would be peculiarly liable to outrage or injury in consequence. The reasonableness of such regulations is the concern of legisla tion, and they may be legal, even when on the score of policy or justice there seems to be abundant ground to question the propriety of the distinctions. The common law did not allow the married woman to make contracts on her own behalf. [*36] The general conviction now is that the *reasons were insufficient; but while they were accepted and acted upon, the most that one could say would be that this class of personsought to have the right, but did not. However unfairly any particular discrimination might operate, it will readily be admitted that to give exactly the same rights to all classes under all circumstances would work injustice rather than equality. The case of the infant is perhaps the best illustration here; to give him the same control and management of his property which the law allows to others would only be taking from him a rule of protection which he needs, but which is not needed by others. The infant is undoubtedly entitled to equal consideration in the law with all others; but equality of civil rights, in a general sense, can only mean equality under impartial regulations; and these regulations cannot be reasonable or just unless in some cases they recognize or establish important distinctions. ers. The right to acquire, own and enjoy property may be said to be of universal recognition in government. And this includes the right to select and follow any lawful employment, with a view to the acquisition of property, subject only to reasonable and impartial regulations. The infant has this right of acquisition equally with the adult, and the insane equally with all othThere may be restrictions on control and management of property for the general good, or for the good of the owner, but these guard the right; they are not properly an abridgement of it. Instances of this are found in the requirement of the statute of frauds, that certain contracts and sales shall not be made unless by writing duly signed; the purpose here is not to preclude any proper contracts or sales, but to establish such precautions. as will prevent the setting up of contracts and sales which were never made, and establishing them on mistaken or false testi mony. Political Rights. The privilege of participation in the government is conferred as an act of sovereignty on those whose par ticipation is supposed to be most beneficial to the State. Being a privilege, no one is supposed to be injured when it is not conferred upon him. The rules of admission will be established by the State on a consideration of the general good. The privi*lege is not conferred on the very young, and it is some- [*37] times withheld from the ignorant. It is also sometimes made to depend on the possession of property. A defense of such a discrimination is made by some on the ground that one of the chief objects of government is to render it possible to own and enjoy property, and if suffrage were universal, this purpose might be defeated by the government passing into the hands of those who, having no property of their own, may be disposed to despoil others. It may also be said that those ought to control the government whose contributions support it, and that these are the property owners. Still, again, it may be said that the owner of property is prima facie better qualified to take part in the, government than he who has nothing, because prima facie he has exhibited more prudence, thrift and judgment than the other. These theories do not concern us now. When the political privilege is conferred as an act of sovereign power, it becomes for the time being a legal right; a right which others must not disturb, which is capable of being defended, and which may even, for the purposes of legal defense, be considered as having a money value to the possessor. The deprivation thereof may consequently be compensated by a recovery of damages. But a like act of sovereignty to that which confers a political right may take it away. There cannot be, either in the elective franchise or in a public office any vested right as against the sovereignty, except so far as, in forming the constitution of government, it has been agreed that there should be. Some political privileges are the right of every person, whether an elector or not. Such is the privilege of meeting and discussing public affairs with others. Such, also, are the privileges of petition and remonstrance. Every person under the jurisdiction of the laws has the right to petition for or remonstrate against a change therein, and also to address any official person or body upon any subject which concerns him as an individual, or the public of Minor. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Spragins. Houghton, 3 Ill. 377, 396; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Spencer o. which he is a member, and over which such official person or board is vested with authority. Precautions are taken to guard this right by constitutional provisions, but they cannot be very effectual, because they are easily evaded. The caucus often in advance decides that the petition or remonstrance shall have no influence, and its reception then becomes an idle ceremony. [*38] *Family Rights. The following may be mentioned as rights in the family relation: 1. The right of the husband to the society and services of the wife. It is often, and very justly, spoken of as a reproach to the common law, that it recognized in the wife no corresponding right to the society and services of her husband. Theoretically, the duty was imposed upon him to comfort and cherish, but the duty was one of imperfect obligation, because no remedy whatever was provided for failure to observe it.' Some few of the States have provided a remedy for this defect in a single class of cases; that is to say, cases in which the loss to the wife is occasioned by selling or giving to the husband intoxicating drinks. In these cases she is permitted to bring suit against the party who, by furnishing the means of intoxica tion, has been the cause of the loss, and she is allowed to recover substantial damages, where substantial loss has been suffered. 2. The right of the wife to a reasonable support, to be furnished by her husband.' This, also, at the common law 12 Kent, 182; Reeve Dom. Rel. 110. The subject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 2 Where husband and wife are liv ing together and he makes her an allowance sufficient for her clothes and has forbidden her to pledge his credit, he is not liable as for necessaries to a tradesman who has sold her clothing without any notice of the prohibition by the husband, the tradesman having had no reason from prior dealing to suppose that the wife had authority to pledge the husband's credit. Debenham v. Mellon, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 394; L. R. 6 App. Cas. 24; see Compton v. Bates, 10 Ill. App. 78. When a wife leaves the husband's house because of his cruelty or neg lect, or with his express or implied consent, the husband is liable to anyone furnishing her with necessaries. Billings . Pitcher, 7 B. Mon. 458; Mahew o. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172; Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 505; Dixon v. Hurrell, 8 C. & P. 717; Rawley v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251; Hodges. Hodges, 1 Esp. 441; Burlen v. Shannon, 14 Gray, 433; Cartwright v. Bate, 1 Allen, 514; Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn. St. 360; Biddle v. Frazier, 3 Houst. 258; Allen v. Aldrich, 9 Foster, (N. H.) 63; Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350; Trotter v. Trotter, 77 Ill. 510; Lockwood v. Thomas, 12 Johns. 248; Tebbetts v. Hapgood, 34 N. H. 420; Walker v. Simpson, 7 Watts & S. 83; Parke v. Kleeber, 37 Penn. 251; Sno was a *right of imperfect obligation, not only because the [*39] remedies for compelling its observance by the husband were inadequate, but because not protected in any way against abridgement or defeat at the hands of other parties. 3. The right of the parent to the custody and services of his child,' which is qualified by such regulations as the State may ver . Blair, 25 N. J. 94; Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227: Reese v. Chilton, 36 Mo. 598; Clement v. Mattison,3 Rich. (S. C.) 93; Black v. Bryan, 18 Texas, 453; Eiler v. Crull, 99 Ind. 375; in spite of his giving notice to the contrary, Watkins v. De Armond, 89 Ind. 553. So, too, if he deserts his wife and family, he is liable for their necessaries. Hall v. Wier, 1 Allen, 261; Walker v. Laighton, 31 N. H. 111, and notices, special or general, that he will not be bound will not avail him. Pierpont . Wilson, 49 Conn. 450. If, by his cruelty, he compels his wife to leave him, and she dies while away, he is liable for the reasonable expense of her funeral, without notice of her death. Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 539; Ambrose . Kerrison, 10 C. B. 776; Bradshaw. Beard, 12 C. B. (N. s.), 344. When goods are furnished against the husband's express orders to his wife living apart from him, he can be held only if the circumstances give her implied authority to bind him for necessaries. Benjamin v. Dockham, 132 Mass, 181. He is not liable if she leaves without sufficient cause. Hartmann v. Tegart, 12 Kan. 177; Oinson o. Heritage, 45 Ind. 73; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 258; Allen v. Aldrich, 29 N. H. 63; Brown v. Mudgett, 40 Vt. 68; Sturtevant v. Starin, 19 Wis. 268; McCutchen . McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Rutherford v. Coxe, 11 Mo. 347; Brown . Patton, 3 Humph. 135; Porter . Bobb, 25 Mo. 36; Evans v. Fisher, 10 Ill. 569; Williams v. Prince, 3 Strobh. 490; Ross v. Ross, 69 Ill. 569; Bevier v. Galloway, 71 l. 517. Mere separation is not enough. The wife must appear to be without fault. Lippincott's Est., 12 Phila. 142. Where husband and wife separate by mutual consent, and the husband makes a contract with a third person to maintain the wife, if the wife leave such third person voluntarily, and without just cause, she will not carry with her authority to pledge her husband's credit for her support. Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350. The husband has a right to change his domicil, and it is the wife's duty to accompany him, and if she refuses, he is not liable for her support and maintenance. Babbitt v. Babbitt, 69 Ill. 277. Husband not liable under penal statute for failure to support, if wife refuses his offer of support at his father's house because of her dislike to his parents. People v. Pettit, 74 N. Y. 320. Where by statutes married women may be liable on their contracts, if goods are bought for ordinary domestic use the legal implication is that the husband is liable. Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454; Chester v. Pierce, 33 Minn. 370. So if domestic servants are hired. Wagnero. Nagel, 33 Minn. 348; Flynn . Messenger, 28 Minn. 208. See further on wife's liability for household necessaries. McQuillen v. Singer Mnfg. Co. 99 Pa. St. 586; Cook v. Ligon, 54 Miss. 368. "The right of the parent to the services of his child may be lost by emancipating him. In brief, the H establish for his benefit and protection, and for the care and preservation of any property of which he may be possessed. One universal regulation is, that the right shall cease at a certain age; at twenty-one, or perhaps, in the case of females, at eighteen. Others which are sometimes established are, that very young children shall not be employed in mines, collieries, or factories, and that for a certain portion of the year they shall be placed in schools. 4. The obligation of the parent to support the child, when from immaturity or other cause he is unable to support himself, can hardly be said to confer upon the child a right to such support, because the law provides no means of enforcing the parental obligation for his benefit. The common law in this regard left the interests and protection of the child to what must often prove the imperfect guardianship of the State. In other words, [*40] it imposed *the obligation on the parent as a duty to the State, and not as a duty to the child. There are other rights to which, in customary but somewhat loose language, it is said the child is entitled: such as the right to protection against injuries and against the unlawful action of others, the right to culture and education, the right to share in the parent's estate. These are sometimes spoken of as natural rights, and the parent is said to be under an obligation to recognize them. But, as in methods in which emancipation may take place are the following: 1. By a formal agreement between the father and child to that effect. Morse v. Welton, 6 Conn. 547; Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270; Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 172; Mason v. Hutchins, 32 Vt. 780; Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293. 2. By the father refusing to care and provide for the child. Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272; Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270. 3. By the father suffering the child to depart and act for himself, and employ his own services at his option. Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 356; Whiting v. Earl, 3 Pick. 201; Wodello. Coggeshall, 2 Met. 89; Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514; Bell v. Bum- |