VII. DE MEDIATORIBUS PACIS.

Arbitri tamen proprie dicti non sunt mediatores, quos vocant qui litigantibus, bellumque parantibus aut jam gerentibus ultro sese interponunt, eosque autoritate, rationibus, precibus ad pacifice transigendum, litesque sapiendas permovere nituntur. Hos cum tam sanctum propositem prae se ferant, praefracte rejicere summa inhumanitas foret; ne quidem ex eo solum praetextu, quod cum altera parte ipsis peculiaris quaedam conjunctio videatur intercedere. Nam penes me utique est, quantum ea, quae ab istis offeruntur, velim admittere: et amicorum solet hoc praecipuum esse munus, ut ubi ipsi mecum in litem descendere nolunt, ad amicam compositionem eandem deducere laborent.

VIII. QUOD SI INSTRUMENTA FUERINT AMISSA?

Formam et processum disceptationum coram arbitris institutarum ipsa communis ratio satis designat, perspecta cujusque negotii indole. Sic ut putidum foret multis praescribere, quo modo partes intentionem suam debeant proponere, quomodo status controversiae formandus, quomodo post expensa utriusque partis argmenta sententia demum sit concipienda. Illud duntaxat monendum, ubi intentio alterutrius alia ratione, quam per instrumenta probari nequeat, et vero illa sint amissa, arbitro nihil superesse quam ut uni partium cum consensu alterius juramentum deferat. Cum consensu alterius, dico. Nam in libertate naturali alias nemo videtur teneri, ut ex adversæ partis conscientia causam suam suspendat.

IX. DE TESTIBUS.

Illud arbitri cum judicibus habent commune, quod circa quæstiones facti adversus nudam et injuratam assertionem partium

F

assertions of both parties, i.e., when they firmly adhere to contradictory statements, to believe neither. But when autographs, accounts, and genuine documents cannot be produced in evidence, judgment will then have to be given according to the testimony of witnesses.

The witnesses again ought, therefore, not to be favourably disposed towards either party, so that it shall not seem likely that either favour or hatred and a desire of revenge should have more weight with them than their conscience.

Therefore as my adversary may take exception to my relatives as witnesses, so may I to my avowed enemies. Indeed, sometimes, near relations are excused from giving evidence in a case, upon a principle of humanity, lest they should be forced to offer violence either to their affections or to their conscience.

Lastly, it is thoroughly in accordance with reason that no case whatsoever should be decided on the testimony of any one single witness.

X. OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE.

With regard to the execution of the award there is not much that we may add; for in a state of nature, if any one does not of his own accord fulfil what is due to another, the latter may by all the forces and arms that he has himself, or that his friends may supply him with, procure the execution. How far such proceeding may be carried will be shown more fully later, when we treat of war. Here it may be merely observed, that in such an execution, I not only become the owner of the thing adjudged to me, when by any method whatsoever I have taken possession of it, but even if I cannot get possession of the thing itself, I may, when the execution is made, seize upon anything else I can which amounts to the same in value (the estimated charges of the execution itself being included), so as to become its owner.

æquales sese debeant præbere, i.e., cum contradictoria simul vera asseverent, neutri credere. Sed ubi signa rationesque et incorrupta instrumenta in cognitionem veritatis haut perducunt, secundum effata testium sententia erit ferenda.

Testes porro ergo alterutram partem non oportet ita esse affectos, ut probabile videri queat, gratiam ipsos aut odium, vindictæque libidinem, ante conscientiam habere.

Igitur uti adversarius meos necessarios, sic et ego professos meos inimicos recte possum rejicere. Quanquam interdum per humanitatem a testimonis in causa necessarii sui excluduntur propinqui, ne vel affectus suos, vel conscientiam lædere cogantur. Denique et id rationi optime congruit, ne unius testimonium ad causæ cujuslibet decisionem valeat.

X.-DE EXECUTIONE REI JUDICATÆ.

Circa exsecutionem rei judicatæ non est quod multa addamus, cum in statu naturali, ubi ab altero non expletur ultro, quod debetur, sibi quisque suis, sociorumque viribus et armis exsecutionem faciat ; quæ quousque progredi possit, inferius, ubi de bello agemus, latius ostendetur. Illud duntaxat heic monendum, in ejusmodi exsecutione me non solum fieri dominum rei mihi adjudicatæ, postquam ejusdem possessionem quocunque modo adprehendi; sed etiam, si ista potiri nequeain, me aliam rem posse, quæ tantundem valet, arripere (computatis simul impensis in ipsam exsecutionem factis) cum hoc effectu, ut ejus rei fiam dominus.

VATTEL ON ARBITRATION.

EMMERICH VATTEL, born 1714, died 1767.

In Book II. Chap. xviii. § 329, of his work "The Law of Nations," Monsieur de Vattel says:

When Sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions, and are nevertheless desirous of preserving or restoring peace, they sometimes submit the decision of their disputes to Arbitrators chosen by common agreement.

When once the contending parties have entered into an Arbitration Agreement, they are bound to abide by the sentence of the Arbitrators; they have engaged to do this, and the faith of treaties should be religiously observed.

If, however, the Arbitrators, by pronouncing a sentence evidently unjust and unreasonable, should forfeit the character with which they were invested, their judgment would deserve no attention; the parties had appealed to it only with a view to the decision of doubtful questions. Suppose a board of Arbitrators should, by way of reparation for some offence, condemn a sovereign State to become subject to the State she has offended, will any man of sense assert that she is bound to submit to such decision? If the injustice is of small consequence, it should be borne for the sake of Peace; and if it is not absolutely evident, we ought to endure it, as an evil to which we have voluntarily exposed ourselves. For if it were necessary that we should be convinced of the justice of a sentence before we would submit thereto it would be of very little use to appoint Arbitrators.

There is no reason to apprehend that, by allowing the parties a liberty of refusing to submit to a manifestly unjust and unreasonable sentence, we should render Arbitration useless; and this

DE L'ARBITRAGE, PAR M. DE VATTEL.

1714.-1767.

Dans Livre II., Chap xviii., § 329, Monsieur de Vattel dit :

Quand les souverains ne peuvent convenir sur leurs prétentions et qu'ils désirent cependant de maintenir, ou de rétablir la paix, ils confient quelquefois la décision de leurs différens à des arbitres choisis d'un commun accord.

Dès que le compromis est lié, les parties doivent se soumettre à la sentence des arbitres : elles s'y sont engagées; et la foi des traités doit être gardée.

Cependant, si par une sentence manifestement injuste, contraire à la raison, les arbitres s'étoient eux-mêmes dépouillés de leur qualité, leur jugement ne meriteroit aucune attention; on ne s'y est soumis que pour des questions douteuses. Supposez que des arbitres, pour réparation de quelque offense, condamnent un Etat souverain à se rendre sujet de l'offense; aucun homme sensé dira-t-il que cet Etat doit se soumettre? Si l'injustice est de petite conséquence, il faut la souffrir pour le bien de la paix ; et si elle n'est pas absolument évidente, ou doit la supporter comme un mal auquel on a bien voulu s'exposer. Car s'il falloit être convaineu de la justice d'une sentence pour s'y soumettre, il seroit fort inutile de prendre des arbitres.

On ne doit pas craindre qu'en accordant aux parties la liberté de ne pas se soumettre à une sentence manifestement injuste et déraisonnable, nous ne rendions l'arbitrage inutile; et cette