is difficult to understand, however, why a conspiracy to deprive one of labor contracted for can be any different in nature or damaging quality from a conspiracy to deprive him of property bargained for, or of anything else of value. There is no peculiar sacredness to the right to service over any other right, and no good reason can be suggested for protecting it differently.'

But the acts done in pursuance of a conspiracy may be unlawful in themselves if they include deception, threats,' intimidation, or any species of duress whatsoever, whether employed upon the laborer or upon the employer. Any one has an undoubted right to refuse to be employed by another, but he has no right whatever to resort to compulsion of any sort to keep others from the employment. A society of inen may lawfully unite in agreeing that they will not perform services for those who employ laborers not associated with them, but they become wrong-doers the moment they interfere with the liberty of action of others. Upon this point the recent case of Carew v. Rutherford is instructive.

In that case, for some disregard of their regulations, a contractor, who had not agrred to be bound by them, was fined by a labor organization, and was threatened that, unless he paid the *fine, his workmen should leave his employ, and [*281] that the power of the association should be used to prevent others engaging in his service. Says CHAPMAN, Ch. J.: “We have no doubt that a conspiracy against a mechanic who is under the necessity of employing workmen in order to carry on his business, to obtain a sum of money from him which he is under no legal liability to pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by deterring others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to do this, so that he is induced to pay the money

'An action may perhaps be maintained for inducing a man to break a contract of marriage. Sheperd v. Wakeman, 1 Sid. 79.

See Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707; Rice . Manley, 66 N. Y. 82; S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 30. Defendant with two hundred men went upon plaintiff's premises, and halting the men some distance from a mill went in to consult the foreman about the employees joining a strike for shorter hours. In his absence, the men

against his cautioning went into the mill and did some violent acts. Defendant held liable as a trespasser. "No man," says the court, "has a right to enter upon the premises of another for the purpose of inducing persons in the employment of that other to leave their employment to the injury of their employer for the purpose of working less hours or getting higher wages." Webber v. Barry, 33 N. W. Rep. 289 (Mich).

demanded, under a reasonable apprehension that he cannot carry on his business without yielding to the illegal demand, is an illegal, if not a criminal, conspiracy; that the acts done under it are illegal; and that the moneys thus obtained may be recovered back, and if the parties succeed in injuring his business, they are liable to pay all the damage thus done to him. It is a species of annoyance and extortion which the common law has never tolerated. This principle does not interfere with the freedom of business, but protects it. Every man has a right to determine what branch of business he will pursue, and to make his own contracts with whom he pleases, and on the best terms he can. He may change from one occupation to another, and pursue as many different occupations as he pleases, and competition in business is lawful. He may refuse to deal with any man or class of men; and it is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object in view, to associate themselves together and agree that they will not work for or deal with certain men or classes of men, or work under a certain price or without certain conditions.1 Freedom is the policy of this country. The acts

*

alleged and proved in this case are peculiarly offensive to the free principles which prevail in this country, and if such practices could enjoy impunity, they would tend to establish a tyranny of irresponsible persons over labor and mechanical business which would be extremely injurious to both." The same general prin

1 Citing Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Boston Glass Manufactory . Binney, 4 Pick. 425; Bowen o. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499.

2 Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 13. See Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47. A master brought action against the Executive Board of a Longshoremen's Union. Defendants were not in the plaintiff's employ and procured plaintiff's workmen to quit work in a body to compel plaintiff to accede to defendant's demands with reference to the pay of the work. men, and further attempted to boycott the plaintiff's business in order to compel the payment of such wages, by which action plaintiff was seriously injured.

"Associations have no more right to inflict injury upon others than individuals have. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or an noy them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members; or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrim ination in the rate of wages paid to the skillful and to the unskillful; to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the inefficient; and all associations designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employ ers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to

ciple has also been declared in England, where the court went so far as to enjoin a labor association which, by means of placards, advertisements, etc., was endeavoring to prevent labor

ers from *entering the plaintiff's employment. The jus- [*282] tification for this action was found in the fact that the organization was proceeding to destroy the value of the plaintiff's property; by their threats and intimidation rendering it impossible for the plaintiffs to obtain workmen, without whose assistance the property would become utterly valueless for the purposes of their trade.' The same doctrine would undoubtedly be applied to the case of employers, who, by combination and unlawful means, should prevent or seek to prevent the employment of any special class of laborers. Every man has the liberty of employing and being employed, and every man must respect the like liberty in others.

Unlawful Combinations. A combination formed by agreement between a number of employers in the same line of business, to suspend or carry on business, as the majority shall agree, is void, because in restraint of trade." So is an agreement between laborers, by which they undertake that they will not seek work at a shop where disputes connected with the trade have arisen, and will not encourage or assist a laborer contrary to certain rules agreed upon, or seek to procure employment for those not associated with them. These are plain cases.

dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to abridge any of these rights, are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means, and accompanied by damage, are actionable." Old Dominion Steam Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48. BROWN, J. 'Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551. Boycotting a factory by parading in front of it

with banners inscribed with threatening words may be enjoined. Sherry v. Perkins, 17 N. E. Rep. 307 (Mass).

2 Hilton . Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, 66. One not injured in his business by a combination of dealers cannot complain of the combination as unlawful. Fairbank v. Newton, 50

Wis. 628.

3 Hornby v. Close, L. R. 2 QI B. 153. And see Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 602; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9. The right of a slave, freed by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, to be paid for his services,

Right to be Carried by Common Carriers. The business of common carriers is a quasi public business; a term which we employ, because it is often made use of, and because it indicates that the public have some rights in respect to the business which do not exist in the case of business of a purely private character. No man becomes a common carrier except with his own consent; but when he does so, he must conform to those principles of the common law under which the business has grown up, and which have always required of the common carrier impartiality in his business as between individuals; he must carry for all, and he

must carry under impartial regulations. But the com[*283] mon law *does not determine what shall be the scope of

his business; he must carry certain kinds of property only, or all kinds of property; or, if he be a carrier of persons, he may, perhaps, limit the business to the carriage of certain classes of persons only; the discrimination being based on distinctions which are not objectionable as being arbitrary, but having some principle to support them. It is not perceived, for example, that any principle of the common law should preclude person from undertaking to carry from point to point, as a permanent business, persons of one sex only; making special arrange ments for their accommodation, while another, perhaps, makes other arrangements for the other sex. But where no such discrimination was made, certain liberty of action in receiving and rejecting persons was always admissible, because it could always be justified on grounds of impartiality and reason. To take a plain case: A railroad company could never be compelled to receive and carry in one of its ordinary passenger coaches a man whose appearance was shocking to the sense of decency of others, or a man in a state of beastly intoxication, or a man afflicted with contagious disease.' The compulsion of impartial carriage is established on public grounds, and for the public benefit, and it is manifest that the public good does not require that persons should be received for carriage under such circumstances. But since it is impossible to anticipate all the cases which may arise to render discrimina tions proper, the law allows to carriers the liberty of making

where he continued in the former master's service, began immediately, without any special contract. Handy v. Clark, 4 Houston, 16.

12 Kent. Com. 451; Redf. on Railw. Vol. 2, Introd. Ang. on Carriers.

2 See Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sum. 221; Markhain v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523.

rules and regulations for the control and management of their business, subject to this restriction only, that the rules and regulations must not be unreasonable,' and that they must not con. flict with any which may lawfully be prescribed by competent legislative authority. Competent authority would be that of the State, in the case of commerce entirely within the State, and that of the United States, in the case of foreign and inter-State traffic.

Among the regulations often established by carriers of passengers is one setting aside certain carriages for the exclusive use of women and their escorts. Such a regulation violates the right of no one who is excluded, and for whom accommodations are *elsewhere provided.' Another, not so plainly jus- [*284] tifiable, is a rule setting aside certain carriages within which alone will persons of color be received and carried. Such a regulation has been sustained where the accommodations furnished were equal to those supplied for other passengers, but has been held invalid where no such impartial accommodations had been provided.

Since the changes recently effected by the new amendments to the federal Constitution, and which have been brought about in the social condition of the country, it has been the policy alike of the nation and of the several States to legislate against certain discriminations which before were customary, and were seldom disputed. The act of Congress of 1875 is sufficiently important in this connection to be specially noticed. Its avowed purpose was to insure to all persons the benefits of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides, among other things, that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of

'Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520; Westchester, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. 435.

Chicago, &c., R. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 641. A colored woman cannot be excluded from such car because of her color. Gray v. Cincinnati, &c., Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 683; Logwood v.

Memphis, &c., R. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 318. Nor can a prostitute, unless her conduct is offensive. Brown v. Memphis, &c., Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 499.

• Westchester, &c., R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209.

Chicago, &c., R. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 641; The Sue, 22 Fed. Rep. 843.