To specify in detail the conduct that might constitute contempt of court would be to enumerate the ways in which misbehavior might obstruct the courts of justice. Assaults in the presence of the court, disorders of any description which interrupt its proceedings, abuse of the court, refusal of one called as a witness to testify, neglect of official duty, or other misbehavior by an officer of the court, neglect to obey the orders or process of the court, etc., may all be punished as contempts.' So might be any acts of violence and disorder calculated and designed to prevent the court convening. It has also been held in many cases that the publication of an article in a newspaper commenting on proceedings in court then pending and undetermined, or upon the court in its relation thereto, made at a time and under circumstances calculated to affect the course of justice in such proceedings, and obviously intended for that purpose, may be punished as a contempt, even though the court was not in session when the publication was made. Such a publication, [*425] when *made, however, is a continuous wrong, as much as would be something of a physical nature, planned in advance, and so arranged as that its natural and necessary results should be to throw the court into disorder and confusion when its sitting should commence. A warrant issued to carry into execution a conviction for contempt, by an inferior court, should show that opportunity was given the party to be heard in his defense. The right to a hearing is absolute, and cannot be denied in a court of any grade.* 550. See Watson v. Bodell, 14 M. & W. 57, 69; Cook v. Bangs, 21 Fed. Rep. 640. It is a contempt if strikers interfere with the receiver of a railroad appointed by a court. In re Higgins, 27 Fed. Rep. 443; In re Doolittle, 23 Fed. Rep. 544; U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. Rep. 748. So is it to attempt to create a belief that jurors in a pending case could be bribed. Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338. a Matter of Sturoc, 48 N. H. 428; Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 438; Respublica . Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; Daw v. Eley, L. R 7 Eq. Cas. 49; Re Cheltenham, &c., Co. L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 580; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416. In er parte Hickey, 12 Miss. 751, this authority was denied, and in Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45, it is decided that under the present constitution of Illinois a person charged with such misconduct can only be punished on indictment, and is entitled to jury trial. Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Lowe v. State, 9 Ohio, (N. 8.) 337; Ez parte Pollard, L. R. 2 Pr. C. Cas. 106. See Bachelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 619; Ex parte Kilgore, 3 Tex. And the punishment must be one warranted by law. Where a justice commits one to prison for refusal to answer a question in a suit before him, the committal is for the purpose of compelling an answer; and if it appears that the suit has been disposed of when the order for commitment was made, the order is void.' Attorneys, solicitors, etc., for misconduct as such, may be punished by having their names stricken from the rolls; but they do not forfeit their right to their office by misconduct in respect to the court as suitors or citizens merely, and therefore cannot be punished by being deprived of it on conviction for other contempts." The punishment imposed for contempt of court must be certain. An order of commitment, until discharged by due course of law, would be void for uncertainty." The cases in the nature of coutempts, where the purpose of the proceedings is to enforce some civil remedy, such as the payment of costs, or of alimony, will come under the same rules in respect to jurisdiction as the cases of criminal contempts above spoken of. App. 247. In this last case the point is considered fully. See also State v. Judges, 32 La. Ann. 1256; Russell v. French, 67 Ia. 102. If a contempt is not covered by statute and is not committed in the court's presence, the offense must be proved, the court cannot act on its own knowledge. Huntington . McMahon, 48 Conn. 174; Welch v. Barber, 52 Conn. 147. [32] 'Clarke o. May, 2 Gray, 410 Ex parte Moore, 63 N. C. 397, and cases cited; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364. Re Wallace, L. R. 1 Pr. C. Cas. 283. Rex v. James, 5 B. & Ald. 894, Re Hammel, 9 R. I. 248. See Craw ford's Case, 13 Q. B. 613. [*426] *CHAPTER XV. WRONGS IN RESPECT TO PERSONAL PROPERTY. The classification of property as real and personal is extremely artificial, and is governed more by circumstances than by the nature or inherent qualities of things. The common law idea of real estate comes from a time and a condition of things when nearly all that was valued highly, and upon which families were built up and sustained, was to be found in the freehold estate, and in those things in the nature of heir looms which, in legal contemplation, attached themselves to it and passed with it to the heir. The estate held by feudal tenure of the feudal superior, with the castle and mansion house upon it, the deer in the park, the family pictures, the family jewels, the charters of nobility or of precedence, if any, perhaps the ancestral carriage; anything, in short, which distinctively pertained to the family as such, and gained importance and imparted importance as it was preserved with and held inseparable from that which gave the family its chief prominence, that is to say, the landed estate; these were the matters of consequence, and these were, in fact as well as in legal designation, the real property until modern times. There . might be temporary interests in land, held perhaps at the will of the owner of the freehold, or even for terms of years; there were beasts raised for the market, and wares in which traders dealt; but such property was not property of that dignified importance and character upon which families were based; it had not connected with it the same idea of permanence; it was for temporary support or for trade, and not to be kept and perpetuated in families; it was property, but it pertained rather to the person who for the time owned and controlled it, and who might dispose of it to-morrow or himself pass away, than to the family which, in legal contemplation, was perpetual, It was, therefore, not improperly designated personal property in contradistinction to the real property which was before mentioned. *In thus classifying certain property as real property [*427] the prominent idea doubtless is that of permanence in interest and ownership. But the representative of this permanency was the land, and the other things which constituted real property connected themselves with the land, and were real only because of the association. The deer in the park were real property only as they were a part of the great estate; the family pictures were chiefly important as they were kept as heir-looms; even the castle and mansion house would lose its value and become a mere temporary shelter if it could be supposed to be set down upon the land of another and subject to be ordered off at the will of the owner of the freehold. Thus a small piece of land, insignificant in value in itself, might give incalculable value to the structure erected upon it, since it would give local habitation and a permanent abiding place to the family which the building alone, unconnected with an ownership in the land, could not afford. Therefore, when traders and others erected buildings on land in which they had no freehold, the owner of the freehold was looked upon as having property of the substantial and real class, and the owner of the building as having that of the less substantial nature. The land was consequently real property, though it might be of little money value, and the building was personal property, a mere chattel, though its money value might be much greater than the value of that upon which it stood. The distinction still exists; the building constitutes a part of the freehold in the one case; in the other it is a removable fixture, and is personalty. The actual or presumed intent on the part of the party attaching a chattel to the realty, that it shall constitute a part of the realty, or on the other hand, that it shall remain a chattel, is usually the most important circumstance to be considered in determining the fact;1 *and if no one were concerned with [*428] the question but the party by whom the annexation was 'Mr. Ewell well says that, "The weight of modern authority and of reason, keeping in mind the exceptions as to constructive annexation admitted by all the authorities to exist, seems to establish the doctrine that the true criterion of an irremovable fixture consists in the united application of several tests: "1. Real or constructive annexation of the article in question to the realty. “2. Appropriation or adaptation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it is connected. "3. The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the made, it might well be suffered to be controlling in all cases. But as the question of ownership often depends on the question whether a fixture is removable or not, and men make purchases and accept liens upon property, supposing it to be of that nature, either real or personal, that appearances would indicate, it would be not only impolitic, but in many cases unjust, to suffer a secret intent to control where appearances would indicate the existence of an intent of a different nature. The law, therefore, usually acts upon the presumed rather than upon any actual intent, and the general rules which govern the question of the removability of fixtures are few and simple. If a building is erected by the owner of the freehold by way of improvement thereof, and apparently for permanent use and enjoyment with it, or if machinery is put up and attached to a building apparently for like permanent use, in the place where it is put, or if a pump is put in the well, or fence constructed to divide off fields, or any erection whatsoever made which apparently is calculated to increase the permanent value of the estate for use and enjoyment, a reasonable presumption arises that the owner intended to make them a part of the realty, and the law accepts this intent as conclusive, and considers them real estate from the time they are constructed or affixed. The owner's deed, mortgage, or lease of the land will convey them as a part of it, and when he dies they pass with the land to his devisee or heirat-law. Nor is the particular manner of annexation to the freehold specially important;' though structures evidently put up freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, and the policy of the law in relation thereto, the structure and mode of the annexation, and the purpose or use for which the annexation has been made. "Of these three tests, the clear tendency of modern anthority scems to be to give pre-eminence to the question of intention to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold, and others seem to derive their chief value as evidence of such intention." Ewell on Fixtures, p. 21, 23. See McConnell . Blood, 123 Mass. 47; 1 Whether the rolling stock of railroads is to be considered a part of the realty, is a point on which the authorities are greatly at variance. See Minnesota v. St. Paul, &c., R. R Co., 2 Wall. 609; Williamson . N. J. Sou. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311; Ewell on Fixtures, 34, and cases cited. As to need of actual annexation; Patton |