thentication as required by law is necessary to the validity of the record,1 and though it is proper and desirable that it should be signed by the presiding officer and clerk of the body by which it is made, an entry of the levy on the proper book of record kept for that purpose may be sufficient.3 Absence of the record from the place provided for its preservation, and in which it ought to be found, raises a presumption that it never existed; 4 but facts may be shown from which its existence and subsequent loss or destruction may be inferred; 5 and when such loss or destruction is established, secondary evidence of its contents may be given. Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; Weber v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 108 Ill. 451. See also Longyear v. Aplin, 72 Mich. 415. In Houghton v. Davenport, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 235, it was held that the return of a constable, on a warrant for calling an annual town meeting, that he has warned the inhabitants of a town, is sufficient evidence that the meeting is legally warned, even though the return does not state in what manner he warned them. See also Sexton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 315; Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 305; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323. It need not appear on the face of a certificate of town auditors, allowing accounts against the town, that they were made at the proper time and place. It is sufficient if in fact their meeting was regular in those respects. People v. Queens County, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 195. 1. Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 423; In re Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215; State v. Padden, 44 N. J. L. 151; Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J. L. 551. 2. Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; 66 Am. Dec. 524; Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 423. In Goddard v. Stockman, 74 Ind. 400, it was held that while it is the better practice that the record of the proceedings of a board of county commissioners should be signed by the members thereof, unsigned orders of the board are not void, and when properly signed within a reasonable time, they become valid from the time when made. in Jefferson County v. Johnson, 23 Kan. 717, it was held that the failure of a county clerk to attach his certificate to the tax roll, is a mere irregularity which will not invalidate the subsequent proceedings. And 3. Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa 141; People v. Eureka Lake, etc., Canal Co., 48 Cal. 143; MacKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. Ann. 944; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; 66 Am. Dec. 524. And see Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143. But see Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 423. The general rule that every public document required by law to be executed by a public officer must be verified by his official signature, does not extend to records of a corporate board or body which exercises powers municipal and quasi legislative. A tax is not void, therefore, because the record of the board levying it is not signed by the chairman and clerk of the board. The effect of a statute requiring it to be so signed is merely to make their signatures evidence of the identity of the levy. People v. Eureka Lake, etc., Canal Co., 48 Cal. 143. A certificate of town auditors, allowing accounts against the town, purporting in the body of it to have been made by the board of auditors of the proper town, is sufficient, though the officers have merely signed their names, without the addition of their official titles. People v. Queens County, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 195. 4. Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75. And see Hintrager v.Kiene, 62 Iowa 605. In Michigan, the rule that when a record is not to be found in the proper office, it must be accounted for before it can be assumed to have ever existed, is changed by statute, and the contrary presumption is indulged. Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Mich. 215; Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 422. And see Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 568. 5. Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75. And see Boyce v. Auditor Gen❜l, 90 Mich. 314. Proof of loss should be made by the party claiming the benefit of the levy. Moore v. Cooke, 40 Iowa 290. 6. Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268; Weber v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 108 Ill. 451; Irwin v. Miller, 23 Ill. 348; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; 66 Am. Dec. 524; Quinby v. North American Coal, etc., 7. Commutation of Tax. In the absence of constitutional prohibition, the legislature may commute or remit unpaid taxes,1 or even refund those which have been paid; 2 but such action should Co., 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 596. And see Norris v. Russell, 5 Cal. 249. In Weber v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 108 Ill. 451, it was held that if certificates for the levy and extension of school taxes, are copied in the record book, the copy is only secondary evidence, and in no event admissible, until proof is made of the return of the original certificates and of the loss thereof. The loss of a paper showing the right to the issue of a mandamus to compel the levy of a tax, will not dispense with the clear proof that it contains all the legal requirements. People v. Oldtown, 88 Ill. 202. 1. Demoville v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214; People v. Lee, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 469; Danghdrill v. Alabama L. Ins., etc., Co., 31 Ala. 91; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 86; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146; State Bank v. People. 5 II. 303; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McLean County, 17 Ill. 291; McDonough County v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490; Jack sonville v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 138; Cooper v. Ash, 76 Ill. 11; Gardiner v. State, 21 N. J. L. 557. And see White v. Wheeler, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 573; Terrel v. Wheeler, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 262; Kelly v. Wheeler (Supreme Ct.), 3 N. Y. Supp. 289; Wallerstein v. Bohanna (Supreme Ct.), 5 N. Y. Supp. 319; Fethian v. Wheeler, 125 N. Y. 696; Lamb v. Connolly, 122 N. Y. 531; In re Stevens County (Minn. 1887), 31 N. W. Rep. 942. But see Wilson v. Sutter County, 47 Cal. 91. The commutation of all taxes and licenses upon the payment of a designated sum, is not an illegal exemption, and does not conflict with a constitutional provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform, and in proportion to the value of the property. Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 86. The power to investigate and determine what part of a tax shall be commuted, may be delegated to boards of assessors or other inferior officers. White . Wheeler, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 573. County and municipal taxes, as well as state taxes, may be remitted by the legislature. Demoville v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214. And see Pro phet v. Lundy, 63 Miss. 603. But city taxes are not under the supervision of the board of supervisors of the county, and cannot be remitted by them. Manufacturers' Bank v. Troy, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 250. The objection that the legislature cannot delegate the power of taxation within an incorporated city, to a commissioner newly created by itself, is not applicable to a statute conferring authority upon the board of assessors of a city to determine what portion of certain taxes which are in arrear shall be charged against, and collected out of, the lands upon which they were assessed; their duty not being to impose, but rather to abate, a tax. White v. Wheeler, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 573. And see Terrel v. Wheeler, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 262. And In Nebraska, taxes cannot be released or commuted. Lancaster County v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119; Lancaster County v. Trimble, 33 Neb. 121. in State v. Graham, 17 Neb. 43, it was held that an assignment by county commissioners upon tax certificates for less than the amount of taxes due thereon when the property if sold would bring the full amount, violates the constitutional prohibitions against the commutations of taxes. Many exemptions are in the nature of commutations. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 456; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford County, 29 Wis. 116; Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga. 645. And when exemptions are prohibited, there can be no power to commute. New Orleans v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 756; New Orleans v. St. Charles Street R. Co., 28 La. Ann. 497; New Orleans v. New Or leans Sugar Shed Co., 35 La. Ann. 548; and see Louisiana Cotton Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 440; Ide v. Finneran, 29 Kan. 569. As to commutation by rendering services, see infra, this title, Municipal Taxation; and see generally, supra, this title, Power to Tax. 2. See Lancaster County v. State, 13 Neb. 523; Warder v. Clark County, 38 Ohio St. 639. Though a tax has been remitted, provision need not necessarily be made for refunding such parts of it as have been operate with fairness and not conflict with the constitutional provision in regard to uniformity and equality.1 XI. THE ASSESSMENT-1. Definition; Necessity for.-An assessment may be defined to be the act of assessing, determining, or adjusting the amount of taxation to be paid by an individual or a community; an official valuation of property, profits, or income, for purposes of taxation.2 Where taxes are to be levied in proportion to an estimate, either of values, benefits, or the results of business, an assessment is indispensable.3 paid. Demoville v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214. Where taxes are rightfully levied under an existing taxing power, they are not invalidated by provisions for their repayment, or partial repayment, to the taxpayer, in case of a failure of the enterprise in aid of which the taxes are levied, or because the benefit might not be equal in its operation. Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 526. 1. Cooper v. Ash, 76 Ill. 11. And see Lancaster County v. Trimble, 33 Neb. 121; Lancaster County v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119. Where a statute restricting the foreclosure of tax liens by counties, to cases in which the amount due exceeds a specified sum, was held void under constitutional provisions requiring all taxable property to contribute its proportionate share of taxes, and prohibiting the legislature from releasing the property of individuals from taxation. 2. Cent. Dict. See New York v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Green v. Gruber, 26 La. Ann. 694; Seattle v. Yesler, 1 Wash. Ter. 571. As commonly used, the assessment consists of the two processes of listing the persons and property to be taxed, Seattle . Yesler, Wash. Ter. 571; State v. Fournet, 30 La. Ann. 1103; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 435; Wells v. Smyth, 55 Pa. St. 159; New York v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; and of estimating the sums which are to be a guide in the apportionment of the tax between them. New York v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Dollar Sav. Bank v. U. S., 19 Wall. (U. S.) 227; U. S. v. Halloran, 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 1; State v. Fournet, 30 La. Ann. 1103; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 435; Wells v. Smyth, 55 Pa. St. 159; Seattle v. Yesler, I Wash. Ter. 571. In Wells v. Smyth, 55 Pa. St. 159, it was held that property is assessed when the assessor has returned his list and valuation and the commissioners have apportioned the rate per cent. on the several townships. Assessment, in its broadest sense, includes all the steps necessary to be taken in the legitimate exercise of the power to tax. Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499. The words " assessing" and "collecting" may be so used as to include the operation called the levy of a tax. San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499. List. In one sense, the assessment denotes the list and valuation of taxable property made by the proper officers for the purposes of taxation. Green v. Gruber, 26 La. Ann. 694; Bratton v. Mitchell, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 310. And see Wells v. Smyth, 55 Pa. St. 159. 3. New York v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529; Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Waller v. Hughes (Arizona, 1886), 11 Pac. Rep. 122; People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449; Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal. 539; Kelsy v. Abbott, 13 Cal. 618; People v. Pearis, 37 Cal. 259; Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 45; 85 Am. Dec. 94; People v. Sneath, 28 Cal. 612; Lake County v. Sulphur Bank Min. Co., 66 Cal. 17; Hurlbutt v. Butenop, 27 Cal. 50; Rood v. Mitchell County, 39 Iowa 444; Bailey v. Fisher, 38 Iowa 229; Early v. Whittingham, 43 Iowa 162; Worthington v. Whitman, 67 Iowa 190; Graves v. Bruen, 11 Ill. 431; Slaughter v. Louisville, S9 Ky. 112; National Bank of Commerce v. Licking Valley Land, etc., Co. (Ky. 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 881; McWilliams v. Michel, 43 La. Ann. 984; Woolfolk v. Fonbene, 15 La. Ann. 15; Augusti v. Lawless, 43 La. Ann. 1097; Person v. O'Neal, 32 La. Ann. 237; Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass. 429; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 482; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 26; While the legislature may alter the manner of making the assessment, it may not dispense with it altogether, unless the statute levying the tax itself prescribes the amount to be paid, in which case no assessment is required.2 3 2. When Made. For the purpose of general taxation, assessments are required to be made periodically, usually every year.* But for special purposes and for local improvements, they need be made only when the special occasion arises.5 When an annual assessment is required, the property must be listed each year, or the tax will be invalid. A tax based upon the valuation of a year other than that of the year for which it was originally assessed, is invalid.7 Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236; Nebraska City v. Nebraska City Hy. draulic Gas Light, etc., Co., 9 Neb. 339; South Platte Land Co. v. Crete, II Neb. 344; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62; May v. Traphagen, 139 N. Y. 478; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 432; McCall v. Lorimer, 4 Watts (Pa.) 351; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 75 Pa. St. 13; Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470; Marsh v. Clark County, 42 Wis. 502; Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 48; Hersey v. Barron County, 37 Wis. 75. Where no assessment was ever made by the proper authorities, upon which a tax could be levied, no previous tender is required as a condition of equitable relief against a tax. Bode v. New England Investment Co., 6 Dakota 499. Пlegal in Part.-Where an assessment is in part illegal and the illegal portion is inseparably blended with that which is legal, the whole assessment is void. California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1. 1. Marsh v. Clark County, 42 Wis. 502; Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 210. See also Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. I. Where a constitutional provision is made for the assessment of property, the legislature cannot fix the valuation. People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449. See also Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 112. In McReynolds v. Longenberger, 59 Pa. St. 13, it was held that the want of an assessment made by competent authority, is not a mere irregularity which can be corrected by curative statutes. 2. U. S. v. Halloran, 14 Blatchf. (U. S. 1; King . U. S., 99 U. S. 229; Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 611; State v. Sterling, 20 Md 502; Texas Banking, etc., Co. v. State, 42 Tex. 630. And see Dollar Sav. Bank, v. U. S., 19 Wall. (U. S.) 227; St. Croix, etc., R. Co. v. Osceola County, 45 Iowa 168. 3. State v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 14 Nev. 220; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; People v. Tax Com`rs, 104 U. S. 466. 4. See People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449; State v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 14 Nev. 220; State v. New Lindell Hotel Co., 9 Mo. App. 450; People v. Tax Com'rs, 104 U. S. 466. 5. See infra, this title, Local Assessments; Municipal Taxation. In Hall v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 39 Tex. 286, it was held that where a special tax is levied, no special assessment of the taxable property on which it is to be collected need be made. 6. People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449. And see Clove Spring Iron Works v. Cone, 56 Vt. 603; Newkirk v. Fisher, 72 Mich. 113. The same rule applies to a requirement of a biennial, triennial, or quadrennial assessment. See Ayers v. Moulton, 51 Vt. 115. 7. Davis v. Boston, 129 Mass. 378; Nason v. Whitney, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 140; State v. Cook, 82 Mo. 185; State v. Union Trust Co., 92 Mo. 157; Johnson v. Royster, SS N. Car. 194; Alger v. Curry, 38 Vt. 382; South Platte Land Co. v. Crete, 11 Neb. 344; People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449; Lebanon v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 77 Ill. 539; Davidson v. Sterrett, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 265; Paldi v. Paldi, 84 Mich. 346; Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis. 291. Under the Iowa statute, an assessment may be made in any year for a tax which should have been levied and collected in the preceding year. Peirce Assessments are usually made to relate to a day certain in each year, from which time the liability of the person or property assessed becomes fixed for that year; after that time neither a change of ownership nor a change of value will affect the tax; nor can the assessor change names, or put new names on the roll for taxation.2 The rule has been laid down that an assessment not made within the time required by law is invalid and will not support a tax.3 But an assessment is not invalid because made after the usual v. Weare, 41 Iowa 378. And a somewhat similar statute exists in Illinois. See Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244. In Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, a statute providing for the ascertainment of the monthly average amount or value of the property or goods held by persons during the preceding year, and for the assessment for taxation on that basis, was held to be valid. 1. See Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 243; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kossuth County, 41 Iowa 57; Ayers v. Moulton, 51 Vt. 115; San Francisco v. Pennie, 93 Cal. 465; Com. v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489; Montgomery County v. Montgomery Gas Light Co., 64 Ala. 269; Price v. Kramer, 4 Colo. 546; Martin County v. Drake, 40 Minn. 137; Warren v. Werner, 14 Wis. 366. Presumption as to Time.-Where no day is designated, either expressly or by implication, for the beginning of the tax year, it will be presumed that the calendar year was intended. See Com. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 429; Com. v. North Pennsylvania R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 460. 2. Hunt v. McFadgen, 20 Ark. 277; State v. Certain Lands, 40 Ark. 34; San Gabriel Valley Land, etc., Co. v. Wetmer, 96 Cal. 623; Shaw v. Dennis, 10 Ill. 405; Briggins v. People, 96 Ill. 381; Sully v. Poorbaugh, 45 Iowa 453; Howell v. Scott, 44 Kan. 247; Com. v. Gaines, So Ky. 489; Templeton v. Levee Com'rs, 16 La. Ann. 117; Vaughan v. Street Com'rs, 154 Mass. 143; Davis v. Boston, 129 Mass. 377; Richardson v. Boston, 148 Mass. 508; Martin County v. Drake, 40 Minn. 137; State v. Hardin, 34 N. J. L. 79; State v. Hanson, 36 N. J. L. 50; State v. Union Tp., 36 N. J. L. 309; State v. Pettit, 39 N. J. L. 654; State v. Shurts, 41 N. J. L. 279; State v. Jersey City, 44 N. J. L. 156; Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 245; Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 263; People v. Tax Com'rs, 91 N. Y. 593; People v. McComber (Supreme Ct.), 7 N. Y. Supp. 71; May v. Traphagen, 139 N. Y. 478; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Portland, 2 Oregon 81; Harth V. Gibbes, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 316; McClellan v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 11 Lea (Tenn.) 336; Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt. 769; Pitkin v. Parks, 54 Vt. 301; Warren v. Werner, 14 Wis. 366; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Porth, 63 Wis. 77; People v. Tax Com'rs, 104 U. S. 466. Property shipped from outside the taxing district on the assessment date, but not arriving within it until afterwards, is not subject to assessment for that year. Johnson v. Lyon, 106 Ill. 64. In State v. Eastabrook, 3 Nev. 173, it was held that property within the state at the time of the levy, is liable, though it is removed before assessment. In Crutchfield v. Stambaugh, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 832, it was held that where land is sold after the assessment, an agreement by the buyer to pay the taxes for that year will not release the seller from liability therefor. In Washburn v. Walworth, 133 Mass. 499, it was held that a partner who withdraws from the firm before the date of the assessment, retaining no interest therein, is not liable for taxes. In Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90, it was held that personal property not in esse upon the date of assessment, cannot be assessed. That property assessed has ceased to exist after assessment, is no defense to the tax. Shelby County 7. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 16 Lea (Tenn.) 401; Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 554. A change in the list does not invalidate the whole list. Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202. A corporation not practically organized, although its certificate has been filed before the date of assessment, is not liable for that year. Anglo-American Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 5 Mackey (D. C.) 422. 3. See Stockman v. Robbins, 80 Ind. 195; Williamsport v. Kent, 14 |