That all other candidates for admission shall pass a satisfactory examination upon the following subjects, namely, (Latin) Horace, Odes Book 3; Virgil, Eneid, Book 6; Cæsar, Commentaries Books 5 and 6; Cicero, Pro Milone. (Mathematics) Arithmetic, Algebra to the end of Quadratic Equations; Euclid, Books 1, 2, and 3. outlines of Modern Geography, History of England (W. Douglas Hamilton's) English Grammar and Composition.

That Articled Clerks shall pass a preliminary examination upon the following subjects:-Cæsar, Commentaries Books 5 and 6; Arithmetic; Euclid, Books 1, 2, and 3; Outlines of Modern Geography, History of England (W. Douglas Hamilton's) English Grammar and Composition, Elements of Book-keeping.

That the subjects and books for the first Intermediate Examination shall be :-Real Property, Williams; Equity, Smith's Manual; Common Law, Smith's Manual; Act respecting the Court of Chancery (C. S. U. C. c. 12), (C. S. U. S. caps. 42 and 44).

That the subjects and books for the second Intermediate Examination be as follows:-Real Property, Leith's Blackstone, Greenwood on the Practice of Conveyancing (chapters on Agreements, Sales, Purchases, Leases, Mortgages, and Wills); Equity, Snell's Treatise; Common Law, Broom's Common Law, C. S. U. C. c. 88, Statutes of Canada, 29 Vic. c. 28, Insolvency Act.

That the books for the final examination for students at law, shall be as follows:

1. For Call.-Blackstone Vol. i., Leake on Contracts, Watkins on Conveyancing, Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Stephen on Pleading, Lewis' Equity Pleading, Dart on Vendors and Purchasers, Taylor on Evidence, Byles on Bills, the Statute Law, the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts.

2. For Call with Honours, in addition to the preceding -Russell on Crimes, Broom's Legal Maxims, Lindley on Partnership, Fisher on Mortgages, Benjamin on Sales, Jarman on Wills. Von Savigny's Private International Law (Guthrie's Edition), Maine's Ancient Law.

That the subjects for the final examination of Articled Clerks shall be as follows:-Leith's Blackstone, Watkins on Conveyancing (9th ed.), Smith's Mercantile Law, Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Leake on Contracts, the Statute Law, the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts.

Candidates for the final examinations are subject to reexamination on the subjects of the Intermediate Examinations. All other requisites for obtaining certificates of fitness and for call are continued.

That the Books for the Scholarship Examinations shal be as follows:

1st year. Stephen's Blackstone, Vol. i., Stephen on Pleading, Williams on Personal Property, Griffith's Institutes of Equity, C. S. U. S. c. 12, C. S. U. C. c. 43.

2nd year.-Williams on Real Property, Best on Evidence, Smith on Contracts, Snell's Treatise on Equity, the Registry Acts.

3rd year.-Real Property Statutes relating to Ontario, Stephen's Blackstone, Book V., Byles on Bills, Broom's Legal Maxims, Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Fisher on Mortgages, Vol. 1, and Vol. 2, chaps. 10, 11 and 12.

4th year.-Smith's Real and Personal Property, Russell on Crimes, Common Law Pleading and Practice, Benjamin on Sales, Dart on Vendors and Purchasers, Lewis' Equity Pleading, Equity Pleading and Practice in this Province. That no one who has been admitted, on the books of the Society as a Student shall be required to pass preliminary examination as an Articled Clerk.

J. HILLYARD CAMERON,
Treasurer.

COSTS IN CASES OF APPEAL. The two highest English tribunals to which colonial courts are wont to look for guidance are at variance on the important question as to the principle to be adopted in awarding costs of appeal to a successful appellant. The difference was tersely pointed out by Lord Cairns in De Vitre v. Betts, 21 W. R. 705, as follows: "The rule is, in this House (the House of Lords), that where an appellant, in succeeding, corrects a miscarriage of the court below, he is not entitled to the costs of the appeal, because the respondent in such a case is merely seeking to retain the advantage which he has obtained. The rule of the Judicial Com

mittee of the Privy Council is, generally speaking, to give the successful party the costs of the appeal; and I own I consider the rule of the Privy Council on the whole the better rule of the two." The Court of Error and Appeal for this Province has always followed the practice of the House of Lords; and when some members of the court in the Goodhue case were, perhaps inadvertently, about to give their decision that the appeal should be allowed with costs yet, on the remonstrances of counsel for the respondents against the innovation, the court gave effect to the general rule of practice, and simply allowed the appeal.

As to appeals from County Courts to the Superior Courts of Common Law, the practice now prevails here, as in England, of allowing such appeals with costs. We commented upon the change of practice in this respect in 8 C.L. J. N.S. 133.

Appeals to the Court of Chancery from inferior courts are but few and far between. For the most part they arise under the Insolvent Act, and we think the practice may now be considered as well-settled that the costs in such cases will usually follow the result. A distinction is to be observed between the Act of

1864 and that of 1869, now in force, as to the provisions respecting the costs of appeals. Sub-sec. 6 of sec. 7, of the former Act, provided that the costs in appeal were to be in the discretion of the court

appealed to. In the latter Act this provision is altogether omitted, and no reference is made as to awarding costs in appeal, except in cases where the appeal is not duly prosecuted. Under the former Act, the usual course was to allow or dismiss the appeal with costs, and the same rule has been generally observed under the present Act. See Re Williams, 31 U. C. Q. B. 153. We understand that the right or jurisdiction of the appellate court to award costs in insolvency appeals was argued before Vice-Chancellor Strong in an unreported case, Re Patterson (January, 1873). The learned judge held that the court had power to deal with the question of costs upon allowing an appeal, and that, in his view, the practice of the Privy Council was preferable to that of the House of Lords, and in a colonial court was to be followed under analogous circumstances, as being the practice of the court of last resort for colonial appeals. Acting upon this opinion, he allowed the appeal, and awarded against the respondents all costs,

both in the court below and in the

Court of Chancery on the appeal. The Vice-Chancellor appears to be in accord with the views of Lord Cairns, subsequently expressed, as to the rule of the Privy Council being more satisfactory than that of the Lords; and from late decisions we observe that Malins, V. C., appears to be of the same opinion. In Ashley v. Sedgwick, 21 W. R. 455, he held that in appeals from a County Court where the subject-matter in dispute is small, the court will, in its discretion, give a successful appellant his costs, both in the court below and of the appeal. And so he also decided in Booth v. Turle, 21 W. R. 721.

In respect to re-hearings in Chancery, the practice in this Province appears to be somewhat changing in allowing the party who successfully re-hears to obtain all his costs. This seems in part to be due to the influence of the judge last appointed to the equity bench, ViceChancellor Blake, who has frequently taken occasion to express his views that in all cases costs should follow the result, and that an error of the judge of first instance should not protect the party who profits by it from paying all the costs in the long run, if the full court reverses the judgment below. The last reported decision in re-hearing, Dalglish v. McCarthy, 19 Grant, 578, exemplifies these remarks. There the court allowed the appeal with costs, Blake, V. C., citing the language of the late Lord Westbury in Bartlett v. Wood, 9 W. R. 817, where he says,

"I have had occasion to observe upon the general rule, and it is one from which, most undoubtedly, so far as I am concerned, I shall seldom depart; namely, that in contentious cases, the costs of the litigation must be considered as following the result of it."

It may be well to note that the same volume of reports contains an able decision of the Chancellor in O'Donell v. Black, 19 Gr. 623, where the general question as to the principle on which costs should be awarded to successful litigants is discussed.

Upon the whole, the courts of Ontario may be said to have come to the conclusion that all appellants who succeed in their appeals should, as a consequence, obtain complete success, by having awarded to them their costs of appeal, except in the highest court of the Province, where the rule of the House of Lords is yet followed. It is desirable, in our judgment, that the practice of the Court of Error and Appeal should be reconsidered, or that a general order should be

passed touching the costs of appeal which would render the disposition of these costs uniform in all the courts.

SELECTIONS.

LICENSE IN CROSS EXAMINATIONS.

Some instances of cross-examination to credit have recently occurred which must have suggested very generally that the prevailing license is apt to be grossly abused. The Pall Mall Gazette, whose representative in legal matters is Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, has handled the subject scientifically, and, we need hardly add, adduced an illustration connected with the Indian Evidence Act. The writer is afraid to mention the cases upon which his article is based, but he evidently refers to the cross-examination of Lord Bellew, who, having given evidence as to the tatoo marks in a celebrated pending trial, was asked in cross-examination whether he had ever acted dishonourably concerning another man's wife and cruelly to his own. In another case the victim of a seduction was asked a series of most offensive questions in cross-examination with a view to show that she had previously been unchaste. No evidence was

called to support this cross-examination, and Mr. Justice Honyman condemned it in unmeasured terms. For the benefit and instruction of attorneys and counsel let us hear what a high-class thinker, and a man of unblemished character, says on the subject:-"The client," says the writer above named, "tells his attorney some lie about a witness against whom he has a spite. The attorney passes it on to the counsel, and unless the counsel is a man both of experience and principle, he is but too apt to regard this, however wrongly, as an instruction which relieves him from all responsibility in the matter, and compels him to throw in the face of the witness an insult which may not only deeply wound his or her feelings, but permanently injure his or her reputation. We do not at all forget, nor are we disposed in any degree to underrate, the good feeling and principle of legal practitioners, or the influence of the Bench in checking abuses of their legal powers. No lawyer in either branch of the profes

sion who had either the feelings of a gentleman or any sort of position or reputation to lose, would degrade himself by slandering or insulting those who must from the nature of the case submit to his insult or his slander without defence or reply. When such conduct does take place it is sure to provoke indignant rebukes from the Bench, and it is to these circumstances that we owe it that English courts of justice are not, in fact, regarded with the horror with which they assuredly would be regarded if the parties used to their utmost their legal right of raking up every incident in the past life of every witness and every lying scandal which has ever been circulated by any enemy with respect to them, and flinging the whole in their faces in the confidence that imputations which may happen to be true will inflict moral injury on the reputation of the witness, and that even if the imputation is utterly false some of the dirt can hardly fail to stick." We hope the passages which we have italicised will be duly conned and remembered. It is suggested that an absolute discretion should be given to a court to permit or forbid the putting of any particular question. We agree that in any case the permission of the Judge should be obtained before cross-examination to the credit of a witness is allowed at all. If a question is put and not allowed to be pressed the object of the cross-examination is in a measure attained. It ought, in all cases, to be a question for the Judge whether the evidence of a witness is of such a kind that his credibility ought to be attacked. A further suggestion made by the writer in our contemporary is that a witness should not be allowed to decline to answer on the ground that he will thereby criminate himself. This is a wide proposition which we shall not at present discuss.-Law Times.

The following incident in the life of Lord Kenyon is recorded in an account of his life recently published by a descendant of his. It is taken from a letter of Lord Erskine to Lord Howell, in 1821, relating to a judgment in the court of admiralty in a case of collision at sea:

"I remember my excellent friend, the late Lord Kenyon, one of the best and ablest judges, and the soundest lawyer,

in trying a cause at Guildhall, seemed disposed to leave it to the jury whether the party who suffered might not have saved himself by going on the wrong side of the road, when the witnesses swore that ample room was left. The answer to which is, the dangerous uncertainty of such an attempt, destructive of all the presumptions of conduct founded upon law. Observing that Lord Kenyon was entangled with this distinction, from his observations in the course of the evidence, I said to the jury, in stating (sic) the defendant's case :- 'Gentlemen,-If the noble and learned judge, in giving you hereafter his advice, shall depart from the only principle of safety (unless where collisions are selfish and malicious), and you shall act upon it, I can only say that I shall feel the same confidence in his lordship's general learning and justice, and shall continue to delight, as I always do, in attending his administration of justice; but I pray God that I may never meet him on the road!' Lord Kenyon laughed, and the jury along with him, and when he came to sum up he abandoned the distinction, saying to the jury that he believed it to be the best course stare super antiquas vias."

CANADA REPORTS.

ONTARIO.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

QUEEN'S BENCH.

HILARY TERM, 1873.

DAVIS ET AL. v. MCPHERSON. Patents, construction of -Description of land "N. W.."

In 1857 a patent issued for the "NorthWesterly quarter" of a two hundred-acre lot, the side-lines of which ran N. 45° W., and S. 45° E., and in 1859 another patent issued for the S. E. of the N. W. of the same lot. Held, that the first patent covered fifty acres, extending half the depth and half the width of the lot, and not fifty acres extending across the whole width and one fourth the depth. Held, also, the subsequent patent could not affect the first; for the question must be, what did the patent cover when issued? Held, also, that the