success being stayed in some other quarter, France would have been better served by her intact army within the Metz lines than by its disorganized remains, after a long and fiercely contested retreat in open field. To those who witnessed the events transpiring outside, it was clear that in detaining a German army of more than 200,000 men around Metz, Marshal Bazaine was rendering his country a signal service, to the value of which every day added greatly. Thus, had he held out until the French victory of Coulmiers, that is, just fifteen days longer, the Germans must have raised the siege of Paris. The fact of his capitulating at the end of October, was, for France, the most calamitous event of the war; as, just when a gleam of success seemed to dawn on her struggling arms, it released an immense army to sweep down upon her and stifle for ever her newlyborn hopes.

That a retreat was very difficult it is extremely easy to see. Of course there would have been a severe sacrifice. But it is doubtful whether this sacrifice would have achieved this just result. It was not only his army which the French marshal must force through the German intrenchments, but all the transport stores and provisions necessary to keep that army in a state fit to march. When we remember that the necessary transport for Bazaine's army would have covered 120 miles of road, if arranged along one road; that this line would have been perpetually assaulted in flank and

rear by the German forces; and that no restingplace nor basis of operations offered him a friendly aid—we may well stand aghast at the boldness of the criticisms which have been so frequently indulged in in the siege of Metz. Undoubtedly there was great sickness among the troops, and it is said that one marshal, twenty-four generals, 2140 officers, and 42,350 men had been struck down by the enemy's fire. The statement of Marshal Bazaine, if correct, and there is no reason to doubt it, that when he surrendered he had only 65,000 men available for offensive operations, supplies, when collated with the numbers comprised in the capitulation, at once the strongest condemnation of the soldiery, and an undeniable excuse for their commander's inaction.

A calm investigation of all the circumstances inclines us to believe that Marshal Bazaine was forced to capitulate by the immediate prospect of starvation which threatened both his army and the city. But on the other hand, there is no doubt that the early exhaustion of food was the result of the grossest waste and mismanagement, and that no self-denial or restraint was practised by the French officers, such as might have been expected under the circumstances. Had the Metz supplies been properly husbanded, and every one placed upon rations at an earlier period, the place could have held out for the few days then so inestimably precious to France. But who at the commencement could have foretold this?

uncomfortable arrangements of their tents awakened the guards to tantalizing recollections of their warm cafés and comfortable beds, and rendered welcome the sound of the réveille, at which they turned out in the most fantastic costumes, smoked their cigarettes, drank their morning coffee, greeted with cheers the relieving company, and then marched to their quarters in the city.

Of the real business of a siege, however, the Parisians for some time remained ignorant. The main body of the armed defenders of the city had hardly seen a German soldier. Even the garrison of the forts, the regular troops, and the élite of the provincial mobiles, who were stationed permanently without the enceinte, knew as yet but very little of their assailants.

A dangerous feature of the case, according to the statement made by General Trochu in the National Assembly in June, 1871, was that, in the quota of National Guards returned by certain quarters of the capital, there were some 6000 revolutionists, and 25,000 returned convicts, whose influence was often felt during the siege, and told with terrible effect after the capitulation. | General Trochu, in conjunction with General Ducrot, had formed a plan for encountering the invasion, which was at once intelligent and bold, and under more favourable conditions would most

probably have insured success. It was not, however, as generally supposed at the time, founded upon the principle of making Paris the great centre and rallying point of national resistance; of detaining the Germans around its walls until formidable armies organized throughout the country should move to the relief of the capital, and, by co-operating with the armed masses inside, should compel the invaders to raise the siege. The project, as subsequently explained by General Trochu before the National Assembly, was rather to utilize the forces under his command, to break through the enemy's lines at a point the least expected, to force a passage to Rouen, there to establish a base of operations, and provision Paris by the Lower Seine. Unlike the majority of his countrymen, General Trochu did not depend on the assistance of the army of the Loire, which he knew could render none. A hastily got up and undisciplined army, such as that was, could never prevail in the field against a regular organized force. The general wished that the army of the Loire should confine itself to amusing

the enemy, by defending to the best of its power such towns as might be attacked, while he was preparing his troops and field artillery for active operations. Circumstances, however, did not favour the development of the scheme, which was never seriously attempted, as will be seen in succeeding chapters.

It is, perhaps, not a matter of surprise that no important sorties were attempted in the early days of the siege, although the red republican party in the capital were inclined to clamour for more offensive proceedings against the enemy. The disciplinary operations above alluded to were, however, continued with vigour, until the ramparts bristled with artillery, and a constant fire was kept up which interfered in a considerable degree with the works of the besiegers, who on their side were most active in securing their positions around the capital, until their lines of investment began to assume formidable proportions. The outer circle formed a huge chain of nearly seventy miles, the inner line extending over fifty; and day by day their grasp of the beleaguered city became more tight and rigid. As soon as it was seen that Paris would make a stubborn resistance, the invaders applied themselves to strengthen their communications, increase their forces, and accumulate stores and supplies for a regular siege. In this work they were very greatly assisted by the surrender of Toul on the 23rd, and the fall of Strassburg on the 28th of September, which gave them a line of railway and main road of communication. These facilities were immediately taken advantage of for the transport of heavy siege guns and munitions of war, while detachments were told off to keep open the communications, and flying columns organized to collect provisions and other necessaries. German army, in fact, took the place of the population of Paris. The fertile country within a radius of some thirty miles from the capital, which in time of peace supplied the inhabitants with a large percentage of their daily food, now yielded its supplies to the invader, usually on payment, sometimes on compulsion. The whole region had become an immense camp of armed men, and with some degree of complacency a German writer avowed himself unable to guess how, after the departure of the German troops, the population of what was once the richest and most luxurious district of Europe would find subsistence in a region which would be as devoid of provisions as

The

the Desert of Sahara. While collecting supplies, the foraging parties served at the same time as a sort of observing force, intended to baffle any attempt to disturb the operations of the besiegers.

The great extent and immense strength of the fortifications, of which we have treated fully in a previous chapter, presented obstacles to the approach of the besiegers which would have deterred a less resolute enemy. On reconnoitring the neighbourhood of St. Denis, to the north of the capital, where four distinct and formidable fortresses formed a square, the Germans found that it would have to be reduced by a regular siege before Paris could be touched. The west side, between Mont Valerien and St. Denis, was the next point selected as most vulnerable. Between these two great fortresses there is a space of seven miles, partly protected by the river Seine, which, after skirting Paris on the west, runs midway between them. To fill up this gap the French had been hastily constructing a redoubt at Gennevilliers, half-way betwixt Valerien and St. Denis. This, however, like other projected defences, was so incomplete when the siege commenced that it had to be abandoned. Again, the east side of Paris, as being the most exposed, was fortified with almost superfluous precaution, with a number of detached forts lying close together, and enfilading the approaches to each other, at Aubervilliers, Romainville, Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent, with Vincennes and Charenton on the south. This rendered attack very difficult, although the Germans diverted the water of the Ourcq Canal in order to strengthen the position of the Prussian guards. Due south the same system of forts was kept up by Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, and Vanves. The Germans therefore resolved on attacking the south-west side. A concentration of forces accordingly took place around Versailles, and their first attentions were paid to Fort Issy. When, however, the commandant was summoned to capitulate, he replied that he would not, "as long as breath remained in his body." Shortly after the commencement of the siege the villages of Sèvres and St. Cloud were occupied by the enemy, who erected batteries opposite the Bois de Boulogne. The terraces of Meudon, the heights about St. Cloud, and the works at Montretout, were also all occupied by the German artillery. Thus the beginning of October found Paris so completely blockaded that its only means of communication with the

outer world was by carrier pigeons or balloons, which sometimes fell into the hands of the Prussians.

The discovery that the difficulties of the siege would be greater than had at first been anticipated, did not for one moment deter the German commanders from facing them. Their unshaken confidence was the more remarkable, when it is remembered that General Trochu had 500,000 men under his command, half of whom were employed as the garrison of Paris, and the remainder formed into two armies intended for operations outside.

A momentary gloom was cast over Paris by the the surrender of Toul and Strassburg—especially Strassburg, the defence of which the Parisians had followed with intense interest. Their demeanour, however, was quiet and dignified, and the minister of the Interior issued a stirring and patriotic proclamation, which did much to raise the spirits of both soldiers and people. "Citizens," wrote M. Gambetta," the increasing strokes of bad fortune can no longer disconcert your minds nor lower your courage. You wait for France, but you depend upon yourselves-ready for all things. Toul and Strassburg have just succumbed. During fifty days these two heroic cities have been exposed to veritable showers of bullets and shells. In want of ammunition and of provisions, they still defied the enemy. They have only capitulated after having seen their walls crumble under the fire of the assailants. In falling they have cast a look towards Paris, to declare once more the unity and integrity of La Patrie. The indivisibility of the republic devolves on us the duty of delivering them, with the honour of avenging them. Vive la France! Vive la Republique!" General Trochu likewise issued a short but re-assuring proclamation to the troops. The elections for a National Assembly were further deferred till, as was said, they could be freely held throughout the entire country.

As yet there had been no military demonstrations of an important character, but great activity prevailed within the capital. A peculiar feature of the defence was the armed vigilance of the égoutiers, employed in the main sewers of the capital. These labourers were placed on guard lest the enemy should attempt to debouch from the outlets of those subterranean passages on the banks of the Seine, into the very heart of Paris.

The engineers also fortified the interior both of the sewers and aqueducts, while they blocked up the shafts entering the catacombs and underground quarries, and walled up every gallery that might give access from the outside to the inside of the circle of defences.

Besides the various journalists, whose communications furnished much valuable information respecting the daily progress of events, Surgeon-major Wyatt, of the Coldstream Guards, who had arrived a day or two before the final investment, on a mission from the British government to observe and report on matters of sanitary hygiene and military surgery in connection with the French medical staff, reported very favourably on the condition of Paris with respect to provisions. During the first weeks of the siege he expressed a firm conviction that the capture of the fortresses would prove a very difficult undertaking. "The zealous patriotism of all ranks," he said, is remarkable, and no exceptions are asked for, the Rothschilds taking their turn of duty on the ramparts, equally with all the other citizens, as privates in the garde mobile. The Prussians have now certainly lost all chance of success by assault, for delay has rendered the place almost impregnable."

The forts continued to throw shells into the enemy's works, and reconnaissances were made in several directions-a party from the Fort de Noisy dislodging the Prussians from a post at Bondy. A series of such movements was continued in conjunction with the fire of the forts, but generally with little result beyond disturbing the operations of the enemy. For instance, in front of Fort de Nogent, three companies of mobiles and a detachment of spahis drove back the advanced posts of the Prussians, but falling into an ambush, were compelled to retire after placing some twenty men hors de combat. ReReconnoitring parties were also despatched towards Clamart and Creteil, Malmaison and Gennevilliers, and on the route of the Lyons railway; but on each occasion they were driven back, the Germans having been seasonably reinforced.

Decrees were published by the government postponing the payment of the Michaelmas quarter's rent, and ordering the reproduction, in bronze, of the statue of the city of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde. On the 3rd of October General Giulham, killed in the engagement of the 30th

September, was buried with military honours, when General Trochu briefly addressed the troops. In the afternoon of this day some 10,000 armed national guards, under the command of M. Gustave Flourens, marched to the headquarters, and demanded of the government that the levy en masse of the entire nation should be decreed; that an immediate appeal should be made to republican Europe; that all suspected government functionaries, in a position to betray the republic, should be discharged; and that a municipal commune should be speedily elected, through which distribution should be made of all articles of subsistence existing in the capital. Once again during the week Flourens headed five battalions of national guards at the Hotel de Ville, demanding to be armed with Chassepots, which it was not in the power of the government to supply. A day or two later a still more serious demonstration was made, organized by the central republican committee, in conjunction with citizens Ledru Rollin, Felix Pyat, Blanqui, Delescluze, and Flourens, at the Hotel de Ville, with the view of forcing the government to consent to the immediate election of a municipal commune. Many thousands of people assembled, including a considerable number of national guards; and in front of the open windows of the Hotel de Ville, where several members of the government were seated, shouts of Vive la Commune were raised. The only response to this appeal was the display of an armed battalion of national guards drawn up in line in front of the building, behind which numerous companies of gardes mobiles, with fixed bayonets, were posted. Some delegates were eventually admitted, who were told by M. Jules Ferry that the government would not entertain their demand. Gradually the crowd had enormously increased, when General Trochu appeared, and rode unattended round three sides. of the Place, assailed with cries of La Commune! La Commune! uttered in a menacing tone, to which, however, he made no response. The gates of the Hotel de Ville were closed, and the rappel beaten, which brought other armed national guards on the scene, prepared to support the government. The commander-in-chief of the national guards rode from group to group, haranguing the more violent among the crowd, but to no purpose. They demanded, and would have, the commune of Paris; and not until the place became completely occupied by national guards who were friendly to the