it has hitherto done. || It is most difficult to lay down any detailed plan of action beyond the general lines. The condition of affairs is continually changing, and we can never say where the Mullah will be a week hence. I have before me two main lines. To drive the Mullah back from this portion of the Protectorate, catching him if we can, and to occupy Burao, afterwards moving through the Habr Toljaala country, partly to show a force in that direction, and partly, if necessary, to fine the Adan Madoba and the Rer Yusuf for their share in these disturbances. This scheme would have to be modified in accordance with the Mullah's movements. For instance, reports have been received that he intends to advance to Syk, near the Jerato Pass. If this is the case we should have to march straight on that position from Berbera, and leave the occupation of Burao till after he has been driven back. Burao is a position of considerable strategical importance. It commands the water supply of the eastern Habr Yunis tribes, and of the Adan Madoba and Rer Yusuf tribes of the Habr Toljaala. With this position in our hands we could exercise a powerful control over the surrounding country. I have suggested that 100 infantry, 25 cavalry, with one Maxim entrenched and protected by the wire zariba, would be sufficient to hold Burao. || I have lately been over the country close up to Burao, and have found that by marching viâ Warren and Wissil there would only be one march between Sheikh and Burao without water. I would propose to make arrangements to have two days' supply of water to be carried with the column. Sufficient transport can be collected here within ten days to a fortnight. The friendly Mahomed Aysa are now collected at the Sheikh Pass; the Ayal Ahmed and Ayal Yunis have sent out men to muster at Argan to the west of the Jerato Pass, near which are also the hill tribes of the Habr Yunis, who have always been against Sultan Nur, and the Adan Aysa. On both sides friendlies could be mustered in thousands, but the difficulty would be to keep them together for more than a few days away from their karias and supplies. The strongest coalition will be that of the Habr Awal tribes near Hargaisa under Sheikh Mattar, but it is questionable whether they will go so far as to join the Habr Yunis in an attack on the Mullah at Odweina, they will probably content themselves with protecting Sheikh Mattar and Hargaisa. I have written to Sheikh Mattar on this point.

Nr. 12505. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

Generalkonsul Sadler an den

Minister des Ausw. Der Anhang des Mullah zerstreut sich.

Aden, October 9, 1899. (October 9.)

(Telegraphic.) || Reports are confirmed that the following of the Mullah has dispersed. The Mullah is said to have moved towards the eastern portion of the Dolbahanta, but news is vague and meagre. It is reported that the nearer tribes are anxious to come in. || To control the tribes and to quash influence of Mullah I still consider it necessary to occupy Burao. Opposition is not likely to be met, but we have to guard against the contingency of the Mullah moving north again. || It is no longer necessary to retain a man-of-war at Berbera. || I am anxious as soon as possible to return to the coast.

Nr. 12506. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Der Minister des Auswärtigen an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verschiebung der Expedition gegen den Mullah.

Foreign Office, October 19, 1899. (Telegraphic.) || I am in receipt of your telegram of 16th instant. || Taking into consideration the demands for the employment of Her Majesty's forces elsewhere, I have come to the conclusion that any expedition against the Mullah or among the tribes must be postponed, and that operations must, in any case, be restricted to the occupation of Burao. If you remain of opinion that such occupation is really necessary, please state what force you require for this purpose beyond that already at your disposal.

Nr. 12507. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Auswärtigen. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Aden, October 22, 1899. (October 22.) (Telegraphic.) || It would be desirable to take 11 cavalry and 600 infantry with 20 sappers to occupy Burao. There are only 50 infantry available at Berbera. || It is not absolutely necessary to occupy Burao, but a show of force for a month or six weeks among the nearer tribes is necessary. In the latter case we could reduce the infantry to 300. The force should be composed of selected Mahommedans. || I can manage for the present if troops cannot be spared, but it would be inadvisable to delay the expedition for long. Please see my despatch of the 12th October. It is desirable that I should return to Berbera without delay.

Staatsarchiv LXVL

2

Nr. 12508. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Beschleunigung der Ex

pedition ist erwünscht. Mitwirkung Abys

siniens.

Aden, October 12, 1899. (October 23.)

My Lord, The only information of any importance received in Berbera up to the 6th instant was the confirmation of previous reports that the Mullah's following had dispersed, and that he himself was supposed to have left Bohotele for a place further east, so as to be within easy reach of Lasader. Reports regarding him are becoming day by day more vague and meagre. It is pretty generally believed that a Government expedition is on foot, and the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis tribes are now reported to be anxious to make their peace with the Administration Some of the sections are coming surreptitiously into Berbera and posing as peaceful citizens; others are sending in Petitions to show that they had nothing to do with the Mullah, or had suffered at his hands. || This is all very well. It is a natural sequence to the Mullah's retirement. But we have to guard, as far as possible, against a repetition of recent events in the nearer portions of our Hinterland, and show the tribes by a display of force in their country, of which they have hitherto had no experience, that we will not allow them to play fast and loose with us, and that the means of punishing them are at hand if they do. || Her Majesty's Government will doubtless consider whether it is worth while to incur the cost of an expedition now that the Mullah's following has dispersed, and he may be said to be out of our reach. This view of the situation has not escaped me. Personally, I have never had much hope of catching the Mullah. It could only be done had he stood his ground and awaited our advance, or were he to remain with a small following in the nearer portions of the Protectorate long enough for a surprise to be effected. || Neither of these eventualities were at any time to be depended upon. He is said to have taken extraordinary precautions to safeguard his person, amongst others retaining a bodyguard of Midgans with poisoned arrows, and these precautions would point to his not exposing himself in a position where he would be liable to be caught. || With the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis the events of the past few months now force us to exercise greater interference than I should have contemplated for some time to come. Our hands have, so to say, been forced by this movement which originated in the Dolbahanta, and by the necessity which has now arisen of breaking the Mullah's influence over the Ishak tribes. || As the situation at present is, it is most important to

secure a proper control over the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis. This can partly be done from Berbera by checking their supplies, but we see that measures taken from Berbera are not of themselves effective when the tribes move south, and are for the time being independent of our port towns. To effect this control we should for a time hold the water supply at Burao, and by a show of force in that direction and in parts of the Habr Toljaala country make it evident to the people that we will not allow any of the Ishak section to be with us at one time of the year when they are dependent on us for supplies and against us at another when they are not so dependent. The control of the wells at Burao and the move of an expedition will at once make this position clear to them. || How long we should hold Burao, and whether or not it will be necessary to keep a permanent post there, will depend upon circumstances. The present is an opportune time to occupy the wells, as the neighbouring tribes are dependent on them till next March. || If we do not move now and content ourselves with taking action against those who hold aloof from us in our coast towns, we shall have no guarantee against the repetition in Ishak territory of recent events as soon as the next spring rains fall, or indeed, at any time it may suit the Mullah to again attempt an incursion into Ishak country. The people will think us apathetic, and when the Mullah appears again, as he is certain to do unless it is made plain that he will be opposed by us, the people, uncertain as to whether we will employ force or not, will be apt to think they are left to themselves, with the result that they will be more or less thrown into his hands. Although most of the Ishak sections who have been affected by this movement have suffered thereby, the way has, in a manner, been paved for a fresh incursion by the Mullah against them, and for the extension of his influence over them; it is these results we have now to counteract. || There is another reason why any delay in the dispatch of an expedition would be inadvisable. For some time past I have been aware of a feeling in the Protectorate that with its severance from Aden the Administration has been left to its own resources, and that troops would not be available for offensive operations. An impression has also gained ground amongst the Somalis that the expedition of friendlies against the Rer Hared in 1895 was not approved by Government, and that that was to be the last expedition into the interior. These ideas are mischievous, they may have had something to do with the late troubles, and the sooner they are dispelled the better. " For the above reasons I am of opinion that the retirement of the Mullah has not materially altered the situation, except in so far that he no

longer threatens Berbera, and that it is necessary to proceed with the expedition on the general line of operations submitted in my despatch of the 5th instant. || This leaves the Dolbahanta out of the question for the time being. The settlement of that part of the country is not so important to us at present as that of the nearer Habr Toljaala, and it would be difficult to devise measures by which this could be effected without great cost, certainly till we know more about the attitude of the tribes than we do now. As matters stand, the gradual weaning of the tribes from the influence of the Mullah, coupled with the closing of our ports to those who shelter him or afford him assistance, are the measures I would rely on for the present in dealing with the Dolbahanta. Later on, other means may, perhaps, be found practicable, but in the first instance we must make sure of the Habr Toljaala. This done, and our hold established over the Ishak country, many of the Darod (Dolbahanta) sections may be expected to see that they have more to gain by peacefully trading with our ports than by following in the wake of this fanatical priest. It has been ascertained that the rainfall has not been sufficient to raise a fresh crop of grass between Sheikh and Burao. | As regards the possible co-operation of the Abyssinians in any offensive movement against the Mullah, it is to be observed that this line of retreat through the Ogaden, only one of his lines of retreat, would be at a considerable distance from the Harrar frontier, that it would be difficult for an Abyssinian force to effectually guard our frontier at that distance from its base. | An Abyssinian force carries no rations, and depends for its supplies on what it can make the country supply. It is true that some of the Ogaden were with the Mullah at Burao, these were probably from tribes situated within the immediate range of his influence; on the other hand the Ogadens are sending in their caravans much as usual, and I have no grounds for assuming that the tribes of the Ogaden are, as a bedy, in any way opposed to us. Under these circumstances, it appears to me very questionable whether the reasons advanced in my despatch of the 22nd July last against an early movement of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden would not still outweigh any advantage we might hope to gain from the appearance of their force to the south of our Protectorate with the view of cutting off the Mullah's retreat. Such is my opinion at present; it may be modified if any further development takes place. || As a matter of fact, I hear from Harrar that a force of 4000 men has been assembled at Jiga Jiga. I had previously heard that an expedition was comtemplated against the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun Ogaden, who had failed to comply with the demands of the