Tapes, the position held by the Prussians on the wooded and hilly ground in the neighbourhood of Norroy and Semecourt, formed from the peculiarity of the situation a natural fortress. It had, however, been strengthened by art. The ground in front and facing Woippy had been cut up into a regular honeycomb of "Schutzengraben," whilst behind every wall a bank had been carefully erected, and the masonry pierced for rifles. The Prussians had become so accustomed to fortifying the small villages they occupied, and had besides so many opportunities of observing the dexterity with which the French made such places tenable, that in a very short time a battalion would convert a farmhouse, a garden-wall, or a hamlet, into a fortification from which generally nothing but artillery could dislodge them. In the present instance, however, all this elaborate defence proved of little avail, for the wellconducted steady advance of the French guard was irresistible. They carried the village of Norroy, and were moving on Semecourt and Fèves, with the intention, apparently, of penetrating towards Thionville by way of Marange, when they were attacked in flank by the troops lying at Amanvillers, St. Privat-la-Montagne, and Roncourt. The fire from Plappeville assisted them so long as they were in the neighbourhood of Saulny; but that assistance failed as soon as they got clear of their own outworks and carried Norroy. Here an obstinate fight continued for many hours; but the Prussians having been reinforced, the French fell back towards Saulny and Woippy, contesting every inch of the road. With the light of a brilliant moon, the big guns had no difficulty in opening fire. Plappeville, the works in Devant-les-Ponts, and some heavy pieces of the town itself, now took part in the action; but the Prussians seemed determined to take Woippy, which they eventually did at nine o'clock. They could not, however, hold it for any length of time, and when about eleven p.m. the action ceased, the French had regained Woippy, and the Prussian troops held Saulny.

This battle, the severest and most important which had taken place before Metz since the 31st of August, was without positive benefit to either side, as both lost heavily without gaining any advantages. The sortie only demonstrated to Marshal Bazaine the utter hopelessness of any attempt to break the bars of his iron cage, while the Prussians found it impossible to follow up their victory by penetrating into the immediate

vicinity of the fortress. The French losses in killed and wounded were stated to be 1100. The estimate was published in Metz as, in some sort, a reply to the clamour for another sortie, which Bazaine was reluctant to risk. There is, therefore, every reason to believe this total correct. If So, the French losses were far less than those of their enemy. Eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and sixty-five officers, were the fearful sum-total of these few hours, among the landwehr alonewho, indeed, bore the brunt of the fray, and checked the rush of the French advance, by holding the villages while they had a man that could stand upright and fire the needle-gun. To them also was intrusted the grand final advance which swept the French out of the villages. The Prussian force engaged consisted of the nineteenth, fifty-eighth, and fifty-ninth landwehr regiments, forming the Posen and West Prussian brigades; the first army corps, the twenty-eighth, twentyninth, eighth, and seventh line regiments, and a portion of the seventh army corps. The number. of French engaged exceeded 45,000. The roar of the artillery, mingling with the deadly clatter of the mitrailleuse, was indescribable; for not only were the French and Prussian field and horseartillery engaged, but during the whole battle the forts kept up a continual blaze from their garrison guns. Singularly enough, this fire was fiercest about nine o'clock, as if the French feared an attempt upon the fortress, to follow up the day's

success.

During the time when these important events were occurring, the imperialist cause, though unpopular, had not been quite forgotten by some of its former supporters. At least one intrigue had been attempted with the view of restoring the Napoleonic dynasty; and as it was partly carried on in the city of Metz, it may be right to notice it here.

M. Regnier was a landed proprietor in France, and the Prussians were but a few leagues from his residence when he and his family took flight for England, which they reached on the 31st of August. On the 4th of September the Empress Eugenie quitted Paris. On the 11th he knew she was at Hastings, and on the 12th wrote to Madame Lebreton a letter, which he requested should be communicated to her Majesty, apprising her of his intention to submit proposals to the emperor at Wilhelmshöhe for the preservation of the Napoleonic

dynasty. The first of these proposals rested on the assumption that the regent ought not to quit French territory, of which the imperial fleet was a part, and that a portion of the fleet ought, therefore, to be occupied by her as the seat of government. Madame Lebreton gave an interview to M. Regnier at the Marine Hotel, Hastings, when she told him that the empress had read his letter, but that she felt that the interests of France should take precedence of those of the dynasty, and that she had the greatest horror of any step likely to bring about a civil war. M. Regnier then addressed another letter to Madame Lebreton, and subsequently saw three officers of the imperial household, who told him that the empress would not stir in the matter. He then proposed that certain photographs of Hastings, which he had bought for the purpose, might be inscribed by the prince imperial to the emperor. On the 17th of September, M. Regnier got back his photographs, on one of which was a note running thus:-"My dear papa,-I send you these views of Hastings, hoping they will please you.-Louis Napoleon." The empress, through M. Fillion, told M. Regnier that there would be great danger in carrying out his project, and begged him not to attempt it. Of course, M. Regnier made Of course, M. Regnier made light of the caution; and on the 20th of September, the very day of Jules Favre's interview with Count von Bismarck, he was standing in the presence of the North German chancellor. From him he requested a pass permitting him free access to the emperor at Wilhelmshöhe, at the same time hinting that his object was to give peace to France by restoring Napoleon to power. On seeing the photographic view inscribed by the prince imperial, Count von Bismarck seemed disposed to attach a little importance to M. Regnier's mission, and explained to him the extremely embarrassing position in which the Prussian government found itself by not having a definite government in France with which to treat. He also expressed his regret that the emperor and his advisers had not accepted his suggestion, and signed a peace on Prussian terms after Sedan; adding, that as the self-constituted government of France also refused to treat on those terms, Germany had no alternative but to continue the war until a disposition was shown to concede the indispensable alteration of frontier.

Later in the day, after the famous conversation with M. Favre, in which the latter refused to yield a "stone of the fortresses or an inch of territory,"

Bismarck saw M. Regnier again, and the latter expressed his determination to go at once to Metz and Strassburg, to see the commander-in-chief of each place, and to make an agreement that those towns should only be surrendered in the emperor's name. Count von Bismarck's answer was: Sir,-Fate has already decided; to blind yourselves to that fact is the action not of an indomitable, but of an undecided nature. Nothing can prevent what is from being as it is. Do what you can to bring before us some one with power to treat with us, and you will render a great service to your country. I will give orders for a "general safeconduct" which will allow of your travelling in all German possessions, and everywhere in the places occupied by our troops. A telegram shall precede you to Metz, which will facilitate your entrance there.

Disguised, and aided by Count von Bismarck's safe-conduct, M. Regnier proceeded to Metz, which he entered on the 23rd of September, and made his way to the presence of Marshal Bazaine, who told him that his position was excellent, and that he had hope of holding out for a long period. Afterwards, however, he changed his tone, and said it would be as much as he could do to keep his ground till October 18, and that only by living of the officers' horses. The marshal hailed with evident satisfaction a proposal that he should be allowed a free passage for himself and army, with their colours, artillery, ammunition, &c., through the enemy's lines, on strict parole not to fight against the Germans during the remainder of the campaign; it being moreover understood, first of all, that he and his army would put themselves at the disposal of the Chamber and the imperial government, which would then be, de facto, the only legal one.

To explain all this to the empress, and pave the way for a treaty of peace and the return of the emperor, it was arranged that General Bourbaki should leave Metz for Chislehurst; travelling, however, in strict incognito, and not allowing the real object of his mission to transpire. Though one of the bravest of French generals, Bourbaki was little skilled in diplomacy; and as soon as he found himself outside Metz his one feeling was that of regret that he had left it. Meeting a comrade on his way through Belgium, who taunted him with treason in flying from France, he indignantly produced the authorization of Marshal Bazaine,

and in maintaining his military honour exposed the whole intrigue. He presented himself before the empress at Chislehurst, on the understanding that he was there by her orders, and was of course surprised and chagrined to find that he had been made the tool of imperialist manœuvres. Bazaine signed his name under that of the prince imperial on the stereoscopic view of Hastings, as a proof to Count von Bismarck that he had authorized M. Regnier to treat. On the 28th of September, when the latter again saw the German chancellor, he was told that his powers were not sufficiently defined, and that there could be no further communication between them. Nevertheless, Count von Bismarck sent a telegram to Bazaine, asking whether he authorized M. Regnier to treat for the surrender of Metz, and received for answer, "I cannot reply in the affirmative to these questions. I have told M. Regnier that I cannot arrange for the capitulation of the city of Metz." Here the whole scheme of the latter appears to have broken up. He reached Chislehurst on the 4th of October, to find that General Bourbaki had done absolutely nothing in the affair committed to his charge, and that he had left en route for Tours to offer his military services to the provisional government. M. Regnier laboured to persuade the empress to persist in endeavouring to re-establish the dynasty. He told her of the fearful misery he had witnessed in the country; village after village entirely deserted, the inhabitants seeking refuge in the woods, and camping there without shelter or knowing where to find food, and that on the approach of winter famine would certainly overtake them, threatening to involve all in destruction. All was, however, in vain. He could not alter the opinions of the imperial exile, who feared that posterity would only see in her yielding a proof of dynastic selfishness; and that dishonour would attach to the name of anyone who should sign a treaty based upon a cession of territory. Thus M. Regnier's scheme, which had been effected with much trouble and danger, ended, and with it the hopes of those who saw in the imperial restoration the only chance of maintaining future order in France.

The failure of the sorties did not much depress the people of Metz. On the contrary, they wished to make common cause with the army, and memorialized the governor to be allowed to garrison the

forts while the whole disposable military force made another sortie on a gigantic scale. The expression of this wish they conveyed to him through General Coffinières. At the same time energetic attempts were made to effect a fraternization with the army, and a spirited address, signed by numbers of the citizens and national guards, was circulated in the camps. "We will shed with you," it said, "our last drop of blood; we will share with you our last crust. Let us rise as one man, and victory is ours. Long live our brothers of the army! Long live France, one and indivisible!"

The marshal, however, who had accompanied his men to the hottest part of the fight on the memorable 7th October, and who knew the utter inutility of the fearful sacrifice of life which another sortie must occasion, declined for the present to accede to the citizens' request. He was deterred also by a consideration of the state of his army, which was suffering exceedingly from the exposure of their camps and the privations to which they were subjected. About the 13th, the date of the memorial, there were, of soldiers alone, 23,000 in ambulances and private houses. There was also an enormous increase of sickness amongst the civilians, as might be expected in a place crowded with double the ordinary number of inhabitants; the surplus largely consisting of the poorer class of agricultural labourers, who naturally soon fell ill in a town abounding in hospitals fitted only to be human abattoirs, surrounded by huge camps where all sanitary rules were utterly neglected. It was, indeed, a marvel that Metz was not one huge lazar-house; but except amongst infants and the aged, the death-rate was by no means excessive, and the dead were buried without murmuring.

We have already said that as a fortification Metz might well have been deemed impregnable. It was handed down to the present generation, by Cormontaigne and other great engineers of the last century, as a very strong fortressstrong in its defensive works. The Second Empire added to these a circle of seven very large detached forts at distances of from two and a half to three miles from the centre of the town, so as to secure it from bombardment even with rifled guns, and to transform the whole into a large entrenched camp second to Paris only. With an army, however, of about 180,000 men

added to the usual population of 60,000, and whole villages of country people who had sought shelter behind the forts, it was evident that the stock of provisions, however large, must soon be exhausted, and the terrible alternative of starvation or surrender arise. This moment of grief appeared now to have arrived. Whispered at first, with bated breath, in quiet corners; then talked of amongst twos and threes; then murmured in coteries and cafés; and at last the general commanding the town called the municipal council together and told them that the bread was done, and the city must capitulate. "Capitulate-never! not whilst a boot remains to be eaten," was the response. Measures were now taken to at least postpone it. But they came too late. Not a pastry cook was allowed to bake a bun for luxury, bran was mixed with the flour already existing, and no more white flour was allowed to be made. Other expedients were adopted, and good brown bread was daily to be had. All were placed on rations; if any went out to dinner they had to take with them their own bread; but generally indeed, dining out simply meant a feast of reason, with an interlude of horse flesh. In the early part of October a leg of mutton fetched eight francs the pound. Potatoes rose to one or one and a half franc the pound, and then disappeared altogether. Salad vegetables existed, but the places in which they were kept were very hard to find. Fowls fetched almost any price, and the lucky avant poste who could kill a rabbit under the pretext of firing at a Prussian was a wealthy man; forty francs being the least he might expect as a reward for his dexterity, plus the rabbit. Eggs rose to one franc each, and sugar sold at five francs and even at nine francs the pound. Coals there were none, and the supply of gas was almost exhausted when the end came. But the greatest privation was salt; nine francs had been paid for a pound, and he who could give a pinch of it was regarded as a valued friend; for the only absolute suffering arose from the want of it.

Horse flesh required some seasoning to make it palatable. All sauces had disappeared, and food was equine in the extreme: horse-flesh soup usually excellent; boiled horse flesh by no means bad, often very good; horse beans as a legume, varied by lentils occasionally and a roti of horse, often tough beyond mastication-made the unvarying round. Such rations were unsatisfy

ing and far from nutritious, as the animal had generally lived as long as possible, and was only killed to prevent his dying. The army was often worse off than the town, frequently from want of direction rather than of food. The avant postes were often forty-eight hours without victuals through the carelessness and neglect of the intendance; and as no additional means of grinding corn had been adopted, grain alone was often served out instead of bread. Of this the soldiers had to make the best use they could, bruising rather than grinding it in coffee mills, and boiling or baking the crushed mass.

The tedium of the siege to the inhabitants was increased at this time by the rather arbitrary suppression of several journals; and a curious feature of the siege was the excessive tenderness of the authorities towards the enemy. One newspaper, the Indépendant, was even suppressed for inserting an article severely condemning the Prussian proclamation which described the franc-tireurs as traitors, and threatened them with death whenever captured. The author of the article indignantly protested against the suppression, declined writing again under such liabilities, and threatened that, in a day not far distant, he would once more use his pen "to write history." To refer with any amount of respect to the republic also procured the exclusion of the article—for all articles had now to undergo a preliminary inspection. At length the journals retorted by suppressing anything that came to them from the military authorities, or by refusing to insert any communication with the word "capitulation" in it. Numberless sly hits were made at the marshal, with that adroitness of inuendo in which the French are always so felicitous; and the town swarmed with secretly printed pamphlets, not very complimentary to the powers that were. There was a great scarcity of paper in Metz at the time, and the journals came out in all shades of colour, from the brightest red to the deepest blue. The people, however, considered themselves lucky when they could get anything at all to read; and were equally compelled to be satisfied if they could obtain a meal of horse-flesh and a ration of brown bread.

With such a state of things existing in the town and camp, it was impossible not to see that the end was fast approaching. Other indications were not wanting. From about the 15th October neither besieged nor besiegers fired a shot, and a feeling of