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rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper " for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general advantage in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.
Although perhaps it is more in the line of persuasion than argument, it may not be inappropriate to call attention to the remarks of Mr. Justice Johnson, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Anderson v. Dunn (6 Wheaton, at p. 226), in support of the proposition that the possession of power does not
necessarily imply its abuse, and that much must be left to discretion. He says:
The idea is utopian that government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security against the abuse of such discretion must rest on responsibility, and stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived from the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposit it at the feet of the people, to be resumed again only at their will, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagination, but individual liberty can be in little danger.
Moreover, the usual checks and balances on powers under the Constitution are not lacking here, and the possibility of any dangerous abuse of this power is largely removed by the necessity for the approval of treaties by the President and two-thirds of the Senators present, and by the condition imposed under the decisions of the Supreme Court that no treaty which is not self-executing can be put in effect without the consent of a majority of the House of Representatives, and by the further condition that every treaty, so far as it is a law of the land in distinction from a national obligation, may be repealed by congressional legislation.
CHANDLER P. ANDERSON.
THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE
I. THE PROGRAMME
In his address to the First Peace Conference on May 20, 1899, President De Staal remarked:
The name "Peace Conference," which the instinct of the peoples, outstripping in this respect the decision taken by the governments, has given to our reunion, well indicates the essential object of our labors. The "Peace Conference" cannot fail in the mission incumbent upon it. It must produce from its deliberations a tangible result which the whole of humanity awaits with confidence.1
Such was the keynote of the salutation with which doubt and pessimism were greeted upon their arrival at The Hague in 1899. Certainly, in 1907 the nations, after the impressive lessons taught by two terrible wars, whether anxious participants or silent witnesses, have a still more ardent desire for permanent peace, and the duty owed by the governments to humanity is not less solemn or less evident.
The deliberations about to begin at The Hague through the initiative of President Roosevelt and at the invitation of the Emperor of Russia concern every human being, without distinction of nationality. For the blind, fortuitous play of local interests and public passions which has thus far so largely affected and determined the history of the world it is proposed to substitute a calm examination of certain questions connected with future international action and development, and to control in some measure the impulses which underlie the relations of sovereign states to one another.
Avowedly, the movement begun at The Hague in 1899, and now to be carried forward to another stage, is an expression of the general conviction that war is an evil to be prevented if possible, and in any case to be mitigated.
What, then, is war? In its most abstract sense, it is a state of conflict in which adversaries endeavor to settle their differences by
'Conférence internationale de la paix. Première partie, p. 16.
inflicting mutual injuries upon each other. In its public and international sense, it is a state of conflict between sovereign powers in which appeal is made to the force of arms. Its apologists defend it as necessary for the defense of rights which would otherwise have to be sacrificed; as legitimate according to the immemorial usage of mankind; and as salutary in developing the strength and courage of a nation. Its adversaries condemn it as inflicting pain, suffering and death upon innocent persons; as resting upon the principle that might makes right; as in no respect adapted to determine a question of right and wrong; as a survival of primitive barbarism; as debasing rather than elevating in its effect upon the character of a nation; as entailing sacrifices of an oppressive nature, often out of proportion to the advantages obtained even in case of victory; and as sowing seeds of permanent ill feeling and provoking plans for future reprisal on the part of the vanquished.
By its apologists as well as by its adversaries war is regarded as a grave, if not an unmitigated evil, which is, in general, to be discouraged and if possible prevented. Upon this point there is practically no divergence of opinion. Those who advocate powerful military organizations and effective navies do so chiefly on the ground that these are the best guarantees of peace. Agreement is practically universal also that peace is not merely a negative notion, the mere absence of war, but that, as the fruitful source or favoring condition of every form of social progress and general prosperity, it may rightly be compelled, if necessary, even by armed force. Thus many of the most earnest pacificists are likewise pacificators, and admit the rightfulness and even the righteousness. of a war against war.
Is war, then, like some other evils inherent in human nature, ineradicable? Sovereign states are, in their juridical relations, moral personalities, endowed with intelligence of their interests and with free volition in the pursuit of them. Is there any reason to believe that they will ever be more just, more unselfish, and more reasonable than the average of the human individuals who compose them? Is there a certainty that governments, however sagacious, prudent, and well-disposed, will ever, in the last extremity, be able to restrain those waves of national feeling which have so often and so fatally
plunged nations into war? The answers to these questions, to have any value, must be based upon a profound knowledge of the psychology of peoples. It is not surprising, therefore, that radical differences of opinion should exist upon this subject, and the danger of open antagonism resulting from this opposition of views in any diversified assembly of men, such as an international conference must necessarily be, is in proportion to the tenacity with which these views are held and defended.
The indispensable conditions for a successful consideration of the means of avoiding war are evidently an entire freedom from the spirit of dogmatism, toleration for the convictions and pretensions of others, perfect liberty of thought, studious courtesy of expression, and a sincere desire to unite with persons holding diametrically opposite opinions in reaching the greatest number of practical results likely to be beneficial to mankind. From the nature of the case, the conclusions of a Peace Conference must assume some form of compromise. The first fact to be recognized is that the chief cause of war is obstinacy in thought, opinion, and purpose, almost always sustained by a real or factitious conviction of duty. If a conference in the interest of peace is to bear wholesome fruit, the idea of uncompromising insistance upon previously elaborated conceptions has to be abandoned; and a new, if not a nobler, form of heroism has to be cultivated, the resolution to live, and to let others live, for the greatest good that may be possible.
It is not intended to represent that ideals must be lowered, that convictions may not be expressed, or that they may not be urged by firm, clear, and cogent argumentation; but the militant spirit is not becoming in a plea for peace. plea for peace. Nor is it to be supposed that the impassioned eloquence which upon another occasion might prove triumphant in swaying an audience can be useful in deliberations where individual feelings really count for nothing, where conclusions must be reached by the determination of separate commissions, where unanimity is essential to success, and where the ratification. of governments unaffected by personal influences is necessary to crown the completed work.
It is to be expected, therefore, that many noble aspirations and ingenious suggestions for promoting the peace of nations must fall