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Mecklenburg troops occupied the place, which was entered by the grand-duke with a brilliant staff at the head of some regiments.

After the surrender Toul presented a scene very different from what is usually seen on such occasions. Instead of the bitter feeling on the one side and the exultation on the other, which are commonly exhibited, both parties, when the gate was opened, seemed to meet like the best of friends. The French garrison were delighted to be out, and the German besiegers no less so to find their work at an end. As there were many Alsatians among the garrison, besiegers and besieged at once entered into conversation, shared the contents of their flasks with each other, and but for the stringent rules separating prisoner from conqueror, would doubtless have made a jovial night of it. The anxious families had passed the last days chiefly in their cellars, the windows of their houses being thickly covered with manure. All now came creeping out, sunning themselves, and spreading out their beds everywhere to dry and air, as they had become damp in the underground abodes. Pale faces were visible everywhere, and loud lamentations were heard; but the habitual French elasticity and cheerfulness were soon manifested, the inhabitants being gladdened by the thought that the siege was ended, and life and

health were no longer endangered. Excursions into the country were immediately undertaken, and civilians, with officers released on parole, were seen driving about and inspecting the positions which had so recently menaced them.

The following officers, men, arms, and munitions of war, &c., were captured at the surrender of Toul:-109 officers, 2240 men, 120 horses, one eagle of the garde mobile, 197 bronze guns, including 48 pieces of rifled ordnance, 3000 rifles, 3000 sabres, 500 cuirasses, and a considerable quantity of munitions and articles of equipment. Soldiers' pay for 143,025 days, and rations for 51,949 days, also fell into the hands of the Prussians.

It is no idle phrase that Strassburg and Toul "deserved well" of their country. Citizens, as well as regular soldiers, appear to have conducted the defence of the two cities. All that could be done was done. Among the incidents of a campaign prolific in startling illustrations of the collapse of the military system of France, it must ever be remembered, as a redeeming fact, that a fourth-rate fortress, defended by a garrison consisting almost entirely of civilians, held out for six weeks against the invading force, and blocked up for that time the direct communications between Germany and the bulk of her army.

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The Position of the German Armies in the beginning of October-Their Depot Battalions of the Line serving as Cadres-The great importance in Modern Warfare of Large Intrenched Camps, with a Fortress for their Nucleus-Count von Moltke's Plans-Occupation of Beauvais by General Manteuffel-The duty of General von Werder's Army-Levée en Masse ordered by the French GovernmentFormation of New Armies-Sad want of Discipline and Good Officers-The Franc-Tireurs-Severe Treatment of them by the GermansBurning of Ablis and other Places-Inconsistency of Prussia in attempting to put down Irregular Warfare-Decree of the French Government with the view of protecting the Franc-Tireurs-More Prudence than Courage shown by the French in many Places-Panic at Orleans-Confusion in both the Military and Political System of France-Great Want of a Real General-M. Gambetta leaves Paris for Tours in a Balloon-Biographical Sketch of Him-Narrow Escape on his Aerial Journey-Address presented to him at Rouen-His Arrival at Tours, and his First Impressions of the State of Affairs-Important Proclamation issued by Him-Arrival of Garibaldi at Tours-He is despatched to the East to take Command of Body of Irregular Troops-The Extraordinary Energy of M. GambettaEngagement between the French and Germans at Toury-Easy Victory of the French-Uneasiness at the German Headquarters, and Despatch of the First Bavarian Corps Southwards-The French are completely surprised at Artenay and easily overcome-Gross Neglect of the French Commanders-Obstinate Encounter near Orleans-Panic amongst the Franc-Tireurs and Terror in the City of Orleans itself -Disgraceful Conduct of the Troops-The City is entered by the Germans-Proclamation of the German Commander to the InhabitantsThe French Army of the Loire retire to Bourges-General d'Aurelles de Paladines appointed to command it-His First Order of the Day— Importance of the Capture of Orleans to the Germans in two ways-The Franc-Tireurs in the Forests around the City prove a great annoyance to them-Chartres and Châteaudun fortified-Determined Resistance at the Latter Town-Chartres capitulates on Favourable Terms-The Military Operations in Eastern France-German Victory between Raon l'Etape and St. Diey-Capture of Epinal, by which Lorraine is cut off from the rest of France-Arrival of Garibaldi on the Scene, and Proclamation to his Irregular Troops-No Combined Action between him and the French General Cambriels, who is actively pursued by General von Werder-Another German Victory-Resignation of General Cambriels-The dislike of the Catholics to Garibaldi, and the obstacles placed in his way-Appointment of General Michel in the room of Cambriels-Surrender of Schlestadt-Siege and Bombardment of Soissons-Acquisition of a Second Line of Railway to Paris-Gallant defence of St. Quentin-Final occupation of it and other Towns in the North of France-The Excitement in Rouen and Amiens-General Bourbaki appointed to the command of the French Army of the North-Short Sketch of his Career- First Proclamation issued by him-Preparations for defence in Brittany under Count de Keratry-A Company of Volunteer Engineers formed in Eastern France to operate on the German Lines of Communication-Plan of their Operations-The Germans compel the most respected Inhabitants in the District to accompany the Trains or Locomotives-The Great Mistake of the French in not establishing suitable Cavalry Corps to harass the German Line of Communication-The Prospects for France brighter at the close of October than at the beginning, chiefly owing to the energy of M. Gambetta-Martial Law Established in all the Departments within Seventy Miles of the Enemy's Forces -Formation of Camps and adoption of Severe Measures in various parts of the Country-The extreme Republicans alone devoid of Patriotic Feeling-A Loan of £10,000,000 contracted-Appeals from France to England and other Countries for Intervention and Assistance-A Negotiation with the view to an Armistice is agreed on-Interview between M. Thiers and Count von Bismarck-Great mistake of the French in breaking off the Negotiations on the Question of Re-victualling Paris-The General Feeling in France when the Failure of the Negotiations became known-The Germans disappointed at the Prolongation of the War, but determined to support their Political and Military Leaders until Alsace and Lorraine had been recovered-Manufacture of the Pen with which to sign the Treaty of Peace Count von Bismarck's Reply on receiving it-The serious Consequences of the War in France-The advantage, both in France and Germany, of the Women being able to undertake Agricultural Operations.

DURING the sieges of Metz and Paris, the chief interest of the war, of course, centered in those two cities. But while France watched with pride the endurance and determination displayed by her greatest fortress and her magnificent capital, the beleaguered garrisons and citizens in each case were anxiously looking for the armies of the provinces to come to their rescue, and assist in dispersing the besieging hosts. In the present chapter we propose to review the state of France, and the military operations of both the French and Germans elsewhere than at Paris and Metz, during the month of October.

It is a remarkable fact that, even after the fall of Strassburg, nearly the whole of the immense

German army in France was fully employed, although not one-sixth of the territory of the country was held by the invaders. Metz, with Bazaine's army inclosed within its line of forts, found occupation for eight army corps (the first, second, third, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, the division of Hessians, and General Kummer's division of landwehr), in all, sixteen divisions of infantry. Paris engaged seventeen divisions of infantry (the guards, fourth, fifth, sixth, eleventh, twelfth North German, first and second Bavarian corps, and the Würtemburg division). The newly formed thirteenth and fourteenth corps, mostly landwehr, and some detachments from the corps already named, occupied the conquered country,

and observed, blockaded, or besieged the places | virtually at the mercy of a conqueror who held

which, within it, still belonged to the French. The fifteenth corps, the Baden division, and one division of landwehr, set free by the capitulation of Strassburg, were alone disposable for active operations.

These forces comprised almost all the organized troops of which Germany disposed. In accordance with their original purpose, the depot battalions served as cadres for the drill and organization of the men intended to fill up the gaps which battles and disease caused in the ranks of their respective regiments. Proportionately as the thousand men forming the battalion were sufficiently broken in to do duty before the enemy, they were sent off by detachments to join the three field battalions of the regiment; this was done on a large scale after the severe fighting before Metz in the middle of August. But the officers and non-commissioned officers of the battalion remained at home, ready to receive and prepare for the field a fresh batch of 1000 men, taken from the recruits called out in due course. This measure was absolutely necessary in a war as bloody as the present one, and the end of which was not to be foreseen with certainty; but it deprived the Germans of the active services for the time being of 114 battalions, and a corresponding force of cavalry and artillery, representing in all fully 200,000 men. With the exception of these, the occupation of scarcely one-sixth of France and the reduction of the two large fortresses in this territory-Metz and Pariskept the whole of the German forces so fully employed that they had barely 60,000 men to spare for further operations beyond the territory already conquered. And this, while there was not anywhere a French army in the field to oppose serious resistance!

If ever there was needed a proof of the immense importance, in modern warfare, of large intrenched camps with a fortress for their nucleus, here that proof was furnished. The two intrenched camps in question were not at all made use of to the best advantage, for Metz had for a garrison too many troops for its size and importance, and Paris had of real troops fit for the field scarcely any at all. Still, the first of these places held at least 200,000, the second 250,000 enemies in check; and if France had only had 200,000 real soldiers behind the Loire, the siege of Paris would have been an impossibility. As it was, however, France was

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possession of barely one-sixth of her territory.

Count von Moltke's plan of operations embraced not only the siege of the capital, but also the occupation of the northern and eastern departments as far as was possible with the forces at his disposal, thus pressing at once on Paris and the provinces, and rendering each unable to assist the other.

On September 29 Beauvais, the capital of the department of the Oise, was occupied by the first Prussian corps, under General Manteuffel, who, with a portion of the army which had been engaged at Sedan, was commissioned to carry the war into the north-west of France; from this point threatening Rouen on the west and Amiens on the north. The fall of Toul and Strassburg in the last week of September liberated 80,000 German troops, part of whom were sent to assist in the investment of Paris, while the remainder, about 70,000, were formed into an army under General von Werder, to be employed in operations over southern Alsace and the south-eastern districts of France. It was to seize any points at which it might be attempted to form military organizations, to disperse the corps, break up depôts, and destroy stores. It was, further, to levy contributions upon towns which had not as yet felt the pressure of the war, and which expressed a desire for its continuance. It was hoped that in this way accurate conceptions of the state of the country and the helplessness of its government would be communicated to that part of the French public which had hitherto derived its impressions from the bulletins published at Paris and Tours.

On October 1 the Tours government issued a decree for a levée en masse of all Frenchmen of the military age from twenty-one to forty-to be organized into a mobilized national guard. Had this decree been carried out, it would have supplied at least three millions of men, for not one in three, even of those liable to serve, had been as yet enrolled. The larger towns had done their part, but the country districts were surprisingly apathetic, and those who possessed any means and desired exemption from service obtained it with little trouble.

From this date, however, commenced the formation of new armies in the north, south, east, and west of France. Indeed, immediately after the events of the 2nd September, the government had adopted vigorous measures to raise fresh troops by means

of a forced conscription, embracing soldiers whose | inhabitants fired upon their troops, or took part in term of service had long since expired, and youths not yet arrived at the legal age; and by calling out all the retired, invalided, and pensioned general and other officers, with all the depôt and garrison troops, gardes mobiles, marines, and gendarmes. The result was that, early in October, there were, in various parts of France, an immense number of men ready for service when provincial armies should be organized. This was especially the case in the district of the Loire, where a very welldefined nucleus of an army had already been got together. Its headquarters were about fiftyfive miles south of Orleans, at Bourges, a place containing a large cannon foundry, and of strategical importance owing to its being situated within the loop formed by the Loire, and at the junction of the different roads leading to Tours, Blois, Orleans, and Nevers, all commanding passages over the river. The force numbered, on October 1, about 60,000 men, well armed, but greatly deficient in artillery. The regulars, mostly fugitives from Sedan, were in the proportion of one in nine; but even out of this unpromising material a very formidable army might have been obtained with a fair amount of discipline. There was, however, a strong republican feeling amongst them; they did not yield a willing obedience to superiors; they thoroughly distrusted those in command; and this, coupled with the want of good officers, went far to neutralize the efforts of the government.

the defence, should be burned down; that every man taken in arms who was not, according to their notion, a regular soldier, should be shot at once; that where there was reason to believe that any considerable portion of the population of a town actively sided against them, all able-bodied men should be treated with merciless severity. A squadron of German cavalry and a company of infantry took up their quarters in Ablis, a village of 900 inhabitants, just off the railway from Paris to Tours. During the night the inhabitants, giving way to a patriotic impulse, with the aid of franc-tireurs attacked the sleeping men, killed several, and captured or dispersed the rest. The next day the German general sent a force which burnt Ablis to the ground, and a neighbouring village from which the franc-tireurs had come. The threat, by the French, of reprisals upon the captured hussars, alone prevented more of the able-bodied men of the place from being shot. This was but one of numberless instances. A Bavarian detachment in the neighbourhood of | Orleans burned down five villages in twelve days. Thus the mode of warfare which was pursued in the days of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., in 1870 was again found necessary. Prussian armies should have been the last in the world to treat with severity irregular warfare; for in 1806 Prussia collapsed from the absence of that spirit of national resistance which in 1807 those at the head of affairs, both in the civil and military departments, did everything in their power to revive. At that time Spain showed a sagacious example of resistance to an invasion, which the military leaders of Prussia-Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz-all urged their countrymen to emulate. Gneisenau even went to Spain to fight against Napoleon. The new

The

Simultaneously with the formation of armies, irregular corps of volunteers, or franc-tireurs, began to spring up all over the country. Many of these were expert marksmen, and caused great annoyance to the Germans by cutting off their convoys, carrying out night surprises, and lying in wait and falling unexpectedly on their outposts or rearguard. Many others were merely highway-military system, then inaugurated in Prussia, men under a different title, who shot and plundered friend and foe alike. On the ground that these franc-tireurs wore no distinctive uniform, and had no regular officers, the Germans claimed the right, under the laws of war, of treating them as unrecognized combatants, trying them by drum-head court-martial, and shooting them as soon as captured. In fact, the whole policy of the Germans, at this time, seems to have been marked by extreme although necessary severity. Their rule was that every town or village where one or more of the

was an attempt to organize popular resistance to the enemy, as far as this was possible in an absolute monarchy. Every able-bodied man was to pass through the army, and to serve in the landwehr up to his fortieth year; the lads between seventeen and twenty, and the men between forty and sixty, were to form part of the "landsturm," or levée en masse, which was to rise in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy, to harass his movements, intercept his supplies and couriers, and to employ whatever arms it could find, and whatever

means were at hand to annoy him. "The more
effective these means the better." Above all, they
were to "wear no uniform of any kind, so that
the landsturmers might at any time resume their
character of civilians, and remain unknown to
the enemy.'
It was proposed more than once
that the Prussian "landsturm ordinary" should
be printed and issued to each franc-tireur as his
guide-book, by which, upon his capture, he could
at least show the Prussians that he had only been
acting upon the instructions issued by their own
king.

With the view of protecting these guerilla troops as much as possible, on the 1st of November it was decreed by the French government, that from that date every corps of franc-tireurs, or volunteers, should be attached to an army corps on active service, or to a territorial division; and they were strictly prohibited acting independently or beyond the assigned limits, under penalty of being disarmed and dissolved.

By the imposition of a fine of a million francs upon any department in which bands of franctireurs should be met with, the German authorities strove to keep down the perilous annoyance. On every town which fell into their hands after resistance offered, they also made heavy requisitions in money. Under these circumstances, and remembering what had happened at Ablis and elsewhere, it is not surprising that the local municipalities sometimes evinced more prudence than courage.

In the night of the 26th to the 27th September, General Polhès, the commandant of the military division of Orleans, suddenly turned out the garrison, and in hot haste took his departure southwards. The Prussians were coming. Next day it was discovered that they were not coming; that there were only a very few of them in the neighbourhood, who certainly were not advancing on Orleans. So General Polhès came back. A couple of hours after his departure, however, two regiments of French cuirassiers had arrived in Orleans from Blois, who, finding no one to give them orders, and hearing that the commander had retreated, also returned. In the forest of Orleans about 800 men, apparently forgotten, had been left without any orders. All this evidence of haste naturally spread alarm the consequence was that the railway authorities went off with their rolling stock towards La Ferté and Beaugency, and those con

nected with the telegraph carried off their apparatus. The prefect, thus deprived of the means of recalling the runaway garrison, managed at last to press a one-horse chaise into the service of the state, to convey to the general letters informing him that a spontaneous deputation was about to start for Tours to ask of the government a general able and willing to defend the forest of Orleans and its environs. Meanwhile the money in the banks and public money-chests had all been removed; the municipal council had met and protested against the abandonment of the city; and all was confusion and fear.

The whole military and political system of France was in fact at this time in a state of hopeless confusion, without a directing head to set it right. The arrangement which gave the prefects the military command of their respective departments, was producing its natural results in disconnected and useless efforts and conflicting authority. Marseilles and Lyons were threatened with a red republican insurrection, which was only prevented by the good sense and patriotism of the masses. At Grenoble, General Monnet, a Crimean veteran, was, at the instigation of a few riotous citizens, deposed from his command of the garrison and imprisoned. The prefect of Lyons, without a shadow of justification, arrested General Mazure, in command of the troops in the city, and because the senseless act was approved by his colleagues of the government delegation at Tours, Admiral Fourichon resigned the portfolio of War. On the other hand, thirteen departments banded together to demand the nomination of a general of independent authority, to organize the defence of the western provinces. Here and there might be heard murmurs of revenge, and in certain districts corps were formed which the government would fain have dignified with the name of armies. But there was no man to stir up popular enthusiasm, or turn it to account; and France merely waited, every day increasing her peril. With an enemy 700,000 strong in their country, the French forces were without a commander-in-chief! No energetic man fit to be endowed with supreme authority, and capable of reducing the chaos to order, was forthcoming. Bazaine, the only man thought to be equal to the present emergency, was closely besieged in Metz, and with him were Canrobert, L'Admirault, Jarras, Coffinières, Leboeuf, and Bourbaki. MacMahon was a prisoner at Wiesbaden,

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