spect to all matters embraced within the enumerated or implied powers under the jurisdiction of Congress are not reviewed here, as they have no bearing upon the regulation by treaty of matters outside of congressional jurisdiction. In such cases no questions involving reserved powers or State rights are presented, and it seems unnecessary to make more than a passing reference to them. The only question there is as to the completeness of the treaty without concurrent action by Congress which has already been considered. If the treaty stipulations relate to matters which are within the powers of Congress and properly concern the international interests of the nation, the right to deal with them through the treaty-making power cannot be doubted.

It will be observed that in none of the cases above cited, in which the Supreme Court has sustained the power to regulate by treaty matters beyond the ordinary jurisdiction of Congress, have the privileges granted exceeded the mere removal of alienage disabilities, such removal being usually in exchange for reciprocal privileges, and in no instance have foreigners been placed upon a more favorable footing than nationals so far as the enjoyment of the privileges granted is concerned.

A different question, and one which has not as yet been passed upon by the Supreme Court, would be presented if aliens should be granted greater privileges than those enjoyed by citizens, or if international regulations should be adopted by treaty dealing with economic questions such, for example, as the universal improvement of labor conditions, or if regulations should be established by treaty in conflict with the police powers of a State, or, to put the extreme case, if the treaty-making power should be exercised to alienate a part or all of a State from the jurisdiction of the United States.

In all of these cases the suggested action of the treaty-making power would concern matters beyond the ordinary jurisdiction of Congress, and in each case such action would conflict with the so-called reserved powers of the States or the people; and although, in the absence of a direct ruling on such cases by the Supreme Court, it is impossible to say that the action of the treaty-making power would be sustained as establishing a "supreme law of the land" in all or any of the cases, yet the grounds and conditions upon which such

action could be sustained have already been indicated and may be briefly stated.

In order to justify the contemplated action of the treaty-making power in these cases, or in any others which might be suggested, it is necessary, as appears from the principles already established, that such action fall within the general scope and purpose of the Constitution with respect both to the nation and to the States, and it is also essential that it should accord with the underlying conditions inherent in the nature of the treaty-making power — namely, that it must be exercised" to promote the general welfare" of the American people and that the matters dealt with must directly concern the international interests or relations of the nation. If it appears that these requirements are fulfilled actually as a matter of fact, and not as a mere subterfuge for exercising the power, then in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court above cited, sustaining the jurisdiction of the treaty-making power over some of the so-called reserved powers, it is difficult to assign any reasonable ground for denying it jurisdiction over the other so-called reserved powers in the cases suggested. It has already been argued that inasmuch as the reserved powers all stand on the same footing in their relation to the treatymaking power, and in view of the terms of the provision making such reservation of powers, the right to exercise jurisdiction over any of them implies the right to exercise jurisdiction over them all. The question of the police powers was left open as a possible exception, but no well-defined distinction can be drawn between the police powers and the other so-called reserved powers in relation to the treaty-making power, and no conclusive reason appears for making an exception of them in this connection.

As was said by Mr. Justice Swayne, in Hauenstein v. Lynham (100 U. S., at p. 489), with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by the treaty-making power over certain of the reserved powers then under consideration, which applies equally to all of them:

If the national government has not the power to do what is done in such treaties, it cannot be done at all, for the States are expressly forbidden to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or federation." Const., Art. I., Sec. 10.

It is hardly conceivable that the national government should find itself powerless to deal with any international questions requiring

adjustment by treaty. The United States Supreme Court has held, in far-reaching terms, that the jurisdiction of the treaty-making power extends to all the appropriate subjects of negotiation between nations, (Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 242; U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 197; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 266, and In re Ross, 140 U. S. 463), and it must be remembered that the United States is a nation invested with all the usual powers of a nation in dealing with foreign governments. The position of the United States Supreme Court on this point has been stated as follows:

Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheaton, at p. 414):

America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The Constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States.

Mr. Justice Bradley, in Knox v. Lee (12 Wall., at p. 555):

The United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state governments.

Mr. Justice Field, in the first of the Chinese Exclusion cases (130 U. S., at pp. 603, 606):

The United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. For local interests the several States of the Union exist; but for international purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.

* * *

Mr. Justice Gray, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States (149 U. S., at p. 711):

The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international rela

tions, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective. The only government of this country, which other nations recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union; and the only American flag known throughout the world is the flag of the United States. The Constitution of the United States speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject.

Mr. Justice Brewer, in State of Kansas v. State of Colorado, recently decided (May 13, 1907):

It is no longer open to question that by the Constitution a nation was brought into being, and that that instrument was not merely operative to establish a closer union or league of States. Whatever powers of government were granted to the nation or reserved to the States (and for the description and limitation of those powers we must always accept the Constitution as alone and absolutely controlling), there was created a nation to be known as the United States of America, and as such then assumed its place among the nations of the world.

In the light of these opinions it cannot well be denied that the treaty-making power is a national rather than a federal power, and this distinction measures the whole difference between its jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of Congress in relation of the so-called reserved powers. An illuminating contrast between this power of the nation to make treaties and the powers of the several branches of the Federal Government has recently been drawn by Mr. Root, in his address on The Real Questions Under the Japanese Treaty," delivered before the American Society of International Law, as follows:

Legislative power is distributed: upon some subjects the national legislature has authority, upon other subjects the state legislature has authority. Judicial power is distributed: in some cases the federal courts have jurisdiction, in other cases the state courts have jurisdiction. Executive power is distributed: in some fields the national executive is to act, in other fields the state executive is to act. The treaty-making power is not distributed; it is all vested in the national government; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the states. In international affairs there are no states; there is but one nation, acting in direct relation and representation of every citizen in every state. Every treaty made under the authority of the United States is made by the national government as the direct and sole representative of every citizen of the United States residing in California equally with every citizen of the United States residing elsewhere. It is, of course, conceivable that, under pretense of exercising the treaty-making power, the president and senate might attempt to make provisions regarding matters which are not proper subjects of international agreement, and which would be only a

colorable not a real exercise of the treaty-making power; but so far as the real exercise of the power goes there can be no question of state rights, because the constitution itself, in the most explicit terms, has precluded the existence of any such question. (American Journal of In

ternational Law, Vol. 1, Second Quarter, p. 278.)

That the jurisdiction of Congress is not the measure of the extent of the powers delegated under the Constitution to the other branches of the United States Government is settled, beyond the possibility of question, in the case of Kansas v. Colorado (supra), recently decided by the Supreme Court, wherein a distinction is drawn between the extent of the jurisdiction of that court and the jurisdiction of Congress. It is there pointed out that all legislative powers granted to Congress by the Constitution are defined, but that there is no limitation or enumeration of the judicial powers granted, and that the entire judicial power of the nation is vested in the federal courts. The conclusion reached is, in the language of the opinion

There may be, of course, limitations on that grant of power, but if there are any they must be expressed, for otherwise the general grant would vest in the Courts all the judicial power which the new nation was capable of exercising.

Applying this construction, the court there held that its jurisdiction extended to the settlement of an interstate controversy concerning matters which were beyond the jurisdiction of Congress.

The reasoning and conclusions of the court in that case on the extent of the judicial powers would apply with equal force to the treaty-making power of the nation.

The considerations hereinabove presented show the propriety, at least, if not the necessity, of interpreting the grant of the treatymaking power to the national government so as to extend its jurisdiction in proper cases over all the so-called reserved powers, and this is in accord with the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton, at p. 187), that a liberal rather than a narrow construction should be placed upon the extent of the powers delegated under the Constitution. On this point he said:

This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this