of about the strength of a brigade, Von Göben followed Faidherbe to Bapaume, sending the sixteenth division to invest Péronne, and keep the communications; a disposition of his army which could only be justified by the event, and which could not fail to tempt the French commander to attack him before he could concentrate his forces. He very speedily had reason to recall the sixteenth division, and to leave the besieging of Péronne to General von Senden, with what forces and material he could collect from St. Quentin and Amiens, which the result proved to be sufficient. Faidherbe gave as an excuse for his retreat on the 24th the failure of his commissariat and train; experience, apparently, not having yet taught the French the value of these services, to the shortcomings of which their earliest disasters of the campaign were to a great extent due. This, how ever, was doubtless only part of his reason for retreating behind his fortresses. Here he received intelligence of the somewhat incautious advance of Von Göben to Bapaume, and perceiving his chances, determined at once to resume the offensive. On Friday, the 30th December, the country round Arras was swept by the division Lecointe, which on the following day proceeded to advance, with its left wing resting on La Scarpe, and its right on the heights of Beaumont-les-Loges. The front of the army, slightly convex in shape, extended for about a league before Arras. On the 2nd January the advanced guard attacked the Prussian post before Bapaume, but, owing to the failure of a subordinate general, without serious effect. Some detachments made a reconnaissance on the Arras and Douai roads, and came so near to a battery of artillery that, had it not been for Count Portalais and his squadron of king's hussars, the French might have recorded the capture of some Prussian guns. When, however, they were within 200 yards of the battery, it was saved by the hussars, who rushed upon them, cutting them down where they stood, and making 200 prisoners. Having thoroughly felt his way on the German left flank, General Faidherbe determined to attack at Bapaume the next morning. Accordingly, at nine a.m. on the 3rd January, just as General von Göben with his staff arrived at Le Transloy, half way on the Péronne road between Combles and Bapaume, the French commenced the action. Bapaume, with the villages of Avesnes-lesBapaume, Ligny-Tilloy, and Grevillers, were held by the fifteenth division, under General Kummer. The twenty-ninth brigade consisted of the battalions of the thirty-third and the sixty-fifth regiment. Two battalions of the thirty-third held the villages of Avesnes and Grevillers; the sixty-fifth regiment the suburb of Bapaume, called the Faubourg d'Arras. The thirtieth brigade, consisting of the twenty-eighth regiment and the second battalion of the sixty-eighth, made ground towards the Arras road and the wooded heights of Sapignies. Bapaume and its environs were consequently held by about eight battalions, with six batteries of artillery. As at this moment, with the exception of those of the nineteenth regiment, no battalion could bring more than 600 men into action, the Prussian force at Bapaume may be put down at 5000 infantry, with thirty-six guns. To their left was the brigade of General Count Groben, who lay at Miraumont, on the Arras and Amiens Railway. The Prussian right was commanded by Prince Albrecht, the younger, with the fortieth regiment, three batteries of horse artillery, and the division of the cavalry of the guard, whose headquarters were in Equancourt, at the juncture of the Cambrai, Bapaume, and Péronne roads. The reserve consisted of the eighth jäger battalion, one battalion of the thirty-third regiment, one battalion of the sixty-eighth, and the artillery reserve. These lay upon the Bapaume and Péronne road, between the villages of Beaulincourt and Le Transloy. The position of the Prussian troops was, therefore, with their left at Miraumont, centre at Bapaume, and right at Equancourt. The French right extended beyond Achiet-le-Petit, and lay in the villages of Bihucourt, Achiet-le-Grand, and Gomiecourt; their centre was in Behagnies and Sapignies; whilst their left rested upon Vaulx and Lagnicourt. The French began with an attack upon the Faubourg d'Arras, and by an attempt to drive the thirty-third regiment out of the village of Grevillers. In this they failed, being driven back and pursued by the thirty-third into the village of Biefvillers, which the Prussians stormed and took possession of, but were soon obliged to evacuate. Heavy masses of infantry came on to attack the gallant little band, amongst whom the French artillery was making sad havoc. Slowly, and with their faces to the enemy, they retreated upon the suburb of Bapaume, where they found the sixtyfifth regiment at their backs, and whence a quick and uninterrupted fire was soon opened upon the French troops. Meantime the Prussian artillery posted on the Arras road swept the plateau beneath, and poured a plunging fire of shell into the heavy French masses as they struggled across to gain the Faubourg d'Arras. The French artillery was never better served than on this occasion, both for rapidity and precision. Besides having excellent cannon, and knowing how to use them, the soldiers of the army of the north behaved most admirably under fire, although composed mainly of recruits, and without skilled leaders. Numerous bayonet charges were executed with creditable courage and gallantry against old and well-trained Prussian warriors. During one of those charges one battalion had to pass battalions of Prussians hidden at about five yards' distance. A full charge was given from the needle-guns with such terrible effect, that it seemed as if little more than fifty men of that battalion remained alive or unwounded. In the course of the morning the thirty-third regiment, now fearfully reduced, was obliged to retire from the suburb it had held so bravely, and took possession of the old citadel of Bapaume, situated on the Albert road, and of the windmill to the left. The sixty-fifth still held a part of the Faubourg d'Arras, while two horse-artillery batteries were sent forward to the left, and, taking up a position at Ligny, opened fire upon the French right. The action now became general and Bapaume was in a circle of fire and smoke. The Prussian centre, overwhelmed by the numbers of the enemy and the hot artillery fire, was beginning slowly to give ground, when the Rhenish jägers, with two fresh batteries, deployed to their left and went into action. Meantime Prince Albrecht had marched upon Baucourt from Equancourt, and had detached two batteries with some cavalry in the direction of Beugny-le-Château, whilst he himself, with the fortieth regiment and the remainder of his command, excepting the hussars of the guard, engaged the French left from Fremicourt. The hussars of the guard were sent along the road to Cambrai, to make sure that no troops were advancing on the Prussian right from that place. At the village of Boursies two regiments of French infantry, with a squadron of cavalry, were reported as advancing on the Cambrai road upon the German right flank. The officer in command was equal to the emergency. A squadron was dismounted, and took possession of the buildings and outhouses of the village. The hussars with their carabines opened a heavy fire upon the French as soon as they were within range; who, thinking that the village was held by infantry, made a hasty retreat. While matters were going on thus on the centre and right of the Prussian army, General Count Groben marched from Miraumout against the French right. Making a slight détour to his left flank, he suddenly appeared on the enemy's rear, and, opening fire from his artillery, made them imagine he was about to attack them in reverse, which speedily had the effect of compelling the French centre to draw off some of their forces, and gave a little breathing time to the gallant defenders of Bapaume. There, in the meantime, confusion reigned supreme. The inhabitants were rushing off pellmell in all directions. Shells went hurtling into the houses, bullets smashed the windows, and the town was set on fire in several places. On the road outside Bapaume, leading towards Beaulincourt, could be heard the sound of the heavy guns playing upon Péronne; and anxious must have been the commander of that fortress for news of those who were trying to relieve him, and whose fire he could distinctly recognize. Towards halfpast one things had a serious aspect for the Germans. The heavy fire and superior numbers of the French had told so effectually, that the whole of the suburb of Arras was relinquished, and the twenty-ninth brigade, under Colonel von Bock, retired into Bapaume. The thirtieth brigade formed up in rear of the town on the Péronne road, and for a brief period the French suspended operations, except on the right flank, where Prince Albrecht was hotly engaged, but where neither side gained any advantage for a time. By sunset, however, the French had not only entered the suburb of Arras, where they at once erected strong barricades, but, after desperate fighting, had taken most of the villages around Bapaume, and even had their posts in some of the streets of the town itself, at only about thirty yards from the German outposts. The sixty-fifth regiment accordingly began to prepare for a fight in the streets by building barricades at every corner, and turning every window into a loop-hole. The terrified inhabitants fled into the cellars, and even the soldiers were not without apprehension, in consequence of the very superior strength of the French. | wasting time in undignified discussions with GenFortunately for them, the battle did not extend eral Manteuffel, he had by advancing made the into Bapaume, and the day closed upon a sanguin- most of it: for he must have known that every ary fight, which again produced little or no real day which passed added to the difficulties, the advantage to either party. dangers, the agony of Paris. The allegation that the object of the fighting at Bapaume was frustrated by the shortcomings of the French commissariat, acquitted the soldiers at the expense of their commander, who had full time for the organization of the service in the north, and should therefore have seen that his army was in a condition to keep the field. As to his other reason for stopping short before Bapaume, "lest an attack upon that place might involve its destruction," he ought to have considered that between him and Paris there were many such places, within which the Germans might have chosen to await his onset, and that if he were equally scrupulous about the safety of all of them, he would never achieve the deliverance of the capital. Pursued to within about four miles of Arras by the Prussian cavalry-who, however, captured no guns and but few prisoners-the army of the north again found itself under the friendly shelter of their fortresses. General Faidherbe subsequently issued a proclamation, expressing the greatest indignation at the pretensions put forward by the Prussians of having had the advantage in the action, and claimed to have won a "complete victory;" which, he asserted, was proved by the fact that his army slept in the villages it had taken. He had not, he said, followed up his victory, because of the failure of his commissariat, and his fear that an advance would involve the destruction of Bapaume. The battle may, indeed, be fairly said to have been won by the French, but a fatality seemed to attend their movements even when they were successful. Faidherbe's army had behaved with the greatest gallantry, and their repeated attacks so exhausted the Germans the thirty-third regiment, for ininstance, having less than half its strength and only three officers left-that at six p.m. General von Göben gave the order to retreat across the Somme. The heavy baggage trains were already in motion when it was discovered that the French commander, whether unaware of his victory, or dismayed by his own losses, or alarmed by the prospect of wanting food, retreated, and the German movement was stayed. Had he only advanced, or even maintained his position till morning, he would have secured an unmistakable victory, which might possibly have given new life to France. It would, at the least, have enabled him to relieve Péronne, and to partially clear the left bank of the Somme; and this would have had much more effect in inspiring his troops with ardour and energy than a paper assertion of victory while in full retreat before the enemy. It was this want of vigour, rather than of capacity or courage, in the French generals, which on more than one occasion made their greatest efforts of so little avail. The real fruits of the victory remained, of course, with the Germans, though dearly purchased by the loss of nearly 1000 killed and wounded. If the French slept in the captured positions, their nap must have been brief indeed, for by midnight a movement of retreat was commenced along their whole line. The proof of a victory is in its results: and General Faidherbe would have furnished the best evidence of having gained it if, instead of The principal cavalry intrusted with the pursuit were the eighth Rheinischer cuirassiers, commanded by Captain von Marées, who, just beyond the village of Sapignies-between it and Morycame upon two retreating battalions of French infantry, one a chasseur regiment, the other consisting of gardes mobiles. At the moment he discovered them he was riding exactly parallel to them, the undulating country having hitherto hidden them from his view. He at once determined upon attacking them. The greater part of the country in the neighbourhood of Bapaume is arable land, most of which had been ploughed, and the furrows, from the severe frost of the previous ten days, were frozen as hard as bars of iron. Every one can see how serious were the difficulties which a heavy cavalry regiment would have to encounter in an attack over such ground. After some deliberation a spot was, however, chosen upon which to attack. No sooner did the French infantry perceive the approach of the Prussian cuirassiers than they formed two squares. The foremost square, which was first attacked, waited until the cavalry came within 300 yards before it opened fire. Then, however, a perfect shower of bullets rang against and pierced the cuirasses of the advancing horsemen. The captain was shot through the knee, and his charger through the head; the lieutenant was unhorsed, and suffered a severe concussion; and the squadron sergeant-major received a bullet through the heart. Undaunted by the fall of their officers and sergeant-major, the men rode boldly at and right through the square, scattering their foes on all sides, and sabring and trampling down many. Having thus pierced their way to the other side of the French, they immediately spread to avoid any concentrated fire. Had they been supported, which unfortunately for them they were not, in all probability the regiment of infantry would have been cut to pieces; but a ravine of great depth separated them from their comrades, who were unable to cross in time to take part in this gallant action. The remains of the shattered French square were thus able to gain the shelter of a village, against which it was of course impossible to advance with cavalry. Von Göben did not consider it wise to hold Bapaume, and soon after the battle of the 3rd retired to Domprere. The retrograde movement was carried out along the whole German line; General Kummer, who with the fifteenth division was at Albert, withdrawing upon Bray-sur-Somme, and Prince Albrecht retiring upon Combles. Considerable detachments of men and siege material were despatched to Péronne, which, under the fearful artillery fire poured upon it, speedily became a mass of ruins, and on January 10 capitulated unconditionally, with its garrison of 2000 men, to General von Senden. pany of infantry were immediately placed upon waggons, and, with two horse-artillery guns and two squadrons of cavalry, under the command of Major Preinezer, of the artillery, went in pursuit of the flying enemy, and captured two more guns and many additional prisoners, before they could ensconce themselves behind the earthworks of Havre. Besides Péronne, two other fortresses fell early in the new year; namely, Mézières on January 2, and Rocroi on January 4. The former had undergone a tedious process of investment, almost since the capitulation of Sedan; for as it could give little annoyance to the Germans, its reduction by siege guns was deferred. Like almost all the other fortresses besieged, it speedily yielded to powerful artillery, which in a bombardment of about three days caused a vast amount of damage to life and property. The wreck, indeed, baffles description; terrible as was the scene presented by Bazeilles after being fired by the Bavarians, it was not so fearful as that which met the eye in some parts of Mézières. At Bazeilles the walls. of most of the houses were left standing, and the streets were free of débris; but at Mézières, in many places, the houses were a mere waste, and not a stone of the front walls was left standing. The narrow streets were so choked up with fallen stones, that it was often difficult to get along. The church was also much injured. The 2nd of January witnessed the capitulation of the fortress and the surrender of the garrison, numbering 2000 men. The same day on which the severe action at Part of the force which had reduced Mézières at Bapaume was fought General von Bentheim, on once marched north-west to Rocroi, on the Belgian the Seine, had a somewhat sharp engagement with frontier. Early on the morning of January 4 the French troops from Havre; to which place a some cavalry appeared suddenly at the gate, and new commander had been recently appointed, who demanded an immediate surrender, threatening had won considerable popularity by encouraging bombardment in case of refusal. The commandant, and organizing a scheme for attacking the Prus- believing that the enemy were unprovided with sian forces in the neighbourhood. For several siege guns, returned a firm reply in the negative. days the Prussian commander had heard that The effective garrison consisted of 150 mobiles and large numbers of French were massing upon the 120 artillerymen and engineers. The guns were left bank of the Seine, threatening Rouen. To old-fashioned pieces, and the fortifications antique. prevent the completion of these movements Von A dense fog prevailed, when at noon the sound of Bentheim, with a strong division, on the 3rd of a cannon was heard and a hissing shell fell within January, at five a.m., surprised the French army the fort. It appears that about thirty-six German in their quarters. The attack was short, sharp, guns were ranged in batteries against the town, and and decisive; four standards, 500 prisoners, and a fierce fire was at once opened from them. A numtwo rifled guns falling into the hands of the ber of long-range guns were placed further in the Prussians. Not satisfied with the result, a com- rear, and the whole were supported by a force of VOL. II. 2 F several thousand men. On the other hand, the fort of Rocroi possessed only four guns of serviceable range. When the first shell fell the mobiles rushed towards the ramparts on the side away from the fire, climbed over them, and fled in all directions. The 120 men who kept their ground, for five and a half hours bore an unrelenting bombardment, of which every shot told, and which crushed the town by the weight of 2000 projectiles. Fires broke out in several places, and a dozen houses were in flames. The four French pieces which were available fired as rapidly as possible against an enemy who could not be seen, and their balls fell at random. The powder magazine was so much damaged that there was imminent danger of its explosion. At half-past five another parlementaire appeared, stating that it was useless to prolong the resistance, and that only from respect to the valour displayed had the Germans been induced to take the unusual course of sending a second summons. The town continued to burn, and no assistance was to be looked for. The commandant, therefore, consented to capitulate, and the Germans entered and extinguished the fires, which, owing to a violent wind, threatened to destroy the whole place. Of the 120 men, nearly one-half managed to escape after the capitulation; the remainder, together with the officers, were sent to Germany. While General Faidherbe was, as we have seen, availing himself of all opportunities of annoying and injuring his enemies in the north, things in other parts of the country were beginning to look extremely serious for France. Paris, patient and resolute, still kept at bay the hosts encompassing it, but only by submitting to privations so severe that it was easily seen they must soon issue in starvation or submission. The army of the Loire, at one time so full of promise to the nation, had been obliged to retire, defeated and scattered, upon Le Mans; and already the Germans were concentrating to deal it the last crushing blow. Seeing that his chances depended upon the hazard of one last desperate throw, M. Gambetta conceived the idea of a simultaneous offensive movement throughout the country. Paris was to make a formidable sortie in force, Faidherbe was to advance from the north, and Chanzy from the south, while Bourbaki was to put forth all his strength to cut the Prussian communications, and even push his way into Germany. M. Gambetta accordingly tele graphed to General Faidherbe that the moment for the supreme effort had come, and directed him to draw upon himself as many of the Germans as could be diverted from Paris. Promptly obeying, he eluded the troops who were watching him, and by forced marches arrived on the south of St. Quentin, threatening his enemy's lines of communication. It was thought advisable, however, to conceal if possible the extent and object of this movement. movement. In a despatch to Bordeaux published on the 18th January, General Faidherbe therefore stated that, "having learnt that the Prussians at St. Quentin demanded of the inhabitants a sum of 548,000 francs, he had resolved to put an end to their exactions, and sent a flying column for that purpose under the orders of Colonel Isnard. That officer encountered the enemy at Catelet Bellicourt, and pursued him, killing and wounding thirty men. Colonel Isnard subsequently entered St. Quentin on the 16th, the enemy flying in great disorder, and abandoning 130 prisoners, as well as a considerable store of provisions. The inhabitants of the town received the troops with great enthusiasm." Though somewhat coloured as to the "great disorder," &c., the despatch was correct in stating that St. Quentin was evacuated by the Germans. No artifice, however, could conceal from the wellinformed Von Göben that the French had really advanced in great force; and promptly gathering together his little together his little army, he gave orders for an immediate attack. immediate attack. The remarkable feature in the conduct of this commander was the great exactness with which he carried out his plans, and the care taken by him of all parts: none were neglected by him, even while each was working for itself for a certain time, and scarcely knowing it was connected with another until the moment came when all acted together as a whole. He cared comparatively little how many perished on the march, provided it was completed in the given time; and in the operations around St. Quentin on the 19th were seen the results of his exact method. Every one was in his right place at the right time. The officers of the Prussian army attributed to Manteuffel's slowness the fact that Faidherbe had not been more decisively beaten on previous occasions, while the confidence of the common soldiers in Von Göben's talent was great. the fatiguing march through snow and mud, from morning till evening, they might often be heard On |