by those of the inhabitants who were engaged in commerce, and who had realized no small harvest. As the Prussians seemed to intend making Dieppe a provision depot for themselves, both this port, and Fécamp and Havre, were shortly afterwards declared by the French government in a state of blockade, and men-of-war were stationed near to enforce its observance.

On December 19 Dieppe was occupied a second time by the Prussians, and as the little army quartered there were in want of boots and horses, all residents and visitors, not being foreigners, were called upon to send their horses to the marketplace, where a Prussian officer selected a certain number, and, according to the custom in such cases, bought them at his own valuation, paying for them in paper redeemable at the end of the war. As nearly all the good horses at Dieppe belonged to Englishmen, the Prussians, out of many hundreds brought forward, found very few worth taking -altogether, not more than a dozen. In the matter of boots they were more successful; the dealers in these articles having been required to send to an appointed place all the ready made goods they had on hand, on assurance that whatever was taken from them would be paid for at its full value.

Of course, too, there was a little money transaction. No contribution was levied. But Dieppe possessed a tobacco manufactory, which, like all such establishments in France, belonged to the state; and General von Göben explained to the municipality that, as state property, the tobacco manufactory passed from the hands of the French to those of the Prussian government. As the representative of that government he could not work the manufactory, neither could he carry it away with him, and he had no wish to burn it. He therefore proposed to sell it, and (making a good guess) fixed the value at the round sum of 100,000 francs. The muncipality protested against the exorbitancy of the demand, which was ultimately reduced to 75,000 francs. Part of the money was paid down at once, and the rest in a day or two after.

On the 9th of December, the same day on which Dieppe was occupied the first time by the Prussians, a somewhat compensating advantage was achieved by a band of active and daring Lille mobiles, who surprised the Prussian garrison at Ham, the fortress where Napoleon III. was once imprisoned. At six o'clock in the evening the

detachment of French arriving before the town, which is protected by a strong castle, first fell on the sentries, and then sounded the Prussian signal for a general march. About 200 of the garrison, mostly belonging to the field railway detachment, hastily collected, and were caught as in a trap. Others fled to the fort, pursued by the French with levelled bayonets. At midnight a parlementaire, accompanied by a lieutenant, appeared before the fort; but they were fired upon, when the flagbearer was killed and the lieutenant wounded. At one o'clock in the morning the French captain, accompanied by a Prussian officer who had been made prisoner, presented himself as a parlementaire, when in an interview with the commandant it was agreed that the place should be surrendered at six o'clock, and that officers who were prisoners on either side should be exchanged. At the appointed hour the French entered the fortress and found the Prussians, seventy-six in number, drawn up in line and disarmed.

Of all the towns besieged by the Prussians during the war, none held out more gallantly than Vauban's virgin fortress of Phalsbourg, a description of which is given in Chapter X.

In

Phalsbourg was closely invested on the 9th of August, and on the evening of the 10th it was bombarded for an hour and a half by two batteries, under the command of General Gersdorff, with four and six pounder shell guns. In that brief space 3000 projectiles are computed to have been thrown into the fortress; but only one house was seriously injured. On the 14th, at seven in the morning, the bombardment was renewed, and raged until four in the afternoon, along the side of Phalsbourg which runs parallel with the Port de France. the conflagration which it occasioned, few of the houses of the town escaped without more or less injury, while forty, including the church, were burnt. Towards the close of the day mons to surrender was sent to the governor, General Talhouet, who returned a firm refusal. The siege was soon after changed into a blockade. The beleaguering troops were relieved from time to time on their march westward, no week passing without parlementaires knocking at the gates. The garrison consisted of about 1000 regular troops and 800 gardes mobiles. The investing force varied; at the close it numbered 5000 infantry, with artillery, and a squadron of Bavarian cavalry. On November 24 there was another

smart bombardment, but famine at the last compelled the garrison to open the gates. The fortress was not well provisioned. Very early in October they began to eat horse flesh. Salt, tobacco, coffee, and sugar rapidly failed, and latterly wine. Towards the close, every other day, the rations of the garrison consisted of a water soup, whose only nutritive properties were derived from the fat of cattle and horses. The population of Phalsbourg is set down in gazetteers at 4000, but nearly half that number had quitted the town, or been turned out of it at the commencement of the siege. Those who remained suffered the same privations as the garrison, and to scarcity of food was added want of water, a Prussian spy having cut the conduit which supplied it. After the rout of Woerth the wreck of MacMahon's army was rallied upon Phalsbourg, when 35,000 kilogrammes of its provisions were drawn upon, and there was not sufficient time to revictual. The earlier sorties of the garrison, for collecting supplies, were often successful; but in the later the villages were found cleared bare by the besiegers.

An enormous quantity of powder had been stored at Phalsbourg, at the beginning of the war, for the use of the army of the Rhine. For some days previous to the surrender volumes of smoke ascending from the place told that these stores were being gradually burnt, that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. Before the gates were thrown open to the besiegers, 12,000 rifles, with 9,600,000 rounds of cartridge, were destroyed, and 12,000,000 lbs. of powder were flung into the moat, all the cannon spiked, and their wheels and carriages broken. On December 12, after sustaining a siege of five months, the fortress capitulated unconditionally; and fifty-two officers, 1839 men, and sixty-five guns, fell into the hands of the captors.

The only fortress in German Lorraine which now remained in French hands was Bitsche. This place also had been besieged since August; but its natural position was so strong that it was unlikely to yield except to famine, and there had for some time been a tacit understanding on both sides to suspend firing, and thus avoid useless bloodshed.

On the 14th December Montmèdy capitulated, yielding to the Germans an additional sixty-five guns and 3000 prisoners. The fortress had been bombarded by about seventy heavy guns, throw

ing balls of the average weight of 150 lbs., which did frightful execution. The upper town was almost destroyed, while the lower suffered but little. The iron roof of the powder magazine had been struck, and the commandant, seeing that the fortress and both the towns were likely to be blown up, called a council of war, which unanimously decided on capitulation. Thirty or forty persons were killed during the siege, and sixty wounded. The Germans lost only a few, as their guns were beyond the range of those in the fortress. The surrender released nearly 400 German soldiers, principally landwehr, who had been imprisoned here for several months. Negotiations for an exchange failed on account of the commandant demanding two Frenchmen for one German, a demand which provoked the retort that one German soldier was worth much more than two Frenchmen.

Montmèdy did not possess much strategic importance for the Germans, as it was too remote from the real scene of operations; but it had long been a favourite rendezvous for the franc-tireurs of the Ardennes, and its possession was necessary to prevent the communications of detachments operating along the Belgian frontier against Mézières, Longwy, &c., with Metz and Thionville, being exposed to the chances of a guerilla war.

We have spoken of Châteaudun as affording the only instance of an open town which in the whole course of the war made a vigorous stand against the enemy. A visit to that and the neighbouring town of Chartres afforded reflection for the moralist, and ample explanation of the non-resistance of open towns. Châteaudun, with the hand of war resting heavily upon it, was continually experiencing a change of garrison, and every change brought a pang of some sort. One day came the Germans, and left after staying a week; then came the French, taking what the Germans had left, scolding the inhabitants for giving these Germans anything, and going; back came the Germans the same evening, squeezed the sponge for the last drop, lived upon the inhabitants until it was a mystery how anybody in the wretched place lived at all, only to make way once more for the French, and so on. For weeks after the memorable fight, for which Châteaudun was voted to have "deserved well of its country," there might have been seen groups of men and women gloomily huddled together among the ruins of their burnt houses, the picture of

misery and woe, and who seemed to pass their existence in brooding over their misfortunes, or in watching the ingress and egress of the various troops. It was a pleasing contrast to leave such a scene, and arrive in the sleek, well-preserved town where the mayor had made friends with the enemy the moment he presented himself at his gates, so that Chartres scarcely suffered perceptibly from the war. The Châteaudun church was riddled with shot and shell, and showed great gaps in its walls and roof. The gigantic Chartres cathedral, towering above every surrounding object, and visible for leagues from every quarter of the landscape, stood intact. The narrow winding streets of the picturesque and historic old town were always alive and animated; all the shops open and well stocked, and even the market-place well supplied with provisions. No sign of plunder or pillage here; people received payment for everything, and in consequence of their good behaviour escaped heavy requisitions. Certainly, a lack of patriotism was attended with great advantages both to conquerors and conquered; and it was astonishing how well all seemed to get on together, and how few bitter recollections the Germans left behind them in places where from the beginning they had been humbly received and systematically well treated.

We have pointed out in a previous chapter that the desperate attempt of D'Aurelles on December 1 to push his army towards Paris, was part of a scheme arranged with General Trochu to break up the besieging forces. The defeat of the army of the Loire, therefore, and the retirement of Ducrot from across the Marne, marked the failure of the first combined attempt on a great scale to raise the siege of Paris. The Germans were on all points triumphant; and yet their able and experienced chiefs did not share in the exultation of the camp. No one knew better than the great strategist who directed the movements of the invading host, how perilous is a miscalculation in war, how insecure the German position had been made, and how success was even yet possible, if not prevented by mighty exertions. Victorious, too, as the Germans had been, their losses round Paris, and especially in the protracted struggle with Chanzy's army, had been severe; and as Paris still held out resolutely, and the winter was extremely rigorous, it was obvious that new and immense demands on the German resources were required. It had become necessary

to strengthen considerably the barrier to the armies intended to relieve the capital, to fill up the gaps caused by the prolonged contest, and to increase the efficiency of the means employed to reduce the besieged city. For this purpose reinforcements, numbering not less than 200,000 men, were in the course of December marched into France. The new levy consisted partly of a portion of the supplementary (ersatz) reserve; men who had been passed over year by year, from the practice in Prussia of absorbing into the line less than one-half of the young men qualified and legally bound to serve. Citizens of all classes and occupations, who never dreamed of being again called upon for military service, received a peremptory summons to start, after a short drill, for the seat of war. There was, however, no grumbling, for the persistency with which it was believed the French had for many years contemplated the invasion of Germany, and the recklessness with which they entered upon it at what appeared to them a favourable moment, created and sustained a degree of indignation which nothing hitherto had been able to allay. This feeling was not confined to the towns and centres of culture, but penetrated even to the remotest villages, and promised a supply of willing and ardent reserves quite as long as the patriotic zeal of the French was likely to fill the ranks of M. Gambetta. The new comers occupied the captured towns and the extensive line of communication, while the more seasoned troops whom they relieved were sent to the front. With them the shrunken battalions of Prince Frederick Charles and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg were replenished, the armies of Manteuffel in the north, and Werder in the east, were augmented, and the sphere of their operations extended; the hold on the communications was tightened, the siege of new fortresses undertaken, whilst at Paris every nerve was strained to accelerate the attack, and lessen the difficulties of a mere investment.

Two decrees of special importance were issued by the French during the month, the first referring to the numerous desertions from the army, which were now of daily occurrence. It was notorious that by far the greater part of the prisoners captured" in the fighting at and around Orleans, were men who delivered themselves up to the enemy, preferring a temporary sojourn in Germany

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to the chances of Prussian steel or bullets. The ill-success of the armies, also, was largely ascribed to panics raised by troops who, terrified at the approach of danger, fled from the enemy. To prevent these scandals, M. Gambetta decreed that to all the armies of the republic should be attached a regiment of mounted gendarmes, the officer in command of which was to preside over a permanent court-martial, to be established in the rear of each army, with the following instructions:

To follow the army, and to dispose his men in such a manner as to watch and close all the issues from it. To arrest fugitives, and hand them over to a troop in due formation. They will regard as fugitives every soldier, every officer, or group of soldiers, found retreating without a written order, or without being placed under the command of a superior officer. Every soldier, not being wounded, found in the rear of the army without arms or equipment, will immediately be brought before the court-martial. Any one who shall raise a cry of Sauve qui peut,' or of We are pursued,' will be taken before the court-martial. Exercise the greatest rigour and the greatest vigilance in the performance of these duties."

On the 25th of December a far more unpopular, and in every way unjustifiable, decree was issued, abolishing the councils general of departments, as well as the councils of arrondissements; and it proved that the "government of the three lawyers," as it was frequently called, or to speak more correctly, the Gambetta dictatorship, was every whit as absolute, and when occasion arose much more tyrannical, than was ever that of the much-reviled "man of Sedan." The act can only be compared to a ministerial warrant of the Home office in this country, which should abolish all boards of magistrates and municipal councils, and hand over the county property and the control of county rates to a band of hungry adventurers and government adherents. The councils general sat regularly in the month of August, and for many years their meetings had been looked forward to with strong interest, as presenting one of the few opportunities that remained for the expression of public opinion. They had the almost absolute control of financial contributions, expenditure, receipts, and local taxes; they created resources, and contracted loans.

Such a provincial representation was peculiarly dear to the nation, and there were not wanting loud and vigorous protests against the decree.

The patriotic portion of the country, however, saw that the time would be equally ill-chosen on their part for domestic discords; and after the first feeling of indignation the decree was admitted, and agitation left over for the future. It may be here remarked that not long after the conclusion of peace it was deemed advisable to rescind the decree of M. Gambetta and his co-delegates, and the councils general were re-established.

As in November, when Russia repudiated the treaty of 1855, so in December another danger burst upon Europe, in consequence of Count von Bismarck repudiating the treaty of 1867 for maintaining the neutrality of Luxemburg, on the alleged ground that she had not preserved her neutrality during the war. In his note to the government of the grand-duchy he declared, that "the hostile sentiments of the population have manifested themselves in the maltreatment of German officials in the duchy; but Prussia does not hold the government of Luxemburg responsible for the bad conduct of individuals, although more might have been done to repress it. The provisioning of Thionville, however, by trains run from Luxemburg, was a flagrant breach of the laws of neutrality, which could not have taken place without the connivance of the officials. The Prussian government at the time lodged a complaint with the government of the grand-duchy, and pointed out the consequences to which proceedings of the kind must inevitably lead. The warning was disregarded. After the fall of Metz numbers of French officers and soldiers, escaping from the captured fortress, passed through the territory of Luxemburg to evade the German troops, and to rejoin the French army of the north. In the city of Luxemburg itself the resident French vice-consul had an office at the railway station, designed to assist the French fugitives in reaching their own country; and at least 2000 soldiers had in this manner reinforced the French army. The government of Luxemburg did nothing to prevent these acts; and the fact undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of neutrality. The conditions upon which Prussia had based her neutrality have, therefore, ceased to exist; and, consequently, Prussia declares that on her part she no longer considers herself, in the conduct of her military operations, bound by any re gard for the neutrality of Luxemburg, and reserves to herself the right of claiming compensation from the grand-ducal government for the German losses

and of taking the necessary steps to secure herself against the repetition of similar proceedings."

The note was answered by M. Servais, minister of State and president of the Luxemburg government, in a long and elaborate document, disputing the truth of some of the Prussian chancellor's statements, and diminishing the significance of others. The Luxemburg government had evidently not been sufficiently vigilant in preventing breaches of neutrality; but it was equally clear that Count von Bismarck had been to some extent misled by the exaggerations of persons who, as M. Servais remarked, "never tired of lightly reporting things calculated to endanger and cast suspicion on the grand-duchy, while keeping themselves out of all responsibility." Fearing absorption into Germany by the Prussian chancellor, the inhabitants hastened to testify their attachment to their legitimate rulers by numerous addresses; but the matter was at length amicably settled by a special Prussian officer being sent to Luxemburg to confer with the grandducal government with a view to the prevention of any similar ground of complaint.

It was impossible that, when our nearest neighbours were fighting, we should not in a vast variety of ways be inconvenienced, and run the risk of being involved in the broil-an illustration of which occurred on the 21st December. Six English colliers, returning from Rouen, were stopped at Duclair, twelve miles lower down the Seine; some shots were fired, and the vessels themselves were sunk to bar the navigation. The incident was readily seized on by that numerous section of Englishmen who, without any real intention of forcing the country into a war with Germany, caught at an opportunity of showing sympathy with France by a paper quarrel with Count von Bismarck.

The facts were that six small sailing colliers had been discharging coals at Rouen, by permission of the Prussian authorities; and after unloading had received, through the British consul there, a permit to return to England. Following the usual course, they dropped down the river to a village called Duclair, about twenty-eight miles below Rouen, where ballast is taken in for the homeward run. When the crews had finished ballasting, the ships were seized by the Prussians, towed into position across the fair-way channel, scuttled, and sunk. The British consul, informed of what was going on, started from Rouen by land, reached

sink the vessels, and entered a vigorous protest, of course without effect. He then undertook the negotiations for the bonds of indemnity, which the officer in command of the Prussians was willing enough to furnish.

In considering the question involved in this attack upon neutral property, it must be borne in mind that it occurred in time of war, and in waters which, after the expulsion of the French, were subject to the German military authorities. Trading vessels have not, like men-of-war, the exceptional property of being extra-territorial; and there is, therefore, a great difference between the confiscation of an English man-of-war and that of an English collier. In this case the act was a kind of military necessity. French men-of-war had frequently steamed up the river, landed troops, and caused loss to the German forces by firing upon them. Hence the determination of the Prussians to have the Seine blocked up; and as this could not immediately be done by means of batteries or torpedoes, they seized and sunk, off Duclair, eleven vessels, of which six were English.

Lord Granville, on hearing of the seizure, sent a remonstrance to the Prussian authorities, and Count von Bismarck at once wrote as follows to the representative of Germany in London:

"VERSAILLES, Jan. 8, 1871.

"The report of the commander of that part of our army by which the English collier-ships were sunk in the Seine has not yet arrived; but as far facts is known. as our intelligence goes, the general outline of the

"You are authorized, in consequence, to say to Lord in order to avert immediate danger, were obliged Granville, that we sincerely regret that our troops, to seize ships which belonged to British subjects.

"We admit their claim to indemnification, and

shall pay to the owners the value of the ships, according to equitable estimation, without keeping them waiting for the decision of the question who that excesses have been committed which were not is finally to indemnify them. Should it be proved it still more, and call the guilty persons to account." justified by the necessity of defence, we should regret

The reply of the Prussian chancellor was considered satisfactory, and the fullest compensation was shortly after made to the owners and crews of the vessels.