implies a reduction of French territory equal in area to the increase through Savoy and Nice, while the population of these provinces obtained from Italy is about 750,000 larger. When it is considered that France, according to the census of 1866, numbers 38,000,000 of inhabitants without Algiers, and with Algiers now furnishing an essential part of the French war forces, 42,000,000, it is palpable that a decrease therein of 750,000 effects no change in the importance of France as against foreign countries."

M. de Chandordy represented to Lord Lyons that, to these claims of Prussia, France could never submit. He added, that "he felt he was entitled to appeal to the rest of Europe for support. The time for good offices had passed. The powers should now speak to Prussia in a tone which could not be mistaken, and take measures to insure their being listened to." Lord Granville, however, replied that England was not prepared to support by force any representations they might make to Prussia; and further instructed Lord Lyons, should opportunity arise, to point out that her Majesty's government thought the rigid determination expressed by M. Favre, not to yield an inch of territory nor one stone of a fortress, was a great obstacle to peace.

But though the English government could not yield to the appeals of France, they took advantage of a circular of Count von Bismarck's respecting the danger of famine with which Paris was threatened, to make a formal suggestion that both belligerents should agree upon an armistice for the convocation of a French constituent assembly, which might decide the question of peace or war. This proposal Lord Granville pressed with great energy, and informed Count Bernstorff that M. Thiers, backed by the personal intervention of the emperor of Russia, had proposed to undertake the negotiation. Russia, Austria, Italy, and Spain joined in urging the armistice; Italy, indeed, appeared to desire even more decided intervention. M. Tissot again pressed Lord Granville to call on Prussia to state her terms of peace, "bring them within fair limits, and then communicate them to the French government." All the principal powers, however, were agreed in restricting the proposed negotiations to the question of an armistice.

In virtue of these proceedings, M. Thiers had his first interview with Count von Bismarck, at Versailles, on November 1, when the general

arrangements for an armistice of twenty-four or twenty-eight days were agreed to. The main difficulty arose out of the revictualling of Paris, to which the Prussian chancellor ultimately consented, on condition that, as a "military equivalent," the Germans should have at least one of the Paris forts. The veteran French statesman had not expected this, and with considerable warmth he replied: "It is Paris that you ask from us; for to deny us the revictualling during the armistice is to take from us one month of our resistance; to require from us one or several of our forts is to ask for our ramparts. It is, in fact, to demand Paris, while we should give you the means of starving or bombarding her. In treating with us for an armistice you could never suppose its condition to be that we should give up Paris herself to you -Paris, our chief strength, our great hope, and

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you the great difficulty, which, after fifty days of siege, you have not been able to overcome." M. Thiers then left to consult with M. Favre, who, in turn, took counsel with his colleagues of the government in the city. The result was, that on the following day, November 6, M. Thiers received instructions to break off the negotiations, and at once left the German headquarters. For a third time, therefore, the hopes of peace were frustrated, and both parties girded themselves for a war à outrance.

Considered in the light of subsequent events, the French committed the French committed a grave diplomatic blunder in refusing the terms offered by the Germans, and allowing the negotiations to be broken off on the question of revictualling Paris. The king of Prussia and his advisers consented to the armistice under the mistaken idea that there was no prospect of an efficient force being formed in any quarter for the relief of the capital. The French had up to that time been everywhere beaten, and were therefore supposed to be incapable of again showing any head in the field. On the contrary, the several armies forming in the provinces only needed time to render them, both in number and organization, extremely formidable to the Germans. With regard especially to the army of the Loire, twenty-eight days would have enabled D'Aurelles to complete his cavalry and artillery, to establish discipline, and to concentrate his army in a state of readiness for an immediate advance. The Breton levies would have been prepared to operate from the west in force, and aid in a simultaneous march to the capital.

In order to keep the truce, Prince Frederick Charles, who was now on the way from Metz, would have been arrested at full twelve days' march from Orleans, so that whatever French forces could have been collected within one hundred miles of Paris during the armistice would have been free from immediate danger of the overwhelming German reinforcements which presently proved their ruin. We cannot see how the revictualling of Paris would have affected matters at all. The inhabitants would not have been any worse off at the end of the armistice, supposing they had obtained no new supplies, since there was at any rate plenty of food to last them for that time. If, therefore, the German armies would have been compelled to raise the siege in December at all, after an armistice, they would have been forced to abandon it whether Paris were revictualled or not.

The news of the failure of the negotiations produced a momentary feeling of regret and disappointment in most parts of France. On November 10, however, there occurred the first German reverse of any magnitude during the war, resulting in the defeat of Von der Tann and the retreat of the Bavarians from Orleans. This raised the hopes of the nation, gave a new light to the failure of M. Thiers' mission, and England and the neutral powers generally were bitterly denounced for having suggested a temporary cessation of hostilities. Many of the journals and prefects, especially of southern France, repudiated with scorn the idea of peace, or even of an armistice, until satisfaction had been obtained from Prussia for the injuries she had inflicted upon their country. Thus the Progrès of Lyons said that the idea of an armistice could only enter into the skull of a Prussian, and could only have been proposed by an Englishman. "It is only when the Prussian hordes are hunting for their food like wolves in our provinces that our felon ally (England) dares to dash her bucket of water upon the brasier of our patriotism. Now that the French nation is upon the point of turning the victories of our enemies into unprecedented disaster, the quaking thrones of this supreme resurrection are trembling upon their bases, and seek, by means of an armistice, to smother the threatening flame." prefect of the Haute Garonne was equally opposed to a cessation of hostilities, and stated in a proclamation that "we will establish the republic upon the corpse of the last Prussian and the body of the

The

last monopolist." The prefect of the Ain declared that, that, "whether the traitors are Prussians, or still dare to call themselves Frenchmen, the bullet and the axe shall render equal justice to both."

Lord Granville's despatch, urging the arrangement of an armistice, was, in the first instance, met on the part of Count von Bismarck by the intimation that any overtures for negotiations must be made by France; and that the benevolent offices of England were regarded with no less coldness by Germany may be gathered from the following remarks of the Cologne Gazette:-" The Gladstone-Bright ministry, and especially the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, unfortunately did not do its utmost to prevent the outbreak of this great war. Indeed, one may say not its least—viz., the public declaration that France had no right to commence this wanton war. This sin of omission is now, alas, too late admitted even by the English. We carry on this war in a certain degree for England, for had imperial France conquered in it, Napoleon would certainly have seized on Belgium, which he coveted more than the left bank of the Rhine. It would then have been seen how England defended Belgium, after formally assuming the protection of it; and Napoleon III. would certainly have gained what was his ultimate object in his powerful naval armaments-the humiliation of England, the revenge for Waterloo of which the French are always thinking. We willingly do justice to the considerations on which England now seeks to arrest the destruction of Paris. It is only a pity that England's prestige suffered so grievously through its cowardly attitude at the commencement of the affair. Per se, we should regret as much as anybody the destruction of a city inhabited by more than a million of women and children, and in which so many treasures of art and science, which can never be made good, are collected. The entry into Paris, however, is a necessity for the German army, and an event which cannot now be averted, especially after the fall of Metz. May the Parisians therefore come to their senses, and by the acceptance of reasonable conditions of an armistice and peace, release us from that lamentable necessity!"

The feeling throughout Germany during October was one of extreme disappointment at the prolongation of the war, which every one expected would have ended soon after Sedan. But it would have been erroneous to mistake this wish of a speedy

cessation of hostilities for a disinclination to continue it, should that appear imperative. Notwithstanding that the military system of the country made war sensibly felt, yet such was the general confidence in the military and political leaders that, as these held the objects of the campaign were not yet attained, the people were willing to support them to the end. If the generals had not declared the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine to be necessary for the protection of the German frontiers, the vast majority in the country would have been in favour of concluding peace at once, and on the terms proposed by M. Favre; but as the German generals were, and indeed had been for the last hundred years, of the opposite opinion, the nation was determined to profit by the opportunity, and acquire the territory which was to enable them to ward off future invasions with a greater chance of success than hitherto. Count von Bismarck was but too accurate an interpreter of the thoughts of his countrymen when, in his negotiations with M. Thiers, he spoke of the probability of future collisions with France, and of the duty the Germans owed to themselves to prepare for coming attacks of the fiery Gaul. The French were now reaping the fruits of the treatment they had accorded Germany for centuries both in word and deed. The people were but too keenly aware how frequently they had been invaded in the past, and could not help remembering with what intense hostility they had been spoken of by nearly every political celebrity in France up to the very outbreak of the war. It was the knowledge of the inveteracy of this feeling on the other side of the frontier, coupled with the observation that the French even now deemed themselves invincible, which led popular feeling in Germany to look forward to another war in the wake of the one in which they were then engaged. Had the French admitted that they were beaten, and that they had better give up battling with Germany for the mere sake of prestige, they would perhaps not have been suspected of a design to resume the fray as soon as they could after the conclusion of peace. But with M. Gambetta declaring the final victory of France a matter of course, and indispensable to civilization to boot, the Germans asked "What can we expect but to see them come down upon us whenever the opportunity occurs? And the contingency being so very probable a one, ought we not to guard against it by securing those military and

territorial advantages commended by the generals, whose experience and judgment we have every reason to confide in? Is not every peace with the French merely an armistice while they do not renounce their old ambition; and should we not be actually encouraging them to attack us again were we to permit them to repeat the thing under the same favourable conditions as formerly?"

An extract from the Bremen Weser Zeitung is subjoined as illustrative of this state of popular feeling: "It is remarkable what an important influence a single trait in the national character of the French exercises upon the destinies of Europe. The constitutional vanity of the French, their inability to realize and recognize unpleasant facts, becomes as terrible a scourge to themselves as to the nations around them. Vanity has stirred them up to a frivolous war, vanity prevents the restoration of peace. Very characteristic in this respect is that passage in M. Favre's last circular, in which he depicts the ravishing aspect France will wear when perishing amid the flaring halo of glory and renown. The consciousness of playing an imposing rôle before the world to a certain extent consoles him for the ruin of his country. But is ruin likely to follow the acceptance of the German terms? Will not the French remain a powerful, gallant, rich, and highly-gifted nation even after the forfeiture of their German provinces? And, instead of revelling in the prospect of fine tragical catastrophes, had they not better look realities in the face, consider the common-sense question how to get out of a bad job, and extricate themselves at as cheap a price as possible? All the statesmen of Europe have had to do this occasionally, and history mentions even some French ministers who capitulated when there was nothing left but to capitulate. But it is quite true, while other nations praise those of their statesmen who in the hour of defeat averted greater evils by timely concessions, the French have always called Talleyrand a traitor for procuring them the best terms possible after the discomfiture of 1815. Though Talleyrand saved all he could for them, the French, in their uncontrollable conceit, only look to what he was compelled to sign away, and therefore insist upon regarding him as a rascal. They have no Talleyrand now, no man sufficiently courageous to bend to the inevitable. Sheer compulsion alone can terminate the war. We know it, and are prepared

for it."

About the same time the Prussian government issued an important manifesto in the semi-official Provincial Correspondenz. Considerable impatience was exhibited in Germany at the delay in the siege operations before Paris. After ascribing this delay to purely military reasons, the article went on to speak generally of the prospects of the war in these

terms:

"Natural as it is to wish for a prompt termination of the war, we are perhaps not wrong in seeing the finger of Providence in the retribution which the French are thus bringing in full measure upon themselves. It seems to be decreed that they are to empty the cup of bitterness to the dregs, and, by having their insolence thoroughly chastised, be weaned from their bellicose propensities and converted into better neighbours for the future.

"All of us would have been delighted had the last shot in this sanguinary contest been fired on the heights of Sedan. Yet there is no denying that had peace been concluded then and there, the idea of holding universal supremacy, so firmly rooted in the French mind, would have regained irresistible ascendancy the moment we left the country. Even now the majority of the French deem themselves unconquerable, and, indeed, unconquered. They They have heard of nothing but of victories, with, perhaps, a few insignificant reverses now and then. They have accustomed themselves to pooh-pooh the fancy that their armies have been subdued, and tell you, with the most implicit confidence, that if he liked Bazaine might easily get out of Metz and crush the forces besieging it. They smile at the thought of Paris ever falling into our hands when it is defended by hundreds of thousands of mobiles, and attacked only by German soldiers. Last, not least, they will swear that Europe will come to the rescue of their holy city, and save what they are pleased to call the 'metropolis of the world.' With these hallucinations the French are consoling themselves in the present disastrous period of their history. Were peace to be re-established before they have been cured of their self-sufficiency, they would doubtless flatter themselves that they have not been vanquished at all—that the war might have been continued, and that if it has not been, its premature conclusion is mainly owing to the pusillanimity and treachery of those in power. With these intoxicating illusions filling their brains, so arrogant a people as the French would not wait long before they attempted to win back what they had lost.

"Only after the Parisians, and with them the entire population of France, have been humbled to the dust; only when the military strength of their country has been entirely broken, and the hope of creating fresh armies is everywhere annihilated— will they become conscious of the magnitude of their defeat, and perhaps perceive and remember that to invade a neighbour may be attended with unpleasant consequences to themselves."

That at this period (October) the Germans were sanguine of a speedy conclusion of peace, is shown by the fact that the pen with which Count von Bismarck was to sign the treaty was already prepared. Herr Bissinger, jeweller, of Pforzheim, manufactured out of massive gold an imitation of an ordinary stout goosequill. The quill itself was polished, in order that it might be more conveniently handled, but the feather closely resembled a real quill, every fibre being represented, while the back of the feather was thickly studded with brilliants, and below them a count's coronet and Bismarck's monogram were engraved. Besides the engraver and maker, two goldsmiths were engaged on it for five weeks. The gold used was of eighteen carats, and that part in which the brilliants were set was of twentyone carats.

In acknowledging its receipt Count von Bismarck wrote:"Your beautiful and very artistic present has been delivered to me by Herr Jolly. I feel some difficulty in knowing how to express my thanks for it. At a time when the sword of the German nation has performed such illustrious feats, you render the pen almost too much honour in making it so costly. I can only hope that the use to which you have destined the pen in the service of our country may conduce to its permanent welfare in a fortunate peace, and I can promise you that, with God's help, it shall in my hand subscribe nothing unworthy of German feeling and of the German sword.”

Serious as were the consequences of the war for Germany, under a military system by which almost all the able-bodied male population were liable to be called away from their occupations, its effects upon the French were far more serious. A policy of prolonged though apparently hopeless resistance might, indeed, in the end have caused extreme perplexity to the Germans; but, on the other hand, it seemed as if the king of Prussia was not far wrong in his assertion that the social system of France was falling to pieces under the enormous

pressure of disorderly war. It is not too much to say that no words could be too strong to describe the critical condition of the French cities and great towns, seeing that all the familiar phenomena (save one) of the first French revolution were showing themselves at Rouen, Lyons, Dijon, and Marseilles. The clubs, the mobs, the municipalities claiming to be supreme over every other authority, the wholesale imprisonment of priests and so-called reactionists, the rumours of conspiracy, and specially of conspiracy in the prisons, the popularity of newspapers of the class of the Père Duchesne, seemed a prelude to another reign of terror. One thing only was wanting. There was an almost complete absence of clamour for civil blood, and when all the rest was so like, it was natural to wonder at the difference. Had the humanitarian spirit which when nations are at peace shows itself in effeminate reluctance to inflict painful punishment, but which when they are at war fails to save them one drop of blood, at least achieved this? Were French mobs less murderous because they had grown to be more humane? or was it that attacks on life had been exchanged for attacks on property? In Lyons the manufactories were still at work, and the workmen were receiving the highest wages required by the rules of the International Union. But the manufacture was only continued through fear of the consequences of stopping it; and it appeared as if general bankruptcy must sooner or later show what strain socialist theories were capable of bearing. Lyons doubtless spun and wove silk for the whole world, and thus, in spite of the impoverishment of all foreign customers indirectly caused by the war, may have been better able than other manufacturing towns to bear up against the loss of the home market, so long as its commodities found access to sea. But some of the cities most seriously threatened by revolutionary fury were wholly engaged in manufacturing goods to be consumed within France itself. In this condition was the great city of

VOL. II.

Rouen, which, with its surrounding villages, barely maintained itself against the competition of Manchester in the best of times, with the assistance of duties still largely protective. Certain political economists, distinguished for peculiar tenderness to all the heresies of the working class, have argued that the share of profit which workmen associated in trade unions may wring from their employers, is greater than an older generation of economical teachers had supposed. But the new doctrine is at best only intended for times of prosperity, and we have yet to learn how an arbitrary rate of wages can be long exacted from a manufacturer deprived of customers. The moment at which calamitous war and socialist convictions are found in presence of one another in any country, may well be regarded with terror.

Deplorable as was the case of both France and Germany in an agricultural point of view, it would have been incalculably worse if the women had not been trained to do much of the farm work which in England devolves on men alone. Every tourist in Rhineland and the south of France has noticed, and deplored, the extent to which female labour is there employed—not only for the lighter tasks of weeding and hoeing, as with us, but for ploughing, reaping, and all the more important branches of husbandry. It was now seen that such a condition of things renders the country far better able to sustain the requirements of war than otherwise it could be. With us the sudden demand on so large a proportion of our male population would almost suspend all agricultural operations; for steam, although it reduces the number of hands employed, throws the work more than ever upon the men. We notice these facts from no desire to see the women of Great Britain converted into farm drudges; but merely to show that soil, climate, and social habits abroad have combined with custom to render southern countries less dependent upon male labour than can be the case with us.

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