telegram. The Ogaden tribes are tired of the Mullah's exactions; they have but few rifles, and are deficient in ammunition, and they fear retri bution at the hands of the Abyssinians; native opinion, accordingly, inclines to the view that they will not coalesce to support the Mullah, and that the latter will try and escape. || If there is truth in the latest reports which have come in that the Abyssinians are in close pursuit of the Mullah, there would seem to be a fair chance of his being caught, as the Abyssinians are mostly mounted; they have taken supplies of water on ponies, and they have been joined by horsemen from the Habr Awal tribes living outside our territory, notably the Rer Ahmed Abdillah. The most unfortunate position would be for the Mullah to flee eastwards and rejoin his old allies, the Ali Gheri, south of Bohotele, where he would be difficult to get at, either by the Abyssinians or ourselves. The country about Bohotele is now very dry. | Owing to the rumours of expeditions against the Dankalis and Aysa, all trade between Zeyla and Harrar is at a standstill.

My Lord, I have the honour to submit copy of an Intelligence Report by Captain Johnston Stewart of the 2nd British Central Africa Rifles, reporting on the movements of the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah; and extract from a note to my address from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar, dated the 20th instant; and translation of a letter I received this morning from Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, intimating the result of an engagement which took place at Jiga Jiga, on the 21st instant, between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces. *) || It seems that after raiding the Rer Ali the Abyssinians did not, as was at first supposed, advance on Daghabur, but remained at Jiga Jiga, where they were attacked by a large force of the Mullah's followers on the 21st instant, with the result described in Garazmach Bante's letter. || The Mullah seems to have taken care to keep in the background; no certain information as to his whereabouts is available. It is said that, previous to the fight at Jiga Jiga, the Ogaden had risen en masse to oppose the Abyssinians, which would account for the large force of Dervishes reported by Garazmach Bante. It is also said

*) Diese Aktenstücke sind hier fortgelassen. Red.

that the Mullah's influence now extends to the Webbe Schebele, where the tribes, including the Negro Adone, have joined his cause and sent him assistance in men and supplies. || The messenger who brought in Garazmach Bante's letter, reports that after the defeat of the Mullah's force the survivors were set upon by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, who said that they and the Mullah had led them to destruction by falsely representing that the arms of the Abyssinians were powerless against them. It is further reported that the Mullah left all his followers from the Dolbahanta, and his rifles, said to number 500, at Harradiggit, and sent on the Ogaden tribes with spears to attack the Abyssinians at Jiga Jiga. This is confirmed by news which has just been brought in, that a raiding party of the Habr Yunis who were out in the Ogaden after the Rer Ali, stumbled on the Mullah's force near Harradiggit, and lost from 100 to 150 men, all killed by rifle fire. || The defeat at Jiga Jiga has doubtless dealt a heavy blow to the Mullah's movement in the Ogaden, but if he gets away with the number of rifles he is supposed to have, his power for evil will have been by no means checked.

Nr. 12515. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Derselbe an Denselben. Nachrichten über den Mullah.

Berbera, April 21, 1900. (May 5.)

My Lord, I have but little news to report in connection with the progress of events in the Ogaden. || The Mullah is reported to be inactive at Harradiggit, having failed to induce the tribes to make another venture in the direction of Jiga Jiga, where the Abyssinian expedition remains intrenched. Native reports are that the Mullah will return towards Bohotele, but nothing certain is known as to his plans or intentions. It is reported from Harrar that the reinforcements from Addis Abbaba have been countermanded, and that, as the hot weather is approaching, the Abyssinians do not propose to make any further expeditions into the Ogaden. || A few caravans from the Rer Ali have commenced to come into Bulhar. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12516. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

Generalkonsul Sadler an

den Minister des Ausw. Englisch-Abyssinische Expedition.

Camp, Sheikh, June 15, 1900. (June 15.)

(Telegraphic.) Please see Harrington's telegrams. The Governor of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the rumours were untrue as to the advance of the Mullah. || The latter is at Daghaboor, near Milmil. Two companies of the British Central Africa Rifles are proceeding with a Maxim to Hargaisa at once, and, if necessary, three more can follow. I could take all available forces towards Hargaisa should the Mullah advance, but infantry could not be safely pushed into the Haud. Tribal levies could be collected; to be of any use they would require active support. || A strong force of camelry, such as the Bikanir Camel Corps, would be wanted if we are to co-operate with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden. || Repeated to Harrington.

Nr. 12517. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien an den Sirdar von Ägypten. Menelek schlägt eine englisch-abyssinische Expedition vor.

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || Menelek has suggested that Her Majesty's Government combine with him in suppressing the Somaliland Mullah. The Mullah is reported to be threatening a movement on Harrar at present. || If it is possible to attempt diversion on Mullah's flank with forces now at disposal of Consul-General, such action is to be recommended. || Copy of this telegram sent to Consul-General for Somali Coast.

(Telegraphic.) || Since my previous telegram of to-day I have seen Menelek. He informs me that he has delayed moving against the Mullah until he receives reply of Her Majesty's Government. I have explained that present season is unfavourable for operations, which would be easy in cold season. If Mullah continues his advance it would be advisable to attempt diversion. || (Sent to Sadler.)

Nr. 12519. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Die Lage wird unerträglich.

Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (August 5.)

(Telegraphic.) || Yao half-battalion embarked on the 21st July; the other half-battalion cannot be spared. The Mullah's followers have raided property from the Protectorate valued at 160 000 Indian rupees; there is a panic among our Ishak tribes, and reports are current of further move by Mullah against our tribes. || Our tribes have all deserted their grazing-grounds in the Haud, and are cramped up round their water places, and are clamouring for assistance. || The position, owing to the Mullah's movement, is becoming insupportable, and may be critical if it continues. Unless we can soon operate with Abyssinia to suppress the Mullah, I shall have to create a diversion by moving with available forces, supported by tribal levies, to punish tribes who are Mullah's principal supporters round Bohotele. This could be safely done, as the eastern Ishak tribes are friendly and united.

Nr. 12520. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

-

Derselbe an Denselben.

Weitere Nachrichten. Die Stämme fordern Bekämpfung des Mullah.

Camp, Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (September 3.)

My Lord, || In continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to report that the raid by the Mullah's horsemen, mentioned in my despatch of the 24th July, has spread consternation over this portion of the Protectorate. From Odweina to Jefir Medir the tribes have hurried back en masse from the Haud with their herds of camels and flocks into their winter grazing-grounds, where they are crowded up with the tribes upon whom they have fallen back, with the inevitable result of disorder and panic in the heart of the Protectorate. || Shortly after my despatch above mentioned was written the Habr Yunis came rushing back from Odweina with reports that the water at Haradiggit had fallen short, and that the Mullah was preparing to attack Hargaisa, or to make a rush for the Odweina water. Without attaching credence to these reports of an advance I could not altogether ignore them, and made preparations to move to Odweina with a company of the Central Africa Regiment to secure the water supply, after reassuring the Habr Yunis, who agreed to return to Odweina if I proceeded there. || In the meanwhile the reports I received from Captain Swayne, who was at

Hargaisa, as to the position of affairs here, was so disquieting that I determined to ask Major Plunkett to proceed with the company to Odweina whilst I came on here. This he has done, and I have since heard that the Habr Yunis have returned to their grazing-grounds in the vicinity of that place. || At Hargaisa the position on my arrival was briefly this: The Aidagalla had come right back from the Haud on to Au Barkadleh and Hargaisa, occupying the grazing-grounds at present tenanted by the Ayal Ahmed, with whom they are on bad terms; more to the west the Samanter Abdillah have fallen back to Usbali; some of the sections of the Ahmed Abdillah have retired on the Jibril Abokr, others have scattered towards the Abyssinians; Sheikh Mattar has removed all his karias and property towards the Guban, and most of the inhabitants of Hargaisa have fled. Owing to the crowding of the tribes at this time of the year in these scanty grazing-grounds there is continual quarrelling amongst them, and close here there have already been two fights in which a number of people have been wounded. || Numerous Akils and deputations from the tribes came in to see me as soon as they heard of my arrival. Although they were somewhat calmer than they appear to have been before Captain Swayne some days previous they were still in a very excited state, clamouring for arms and to be at once led on to the Mullah. || They openly say that we do not protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, and that if these are closed to them by the armed forces of the Mullah they must lose all their live-stock by starvation as the nearer grazing-grounds their winter resort cannot hold them all at this season of the year, and if the grass there is now consumed they will have nothing to fall back upon at the conclusion of the summer rains. This is all perfectly true. They attach no importance whatever to our holding the water places of Adadleh, Odweina, and Hargaisa, as they say that troops located there are useless to protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, which is also true. Had we ten times the number of troops here we could not insure the protection of the tribes' herds over the vast waterless area they frequent miles to the south of our positions, though I am pretty certain that were we not holding Hargaisa now the tribes in the neighbourhood would have all rushed back on the Guban.

The tribes urge that formerly they were at times at war with the Ogaden, and at times at peace, and that the fights mattered very little, as in the end the losses adjusted themselves; but now, since the Mullah has appeared on the scene, all this is altered, and they are exposed to attacks by raiding parties armed with rifles, against which they cannot