turn, all made their appearance on the steps of the entrance doorway, from which General Trochu and M. Jules Favre addressed short speeches to the populace, thanking them for the confidence they had shown in them by that day's voting. On the following morning the official announcement of the result of the plebiscitum showed that 321,373 had voted Yes, against 53,585 No. The voting of the army, which was not included in the above, was subsequently published, with the following results: 236,623 Yes, against 9053 No; giving a general total of 557,996 Yes, against 62,618 No, being as nearly as possible at the rate of nine to one. By order of the government, in the course of the day about a dozen of the leaders in the proceedings of the 31st were arrested, amongst them Citizen Felix Pyat, who was at once conducted to the Conciergerie. Citizens Flourens and Blanqui succeeded in concealing themselves. A decree appeared in the Journal Officiel appointing General Clement Thomas commander-in-chief of the national guard, in place of General Tamisier, who had been severely injured in the tumult of the 31st.

The news of the proceedings which have just been related reached the besiegers in an exaggerated and distorted form, and raised their expectations of a speedy capture of the city. Internal discord had from the first been reckoned upon by Count von Bismarck as a powerful ally; and it may therefore be easily understood that the intelligence of the outbreak after the surrender of Metz was received with great satisfaction, which was, however, followed by disappointment when the actual truth came to be known.

To the great bulk of the French community this futile attempt at open rebellion brought a positive relief. The fact of its utter failure secured them to a certain extent against the efforts of the disaffected, and by means of the plebiscite afforded an opportunity of placing General Trochu and his colleagues more firmly in their seats. Backed by the universal suffrages of the citizens, the provisional government had now real claims to general respect, and was enabled to proclaim that henceforth it would not permit "a minority to attack the rights of the majority, and by defying the laws, to become the effective allies of Prussia."

Bazaine the soldier who had fought the battles most honourable to France during the campaign, who gave breathing time to Paris to fortify itself, who had occupied 250,000 of the enemy's troops for two months and a half, who had held out until forced by famine to surrender-and that accusation was recklessly urged without inquiry and without knowledge. The army was indignant that no efforts, no bravery, no sacrifices were accounted of in the moment of a reverse, and that the men who were trumpeted as heroes one day should be denounced as traitors the next. The Moniteur, without mentioning the proclamation itself, indignantly protested against this cry of "treason" being raised upon the occasion of every misfortune. We have been betrayed, indeed, it said, but not as the multitude imply, by one or more individuals, who have sold us to the enemy for some pieces of money, but by the incapacity and carelessness of most of those who have exercised an influence upon the success of the war, either in declaring it, or preparing for it, or conducting it. The sovereign first was betrayed, a little by the reports of his ambassadors and marshals, much by his own blindness, his obstinacy before the hostilities had commenced, and his indecision afterwards. The generals have been betrayed by their incapacity, and by the disorganization of the administration, and by the negligence of their subordinates. The inferior officers have been betrayed by the vices of an organization, which doubtless it was not their place to reform; but they have been betrayed also by their too great confidence, by the insufficiency of their military knowledge and preparatory studies. The soldiers, in their turn, have been betrayed by the bad tactics of their chiefs; but they have betrayed themselves frequently by their insubordination and undiscipline. Let us examine and correct ourselves, and we shall be no longer betrayed.

Throughout the country the news of the fall of Metz was variously received, and to many Frenchmen, chiefly in the northern departments, it appeared hopeless to continue the war after so terrible a misfortune, following on the crushing blows that had descended on the nation. Almost the last regular army of any importance which France possessed had been handed over to the enemy, with weapons and munitions of war that could not easily be replaced. Of the fighting men who remained the majority were raw troops, hastily raised, imperfectly

VOL. II.

drilled and armed, whom it seemed vain, as well as cruel, to send against the tried and successful warriors of Prussia; and many who had been hopeful till then now cried for peace. Winter was approaching, which would tell, indeed, against the invader, but would also aggravate the sufferings of the poorer classes of Frenchmen. The harvest had been bad, the fields in many places cut up by the struggles of embattled hosts; trade and commerce were almost destroyed; rinderpest was spreading with alarming rapidity among the cattle; and the requisitions of the Germans became more onerous every day. In the north of France, where this feeling of apprehension especially prevailed, an appeal to the members of the provincial councils was circulated in favour of peace. This document stated that, as the ministry had postponed the elections till the retreat of the enemy, while Prussia would only conclude peace with a government empowered by the nation; and that as these conflicting views might prolong the war, it behoved men of influence, such as those composing the councils, to meet, and send a petition or deputation to the government, urging the importance of taking immediate steps to enable the nation to declare either for peace, or for the continuation of the war, if the Prussian conditions should be deemed unacceptable. "One must place justice higher even than patriotism." the circular proceeded, "and must confess that it was France which, badly influenced, declared war against Prussia, and that, had the fortune of war been so favourable to it that its armies had penetrated to Berlin, it would scarcely have made peace except on a rectification of frontier at the expense of Germany. France, therefore, should not deem it unreasonable if Prussia to-day makes the same demand, as long as it restricts it within reasonable limits. They will not be humbled who submit to a peace, but rather those senseless people who, in their mad pride and presumptuous patriotism, approved the war, and contributed to its being declared."

The tone of several of the northern papers was in somewhat similar strain. The Courrier du Havre exclaimed: "Peace! That is the cry which at this moment millions of voices raise in all quarters of the earth, as well as in down-trodden France; in Germany, intoxicated with unexpected triumph, in intelligent England, in practical America, in far-sighted Russia, in loyal Spain, and in Italy,

T

Everywhere this cry is raised to the Almighty, and seeks to make heaven gracious, seeing that the leaders of the peoples are without mercy." The Journal de Fécamp, commenting on this article, said: "Yes; conquered and humbled France desires and demands peace. All resistance is for the future unavailing. It will only add new hecatombs of a million of corpses to the million of corpses mouldering on the fields of Wissembourg, Reichshofen, Jaumont, and Sedan. We are conquered, scattered, as a nation has never been before. Let us cease to delude ourselves with new hopes, and to calculate on an impossible resistance. We are honourably conWe are honourably conquered. Our army, which is no more, has made heroic exertions. It has even won the respect of the victor. Honour is saved. We are conquered. Let us humble ourselves. Let us assume the dignity of misfortune. Silent and modest, let us submit. Peace, peace alone, which is everywhere demanded by all France, can save the country's future, by its men and resources being spared. In view of the country's misfortune, we must at this hour have the courage to bow our necks, and sue for peace."

Looking to the heroic efforts subsequently put forth by Frenchmen on the Loire, or even by those in the northern departments themselves, such language appears craven and unpatriotic; but a calm review of the situation at this time could hardly fail to excite the most anxious fear for the future of France. The war had been begun with 400,000 men, ready for service, with some 1200 field-pieces, and with two first-class fortresses on the frontier to support the operations: 100,000 men killed and wounded had fallen, and 300,000 were prisoners. The 1200 field guns had nearly all been captured, and the fortresses had surrendered; the emperor and his imperial guard were in the enemy's hands, the most experienced officers wounded or prisoners; and would France, with a third of its territory occupied, be able with raw levies to turn the tide which had swept away its veteran army? The loss of men sustained by the Germans in actual fighting was not greater than that of the French, while the balance of prisoners was enormously in their favour. It would be next to a miracle if the raw levies of France could chase away the invader, or even long hold him in check.

In spite, however, of such discouraging pros

the north addresses were sent to Tours, assuring the government of support, and declaring that the population were ready to die rather than surrender, or accept a dishonourable peace. At Marseilles the body styling itself the League of the South issued a manifesto; concluding with a decree that, in all the departments which have adhered to the League, all citizens must hold themselves in readi ness to quit their homes at the first summons, and to march under the standards of the republic against Prussian and monarchical despotism. "The point of rendezvous for the national forces will be the city of Valence and the surrounding plains. The delegates of the co-operating departments are designated as general commissioners of the League of the South. They will traverse the departments to preach a holy war, to call together republican committees in the various localities, and to act in concert with them in order to effect, by all sible means, a general uprising." The expense of equipping the forces of the League was to be met by public subscription, and the general commissioners were to arrange with the republicans of each department for the election of cantonal delegates, who should attend the general assembly of the League of the South at Marseilles, on November 5. The document concluded by saying, that "In the name of the republic, one and indivisible, the members of municipal and administrative bodies owe the most energetic assistance, as citizens, to the members of the League of the South, created for the defence of the republic, and to their representatives. Done at Marseilles, October, 1870."

pos

It would have been better for France had these southern republicans seen, that the safety of their country at this painful crisis depended not so much upon the promulgation of the republic, as upon unity of co-operation with the government of "National Defence," and the sinking of all political predilections until the common enemy had been overthrown. M. Gambetta himself, however, had set the example of so mixing up republicanism with his measures for national defence that, of the two, he frequently appeared to be holding up rather the banner of the revolution than that of France; which led one of the most influential papers, referring to his proclamation after the surrender of Metz, to remark, "It is the republic, one and indivisible, that must be greeted before

everything. One and indivisible! And how are you to avoid the division of the territory when you scatter broadcast divisions in hearts and minds, by charging with treason all those who do not bow the knee before you, or who destroy, even unintentionally, your calculations and your lies?" The article went on to observe that, while Gambetta was stigmatizing Bazaine as a traitor, a Marseilles club was condemning Gambetta as a scoundrel." How," it was asked, "could any "could any new form of government be permanently established in the midst of such revolting confusion? or what chance existed of the struggle being effectively carried on against the invasion?" A French clerical paper, the Union, also speaking of the sarcasm implied in the words "one and indivisible," when compared with the distracted state of the country, said that "at this moment it would be betraying our country not to tell the truth. Every day which is passing is only deepening the abyss into which we are plunged. Resistance to the enemy is weak; the Prussian flood is still rising, and anarchy is extending its ravages more and more. There are two governments, one at Paris, the other at Tours. The investment of the capital renders concert impossible, and the official bulletin is exposed to registering contradictory decisions. There exists at Marseilles a revolutionary power, which is self-constituted, and oppresses a noble city; Lyons has again become a free town in this sense, that as the violent administration of that great city only breathes demagogic ardour, it is free from everything which restrained it. almost all our departments there is a tendency among the prefects to obey Paris or Tours as little as possible. The country is on the way to being covered with governments, and all this being developed alongside the Prussian invasion. These are frightful complications which have no name in political language."

In

There was a great deal of truth in all this, though it is difficult to say that any one in particular was responsible for the state of semi-anarchy that prevailed. In fact, when it is considered In fact, when it is considered that France had now been two months without any definite ruling power, and that nowhere in the world is faction so general, it seems almost a wonder to find order or unity of action present at all. As a rule, the artizans supported a republic, while the peasantry and trading classes were in favour of some form of monarchy. The republic,

however, though not generally loved for itself, was accepted as representing, for the time being, the principle of nationality and the determination to fight; and with the majority the Provisional Government, up to the present time (November), had gained rather than lost in popularity by its determination not to lower the national flag. Men argued that France was lost if she permitted herself to be disheartened, even by such a succession of defeats as those she had endured; and no people that values its own historic reputation can blame them for so thinking. M. Gambetta became the most influential man in the Provisional Government, because he was the most earnest in devising means for continuing the war. Being minister of the Interior as well as of the department of War he had, by the authority of the government in Paris, been invested with two votes in the Ministerial Council of Tours. He thus acquired nearly dictatorial powers; for unless all the other three voted against him-a not very likely circumstance-his will would be law. The present and succeeding chapters will show with what almost frantic energy he used this power. The national defence during the autumn and winter was mainly due to him; and though the prolonged and agonizing struggle was destined to fail, the endeavour cannot be said to have been utterly vain, for, as we shall presently show, France was never so near victory during the whole course of the war, as in the autumn months that followed the capitulation of Metz.

The internal state of the country being so unsettled, the prospects of France in entering on another stage of the war, were thus far from cheering. On the one side were the hosts of Germany, by this time flushed with their unbroken successes, and, confident in their skilful generals, their splendid organization, their enormous resources, and their perfect discipline and equipment, regarding themselves as invincible. On the other side were the half-formed armies of France, consisting for the most part of men who knew nothing of actual war, who had never been under fire, who had little confidence in themselves and less in their leaders; who in many instances were poorly furnished with the necessary weapons, and some of whom seemed to think that little more was needed in meeting the enemy than to cry "Long live the Republic." As we shall see, however, in their future struggles they displayed