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this war right, now a matter of accepted international law, will not be given up except in isolated arrangements like that of the United States and Italy. So far England's Government as the great sea power has persistently refused to discuss even any proposition for the abolition of the right to capture private property at sea. I will mention only one official statement upon the matter which will stand as a representative statement of the Government of England as to its policy.

Lord Palmerston, in 1859, said:

The existence of England depends upon her maritime preponderance, and she could not maintain herself if she were deprived of the right to capture the private property of the enemy and to make prisoners of the crews of its merchant ships. A maritime power like England cannot renounce any proper means of weakening her enemies, and if she did not take as prisoners the sailors of their merchant ships they would soon be employed in fighting upon the ships of war.

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But times change and with them the interests of nations. great carrying trade of Great Britain is now more than half of that of the world; that of the United States has sunk into insignificance. From the insular conditions of the British isles not only is her food supply sea borne in transit, but the greater part of the raw materials which feed the industries of Great Britain are sea borne, and her large export trade of manufactured articles finds upon the sea also its distributing routes.

As a result some of her statesmen and her writers upon international law advocate the exemption from capture of private property at sea as a policy most conducive to her interests.

Among these I may mention Sir John MacDonell, Dr. Thomas J. Lawrence, Mr. Edmund Robertson, a member of the present Government, and Lord Loreburn, now Lord High Chancellor of the realm.

Still in opposition may be found Atlay, the editor of Hall's International Law; Mr. Oppenheim, author of a recent work on International Law; Westlake, and Professor Holland.

But even the latter writers have shifted their ground.

Westlake, after discussing the matter under its old received conclusions, says:

The true conclusion appears to be that a real cause, when such may exist, for desiring the detention of the enemy's sailors and ships in order to prevent invasion or the loss of our naval supremacy, is the only adequate motive for maintaining the present practice; and that at the commencement of a war England should offer to her enemy to enter with him into a convention determinable by either side on short notice for mutual abstention from maritime capture except under the heads of blockade and contraband.

Holland, who expresses still his opposition to any change, said in a letter written in 1900:

The question of immunity seems to me to be rather one for politicians and shipowners than for lawyers. It is probable that immunity would now be in the interest of Great Britain, but if so the continental governments, whatever may be continental legal opinion, are not likely to pledge themselves to it, and, even if they did enter into a general convention to that effect, could hardly be relied upon to stand by their bargain. I doubt the expediency of making treaties about lines of conduct which may affect national existence. The strain upon them is likely to be too great for endurance, and one is afraid that one's country might be lulled into security by a paper contract which might be torn up on the outbreak of hostilities.

Lord Loreburn, now the Lord Chancellor, in the present British Cabinet, as Sir Robert Reid and as a member of Parliament in opposition to the late ministry, wrote to the London Times of October 14, 1905, a long letter in advocacy of the abolition of this war right. Time permits me to quote three significant paragraphs only of this communication, whose importance is accentuated by the fact that it came from one who is now one of the most distinguished officials of the party in power in Great Britain.

Sir Robert wrote just after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war and says:

Let me begin by stating plainly the conclusions which I seek to have adopted. I maintain that conditions have completely changed since the Napoleonic times, and, that, whatever it may have been then, it is now the true interest of Great Britain and also of other nations (though the reasons may be diverse) to exempt private property at sea from capture unless really contraband or its place of destination be a beleaguered fortress.

It may be asked, What prospect is there of altering the law in this respect, even if we desired it? An answer may be found in the history

of this question upon which instructive though it be a few words must suffice. During the last fifty years or more the United States have persistently advocated this change, even to the point of refusing to abandon the right of privateering in 1856 unless all private property (other than contraband) should be declared free from maritime capture. Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia, have all within the last half-century either adopted in their own practice, or offered to adopt, the American view; and continental jurists have almost without exception denounced the existing law. Indeed two nations, Great Britain and France, have alone stood in the way, and but for their opposition the American view would have prevailed many years ago. Perhaps Great Britain and France opposed because they were the only two great naval powers at the time. Perhaps other nations which have since become or resolved to become great naval powers may now oppose what they once supported. That remains to be seen. It is enough to say that the chances of reform in this direction seem very hopeful if only the British Government is willing.

Last year President Roosevelt declared in favor of a new International Conference at The Hague, and notified that, among other matters for deliberation, the United States intended again to press this very subject on the attention of the powers. Unquestionably the American President, with the immense authority he now wields, will exert every effort to attain this point. I trust that His Majesty's Government will avail themselves of this unique opportunity. I urge it not upon any ground of sentiment or of humanity (indeed, no operation of war inflicts less suffering than the captrue of unarmed vessels at sea), but upon the ground that, on the balance of argument, coolly weighed, the interests of Great Britain will gain much from a change long and eagerly desired by the great majority of other powers.

As to other powers of the civilized world:

In the war of 1866 Austria, Italy, and Prussia adopted the principle of immunity of private property at sea. The same principle was urged upon France in the war of 1870 by Prussia, but, not being adopted by France, was relinquished by Prussia. Since then no immunity has been asked for or observed in war time.

The change of the status of Prussia from a non-maritime power to the nucleus of the maritime power of the Empire of Germany may lead to a changed attitude on her part upon this subject at an international conference. Certain it is that some continental writers, like Köpeke, Dupuis, and Perels, favor the retention of this war right. The better known writers, like Fioré, Calvo, Bluntschti, and Martens, still advocate immunity.

International agreements and the usages of international law have

given the following vessels of a belligerent immunity from capture on the high seas:

(a) Ships engaged in voyages of discovery;

(b) Hospital ships under Hague conventions;

(c) Cartel ships engaged in the exchange of prisoners;

(d) Mail packets under conventions;

(e) Coast fishing vessels innocently employed;

(f) Ships protected by special license, ransom, or days of grace. In addition to these, ships engaged in purely charitable or scientific pursuits are generally exempt from capture, released thereafter, or given a license of immunity.

It may be well at this point to enumerate the military advantages claimed for the capture of private property at sea in time of war. We will preface this enumeration, however, by the statement "that the general object of war is to procure the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period, with the least expenditure of life and property." (Naval War Code of United States, Art. 1, p. 5.)

1. The first and most wide-reaching result claimed for this war right is the diminution that would follow in certain countries of food supplies and also of raw materials for manufacture. This interference with food supplies, etc., would bear with especial severity upon insular countries or in case of nearly insular countries that were bordered by the territory of the other belligerent on the land side.

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The royal commission on supply of food and raw material in time of war, which was appointed in Great Britain in 1903, reported in 1905 upon this subject. This commission, composed of distinguished men of various classes, included Dr. Holland as an international law expert and Admiral Sir Gerard Noel as a naval expert. large and valuable amount of evidence is printed with the report. The commission carefully ascertained the extent of the dependence of the British isles for supplies of food and raw materials for manufacture upon foreign sources, developing the fact that four-fifths of the wheat and flour consumed in the British isles was imported over the high seas, and also that the food stocks on hand may and have run down to a supply of seven weeks only for the whole country.

A full realization of the fact was reached that the food thus imported, as well as all other imports and exports of the British isles, when property of British subjects and carried in British ships, was liable to seizure and confiscation by an enemy in war time. The Admiralty authorities and the naval experts who were witnesses before the commission were forced to admit that even with a strong navy trade would to an extent be endangered, supplies to an extent interrupted, and prices to an extent increased. To what extent this would occur

the commission found itself divided in opinion.

But it was also shown that the actual deprivation, more or less great, or more or less continued, of food supply would not alone. cause suffering, with the consequent pressure upon the Government for relief or peace. A rise in price of food stuffs would cause suffering among the poorer poor, and especially among the unskilled workmen whose wages were so low as to leave little margin to meet such rise in the necessaries of life. The number of this class has been estimated to reach about ten millions of people in Great Britain. The rise in prices which might occur in a war with a maritime power or powers can be a result of the following causes:

(1) From actual deficiency;

(2) From increased cost of freight and insurance war risks; (3) From apprehension and uncertainty as to what may happen. In a parliamentary or republican form of government no really unpopular war can be continued in these days for any length of time. Riots would be speedily followed by more effective ballots, until peace would be sought by the governing authorities.

Raw materials essential to manufacture like cotton, wool, sugar, flax and jute, silk, iron ore, timber, hides and leather, petroleum, india rubber and tobacco have to be sea-borne to England.

A wholesale transfer of British vessels to foreign flags would not be a remedy for the danger outlined above. A want of capital to purchase the vessels necessary to carry on the trade of the country would be an essential difficulty, especially with Great Britain, and any transfer made in early war time would be likely to be found to be so fraudulent or colorable in nature as to render the ships liable to capture and, under international law, subject to confiscation. This liability of capture for fraudulent transfer would very probably

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