Attempts by the foreign commanders at Taku to relieve the beleaguered legations failed. Their first step was one of direct hostility. Taku was shelled and its forts stormed after a stubborn defense by Chinese troops. The expedition under Admiral Seymour fought its way a short distance towards Peking, and returned to Taku.

The interested powers thereupon proposed a concerted armed movement, to relieve their countrymen and secure reparation. The perilous situation of the legations in Peking called for instant and energetic action. The question was, how to act, without drifting into war with all China. As yet, the anti-foreign movement was conspicuous only in the northern provinces. An incautious step might inflame the central and southern parts. In some quarters there seemed to be a disposition to treat the Chinese Government as an enemy, in sympathy, if not in collusion, with the Boxers. The United States inclined to regard the movement as a local rebellion beyond the control of the Chinese Government. On the 22d of June, Minister Wu communicated to Secretary Hay the important declaration that the five southern provinces were at peace and that their viceroys were able and determined to protect foreigners, for which reason they asked that the powers should make no protective demonstration in that quarter. Mr. Hay replied on the same day that the United States had no disposition to send either military or naval forces into Chinese provinces where the Government showed ability and determination to preserve order and protect the lives and rights of foreigners. This view was communicated to the interested powers and was shared by them. Events fully justified the reliance thus placed on the loyalty of the southern viceroys. No disturbance occurred in their five populous provinces. The issue was confined to the north, and the contingency of a general belligerent invasion of China by allied armies. was eliminated. The question was narrowed to the rescue of the besieged legations. It remained to be determined whether the efforts of the powers to this end should be in the nature of an alliance hostile to China or be in aid of the Chinese Government and so conducted as to tend to relieve the Chinese of the rooted apprehension that their national existence stood in peril from foreign designs of aggression, subjugation, and dismemberment.

The powers consulted the United States as to the course to be pursued. The views of the American Government were expressed in a note to the French chargé d'affaires, dated July 3, 1900, in which Mr. Hay said:

Following the precedents enunciated by the United States as early as 1857, this Government aims at the conservation of peace and amity with the Chinese

nation, the furtherance of lawful commerce, and the protection of the lives and interests of American citizens in every part of China by all the means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the law of nations, to which ends we are prepared to uphold the efforts of the Chinese authorities in the provinces to use their powers to protect foreign life and property against the attacks of subversive anarchy, and are resolved to hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of any wrong done to our citizens. To attain these objects the Government of the United States is now, as heretofore, ready to act concurrently with the other powers in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the imperiled Americans and foreigners there, to afford all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property, to guard all legitimate American interests in the Empire, and to aid in preventing a spread of the disorders to other provinces and in securing future immunity from a recurrence of such disasters seeking to these ends a solution which may bring about permanent peace and safety to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

These views were communicated to all the interested powers by Mr. Hay's telegraphed circular note of July 3, 1900. (Supplement, p. 386.) They proved to be pivotal. The powers promptly responded in like sense, whereupon a concerted relief expedition was organized, composed of such forces as the interested powers could muster at Taku, and dispatched to Peking. The effort succeeded and the story of its achievement has passed into history.

As indicating the cordial acquiescence of the powers in Mr. Hay's proposals of July 3, it is pertinent to cite the declaration made by the German Foreign Secretary, Count von Bülow, on July 11, to the several federated governments of the Empire. He said:

The end for which we are striving is the restoration of safety to the persons, property, and enterprises of German subjects in China, the rescue of foreigners shut up in Peking, the revival and assurance of order under an organized Chinese Government, and expiation and indemnity for the acts committed. We desire no partition of China; we are striving for no special advantages. The Imperial Government is fully convinced that the maintenance of the understanding among the powers is the preliminary requirement for the restoration of peace and order in China, and will, for its part, continue to consider this as of the first importance.

The immediate necessities of the situation having been met, Mr. Hay hastened to reemphasize the vital proposals of his circular note of July 3, 1900. On the 6th of September following, the American ambassadors to France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia were instructed to

acquaint the Governments to which they were respectively accredited with the desire of the United States that they should severally make formal declaration of an "open door" policy in the territories held by them in China, and give assurance that within their respective "spheres of influence" all nations should enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation. All the interested powers made cordial response.

One of the earliest statements of the policy thus adopted by the powers is found in the formal agreement signed in London by the British premier, Lord Salisbury, and the German ambassador, Count von Hatzfeldt, on October 16, 1900 (Supplement, p. 387), which declared:

1. It is a matter of joint and international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction; and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence.

2. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Government will not, on their part, make use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire.

3. In case of another power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China,

The settlement effected with China by the cooperating powers, by the final protocal of September 7, 1901 (Supplement, p. 388), while dealing with the questions of reparation for the Boxer outrages, the security of legations in Peking, the protection of foreigners in the Empire, and the commercial relations of China to the treaty powers, was silent in regard to the territorial problems. Those remained to be determined by special agreements.

The next authoritative step in formulating the doctrines of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and the " open door" was taken in the agreement of alliance between Great Britain and Japan, signed at London January 30, 1902 (Supplement, January, 1907, p. 14), wherein they declared themselves to be "specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries

for the commerce and industry of all nations," and to be "entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country."

Fortified by this potential alliance, and acting in behalf of her own interests, Japan exerted all possible influence with China to bring about a conventional understanding with Russia in regard to Manchuria. The negotiation then set a-foot was far reaching in its consequences. China had stronger motives than Japan to undo the virtual appropriation of southern Manchuria by the Russians. Their influence had spread beyond the limits traced by the Convention of 1898, and not alone the neutral territory of Liao-tung, but the whole country to the Siberian border had passed from Chinese to Russian control. Niuchwang and other ports were practically Russianized. On the Yalu, Russian influence faced the policies of Japan in Korea. The situation was fraught with peril. On March 20-April 8, 1902, China signed with Russia an agreement for the reestablishment of the authority of the Chinese Government in Manchuria, and the gradual evacuation of the territory by the Russians within three periods of six months each. Russia's nonwithdrawal precipitated the Russo-Japanese war. Its result tended to accentuate the policies of the "open door" and of respect for the sovereignty and integrity of China. By the third article of the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, between Japan and Russia (Supplement, January, p. 17), the parties mutually engaged "to entirely and completely restore to the exclusive administration of China" all parts of Manchuria then occupied by either belligerent; while Russia declared that it had no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria of such a nature as to impair the sovereignty of China or which are incompatible with the principle of "equal opportunity" i. e., the open door. By Article IV "Russia and Japan mutually pledged themselves not to place any obstacles in the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and which China might adopt for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria."

The latest conventional phase of these closely allied questions is shown by the recent negotiation of conventions between Russia and Japan, July 30, 1907 (Supplement, p. 396), and between Great Britain and Russia, signed August 31, 1907 (Supplement, p. 398), both looking to the maintenance of the status quo in Eastern Asia. In both of these, the obligation to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of all existing sovereignties in the Far East, and to promote in those quarters the fullest application of the principle of the "open door" for all nations, is announced and assumed.

The old-time policies of Chinese reclusion and foreign aggression and special privilege have been reversed and limited, to the advantage alike of China and the world.

THE NORTHEASTERN FISHERIES QUESTION.

The proposed submission to arbitration of the questions in dispute under the fishery provisions of the Treaty of 1818 marks an important and hopeful development in the northeastern fisheries controversy.

From the outset there has been a wide divergence of view between the United States and Great Britain as to the meaning and effect of the fishery provisions of this treaty. Questions have arisen not only as to the extent of the rights and obligations of the American fishermen in the Canadian and Newfoundland waters affected by the treaty, but also as to the extent of the treaty waters themselves. Canada and Newfoundland have invariably so interpreted the treaty as to exclude or render worthless the fishing privileges claimed under it as a matter of right by the United States, and their admitted purpose has been to compel the United States to grant trade concessions as the price of the enjoyment of such privileges. Under the circumstances it can hardly be expected that the United States would grant the trade concessions demanded as the price of better treatment. The reciprocal agreements entered into from time to time for new and more extensive fishery privileges and trade concessions, in which the fishery privileges of this treaty have been merged, have always proved unsatisfactory and short lived. Experience has shown that a permanent settlement of this dispute by such methods is now a practical impossibility. It is evident, therefore, that, in order to arrive at any final adjustment, the rights of the respective parties under this treaty must first be ascertained, and for that purpose resort to arbitration must be had. A just and substantial basis will thus be established for the exchange of such additional privileges as may be desired on such terms as may be mutually agreeable.

The terms of the new modus vivendi relating to the fisheries in the treaty waters of Newfoundland, entered into pending the submission of the entire controversy to arbitration, and the diplomatic correspondence on the subject between the British and United States Governments will be found at pages 349 to 377 of the Supplement to this number.

It will be observed that the new modus vivendi differs from that of last year in the omission of the provision permitting the use of purse seines by the American fishermen, and the addition of the provisions