as to show the intention to give it official sanction; but it is immaterial whether the signatures appear at the beginning or the end.2 Provisions in relation to the signature, as for instance, that both list and warrant shall be signed, are mandatory ;3 but provisions as to the time of delivery are directory. The delivery of the warrant, however, must be made in time to allow the collector time for compulsory enforcement of the tax by action.4 3. Method of Collection-a. GENERALLY.-The government is entitled to all the remedies for the collection of taxes, to which Land, etc., Co., 73 Me. 404; Pearson v. Canney, 64 Me. 188; Goddard v. Seymour, 30 Conn. 394; Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 436. And see Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420. In Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt. 590, it was held that, in the absence of statutory provision, one selectman may properly perform the mechanical act of writing the names of the other members of the board, to a certificate of assessment, he being authorized by them so to do. 1. Belfast Sav. Bank v. Kennebec Land, etc., Co., 73 Me. 404. In Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473, it was held that a warrant issued by supervisors of a county for the collection of taxes, is valid, even though the persons describing it are not described therein as supervisors, or by any other official designation. Presumption of Due Signature.—It will be presumed that the tax list and warrant were duly signed by the assessors, in absence of proof to the contrary. Kellar v. Savage, 20 Me. 199. 2. Belfast Sav. Bank v. Kennebec Land, etc., Co., 73 Me. 404; Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 422. A warrant does not, like a deed, import a sealed instrument. Bradford v. Randall, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 495. Where the law requires the comptroller's signature to be "affixed" to a collector's warrant, the word "counter-signed" at the left of his name, does not vitiate his signature. Scammon v. Chicago, 42 Ill. 192. In Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 422, it was held that a highway tax is not void simply because the commissioner of highways did not sign the highway list. when he did sign the warrant for collection which was attached to the list. And in Kane v. Brooklyn, 114 N. Y. 586, the same rule was applied to the signature of the board of supervis ors upon the city tax rolls of Brooklyn. See also Doolittle v. Doolittle, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 313. Under the New Hampshire statute, the list of taxes committed to the collector, must be signed by the collector. Gordon v. Rundlett, 28 N. H. 435. 3. Belfast Sav. Bank v. Kennebec Land, etc., Co., 73 Me. 404; Colby v. Russell, 3 Me. 227; Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Me. 72; Johnson v. Goodridge, 15 Me. 29; Bangor v. Lancey, 21 Me. 472; Pearson v. Canney, 64 Me. 188; Chase v. Sparhawk, 22 N. H. 134; Copp v. Whipple, 41 N. H. 273. And see Den v. Craig, 5 Ired. (N. Čar.) 129. It is not sufficient that the list is specially referred to in the warrant to the collector, accompanying it. Copp v. Whipple, 41 N. H. 273. In Chase v. Sparhawk, 22 N. H. 134, it was held that selectmen issuing a warrant without authenticating the accompanying list of taxes, are answerable, in an action of trespass, for the act of the collector in the seizure of property for the enforcement of the collection of taxes, in pursuance of the direction contained in the warrant. 4. Bradley v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 401; People v. Allen, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 486; Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473; Oswego County v. Betts, 6 N. Y. Supp. 934; 53 Hun (N. Y.) 638; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 418; Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich. 146; Smith 7. Crittenden, 16 Mich. 152; Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182; Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 428. A tax sale is not invalid because the tax collector's certificate was not dated, or because the auditor's certificate did not show when it was received in his office. Corburn v. Crittenden, 62 Miss. 125. See also Mills 7. Scott, 62 Miss. 525; Wheeler, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Ligon, 62 Miss. 560. it may choose to resort.1 The state may provide that taxes shall be enforced, to the exclusion of other claims against the person or property. The method employed to enforce the collection may be changed at any time before the taxes are discharged or paid,3 for example, the state may adopt more stringent measures 4 but the law as it was before the change will govern pending proceedings, unless it is otherwise provided.5 The statutory remedy is exclusive, unless other remedies are expressly authorized. 1. Sce Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 30; York v. Goodwin, 67 Me. 260; Packard v. Tisdale, 50 Me. 376; State v. Duncan, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 679; Jonesboro v. McKee, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 167; Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 568; 91 Am. Dec. 299; Marr v. Bank of Tennessee, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 471. 2. A state is not bound to wait until the estate of a deceased person or insolvent has been distributed, but may enforce the payment of taxes, to the exclusion of other creditors. Dunlap v. Gallatin County, 15 Ill. 7. And see Bulfinch v. Benner, 64 Me. 404; Huiscamp v. Albert, 60 Iowa 421; In re Columbian Ins. Co., 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 239; Harvey v. South Chester, 99 Pa. St. 565. 3. Aplin v. Reynolds, 83 Mich. 471; In re Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. 488; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58; Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145. The legislature has power to pass an act to remedy defects in a law authorizing a tax, while the tax remains uncollected. Cowgill v. Long, 15 Ill. 203. 4. In re Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. 488. And see State v. Heman, 70 Mo. 441. Knowledge of Taxpayer.-Every taxpayer is assumed to know the usual course taken to enforce payment of delinquent taxes. Louden v. East Saginaw, 41 Mich. 18. 5. Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274; State v. Waterville Sav. Bank, 68 Me. 519; Oakland v. Whipple, 44 Cal. 303; State v. Tufts, 108 Mo. 418; Fitch v. Elko County, 8 Nev. 271. And see Bellows v. Parsons, 13 N. H. 256; State v. Sloss, 83 Ala. 93; People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 662; State v. Shepherd, 74 Mo. 310; Smith v. Kelly (Oregon, 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 642; Pacific, etc., Tel. Co. v. Com., 66 Pa. St. 70; People v. Latham, 53 Cal. 386; New Orleans v. Day, 29 La. Ann. 416; New Orleans v. Rheinish Westphalian Lloyds, 31 La. Ann. 784. But see Spokane County v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 5 Wash. 89; Brigins v. Chandler, 60 Miss. 862; Bryan v. Harvey, 11 Tex. 311. The repeal of a statute under which taxes are levied, however, puts an end to the right to collect them, unless the intent to preserve the right to collect appears. Gorley v. Sewell, 77 Ind. 317; Mount v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 25; Bleidorn v. Abel, 6 Iowa 5; State v. Hill, 70 Miss. 105. Additional Taxes.-When the duty to collect taxes, in addition to the ordinary ones, is imposed upon a collector, he should proceed in the same manner as for the collection of other taxes. Cunningham v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. St. 78. New Remedies.-In Briggins v. People, 106 Ill. 270, it was held that a new remedy given to enforce a tax lien by foreclosure in equity, applies to preexisting rights, as well as to those subsequently accruing. Not Applicable to Municipal Assessments. In Harvey v. South Chester, 99 Pa. St. 565, it was held that an act applying a new method for the collection of taxes in a certain county, has special reference to taxes, properly speaking, and does not apply to municipal claims or assessments which are made liens entitled to priority of payment by statute. Constitutional Charges.-In New Orleans v. Wood, 34 La. Ann. 732, it was held that a constitutional provision with reference to the method of collecting taxes, is not self-operative, and the former mode of collecting remains in force until otherwise abrogated. Saloy v. Woods, 40 La. Ann. 585. 6. See Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342; Johnston v. Louisville, 11 Bush (Ky.) 527; People v. Lee, 112 Ill. 113; Biggins v. People, 96 Ill. 381; Hibbard v. Clark, 56 N. H. 158; 22 Am. Rep. 442; Pole v. Muscatine, 17 Iowa 298; Packard v. Tisdale, 50 Me. 376; Macy v. Nantucket, 121 Mass. 351; Andover, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Gould, 6 Mass. 43; 4 Am. Dec. So; Crapo v. Stetson, 8 Met. (Mass.) 393; Alexander v. Helber, b. SUMMARY PROCESSES--(1) Nature and Constitutionality.The term "summary processes is applied to those informal proceedings for the collection of taxes which are of a speedy and peremptory nature, differing from the ordinary and regular proceedings of courts of justice. Such proceedings are not necessarily unconstitutional.2 (2) Construction.-Statutes authorizing summary processes for the collection of taxes, are to be strictly construed, as they are in derogation of the common law. They cannot be extended 35 Mo. 334; Caronchlet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 125; Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396; Montour v. Purdy, 11 Minn. 384; American Glucose Co. v. State, 43 N. J. Eq. 280; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 399; Board of Education v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., 18 W. Va. 441. But see infra, this title, Collection by Action. This rule does not apply where the remedy given is inadequate. Johnston v. Louisville, 11 Bush (Ky.) 527; McLean v. Myers, 134 N. Y. 480. And see Ryan v. Gallatin County, 14 Ill. 78; Central Trust Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co., 109 N. Y. 250. The rule has been laid down, how ever, that when the statutory remedy is defective, the courts cannot provide one. See Biggins v. People, 96 Ill. 381; Thompson v. Allen County, 13 Fed. Rep. 97. In Byrne v. La Salle, 123 Ill. 581, it was held that where forfeited lands are sold for delinquent taxes, an action afterwards brought to recover a personal judgment against the owner may be barred; but such a proceeding will not in any way impair the validity of a personal judgment already rendered. In State v. Georgia Co., 112 N. Car. 34, it was held that the existence of a special remedy for the collection of state and county taxes, restricts the revenue officers only, and not the state itself, which may pursue other methods than those provided for by statute. In State v. Georgia Co., 112 N. Car. 34, it was held that the right of a state to forfeit the charter of a domestic corporation, for failure to pay taxes, does not bar its right to bring a creditor's suit for such taxes. 1. See Taylor v. Secor (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U. S. 575; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 41; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701; Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 108; New Orleans v. Cannon, 10 La. Ann. 764. 2. State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 260; State v. Sargeant, 76 Mo. 557; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 494; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283; Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038; McCarroll v. Weeks, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 246; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722; Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586. It is competent for the legislature to authorize the use of different summary processes for the collection of the sum taxed, see Bristol v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 587; or it may provide for its enforcement, either by action or by summary process, at the option of the officers whose duty it is to effect its collection. York v. Goodwin, 67 Me. 260. Due Process of Law. They do not infringe the provision that property shall not be taken without due process of law. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 19; Den v. Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 272; U. S. v. Ferriera, 13 How. (U. S.) 40; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 311; Pritchard v. Marden, 24 Kan. 486; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 146; 40 Am. Dec. 274; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 59; 30 Am. Dec. 430; Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 260; State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 260. The constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, does not require that taxes shall be collected by an action in court, or under the forms of legal procedure. State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 260. But the taxpayer must have an opportunity to comply with the requirements of the law, and the state, not he, must be the actor. Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038. beyond their legitimate scope, and none of the safeguards which they have provided can be omitted. And it must appear from the face of the proceedings that the requirements of law have been strictly complied with.2 In determining what is required, however, the statute must receive a reasonable construction,3 and Where a tax may be enjoined, and its validity tested, before a court of justice, due process of law is given, even though the party applying for relief is required to give security in advance, as in other injunction cases. McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37. And see supra, this title, Due Process of Law. Appeal. The taxpayer, however, cannot be deprived of his property by summary process, unless the right of appeal is given to the courts to protect his substantial rights. State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 260; Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63 Ala. 574; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; Aplin v. Rey nolds, 83 Mich. 471; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722. 1. Scales v. Alvis, 12 Ala. 617; 46 Am. Dec. 269; Parker v. Burgen, 20 Ala. 251; Elliot v. Eddins, 24 Ala. 508; Gachet v. McCall, 50 Ala. 307; Milner v. Clarke, 61 Ala. 260; Pack v. Crawford, 29 Ark. 489; Graham v. Parham, 32 Ark. 676; Wilcox v. Gladwin, 50 Conn. 77; Redwine v. Hancock, 45 Ga. 364; Barlow v. Sumter County, 47 Ga. 642; Allen v. Scott, 13 Ill. So; Chicago v. Rock Island R. Co., 20 Ill. 286; Chicago v. Wright, 32 Ill. 192; Charles v. Waugh, 35 Ill. 315; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 Ill. 146; People v. Otis, 74 Ill. 384; Butler v. Nevin, 88 Ill. 577; People v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172; People v. Lee, 112 Ill. 113; Veit.v. Graff, 37 Ind. 253; Gregory v. Wilson, 52 Ind. 233; Stevens v. Williams, 70 Ind. 536; McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa 331; 71 Am. Dec. 421; Ankeny v. Henningsen, 54 Iowa 29; Bishop v. Looan, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 116; McCall v. Clark County Ct., 1 Bibb (Ky.) 516; Chiles v. Com., 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 577; Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me. 599; Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 561; Newsom v. Hart, 14 Mich. 233; King v. Harrington, 18 Mich. 213; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Blair v. Compton, 33 Mich. 414; Ward v. Carson River Wood Co., 13 Nev. 44; Cambridge v. Chandler, 6 N. H. 271; Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85; Dawson v. Croisan, 18 Oregon 431; Drexel v. Com., 46 Pa. St. 37; Com. v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 119; Michie v. Mullin, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 90; Glass v. White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 475; Spear v. Ditty, Š Vt. 421; Bellows v. Elliot, 12 Vt. 574; Sumner v. Sherman, 13 Vt. 612; Carpenter v. Sawyer, 17 Vt. 124; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470; Henry v. Tilson, 19 Vt. 447; Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388; Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48Vt. 403; Emerson v. Thompson, 59. Wis. 619; Knox v. Paterson, 21 Wis. 247; Potts v. Cooley, 51 Wis. 355; Williams v. Peyton, Wheat. (U. S.) 77; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 119; Early v. Doe, 16 How. (U. S.) 610. The state and its officers are asmuch bound to observe the law, and proceed in the mode pointed out by statute in the collection of a tax, as are individuals in the enforcement of any statutory right. People v. Biggins, 96 Ill. 481. In Walker v. People, 75 Ill. 614, it was held that an act to provide for the collection of revenue, and for the sale of real estate for non-payment of taxes for state, county, and municipal purposes, does not apply to a city, when it has no legislative authority to direct the time and manner of return of the collector's warrants therein provided for. The rule of strict conformity to statutory provisions in the collection of taxes, applies also to ordinances adopted by a municipality under statutory authority. Glass v. White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 475. When the statutes direct a thing to be done, or prescribe the form, time, and manner of doing it, it must be done in the form, time, and manner prescribed, or the act is invalid. Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388. 2. Francis v. Washburn, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 294; Hamilton v. Burum, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 359; Chicago v. Wright, 32 Ill. 192; Chicago v. Rock Island R. Co., 20 Ill. 286; Allen v. Scott, 13 Ill. So; Richards v. Stogsdell, 21 Ind. 74; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 119. 3. Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388; Michie v. Mullin, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 90. And see Wilson v. Herrington, 86 when no particular form or manner of doing a thing is pointed out, any mode which effects the object may be sufficient.1 (3) Different Kinds of Summary Methods-(a) Detention of Property. -Where the sheriff or other officer has in his hand a fund liable for taxes, the taxes may be deducted by him, or a direct claim for the amount due may be made against the fund by the collector, without instituting any other proceedings.2 So taxes may be collected indirectly, by directing that a debtor shall pay the tax upon the debt due and deduct it from moneys due his creditor, or that a corporation shall pay the tax upon its stockholders' shares, and deduct the sum paid for the dividends due the shareholders.3 Ga. 777; Harriman v. School Dist., 35 Vt. 311; Clemons v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 673. A collector is not bound to keep or sell distrained property within the limits of the town in which it is first seized by him. Carville v. Additon, 62 Me. 459. In King v. Whitcomb, 1 Met. (Mass.) 328, it was held that a demand by the collector, of payment of a tax assessed on a non-resident who has no agent or attorney in the city, is sufficient to justify a subsequent seizure and sale of his goods, if it be made at his last usual place of abode, in the town where he is taxed. 1. Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388; Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt. 421; Bellows v. Elliot, 12 Vt. 574; Isaacs v. Shattuck, 12 Vt. 668; Michie v. Mullin, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 90. It is no objection to the legality of the collector's proceedings, that one of the days during which he kept the distress according to law, was Sunday. Carville v. Additon, 62 Me. 459. In Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28, it was held that a tax collector does not become a trespasser ab initio, by keep ing a horse, which is levied upon, a little longer than is absolutely necessary to giving notice and making sale, and that if the keeping is lawful, the expense of the keeping is a lawful charge, but where the keeping is unlawful, the owner may recover the excess. 2. In re Dupuy, 33 La. Ann. 258; Scholefield v. West, 44 La. Ann. 277; Central Trust Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co., 109 N. Y. 250; In re Columbian Ins. Co., 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 239; Hoglen v. Cohan, 30 Ohio St. 436. See REVENUE LAWS, vol. 21, p. 301. Where a city taxes its own stock, payment may be enforced by deducting the amount of the tax from interest due on the stock. Jenkins v. Charleston, 5 S. Car. 393; 23 Am. Rep. 14. Where real estate on which taxes are due has been sold under a decree of a court of equity, the duty of a tax collector is to apply to the court to have the taxes paid out of the proceeds of sale. Prince George County v. Clarke, 36 Md. 206. Decedent's Estate-Assignee.-In Millett v. Early, 16 Neb. 266, it was held that, upon the death of a taxpayer, a claim for taxes may be properly filed against his estate. Under the Missouri statutes, taxes on the personal estate of a decedent, whether accruing before or after his death, are demands which may be established by proceedings either in the probate or circuit court. State v. Tittman, 103 Mo. 553. And see Richardson v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480. A petition by a collector of taxes, for an order to compel an assignee of a tax debtor to pay taxes due from the assignor, out of funds in his hands, which fails to show that any property went into the assignee's hands to which a lien could attach, and simply charges that he has funds in his hands sufficient to pay the taxes, is wholly insufficient. In re Johnson, 104 Ill. 50. In Wolf v. Geffroy, 16 Ohio St. 219, it was held that provisions of the Ohio statute for the summary collection of taxes against executors and administrators, does not apply to taxes assessed upon the intestate before his death, but only to taxes assessed upon executors and administrators as such. In Smith v. Gatewood, 3 S. Car. 333, it was held that where the lien of a municipal corporation for taxes is not displaced by a decree of foreclosure and sale thereunder, the remedy is not against the proceeds of the sale. 3. See Maltby v. Reading, etc., R. |