or a movement on his flank. General Werder was accordingly directed to concentrate the Baden division on the line of Vesoul, Lure, and Montbéliard, to give up the advanced positions of Dijon and Langres, and to repel any attempt to relieve Belfort. The French ships of war had about this time captured several German merchant vessels, and detained the captains as prisoners of war. In retaliation the Prussians, a few days before leaving Dijon, summoned thirty of the "notables" of the place, and explained to them that they required forty hostages, who would be sent off to Germany, where, however, they were assured they would be well treated. Twenty were taken from Dijon, ten from Vesoul, and ten from Gray, and in spite of some strong protestations were at once despatched to Prussia. Dijon had been required, on the entry of the Germans, to deposit £20,000 as security for the good behaviour of its townsfolk; but at the entreaty of the mayor, who gave a touching description of the distressed condition of the working classes, the amount was reduced to £12,000. This was returned to the mayor by General Werder on his departure, with a letter complimenting the inhabitants on their exemplary conduct.

We now approach the last effort that could at all be regarded as formidable, made by the provincial armies to retrieve the disasters of France and checkmate the enemy, whose hitherto triumphant progress had been without a parallel. Our readers will remember that after the army of the Loire had been dispersed from Orleans on December 4, it was divided involuntarily into two main portions, and that M. Gambetta, accepting the situation, constituted the two halves respectively as the first and second armies. That which had fallen back along the upper, or left bank of the Loire, towards Bourges, now called the first army, was placed under the command of Bourbaki, the late chief of the imperial guard; while the other division, or second army, was confided to General Chanzy. The "great and paramount object" of the forces of both generals, as announced by M. Gambetta at the time, was the relief of Paris; and in order to effect this the two armies were each reinforced, reorganized, and thoroughly equipped, as far as was possible whilst under the surveillance of a vigilant enemy. In all, including the forces operating in the east and north, there could not at this time (about the end of December) have been less

than 450,000 Frenchmen, with from 700 to 800 guns, under arms, exclusive of the garrison and army of Paris-a marvellous spectacle, considering the circumstances; but unfortunately, as Napoleon has observed, there is a wide difference between men and soldiers. The great bulk of these troops were unformed levies; and as most of what was best in the force originally under D'Aurelles had fallen in the terrible struggle of the previous two months, it may be affirmed that the real strength of the principal armies in the field, under Chanzy and Bourbaki, was not nearly equal, even if united, to that of the first army of the Loire. The organization of the new corps was pitiable, and there was such a lamentable want of officers, that their proportion to the men was wholly inadequate. Thus, while the victorious armies of Germany, as we have seen in the previous chapter, had been largely and formidably strengthened, there was nothing like a corresponding increase in the forces of France. So far, however, as comparative numbers could constitute strength, the forces of Bourbaki and Chanzy were strong indeed, considerably outnumbering the united forces of Prince Frederick Charles and the duke of Mecklenburg, who were thus exposed to an overwhelming onset, had both branches of the Loire army resolved upon closing in upon them. Though Bourbaki had remained inactive for several weeks, he with such good effect held in check the German army occupying the line of the Loire, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, that, enterprising and adventurous as the prince was known to be, he seemed reluctant either to attack Bourbaki or to withdraw from his position in front of him. The prince's duty was to cover Paris on the southern side; and he co-operated with the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who, with his army at Chartres, was almost daily awaiting Chanzy's attack from Le Mans. If at this juncture any important event of the war could have been confidently anticipated, it was a combined movement by the two French generals against the prince and the grand-duke. The courage and firmness with which Chanzy held every position from Vendôme to Le Mans, although he fought single-handed and stood on the defensive, may be taken as an earnest of what he might have achieved had he been seconded by Bourbaki and acted on the offensive, as best suits French soldiers. That he had by far the best disciplined half of the Loire army may be inferred from the

fact that, while his troops performed prodigies of valour at Beaugency, and stubbornly contested every inch of their retreat, those under Bourbaki had fallen back along the Upper Loire without firing a shot. Bourbaki's soldiers, however, if properly provisioned, were by no means unfit to take the field; and, such as it was, his army was sufficient to paralyze all German movements. To withdraw it, therefore, from Bourges, till it was demonstrated either that Chanzy could raise the siege of Paris without Bourbaki's help, or that he could not raise it even with his help, would appear to be the height of folly.

Not so, however, thought Lieutenant-colonel de Bigot, a staff officer of the regular army, and attached to the seventh division at Besançon. It was natural that the mind of this intelligent officer should dwell especially on the best means of striking an effective blow in the part of his country in which he was, or had been, more immediately interested. He saw that Belfort was invested by some divisions of Werder's army, while Werder himself was operating generally in Franche Comté. His forces, however, were inconsiderable, numbering perhaps 40,000 or 50,000 in the field. They were, withal, occupied in reducing or holding the northern towns of the province, and in guarding the railway lines that from Dijon and Vesoul converged on Paris; they were already kept somewhat in check by Garibaldi and the French army of the east, and had even suffered some slight reverses. Bourbaki, however, and his numerous army were in force at Bourges and Nevers—that is, at no great distance to the west; and Colonel Bigot thought an opportunity was thus presented to strike a sudden and decisive blow which, if successful, would completely change the position of France in the east, and might lead to the relief of Paris. If Bourbaki, with 90,000 out of his 120,000 troops, were to unite with a part of the army of the east, he might, by a rapid attack, isolate and overwhelm Werder, and cause the siege of Belfort to be raised. This done, he could not only master the German communications by Dijon and Vesoul, but a few marches would place him upon the leading railway line which, from Strassburg to Paris, via the great depôts at Nancy, was the mainstay of the besieging army, and essential to its safe existence. A move of this kind, vigorously executed, might compel the invaders to relax their gripe on the invested

capital; nor was it necessarily attended with peril to the operations of the French as a whole. True, the withdrawal of Bourbaki might subject Chanzy to the necessity of fighting single-handed with Prince Frederick Charles and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who were now extended from Chartres to Orleans, with detachments pointing towards Le Mans; but having been largely reinforced, he could, it might be expected, hold his own; nor was it likely that a combined movement of this kind would be made against him. On the contrary, it was reasonable to suppose that, when informed of Bourbaki's march, Prince Frederick Charles would detach against him the whole or a large part of his troops, or would pause, hesitate, and delay at Orleans. In either case Chanzy would be safe, and might perhaps be able, by a bold advance, to defeat the enemies in his front in detail, and so open a way to Paris. Nor would the operations of Bourbaki be marred even were he followed by Prince Frederick Charles; for he would have greatly the start of him; and a French corps could be left in his rear to observe and retard the prince's movements.

Such was the scheme for the last effort of the provincial armies in behalf of Paris; and although it is unfair to judge of strategy by the event, yet looking at the relative condition and strength of the belligerents, the project from the first might have been pronounced desperate. No doubt the communications of the Germans formed their most vulnerable point, and a few facts will suffice to show their vital importance. Experience had shown that "requisitioning" was of but trifling use in providing for the wants of an army. Only upon the first occupation of a district did it supply any considerable amount of food. If the enemy remained for any length of time the provisions of the inhabitants were either exhausted or concealed, and were not to be had for love or money. Throughout the siege of Metz the troops engaged in that undertaking had to be fed by Germany; and although the army besieging Paris, and those in the several zones around, resorted at first to extensive requisitions, the supplies from this source ultimately proved so precarious as hardly to be worth the danger incurred by the detachments told off to gather them in. Throughout the war, therefore, Germany was the main base of supplies for her armies, whose enormous requirements may be conceived when we remember that, in the