory to laying a tax which such commissioners are required to certify in writing. Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 481; 19 Am. Dec. 243.

The record of the proceedings of a district meeting has been held admissible in a proceeding to compel the proper officers to levy a tax, although not expressly required by law to be kept. Rose v. Hindman, 36 Iowa 160.

In Vermont, the warning for a meeting of a school district, must be recorded by the district clerk, and if the record of the warning does not show

stated.1 It should show that the requisite statutory preliminary requirements have been complied with ;2 that a meeting of the proper body has been held, and the proceedings thereof,3 and that the proposition to make the levy has been duly presented and adopted; and the facts constituting performance of the statutory requirements should appear, a mere statement that the statute was complied with being usually not enough.5 Due au

that the hour of the day for the meeting was specified in the warning, the defect cannot be supplied by parol evidence that the hour was named in the original warning. Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337. 1. See First Nat. Bank v. Concord, 50 Vt. 257; Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362; West v. Whitaker, 37 Iowa 598; People v. Queens County, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 195; Gaither v. Green, 40 La. Ann. 362; Voes v. Frankfort, 64 Me. 229; Smith v. Crittenden, 16 Mich. 152; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494. And see Greer 2. Howell, 64 Tex. 688.

In State v. Van Winkle, 25 N. J. L. 73, it was held that a book of minutes kept by the trustees of a school district, is admissible in evidence to establish their acts in making a levy, but that it is not conclusive and may be overcome by parol evidence. And if defective it may be explained or supplied by parol testimony. Gearhart v. Dixon, i Pa. St. 224.

3. Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; State v. Van Winkle, 25 N. J. L. 73. And see State v. McIntoch, 7 Ïred. (N. Car.) 68; Dudley v. Oliver, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 227; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. Car. I.

In North Carolina, the record must affirmatively show that on voting a tax a majority of the justices of the county court was present. Dudley v. Oliver, 5 Ired. (N. Čar.) 227.

A statement in the minutes, that all the school directors were present, and that the vote was unanimous, but without giving the names of the persons voting, either in the affirmative or negative, is a substantial compliance with a requirement that the names of the members voting, both in the affirmative and negative, be entered upon the minutes, the recording of such vote being contemplated only where there are votes on both sides. Tobin v. Morgan, 70 Pa. St. 229.

The denomination of a tax in the levy 4. See Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 as "for judgment fund" and "for city Mich. 104; Pontiac v. Axford, 49 Mich. judgment tax," is not a latent ambiguity, 69; Boyce v. Auditor Gen'l, 90 Mich. such as will admit evidence to show 314; State v. Van Winkle, 25 N. J. L. how the proceeds were intended by the 73; State v. Duryea, 40 N. J. L. 266; city council to be applied. Rice v. Andrews v. Boylston, 110 Mass. 214; Walker, 44 Iowa 458. Judd v. Thompson, 125 Mass. 553.

2. Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 25; Flint, etc., R. Co. v. Auditor Gen'l, 41 Mich. 635; Boyce v. Sebring, 66 Mich. 210; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182; State v. Van Winkle, 25 N. J. L. 73; State v. Duryea, 40 N. J. L. 266; State v.Hardcastle, 26 N. J. L. 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J. L. 551. And see Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt. 419; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494.

A certificate of trustees, reciting that the company in aid of which a tax is voted, has so complied with the act as to be entitled to the tax, complies with the terms of a statute requiring it to recite a compliance with the statutes in all respects. Casady v. Lowry, 49 Iowa 523. And see Williams v. School Dist. No. 1, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; 32 Am.

Dec. 243.

Where a tax is ordered, the sworn certificate required by the New Jersey laws to be delivered by the trustee to the assessor, should show all the facts necessary to render the tax legal, and that such facts are within the knowledge of at least two of the trustees; and the certificate should be verified by their oath. Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J. L. 551; State v. Padden, 44 N. J. L. 151. And it should show the apportionment by the meeting of a specific amount for each specific purpose. State v. Padden, 44 N. J. L. 151.

The county clerk, before the delivery of the tax books, may amend his record by showing when the levy of a road tax was made. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. People, 119 Ill. 207.

5. See Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194; State v. Hardcastle, 26 N. J. L. 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J. L. 551;

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