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the month General Bourbaki, the able commander of the imperial guard, and right hand of Bazaine, as we shall see in the next chapter, found his way out of Metz and through the Prussian lines, in connection with a mysterious intrigue, the exact nature and object of which did not at the time transpire. Suffice it here to relate that he came over to England, to visit the empress at Chiselhurst, who, as it turned out, had not expected him, and had nothing to say to him. He recrossed into France, hoping that the Prussian staff would allow

from each other, in the interior of the town; and the fourth closing the road from La Fère to the top of the Faubourg d'Isle. Ten men could defend this barricade for a brief space. At the entrance of the town, close to the Grand Canal barricade, which formed, indeed, a very strong position, the fight began, and while it lasted the prefect remained in the first post of danger. The Prussians, numbering about 750, intrenched themselves in the railway station. Taking advantage of the angles of the houses, and of the openings in the railway balustrades, they endeavoured to deploy as sharp-him to rejoin Bazaine; but as they threw obstacles shooters, but failed to reach the national guard, and suffered rather serious losses, every man who showed himself being shot. The struggle lasted from half-past ten until about two o'clock, when the Prussians retreated, taking the road to Marle. On October 21 they returned, at least 5000 strong, and with twelve field-guns they for half-an-hour cannonaded the town. No resistance being offered, they entered, and demanded 2,000,000 francs, 1,500,000 of which (£60,000) was paid-an exaction which, the Germans said, would have❘ been very much less had not the town defended itself on the first occasion.

Clermont was captured, after a brief resistance, in the end of September. Beauvais, Breteuil, Montdidier, Vernon, Gisors, and Gournay were also occupied, and from these points the Prussians scoured the country for provisions for the army around Paris. Here and there the national guard showed in force; but in these cases a requisition was made that all arms should be given up, under penalty of death, and the result generally was that, a few hours afterwards, waggon-loads of muskets poured into the German camp. In Rouen, Amiens, and the larger towns, the inhabitants were kept in a feverish state of excitement by the frequent raids made in the places around. The national guards were called out, equipped, and drilled, and throughout all the northern departments very large enrolments of garde mobile took place, who displayed a better spirit than was shown in many parts of the country; but it needed a responsible master-hand to introduce organization and discipline amongst them. Considerable spirit was shown by the irregular troops of the northern departments, who on every opportunity harassed the Germans, and caused them the loss of a gun-the first sacrificed by them in the campaign-in an attempt to cut the railroad between Amiens and Rouen. Early in

VOL. II.

in his way, he repaired to Tours, and placed his sword at the disposal of the Provisional Government, by which he was at once appointed to the command of the army of the north.

This general is of Greek origin, and his father, a staunch imperialist, rendered important services to Napoleon I. It was he who, in the Egyptian campaign of 1798-99, went over from France in a felucca, and aided by his nationality, succeeded in duping the English cruisers and entering Egypt. He brought Napoleon such news as decided him on returning immediately to Paris, to which circumstance he owed his throne. Seventeen years later the same faithful adherent was sent to inform Bonaparte of the decision of the Allies, that he should be transferred to St. Helena.

General Bourbaki especially distinguished himself by his cool and determined courage in that training-ground of all modern French generals— Algeria. In the Crimean war he served as general of brigade, and his gallantry at the Alma, Inkerman, the Malakoff, and the taking of Sebastopol, is too well known to be dwelt upon here. General of division in 1857, he took no mean part in the Italian war, and in 1870 was nominated commander of the second camp at Châlons. At the beginning of the war he was appointed to the command of the imperial guard, joined Marshal Bazaine, and was forced with him into Metz, where he remained until his extraordinary release. He was one of the French generals who received a decoration from the king of Prussia in 1864. No name was better calculated to restore confidence and inspire energy into the newly-enrolled troops throughout the North, to whom, on his appointment, he issued the following proclamation :—

66 FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"Citizens, national guards, soldiers, and mobile

M

guards, I have been called by the minister of War to the military command of the region of the North. The task which devolves on me is a great one, and I should think it above my strength were I not sustained by the feelings of patriotism which animate you. All my endeavours tend to the creation, as speedily as possible, of an active army corps, which, provided with a war matériel, can take the field and proceed to the assistance of the fortresses, which I hasten to place in a good state of defence. As to me, who have loyally offered my sword to the government of the national defence, my endeavours and my life belong to the common work which it prosecutes together with yourselves, and in the moment of danger you will see me at the head of the troops who will soon be organized. To fulfil this difficult task, and to make our implacable enemy pay dear for each step on our territory, concord and confidence must reign among us, and our hearts must be animated with only one wish -to save and avenge our unhappy France. You may rely upon the most energetic co-operation and the most absolute devotedness on my part, just as I rely upon your courage and patriotism.

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Brittany and the district west of Paris began in October to show signs of activity in contributing towards the national defence. Early in the month the command of the western levies was intrusted by the government to Count de Keratry, a Breton noble, who forthwith issued a proclamation urging his compatriots to emulate the noble example of their brethren of Brittany who at that moment manned the ramparts of Paris. The army of the West had not, it is true, assumed large proportions as yet; but with good organization it was sufficiently numerous to be no mean auxiliary to the army of the Loire, in any attempt for the relief of the capital. Before Count de Keratry took the command of the army of the West it had been a continued source of misfortune to the district, by its ill-disciplined and scattered bands offering resistance to the German requisition columns, which, while utterly ineffectual, brought down severe vengeance upon unoffending villages, several of which were ruthlessly destroyed. The count soon afterwards assumed the command of the irregular forces of the West, franc-tireurs, &c., for the

organization of which he was well fitted by his influence and experience. General Fiereck was appointed over the western regular army.

Besides the several field armies organizing in the provinces in October, a corps of volunteer engineers was formed, to operate upon the German lines of communication. These companies-known as "The Wild Boars of the Ardennes," "The Railway Destroyers," &c. were composed of artisans of all classes, and carried picks, crowbars, mining tools, hatchets, powder petards and cases, for pulling up rails, blowing up bridges, felling trees, and mining roads. Two companies were specially designed to guard them when at work, and one to collect provisions and attend generally to the commissariat. In at least one instance the operations of this corps were eminently successful, and several railway accidents were caused to the German trains. To stop these proceedings, however, the Prussians issued an order that the trains should "be accompanied by inhabitants who are well known and generally respected, and who shall be placed on the locomotive, so that it may be made known that every accident caused by the hostility of the inhabitants will, in the first place, injure their countrymen." At Nancy the first hostage was M. Leclair, the venerable president of the Court of Appeal. On another occasion, Procureur-général Isard was "invited" to make an involuntary journey. an involuntary journey. Escorted by two Prussian gendarmes, he had to mount the tender and travel to Luneville, where his colleague in that town took his place. The president of the Chamber of Commerce, a judge, and a barrister, also occupied in turn the post of danger.

While speaking of the "railway destroyers," it may be remarked that, although the war we are now reviewing gives no actual examples of the working of the well-known theory of Marmont, that mounted infantry should play a striking part in the warfare of the future, we see at least that the German cavalry would have found their movements in the interior of France paralyzed by the hostility of the armed bands which lurked in every covert, had they not fallen upon the device of attaching to each brigade a detachment of riflemen, to assist in dispersing these secret enemies. The clearing and occupation of the country south of Paris was accomplished mainly by the aid of the Bavarian riflemen who were employed with the fourth and sixth cavalry divisions; and when, after

the fall of Metz, Manteuffel advanced to occupy the north of France with the first army, his flank and front were kept clear by the first division under Göben, who carried similar small parties of riflemen with each of his brigades, and used them constantly in his occupation of villages and other inclosed posts. Such infantry, however active, would of necessity have been a heavy clog upon the movements of the horse, had they not been repeatedly hurried forward in country carts or other wheeled carriages. Indeed, the device was simply a rude expedient to meet an emergency for which the Germans were not prepared. Had the events of 1870 been fully foreseen, some such scheme would doubtless have been fallen upon as raising bodies of mounted riflemen for the express purpose of ridding the advanced guards from lurking franc-tireurs. There is the highest authority that of the most successful of the generals who have used this modified form of cavalry on a great scale for asserting that, had the French early in this war trained up a mass of horsemen such as those that followed Sheridan during the American civil war, instead of devoting their whole efforts to the collection of masses of raw infantry and artillerymen, they might have so threatened the line of railroad which fed the German host before Paris as to render a continued investment impossible. Few at least will doubt that such a body, acting upon the communications of the Germans, would have done more to hinder the conquest of the country than tenfold their numbers sent on foot to be fresh food for the enemy's powder.

That the month of October closed with far brighter prospects for France than it opened, was due mainly to the energy and indefatigable activity of M. Gambetta. From the date of his arrival at Tours he had virtually been the government of national defence. Indeed the various proclamations and decrees issued rarely bore even the signatures of his colleagues, MM. Cremieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon. That some of these decrees were in spirit extremely revolutionary there is no doubt; but it is equally certain that under the exceptional circumstances of the country they offered the best remedies for its misfortunes. They did not result in the salvation of France, because in the hour of need no great military genius arose to enforce them. Could the minister have relied upon a colleague in the field of equal

daring and energy with himself, it would have fared hard even with the magnificent armies of Germany. The first decree of October, for a levée en masse of all men between twenty-one and forty years, ought in a month to have been answered by a number several times larger than any trained army which Germany could bring into the country; and with very moderate organization, numerical strength so vastly superior should have had a proportionate effect on the fortunes of the war. October, however, closed with at least 700,000 German soldiers on French territory, to oppose which there were not 250,000 organized forces outside Paris and Metz. Twelve fortresses of France-namely, Strassburg, Toul, Marsal, Vitry, Sedan, Laon, Lützelstein, Lichtenberg, Weissemburg, Soissons, Schlestadt, and Metz had been captured by the enemy; and Phalsburg, Bitsche, Paris, Thionville, Mézières, Montmèdy, Verdun, Longwy, and Neu Breisach were besieged.

One of the earliest and most questionable of Gambetta's decrees was that which abolished the laws of regular promotion in the army, and opened every grade to civil talent. With the most orderly army, such an experiment would be dangerous in the most favourable circumstances; it was especially so in the midst of such confusion. M. Gambetta thought, however, that the only hope of France was in the creation of entirely new armies out of the civil population; and while he betrayed no little distrust of the regulars, he lost no opportunity of praising and encouraging the new levies, upon whom he imagined all the hopes of his country now rested.

All provinces within a hundred kilomètres (about seventy miles) of the enemy's forces were placed under martial law, and in each a commission of defence was appointed to concoct plans of defence, to fortify the points most suitable for defensive purposes, and to direct the local forces. It was further decreed that camps should be formed at a distance of not less than two miles from each town where the troops of all arms mustered over 2000, and that officers and men alike, taking up their abode there, should not return to town without a special permission. In these camps they were to undergo severe drill, and other discipline, to fit them in every way for service. Another decree enjoined on the prefects of invaded or threatened provinces to see that the country was laid waste, and all carts, horses, cattle, and sheep removed to

a distance. Soldiers quitting their posts, or flying before the enemy, were to be brought before a court-martial, and shot. Any commanding officer whose troops should be surprised by the enemy, or who should have advanced upon a position "without suspecting the hostile presence," was also to be brought before a court-martial. The authorities of every town were to defend the place, or to show sufficient reason for not doing so.

Another edict was issued for the purpose of establishing proper systems of information. Hitherto the authorities had literally been acting in absolute ignorance of the movements and intentions of the enemy, while the Prussians, by their widely-spread system of espionage and their innumerable cavalry scouts, kept themselves perfectly informed of the position and intentions of the French. The government now ordered every maire to employ throughout his commune gardes champêtres, workmen, &c., who should instantly report to him the approach and direction of any body of the enemy, with an approximate estimate of their force and composition; and that this information should be immediately despatched to the prefect, to be telegraphed to the government. Every maire who failed in these details was to be tried by court-martial.

In the earlier part of the month the conduct of the extreme republicans, who alone of all the French nation showed themselves devoid of patriotic feelings, paralyzed the efforts of the large towns. Imperialists, Legitimists, Orleanists, alike laid aside their partialities and prejudices, and combined with the government for the national defence. The extreme republicans alone preferred party to patriotism, caused dissension, sacrificed France, under pretence of saving her, and thus gave a dim presentiment of the terrible scenes which, in Paris, were to aggravate the horrors of the war at its close. Paris, Bordeaux, Rouen, Lille, Havre, all great centres of industry, nobly allowed nothing to interfere with the national defence; while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, and Toulon were sources of weakness, rather than of strength, to the country. The establishment of communal institutions and of the extremest forms of republicanism were deemed matters of greater importance than the expulsion of the invader. Ardent republican though he was, so ashamed was Gambetta of the conduct of the Lyons republicans, that on receiving the delegates of a committee from that city he exclaimed, "Your commune of

Lyons is a disgrace to France and a laughingstock to Europe. Out with you at once!"

To meet immediate claims, and supply articles necessary for the purposes of the war, the Tours government, on the 26th of October, contracted a loan of £10,000,000. The result of the subscription to it proved that if France was doomed to succumb in the war it would not be for want of means to fight, nor of the spirit to use them. In her then critical situation, with the capital invested, and over a score of rich departments terror-struck by Prussian legions, it was thought that a loan of this extent must be a failure. For the first time, therefore, a French loan was opened in a foreign country-England. Subscriptions were, nevertheless, invited in France, and in less than three days the result was an amount equal, in round numbers, to £3,750,000. When it is remembered that a large proportion of the country, the metropolis included, could take no share in the subscriptions, and that local loans to an enormous amount had been contracted in all quarters for purposes of defence, such a result was a striking proof of the internal resources of France, and of confidence in the credit of the state.

Throughout October the French government continually appealed to England and the various European cabinets for interposition or assistance. In an important interview with Lord Lyons on the 15th, the French delegate minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that England, either singly or in concert with other neutrals, should request Prussia to state the conditions of peace which she would accept; that France should then submit her views; and that the neutral powers should in a conference, or by exchanging notes, give out with authority what in their opinion were equitable terms of peace, and call upon both belligerents to accept them. M. de Chandordy seemed to think that both must of course listen to the voice of Europe; but as this was by no means probable, his suggestion was not adopted.

Count von Bismarck had indeed pretty plainly intimated already the extent of the German territorial claims; for in a short despatch to Count Bernstorff on the 1st October, in which he combated the statement of M. Favre, that "Prussia means to continue the war and to bring France back to the position of a power of the second rank," he said:" The cession of Strassburg and Metz, which we seek in territorial connection,

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