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mand; I did not order the troops you mention to be posted where they were.' Here, gentlemen, I beg to say that I am thoroughly

convinced that if I had been in command the case would have been

precisely the same. I further said to General Lebreton, 'Look here, general, you want me single-handed to stop the advance of half a million of men who are surging up towards the Assembly; and yet you must know as well as I that it cannot be done; but as you make this demand in the name of the Corps Législatif, I will attempt the effort, though I am well assured of its failure.' Ten minutes later I was on horseback, on my way to the Corps Législatif. At the same moment I despatched General Schmitz to the Tuileries to inform the empress of what I was going to do. I was accompanied by two aidesde-camp, and had no difficulty in getting through the Carrousel, though the place was crowded, because nobody seemed to want to penetrate into the Tuileries; but when I got to the quay I had great difficulty in moving through the huge mass, which stretched from a long way beyond the Pont Neuf, far up in the Champs Elysées. I witnessed, not without fear or emotion, such a sight as I had never beheld, although I had seen both 1830 and 1848. An immense multitude of men, women, and children, wholly unarmed, and in which kindliness, fear, anger, and good nature were oddly mingled, surged up all around me and wholly prevented my advance; men with sinister faces threw themselves on my horse's reins, and shouted, "Cry "Vive la Sociale!" Yes, gentlemen, 'Vive la Sociale.' I said to them, 'I will not cry anything at all; you want to bind my free will-you shall not do it.' Other men, understanding my position, remonstrated, and shouted, "He's right.' It took me nearly an hour to get to the corner of the Pont de Solferino. There I was compelled to come to a stand-still. I had long since lost my two aides-de-camp, and could neither go forward nor back. I kept parleying with the crowd, trying to get them to open a way for me, when a tall man elbowed himself up. I did not know him; he was under the influence of great emotion. He said, 'General, where are you going?' 'I am going to try and save the Corps Législatif.' 'The Corps Législatif has been invaded. I was there I saw it. I give you my word it is so. I am M. Jules Favre.' M. Jules Favre added, "That is the culminating disaster; here is a revolution being consummated in the midst of the disasters of our armies. You may be sure that the demagogues who are going to try and turn it to account will give France her death-blow if we don't prevent it. I am going to the Hotel de Ville: that is the rendezvous of the men who wish to save the country.' I replied, 'Monsieur, I cannot take such a resolution at present;' and we parted. It took me about an hour longer to get back to the Louvre. Whilst these events were taking place, the empress had left the Tuileries. General Schmitz had found her gone, and had been received by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, who had remained at the palace. The official historiographers, whose narratives I have read, generally add-The principal functionaries of state crowded round the empress to take leave of her; alone General Trochu did not appear.' No, I did not appear, because at that time, instead of paying compliments of condolence to the empress, I was making an attempt personally to protect the Corps Législatif, at the request of General Lebreton. A little after my return to the Louvre a group of persons, utterly unknown to me, presented themselves. The person who led them said, 'I am M. Steenackers, a deputy. I am sent to you with these gentlemen to tell you that a real drama is being enacted at the Hôtel de Ville; it is surrounded by the mob; deputies have met there to form a Provisional Government; but there are no troops; there are no soldiers; there are no means of enforcing any decision that may be arrived at; they imagine that your name will be a kind of sanction, and that the troops dispersed all over Paris would rally round you.' I asked for five

minutes to see my family, and went to the Hôtel de Ville.

What I saw there was striking enough. There were the same enormous crowds as during the morning, but very much more mixed. Shouts, clamours, and threats arose on every side. The Hôtel de Ville itself was filled with so dense a crowd that it was only by devious ways that I was able to reach a closet, about four times the size of this tribune, in which the Provisional Government had stationed itself by the light of a solitary lamp. I didn't know whether the men I saw there for the first time-with the exception of M. Jules Favre, whom I had seen during the day-were really usurpers, vultures soaring down on power as a prey; but they did not look like it. I felt that they and I were exposed to a great peril. One of them said, 'General, in this formidable crisis we are especially anxious that the government should not fall into the hands of the people in the next room. Just now, taken aback by the suddenness of events, they are assembled, but they are not yet armed; but they will be to-morrow. If you consent to be the minister of War of the Provisional Government to-morrow, the officers and soldiers in Paris will gather round your name, and there will be some means of enforcing the measures that must be taken for the preservation of order in Paris.' I replied, 'Before making up my mind it is my duty to go to the War office and acquaint the minister, who is my chief, of what is going on here.' I went and found General Palikao in his office a prey to intense grief; he thought that his son, a clever young officer, had been killed at Sedan. On this occasion he received me with the greatest cordiality. 'General,' he said, 'the revolution is a fait accompli; if you don't take the direction of affairs it is all up with us; if you do, probably the result will be just the same; but the soldiers will rally round you.' I returned to the Hôtel de Ville, where I found the Provisional Government had received during my absence an addition to its numbers in the person of M. Rochefort. I told them, 'If you want me to be of any use at this fearful crisis I must be at the head of affairs. M. Jules Favre is president; I must be president in his place.' Such, gentlemen, in a very condensed form, is the history of September 4."

In his letter to the President of the National Assembly, referred to at the end of the previous chapter, Count Palikao, referring to this part of General Trochu's defence, said:-"On the morning of the 4th the council met as usual, and only broke up at half-past eleven, as the ministers had to go to the Chamber; none of the persons whose duties called them elsewhere were therefore with the empress-we all knew the dangers of the situation as well as the governor of Paris. I was the last to leave the Corps Législatif. I had strenuously contended with the insurgents in the Salle des pas Perdus until the very last moment, exposed to the brutality of an infuriated mob, excited against me by a member of the Extreme Left; and was only rescued from the hands of these misguided men by my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-colonel Barry, and Captain de Brimont, my orderly officer. I had one last duty to fulfil-to wait upon the empress. It was three o'clock when I got to the Tuileries; at that hour the guard were leaving their posts and the mob had invaded the palace. The empress had gone, no one knew whither. It was therefore impossible for me to take her orders. I returned to the ministry at four o'clock; the Revolution had conquered through an insurrection doubly criminal, from the fact of its taking place before a victorious enemy. At five o'clock General Trochu called upon me, to inform me that he had replaced me at the War Office; he wished to know my opinion as to what he had to do. He did not mention his meeting M. Jules Favre, nor what he had done during the day. I replied, that as disturbances might entail the greatest calamity, the presence of men of order such as he could not but be useful. He could not ask me-nor could I give him-advice as to what his conscience might dictate. I have not seen him since."

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The Situation and Possibilities on both sides after the Battle of Sedan-The great mistake of the French in not constructing Intrenched Camps and making the Sea the Base of their Operations for the relief of Paris-Commencement of the March of the Germans on Paris the day after the Battle of Sedan-Their Forethought and Organization-The Routes taken and System adopted by the Armies in their March to the Capital-Escape of a French Corps which had been sent to assist MacMahon-No resistance offered to the Germans-Their Arrival at Rheims, and Surrender of the City-Catastrophe at Laon, which caused the Explosion of the Powder Magazine in the Citadel-The Commandant declared innocent by the Germans-Letter from him to his Wife on the General State of Affairs-Description of Laon and its HistorySkirmishes as the Germans approached nearer to Paris-Their Investment of the City-General Trochu's Plans-Engagement between the French under General Ducrot and the Germans under the Crown Prince of Prussia, on September 17-The French are completely defeatedA more severe Engagement on the 19th, in which the Germans are again Victorious-Disgraceful Conduct of part of the French TroopsManifesto of General Trochu on the Subject-Entry of the Germans into Versailles-Sketch of the Palace, in which their Headquarters were established, and Town-Negotiations for an Armistice-Count von Bismarck's opinion on the general Situation-His difficulty in dealing with "the Gentlemen of the Pavement "-The German intention of starving the City out, and the only Terms on which Germany could consent to Peace-Meeting between Jules Favre and Count von Bismarck at Ferrières-Epitome of the Reports issued by each on their Interview-The French Government reiterate their Determination not to cede "an Inch of their Territory, or a Stone of their Fortresses"-The Action taken by the English Government between both Belligerents-The Operations of the Besiegers up to the end of September-The Feeling in Germany-Speech and Imprisonment of Dr. Jacoby-Events in Italy-The French Troops withdrawn from Rome on the outbreak of the War, and the Italians at once determine to take possession of the City-Enthusiasm in the Army-Triumphant Entry of the Troops on the 20th of September, after three hours' fighting-The Fall of the Temporal Power proclaimed-A Plebiscitum declares unmistakably in favour of the New Order of Things.

BEFORE proceeding further, it may be of service that
we pass in brief review the situation and possibili-
ties on both sides, at the time to which our narra-
tive now reaches, as they were estimated by an able
writer in the Quarterly Review for January, 1871.
First, as to France, Starting with the assump-
tion that Paris could resist for three months, we
find the French bent on continuing the struggle
a determination which appears to have been inten-
sified by every fresh disaster; but the only elements
of success were supplied by the superior numbers
and wealth of the defenders. Of able-bodied men
there was no lack; but they were at first without
arms and without officers to organize them.
Especially were they deficient in field artillery, a
deficiency for which no amount of courage or num-
bers could make up. The action of the civilian
prefects in many cases disgusted the officers of the
regular army; and the hoisting of the red flag at
Lyons and Marseilles, referred to in the previous
chapter, threatened at one time to divide the
French people into two hostile camps.

While such was the state of affairs without the city, the temper of the Parisian populace could not be counted on. Dissensions were known to exist, and the Belleville clique, headed by Flourens, were noisy and violent. As already stated, the armed force at the disposal of Trochu was of a mixed character, consisting of regular troops, mobiles, and

national guards; the regulars greatly disheartened by the events of the war. This force too, wanted organization, and was very imperfectly armed. The garrison was almost destitute of field artillery. Guns had to be cast, and the horses and gunners trained, while the enemy was thundering at the gates. Until this was effected, sorties in force, though the soul of the defence, could not be successfully undertaken.

Thus the composition and equipment of the garrison were in every respect so inferior to those of the approaching besiegers, that the salvation of the city depended absolutely on the formation of such an army without the walls as, in co-operation with the army within, might be able to drive the Germans from their prey. Now, the organization, arming, and provisioning of such a force required both time and a place where, secure from molestation, it might be drilled, and disciplined, and supplied with all the matériel and provisions necessary to enable it to take the field with any prospect of success. Such a place the sea alone could furnish. During the whole war the sea was at the command of France, and should have constituted the base of operations for the relief of Paris. Three harbours, Bordeaux and Havre being two of them, might have been fixed on as the rallying points for the whole of the French levies; by united and ceaseless effort on the part of all who were able to

labour, entrenched camps might have been constructed round those ports, the flanks resting on the sea; and the works armed with heavy guns from the fleet, which should have been recalled to the defence of France and divided between the three ports, to which the whole available merchantmarine should have been constantly employed in bringing field-guns and breech-loading rifles for the equipment of the armies, as well as the stores of food and forage required for their maintenance in an advance on Paris. The three camps, each garrisoned by 150,000 fighting men, and armed with guns very superior to any the Germans could bring against them, would easily have defied attack, and divided the operations of the enemy. To assail them, indeed, it would have been necessary to employ three powerful armies, so widely separated from each other in a hostile country as must have rendered intercommunication tedious and difficult; and those armies could not even have been brought into the field, and provided with the requisite heavy guns, except by abandoning the siege of Paris.

sufficient to hold fast 150,000 French occupying the centre of the circle, and with every strategical advantage in their favour.

At Strassburg a French garrison of 19,000 was besieged by 70,000 Germans. By one Prussian division, under the grand duke of Mecklenburg, a garrison of 2000 mobiles was besieged at Toul, whose cannon, commanding the railroad from Nancy by Châlons and Epernay to Paris, compelled the Germans to unload their trains some distance east of the town, to transport their supplies on wheels by a long detour, and to reload them on trains to the west of the fortress. Thus the persistent defence of the garrison, which only surrendered in the last days of September, contributed largely in delaying the operations of the besiegers of Paris. Thionville, Longwy, Montmèdy, and Mézières, all held French garrisons, and prevented the Germans from using the railroad passing by these places to Rheims and Paris. Thionville and Montmèdy were blockaded, and the blockades of Bitsche and Phalsburg were continued; they were defended chiefly by mobiles, and occupied about 18,000 German troops.

To compensate somewhat for their inferiority in the field, the French, as fighting in defence of their own soil, had this advantage, that instead of being limited to one general line of retreat, they could, in the event of defeat, retire in any direction save the one barred by the enemy. With such an extent of seaboard and a powerful fleet they would have been secure of finding safety and support on reaching any point on the coast where local con

The defence of the three camps, on the other hand, might be considered as one; since they could have maintained constant and rapid communication by steam, and reinforced each other according to need. As soon as they were ready to take the field, the French marine could have easily transported the armies of the two southern camps to Havre, from which an united army of 450,000 men might have marched to raise the siege of the capital. To the last a screen of troops should have been maintained as far as possible in advance of the two camps; but all serious engage-ditions were favourable; and this circumstance ments in the open country, where success might would evidently give them a real tactical advanbe doubtful, and especially all attempts to defend tage in battle. open towns, should have been avoided.

After Sedan the only organized army remaining to France was shut in at Metz, under Bazaine, and consisted of 150,000 men, exclusive of the regular garrison of the fortress. This force was now hemmed in by strong lines of circumvallation, and invested by the first and second German armies under General Manteuffel and Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of seven corps and three divisions of cavalry, reinforced later by one infantry division. Thus, a German force, never probably exceeding 210,000 men, spread over circumference of twenty-seven miles, which was divided into two parts by the Moselle, was found

a

Turning, now, to the Germans. The capture of Paris was the one great object they proposed to themselves in continuing the war, as its attainment, they considered, would lead to the immediate submission of France. The siege of the capital, therefore, was the one great central operation to which all the other military movements were accessory. Had the Germans foreseen the resistance they would have to encounter, it is not improbable that, after Sedan, they would have offered terms of peace which the French might have accepted; but they were under the impression that Paris would yield on the mere appearance of their forces before it, and thus they were committed to a

tedious and difficult enterprise, the duration of which gave France all the chances arising from the mutability of human affairs in general, and the changes which time might work in the opinions and conduct of the other European powers.

Destitute as France was at this period of any organized military force in the field, the most obvious way of reducing her to subjection was to prevent the assembling and training of such a force, by sending strong movable columns of the three arms into every district. But from the large extent of France it was impossible, even with the overwhelming numbers at the disposal of the Prussian monarch, to coerce in that manner more than a small portion of her area. The German columns could command only the ground on which they encamped, with a certain zone around it; and the fire of hatred and resistance, smouldering over the whole surface of the country, would thus be stamped out in one quarter only to burst forth with increased violence in another. To this it was owing that the French government was left so long unmolested at Tours, as it would have been hazardous, in view of the strength of the garrison, to detach to so great a distance from Paris a large force from the investing armies, and a small one would have run the risk of being overpowered.

The base of operations for all the German forces was formed by the line of frontier extending from Saarbrück on the north to Basle on the south, and all their movements were necessarily regulated by that consideration.

The lines of communication for the army engaged in the primary operation of the siege of Paris took their departure from the northern half of this base; and on these lines were situated all the strong places excepting Strassburg, such as Thionville, &c., which the Germans were besieging at the period of the fall of Sedan. The southern half formed the base of operations for the troops engaged in the siege of Strassburg, and for those subsequently employed in reducing Schlestadt, Neu Brisach, Belfort, &c.; as well as for the armies operating by Dijon towards Lyons, and to the south of Belfort towards Besançon.

The position of the investing army at Paris formed a secondary base, from which radiated the different columns acting towards Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Evreux, Amiens, St. Quentin, &c.; the capital being, as it were, the centre of the wheel,

VOL. II.

of which these columns represented the spokes. The object for which they were employed, was the collecting of supplies, and preventing the siege from interruption by the different bodies of French troops which were organizing all over the country.

With these explanations clearly apprehended, the movements of the German forces, which otherwise would appear confused, will assume in the mind of the reader a methodical and symmetrical arrangement.

On the evening of the 2nd September, the day on which the surrender of Sedan was consummated, the German armies received their marching orders, and on the morning of the 3rd broke up in different directions, en route for Paris. The readiness and rapidity with which they resumed their march were noteworthy. An army of 120,000 prisoners, with their personal arms, artillery, camp baggage, ammunition, military train, and military stores, had to be received and transported on a sudden emergency. The transport, store, and commissariat services were thus put to a severe strain; and the victors were hampered in proportion to the magnitude of their victory. The men and horses which came into their hands required to be fed, and the sick to be provided for. The ease, however, with which all this was accomplished was equally astonishing with the victory itself, and showed extraordinary forethought and organization. The demolition of the French army and capture of the emperor seemed only a little episode, by which the stern purpose of the invaders remained unshaken and unaltered. Their goal was Paris; and orders were issued that by the 14th of September the battalions were to be each in position at a distance of ten leagues from the city.

The eleventh corps and first Bavarians, both belonging to the third Prussian army, were detailed to escort the prisoners to Pont-à-Mousson, whence, having handed over their charge to the tenth corps, employed before Metz, they were to make all speed to join the Crown Prince of Prussia in his march to Paris.

The third and fourth armies marched on the capital by two different routes. The third, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, passed by Rethel, Rheims, and Epernay, to the south bank of the Marne; and continued its march by Montmirail to Coulommiers, whence the different corps diverged to take up their respective investing positions from Lagny, on the Marne, towards Versailles.

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The

Crown Prince of Saxony, with the fourth army, | hardly a single fortress of the invaded country moved his columns to the south-west, but without encroaching on the roads to the west of the line formed by Remilly, La Besace, and Le Chêne. They passed by Vouziers, Rheims, and generally by the north bank of the Marne to Claye, whence the several corps diverged to their respective positions for continuing the investing line from Lagny on their left, round by Gonesse to St. Denis and Argenteuil, north of the city. The tracks of the two crown princes intersected each other at Rheims. That one army of 80,000 men, with all its trains and impediments, should, without serious inconvenience, have been able to cut across the march of another numbering 120,000, added another proof to the excellence of the working staff amongst the Germans.

Each army marched in parallel columns, the lateral communication between which, as well as between the two armies, was kept up by the cavalry; and in particular, the outward flanks of both were protected by strong bodies of mounted troops. Their front was, at the same time, covered by a chain of advanced guards, at a distance of from twenty to thirty miles, in communication with each other by means of cavalry patrols, thus forming a continuous circle, either for protection or conveying information, enveloping the head of the line of march of both armies.

A new French corps d'armée, which had been formed in Paris, under the command of General Vinoy, was despatched by rail to Soissons, Laon, Marle, Vervins, &c., to join MacMahon on his way from Rheims to Stenay, to attempt the relief of Bazaine at Metz. This thirteenth corps consisted of the four last regiments of infantry and two of light cavalry that had arrived from Algeria, and the débris of one of MacMahon's cuirassier brigades; to which were added regiments de marche composed of fourth battalions and depôts. The corps, however, did not get beyond Mézières; but retreating as quickly as possible, escaped by rail, via Laon, Soissons, and Villers-Cotterets, to Paris, before the first-named town surrendered to the cavalry division of Duke William of Mecklenburg. The march of the Germans met with little opposition. After the defeat at Sedan, although France still had considerable elements of military power, they were for a time so disorganized that they could offer but a feeble resistance to the advance of the enemy. As yet, however,

had fallen; and Bazaine was still in occupation
of Metz with an immense force. The Germans
had not, indeed, mastered even one of the main
roads or railways necessary to maintain their com-
munications with the interior and with the frontier
of Germany, but they still pressed forward, not
doubting that Paris would soon be within their
reach. Their march was well described by a
correspondent of the Daily News:-" All through
the fertile province of Champagne, down the
straight roads, with their lines of poplar trees, and
among the pleasant villages on the vine-covered
slopes, the Prussians advanced towards Paris.
There was a great bend to the northward when
the Crown Prince swung round upon MacMahon,
and pinned him in against the Belgian frontier at
Sedan. There was a momentary pause after the
success of September-a pause merely to rest the
exhausted troops; then a second movement, as
decided and almost as rapid as that of the shutting
in of MacMahon. The German forces returned
to the main road to their promised goal. They
came slanting back to the line of the Marne, and
occupied village after village and town after town,
with astonishing quickness. The French had no
time to prepare a systematic defence. Before the
national guard could even be armed, far less ex-
ercised, those fluttering pennants of black and
white which told of the Prussian lancers, or those
spiked helmets of the Prussian dragoons, were
seen approaching. Everything had to be aban-
doned. The armed force, such as it was, dispersed
or retreated, and the people submitted themselves
to the inevitable in the
to the inevitable in the way of war contributions."
On and on marched the invaders. Heralded by
their trusty cavalry, the immense armies moved in
open order, although never beyond the reach of
their prescient strategist, who required but a few
hours' notice to mass them for any possible con-
tingency. Dr. Russell also wrote as follows to the
Times on the subject:-
Times on the subject:-"One thing which causes
astonishment to me is the perfect impunity with
which the Prussian communications have been
preserved. Their military administration is most
vigorous, and its apparent severity prevents blood-
shed and secures their long lines against attack.
It is Death' to have any arms concealed or
retained in any house. It is Death' to cut a
telegraph wire, or to destroy anything used for the
service of the army. What can a disarmed popula-

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