THE RECENT ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION.

The Anglo-Russian Convention (in three parts) signed August 31, 1907, at St. Petersburg (see Supplement, p. 398), may, to quote the Spectator (September 28), in an editorial at once hopeful, congratulatory, and condescending, "be described in the technical language of photography as a fixing' solution," that is, its terms are supposed merely to recognize and define as to interests and influence the status existing in Persia at the moment of signing.

The following briefly summarizes its provisions:

By the first "Arrangement" of the Convention, Persia, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. The first includes all that portion of Persian territory lying south and east of a line drawn from the Afghan boundary near Gazik, through Gazik, Birjand, and Kerman to Bunder Abbas on the Strait of Ormuz this is the British sphere; the second, or northern zone, all that portion lying within and north of an angle that has its vertex in the south at the town of Yezd, and that runs thence northeast and northwest-northeast through Kakhk to the intersection of the Persian, Russian, and Afghan frontiers, and northwest through Isfahan to Kasr-iShirin- this is the Russian sphere; third, the territory lying between these two sections, which by the terms of the instrument is left to Persia. The contracting parties next assign to themselves their respective powers in all this territory and mutually bind themselves in identical language (1) not to seek for themselves and not to support in favor of the subjects of third powers "any concessions of a political or commercial nature such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.," outside their respective zones; and (2) not to oppose any concessions to the subjects of the other in the central. zone without previous arrangements with the other.

Finally the instrument provides for the disposition of the revenue from the Persian customs and the amortization of certain Persian loans held by Russian and English banks.

The second part of the Convention (under the title "Convention ") relates to Afghanistan.

It provides that Great Britain shall not change the political situation in that country nor interfere with its internal government provided the terms of the treaty with the late Ameer Abdur Rahman are fulfilled; nor will she herself take "nor encourage Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia." Russia, on her part, recognizes that Afghanistan is outside her sphere of influence and undertakes to dispense with her agents there and to deal with the Afghanistan govern

ment through England as an intermediary. These "Arrangements will only come into force" when England notifies Russia that the Ameer has consented to the stipulated terms.

A third part of the Convention, styled an "Arrangement," relates to Thibet. It respects the territorial integrity of that country, recognizes China's suzerain rights, and provides that the parties shall treat with Thibet through the Chinese Government only, except as to the direct relations guaranteed to the British Government by Article V of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of September 7, 1904 (Supplement, January, p. 80), and Article I of the Convention of April 27, 1906. Neither Government is to send representatives to Lhassa, nor to seek concessions for themselves or their subjects, nor to secure the pledging of the Thibetan revenue to themselves or their subjects. An "Annex” to this agreement provides for the withdrawal of British troops from the Chumbi valley so soon as the stipulations (concerning indemnity and trade marts) of the 1904 Convention have been fulfilled; and by letters exchanged on August 18, 1907, the two powers agree that no "scientific mission" shall, for a period of three years, be allowed entry into Thibet except by a previous agreement between the two Governments.

From this summary of its terms it is evident that the Convention particularly affects Persia, less directly China, Russia and England, and perhaps, remotely, other nations, by reason of some disturbance of the European balance of power.

Its meaning for Persia is, of course, deep and far reaching, both as to its foreign and internal relations. Even admitting, as is contended by the English press, that the Convention does no more than recognize the actual existing conditions in Persia, yet it does do that, and obviously any formal announcement or recognition of the fact that a hitherto sovereign nation is no longer completely sovereign is a matter of the greatest import, not only because of its effect upon the national life of the individual nation, but because of its direct bearing upon the intercourse between that nation and all others.

It seems evident that Persia's policy concerning her foreign commerce will be most immediately affected, for while both Russia and Great Britain have bound themselves not to support for themselves or their subjects, or for the subjects of other powers, any concession "beyond" their own zones, and each is not to oppose concessions to the other in the independent zone "without a previous arrangement" between them, yet this leaves each perfectly free to oppose such concessions in the central zone as may be sought by the citizens or subjects of third powers,

and likewise to oppose concessions to others than themselves in their own zones. That is, the treaty, even if it does not contemplate, might easily be interpreted to protect the monopolizing of Persian resources by Russia and Great Britain. Indeed, the treaty expressly provides that the respective Governments may either "support" or "oppose" alien petitioners for Persian concessions. There is nothing of the "Open Door" in this "Agreement."

Hereafter alien Persian concessionaries must deal not only with the Persian Government but with the British and the Russian foreign offices. Whether Persia is also to lose control of her foreign affairs under the new status remains to be seen.

However, the instrument contains, as to Persia's domestic affairs, other and more significant provisions that seem clearly to have a vital relation to the internal government. True, in the opening paragraph of the "Arrangement" the arranging powers mutually and formally engage themselves "to respect the integrity and independence of Persia," but this phrase is no stronger, as pointed out by a Persian correspondent in the Spectator (Oct. 26), than the language used by certain powers in their treaties with Tunis, Morocco, and Egypt. Moreover, the phrase is immediately followed, and it would seem purposely limited, by the declaration that both powers have entered into the agreement because they sincerely desire the "preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations," and because "each of them has for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Beluchistan on the other hand." These words of inducement, if read, as they must be, by the light of attendant conditions, are of unusual significance, since at the very moment of signature Persia was (and still is) in the grasp of an apparently widespread revolutionary movement which had already manifested itself in numerous burnings, pillagings, and plunderings, and which was particularly vigorous within the zone allotted to Russia. The present violence dates from disturbances that resulted from an ineffectual attempt by a Persian armed force, under command of the vigorous Majd-es-Sultaneh, to capture, in the disputed Turko-Persian frontier in the indefinite Kurdistan region, the accomplices in the murder of the Rev. B. W. Labaree, an American missionary killed at Urumiah in March, 1904. In pursuing these fugitive

criminals the Persian forces, after penetrating the disputed territory for some distance, were suddenly confronted by a greatly superior body of Turkish troops whose commander gave Majd-es-Sultaneh the option of battle or withdrawal. Majd-es-Sultaneh chose the latter, but before he could get away the Turks attacked him and his forces retired towards Persia, the Turks following them, it is alleged, into undisputed Persian territory, where they pillaged and plundered a number of Nestorian Christian villages. (The Turkish advance was stopped by the Porte as the result of the combined representations of America, Great Britain, and Russia.) This formed the prelude to general scenes of violence and bloodshed, later enacted by a number of revolutionary parties in northwestern Persia; and these in turn were followed by others particularly in Tabriz and the province of Azerbaijan in the north, and the province of Lusistan in the west. These disturbances have at times risen to the dignity of field movements by armed revolutionary forces, marching towards, though never reaching, the capital, one body of them, at least, being under the command of a brother of the Shah. Hitherto the Government seems to have been wholly unable to meet the situation successfully. A Grand Vizier, appointed because of his reputed power and ability to quell the disturbances, was assassinated. The people appear to have been not only not mollified, but inflamed, by the half-hearted fulfillment of the promises made by the late Shah in 1905, concerning the establishment of a representative government. Even the election and convening of the National Council has failed to satisfy the people, who continue the disturbances. With Persia's internal affairs in this condition, Russia, it is said, has recently sent a note to the National Council calling attention to the troubles and intimating that she might find it necessary to interfere unless order were soon restored. The President of the Council is reported to have returned the note requesting a modification of its tone and suggesting that similar disturbances had accompanied similar constitutional reforms on the other side of the Persian boundary. There seems little doubt but that Russia will not only be willing, but is actually under obligation, to carry out her intimated policy unless the Shah is able to bring a speedy order out of the present chaos. And if Persia once loses control of her local government, it is a question when it will be restored to her.

Well may the Spectator suggest that the two powers have on their hands another "sick man," and it is most significant that certain quarters seem to regard it as his last illness. "Of course, it is sad that Persia should decline the decline of every country, the death of every

man, is sad

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but the existence or nonexistence of the convention makes not a jot of difference to her condition. Her illness was obvious. All that has happened now is that the doctors have told her the truth." (Spectator, Sept. 28, 1907.) However, Russian and English control will doubtless mean an ending of the Persian missionary troubles.

As to the effects upon Russia and England, the contracting parties doubtless expect them to be both beneficial and permanent. Russia gives up, for the present at least, all hope of an ice-free port on the Indian Ocean, a goal she is supposed to have been seeking from her earliest history; but she now circles the Caspian and has all but acquired what are said to be the richest regions of Persia. She also has doubtless weakened Japan's position, since the supposed moving cause for the Anglo-Japanese treaty, the fear by England of Russian aggression southward toward the Indian Ocean, has now by this treaty been largely removed; but she has acquired an unsettled boundary dispute of long standing with Turkey, the disputed region being inhabited by a semibarbarous people who appear ready to cause trouble at any time on the slightest provocation. She also gives up, while the treaty lasts, all hope of further territorial expansion southward; but she has freed herself from the apprehension of a further English advance, particularly in the direction of Thibet, and so may reduce her forces and expenditures all along her southern frontier. Everything considered, Muscovite diplomacy need have no shame because of the recently negotiated treaty. As for England, the Spectator says,

The spectre of the Russian danger on our Indian frontier is laid. Now that Russia has promised to send no more agents to Afghanistan in order to sow wild ideas in the brain of the Ameer, and has also promised to keep her hands off that triangle of Persian territory through which she might have turned the flank of our position in India, our expensive suspicions are ended. It is thoroughly satisfa ry to think that the crisis of this long disease of anxiety about Russian intentions is over. For more than half a century Russia refused to give us the assurances we asked for — and suspicion broke out afresh with every refusal-but at last she has given them.

Truly, the great consideration running to the British in this transaction is the laying of the spectre of Russian advance by the Southern Asiatic frontier. Britain has in Persia given up Isfahan and Kashan, where English interests were paramount, as well as some of the richest and most civilized northern provinces, but Russia has indicated her willingness to abandon her designs for a seaport on the Persian Gulf, and so Britain's left Indian flank is safe. The price paid here is certainly not too great.