draught treaty, explaining that he preferred one treaty to two; that he found Landau and Saarbrück unattainable, and that he had accordingly kept to Luxemburg and Belgium. The Germans had also got hold of the reply to Count Benedetti's letter from the French government. A general approval was given to his draught; but whereas the fourth article contemplated the extension of Prussian supremacy south of the Main, and the fifth provided for the annexation of Belgium, the French government wished it to be made clear that the latter article was not to be regarded as only binding if the former had been carried out. success our demands will have to be graduated | to the principles laid down in it. He inclosed a as follows: In the first place, you will have to combine into one proposition the recovery of the frontiers of 1814 and the annexation of Belgium. You have, therefore, to ask for the extradition, by formal treaty, of Landau, Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and the duchy of Luxemburg; and you have to aim at the annexation of Belgium, by the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty which is to be kept secret. Secondly, should this basis appear to promise no result, you will resign Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and even Landau, which, after all, is but a dilapidated nest of a place, the occupation of which might excite German national feeling against us. In this eventuality your public" It is obvious that the extension of the supremacy agreement will be confined to the duchy of Luxemburg, and your secret treaty to the reunion of Belgium with France. Thirdly, supposing a clear and unmistakable reference to the incorporation of Belgium is found unpalatable, you are authorized to assent to a clause in which, to obviate the intervention of England, Antwerp is declared a free city. In no case, however, are you to permit the reunion of Antwerp with Holland, or the incorporation of Maestricht with Prussia. "Should Herr von Bismarck put the question, what advantage would accrue to him from such a treaty, the simple reply would be, that he would thereby secure a powerful ally; that he would consolidate his recent acquisitions; that he was only desired to consent to the cession of what does not belong to him; and that he makes no sacrifice at all to be compared to his gains. To sum up, the minimum we require is an ostensible treaty which gives us Luxemburg, and a secret treaty, which, stipulating for an offensive and defensive alliance, leaves us the chance of annexing Belgium at the right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us, if necessary, by force of arms, in carrying out this purpose." These instructions of August 16 were answered by Count Benedetti in a letter dated Berlin, August 23, and commenting upon it, in replying to his book, published in 1871, Prince Bismarck drily observed that "this letter, which is entirely in his own hand, like so many other interesting documents of the same kind, is at this moment in the possession of the German Foreign Office." In the letter Count Benedetti told his correspondent that he had received his communication, and would conform as closely as possible VOL. II. of Prussia across the Main will, as a matter of course, compel us to seize Belgium. But the same necessity may be brought on by other events, on which subject we must reserve to ourselves exclusively the right to judge." Amendments to carry out the views of the French government were added on the margin of M. Benedetti's draught treaty, and as thus amended, it also fell into the hands of the German government. On the receipt of his revised draught, Count Benedetti presented to Count von Bismarck a draught treaty incorporating the amendments with his original handiwork, and this was the treaty which Count von Bismarck published to the world in 1870. When, however, M. Benedetti came to discuss the project he was disappointed at the reception he met with; and he wrote home on the 29th of August, expressing for the first time a doubt whether France could count on the sincerity of Prussia, which, according to his belief, had succeeded in establishing an alliance with Russia, that might lead to the co-operation of France being refused. The whole matter, for the time at least, thus dropped, and secret negotiations were suspended for several months. These documents entirely disposed of M. Benedetti's case, which was that the suggestion for the annexation of Belgium came solely from Count von Bismarck, at whose dictation the draught treaty had been written; and that the treaty was at once rejected by the French government, which would have nothing to do with the annexation of Belgium. In short, Count Benedetti's story was shown by the documents of his own government to be entirely untrue. In so far as regards France, there is the clearest 20 The evidence of her determined design upon Belgium, and the French government had actually condescended to calculate what it might be necessary to provide as a sop to appease England. It is more difficult to say what was the true history of the part played by Count von Bismarck and Prussia in the matter. A part of M. Benedetti's book is proved to have been utterly false, but other parts the Prussian minister by no means explained. All that is really proved by the emperor's instructions of August 16 to Count Benedetti is, that the French government was plotting to seize Belgium, while he-anxious to put his government forth as a paragon of virtue endeavoured to make the world believe that France would not have Belgium, even if offered. Prince Bismarck's revelations would have us infer that the proposal to lay hands on Belgium originated with her, but this by no means follows. Louis Napoleon had manifested considerable uneasiness at the growing power of Prussia, and could not but see that it was quite possible for him to prevent the easy subjugation of Austria in the war of 1866. He thought it reasonable, therefore, to inquire of Count von Bismarck, what compensation he might expect in return for allowing Prussia unmolested to absorb German territory on all hands. idea of French interference evidently caused great uneasiness in Prussia; and on the 6th of June (more than two months prior to the letter of instructions above quoted) M. Benedetti wrote to his government that Count von Bismarck had told him that the compensation France might require in consideration of any future territorial aggrandizement of Prussia must be sought in a French-speaking district. This, it appears to us, was the first intimation of the secret treaty busiCount von Bismarck wished to disarm the hostility of Napoleon III., and in order to this he chose to keep dangling before him the prospect of an accession of territory to France at no risk or cost to himself. By this device he was completely taken in, and confirmed in his intention of maintaining an absolute neutrality between Prussia and Austria. On the 16th of July M. Benedetti wrote that Count von Bismarck had pressed on him the advantages of an alliance between the two countries. On his objection that to take the compensation offered would involve a breach of international treaties, Bismarck replied that if France and Prussia were united they need not fear armed resistance either from Russia or England. On the 26th of ness. July M. Benedetti wrote again, that he should be telling the French Foreign minister nothing new in saying that Count von Bismarck "is of opinion that we ought to seek compensation in Belgium, and has offered to come to an understanding with France on this head." All these letters, written from time to time by M. Benedetti, in the ordinary course of his business, for the exclusive and private information of his own government, were published in his book, and their accuracy was certainly not impugned by anything Prince Bismarck afterwards published. Putting all the accounts together, therefore, we think it is not very difficult to guess what really happened. Prince Bismarck was, in June and July, 1866, very much afraid of France helping Austria, and thought it expedient to agree that the former should have some makeweight to counterpoise the increased power of Prussia. As he did not wish to give up German soil, he suggested that France should take Belgium. France did not at all approve of this. She did not wish to get into a great international quarrel, and held that, as it was Prussia that was winning, she it was that ought to pay. France demanded Mayence and the left bank of the Rhine. Count von Bismarck rejoined that, rather than agree, he would prefer war. France backed out of the demand, but immediately caught at his suggestion for the annexation of Belgium, with, however, a demand for Luxemburg and a slice of Germany. Count von Bismarck would consent to no infraction of German territory, but was quite open to discuss what compensation he was to receive for Luxemburg and Belgium. During all this time that he was keeping France and M. Benedetti in play, he was arranging a Russian alliance; and no sooner had that point been gained than he threw M. Benedetti and his draught treaty to the winds, and vowed that he could never have the heart to do anything distasteful to England. Under the title of "A Ministry of War for Twenty-four Days," Count de Palikao endeavoured to shuffle all the responsibility of the march to Sedan off his shoulders, and to justify the other acts of his administration. He admitted having been the author of the plan which proved so disastrous to MacMahon, but endeavoured to show that it was founded upon military considerations suggested by a former well-known campaign of Dumouriez in the Argonne. Dumouriez marched from Sedan southwards and won the decisive battle of Valmy; therefore Count de Palikao thought if MacMahon marched northward towards Sedan he too would win a great battle over the sons of those who were defeated at Valmy. "When I con"When I conceived the march of the army of Châlons on Metz, in order to operate its junction with that of Marshal Bazaine," says the War minister of twenty-four days, "I understood that Dumouriez's plan could be executed in an inverse sense, that is to say, by a rapid march from the valley of the Marne to the valley of the Meuse." In Chapter X. of this work we have expressed our opinion that the sending of MacMahon northwards in the attempt to relieve Bazaine was one of the most striking examples in all history in which military were sacrificed to political considerations; and notwithstanding Count Palikao's explanations, to that opinion we still adhere. From M. J. Valfrey's "History of French Diplomacy since the 6th September," and the official documents published by M. Jules Favre, we obtain a clear insight into the extraordinary part played by M. Gambetta in the misfortunes of France, and some very interesting details respecting the mission of M. Thiers to this and other countries in September, 1871. The mission intrusted to M. Thiers was the opening of a series of illusions destined to be dispelled by a terribly painful experience; and the manœuvres of M. Gambetta to paralyze the small results of the mission inaugurated what may be called the "era of patriotic falsehoods." It was an understood thing that, with M. Gambetta, "country" was synonymous with "republic;" if no republic there was no country; to save the country, therefore, it was necessary to save the republic. But if the republic signed a disastrous peace it was lost. This was the reason why, after the 4th of September, M. Gambetta was ever found impeding all attempts at a peace, or even an armistice. Before leaving Paris by balloon he was hostile to the pacific projects of M. Jules Favre, and he found a powerful auxiliary in the famous "plan" of General Trochu; at the end of October he resisted in his despatches the attempts at an armistice made by M. Thiers; in February, at Bordeaux, he voted against peace. His conduct was consistent, and from his own point of view irreproachable. M. Thiers had been charged by the government of the 4th September with a mission to all the great powers, the main object of which was, if possible, to draw them into alliances with France, so as to continue the war and expel the Germans from French territory. Where, however, the Emperor Napoleon in the fulness of his power, and his cousin Prince Napoleon, had, after a first disaster, been unsuccessful, there could be little chance for the representative of a country without an army and without a government. Besides, these projects of coalition "against the common enemy" were little likely to be favourably entertained by cabinets accustomed to look upon France as "the common enemy." In case of the failure of these projects M. Thiers was to induce the various powers to remonstrate strongly with Germany upon the exorbitancy of her demands. But to extort from Germany better terms than she deemed equitable was a task which would have required the combined efforts of Europe-a task, withal, in which it was doubtful whether Russia would, or Austria could, co-operate. It would be hard to say what England alone, or even England with Italy, could have done for France after Sedan; and M. Thiers should have considered how little influenced France herself would have been by the mere remonstrances of Europe, had the Prussian armies been overpowered in two pitched battles, Mayence and Coblenz besieged, and the French van-guard in sight of Berlin. In spite of his quick intelligence, M. Thiers did not at once perceive how difficult it would be to turn the opinion of Europe in favour of France, or instead of listening to his fears, he obeyed only the promptings of his devotion to his country. He went to London, and there proved in lengthy conversations, to his own satisfaction at least, how necessary France was to the equilibrium of Europe and to the happiness of mankind. He was listened to, as he always had been, with deference, with sympathy, and even with pleasure; but Lord Granville answered that England "did not mean to go to war; that by interfering in behalf of the neutral powers she might run a risk of offending Prussia, who would not put up with her intervention; and that such an intervention might do more harm than good." He added, that England had already paid the penalty sure to fall on all neutrality; that she had given offence to both belligerents, and the Germans complained of her too great partiality to France. M. Thiers insisted that the course England had followed, and was bent on following, would cause her to fall from her rank among nations, and that her inaction, under present circumstances, amounted to connivance with Prussia, as it would necessarily turn to her advantage. The English minister had, however, made up his mind not to compromise his country on any account. Her Majesty's government were fully aware of the futility of offering mediation between two belligerents who could not agree upon a basis of negotiation. They had brought the two plenipotentiaries face to face at Ferrières, and there left them to do the best they could together. M. Thiers next went to Vienna, charmed Count Beust, thought that he had won him over, and went on to St. Petersburg. There all was cordiality and goodwill; the Emperor Alexander was understood to renew his promise that the French territory should be spared; this was much. Returning to Vienna, M. Thiers was received with good words, but it was necessary to make sure of Italy. King Victor Emmanuel was frankness itself; he acceded to everything asked by him, provided that his cabinet consented, but the cabinet did not consent. These great armies, this general rising announced by M. Gambetta, were they indeed real? M. Thiers, speaking officially, had no doubt about them, but when he spoke in his own name he was full of anxieties. His sad pilgrimage over, he returned to the government of the Delegation, bringing with him, besides the fair words which he everywhere received, a telegram from the Emperor Alexander to the king of Prussia, the object of which was to arrange for the entrance of M. Thiers into Paris, and to facilitate overtures for an armistice. If the Delegation approved, the telegram would be sent. At Tours the proposal was met by a similar proposal from the British cabinet. The combination decided their acceptance; for fear of showing unreasonable stubbornness, M. Gambetta yielded. While apparently joining in the opinion of his colleagues, however, he drew up privately for the government of Defence a long despatch, intended to precede M. Thiers and to destroy beforehand the effect of his speeches and his advice. This despatch may be said to throw a full light upon the character of M. Gambetta, as well as upon this episode of a very dark story. Overpowered by the authority of M. Thiers, M. Gambetta gave his vote for peace, but by underhand means he endeavoured to make it impossible. He put the government of Paris on its guard against the very objectionable views of the negotiator; the country was not so exhausted as he thought, men abounded, the staff of officers was being reformed. There existed in reality an army of the Loire of 110,000 men, well armed and equipped. The general who commanded them was not a great captain, but he was fully competent for his task. Another army was forming in the east; the west was getting ready; the north would stand firm; the franc-tireurs were the terror of the enemy; with Keratry and Garibaldi to command them they formed important resources. In a word, the military position was excellent, and as Paris would hold out long enough for all these forces to come into action, the state of affairs, from being critical, would become favourable; the flight of time, the rigours of winter, were so many auxiliaries which might be counted on. This picture was drawn with the view of rendering the government remaining in Paris more exacting with regard to the conditions and even the acceptance of the armistice. To give additional effect to the picture, M. Gambetta furnished a highly coloured description of the state of people's minds in France. According to him elections were demanded only by a minority in the country. All the towns were "passionately republican and warlike;" even the provinces began to show their teeth. The Legitimists and the Orleanists alone, enemies to the supremacy of the capital, demanded new elections. There were no disturbances in the large towns. Lyons and Marseilles recognized the authority of the central government; leagues had been formed, but a little firmness and plain dealing sufficed to disperse them. Besides the republican party, "with the exception of two or three ultramoderate individuals, are unanimous in considering the elections as a perilous diversion from the necessities of the war." If an armistice was to be concluded, it must serve to reinforce the defence and not to weaken it. There must, therefore, be laid down as absolute conditions the revictualling of besieged places. "Far from weakening the spirit of resistance," says he, "we ought to excite it still more; we ought only to accept the truce proposed to us if it is advantageous from a military point of view, and only to make use of it from a political point of view if we are resolved to hold really republican elections." The eloquence of Gambetta had the most disastrous influence upon those who read his fatal despatch; it persuaded them that the armies from the outside were hastening towards them, that the enemy was about to raise the siege, was imploring quarter, and must be made to pay for it. The armistice, as we know, was rejected, because the Germans would not consent to the re-victualling of Paris, and ultimately France had to pay three milliards more than would probably then have satisfied her enemy, and to lose, besides Strassburg and Metz, the whole of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine. A singular feature of the war publications was the complaisance with which all the French generals sang their own praises. General Faidherbe was always victorious, and General Chanzy would have ultimately triumphed had the war continued. In our account of the operations in the north of France we have already alluded to M. Faidherbe's work, "Campagne de l'Armée du Nord en 1870-71," and see no reason to modify the opinions then expressed. The object of successful war is not to fight battles, or win them, for their own sakes, but as means to certain desired ends; and the whole question of a general's alleged victories turns on the degree in which he approached to or attained his object. Now, if Faidherbe in December wished merely to fight a defensive action and then move off, or in January to fight a defensive action and then move off, he certainly succeeded. But if the battle of Pont-à-Noyelles came out of an attempt to recover Amiens, as is generally supposed, or that of Bapaume of the desire to save Péronne, as Faidherbe himself tells us, then it is certain that he failed on each occasion, and can claim no success merely because he was not re-attacked or pursued. ENGLISH BENEVOLENT OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR. We have more than once, in the course of this history, alluded to the difficult part which England, as a neutral nation, had to play during the war. We were regarded by the belligerents as cold-blooded and lukewarm, for not taking an active share in a contest which stirred up the fiercest passions of both countries, and which each worked itself up to consider could only be rightfully regarded from its own point of view. Many Frenchmen felt more disposed to forgive Germany the invasion of their country than to forgive England for "permitting" it; while on the other hand, many German newspapers demanded a "bloody reckoning" of us for allowing the export of arms; forgetful that Prussia supplied Russia with them in the Crimean war, and that her jurists maintained that it was then both legal and expedient. There is, however, one field where the muchmaligned neutral is allowed fair play—the hospital and the ambulance. Here, at least, the United Kingdom showed that its neutrality was owing to no indifference, and that it is possible for outsiders to feel that there is a certain amount of truth and right on both sides, which the eager combatants overlook in the heat of the fearful strife "Where furious Frank and fiery Hun Charge 'neath their sulph'rous canopy." In these days of close intercourse and free trade among nations, England must suffer by all the misfortunes of its neighbours; a truth which, it may be hoped, will in time bring about a more charitable spirit towards us. Commerce is a sensitive plant, which shrivels up immediately under any cold chill, and our commerce, as the greatest in the world, is the most quickly affected. Yet the British contributions on behalf of the sufferers by the war exceeded those for any former object, and were larger by far than for our own Patriotic Fund, in the Crimean distress, in the same time. Such aid by neutral nations is regarded by some as an indirect subsidy for the carrying on of war; but a little reflection as to the circumstances of the recent contest will show that such was not the case in 1870-71. Under ordinary circumstances it is an admitted fact that any provision which a government can maintain for the service of the sick and wounded in time of peace, is invariably inadequate to meet the enormously increased demands which instantly spring up at the commencement of war. While the French arrangements in this respect were found on almost every occasion to be very greatly defective, the abundant provision made by Germany often seemed equally shortcoming. For the reason of this we have not far to seek. The campaign was one of unprecedented mutilation and slaughter; but in addition to this, and as a natural result of the extraordinary success of the Germans, a battle invariably threw upon their hands the sick and wounded of both sides; and the enormous strain under which they laboured may be gathered from the fact that the three first battles, Wissembourg, Woerth, and Forbach, left with them no less than 20,000 wounded. |