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upon them a considerable number of people, by whom the premises and crops were considerably damaged. For this he was held responsible as for a result he should have fore- [*74] seen and avoided.' In the other, a preacher attracted a crowd about him in the public street, some of whom mounted a pile of stones which were private property, and by their weight broke them. Whether the speaker should have anticipated this result, it was said, was a question of fact for the jury. "It cannot be said with judicial certainty that when he stopped to make his speech in the street he must have foreseen, as the natural and probable consequence of his act, that the persons collecting together to listen to him would mount the pile of stones, and even if some of them would, that so many would as, by their connected weight, might break some of the stones. The lowermost stones in the pile were already trusted by the plaintiff with the weight of the uppermost. Height of pile, strength of grain, distance from the speaker, number of bystanders, and perhaps other circumstances, all would enter into the question of the probability of injury. The question was therefore one of fact for the jury, and not of law for the court."

1 Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381. The case of Toms v. Whatby, 35 U. C. Q. B. 195, is a valuable case on the general subject of remoteness of injury from the cause. The facts were that the approach to a bridge was not protected by any railing or guard; that the plaintiff's wife was driving over the bridge, when the horse shied, and backed the carriage over the bank. Held, that the injury was to be attributed to the want of the railing as the proximate cause. See also Wright . Templeton, 132 Mass. 49; Burrell . Uncapher, 11 Atl. Rep, 619 (Pa.); Spaulding v. Winslow, 74 Me. 528. A railway track was laid in a street with no fence between it and the drive-way. A horse being driven on the street was frightened by a moving car and ran upon the track, throwing out and injuring the plaintiff. In an action against the city, held that the moving of the car was not so far the proxi

mate cause of the injury as to pre-
vent a recovery. "When several
concurring acts or conditions of
things,-one of them the wrong-
ful act of defendant-produce
the injury, and it would not have
been produced but for such wrong.
ful act or omission, such act or
omission is the proximate cause of
the injury. The injury is one which
might reasonably be anticipated as a
natural consequence of the act or
omission." Campbell v. Stillwater, 32
Minn. 308. See Maher . Winona,
etc., R. R. Co., 31 Minn. 401.
pare De Camp v. Sioux City, 37 N.
W. Rep. 971 (Ia), where because of a
defect in the street one could not turn
out and avoid collision with a wagon
recklessly driven, and the defect was
held not the proximate cause of the


Fairbanks. Alston, 70 Penn. St. 86, 91, per AGNEW, J.; Kerr v. Herring, 11 Exch. 812. The question of



*It may also be instructive to compare two others, in each of which successive events followed the original cause before the damage was suffered, but in the one the wrong of a third party intervened, while in the other the subsequent acts were blameless. In Vicars v. Wilcocks the special damage from defamation for which a recovery was sought, was the discharge of the plaintiff from his employment before the time for which he had been engaged had expired. But this, as Lord ELLENBOROUGH showed, was "a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the defendant was no more answerable than if, in consequence of the words, other persons had afterward assembled and seized the plaintiff and thrown him into a horsepond by way of punishment for his transgression." In

proximate cause is usually for the
jury upon all the facts. Eames v.
Texas &c. R. R. Co., 63 Tex. 660;
Hoag v. Lake Shore &c. R. R. Co., 85
Pa. St. 293. See Ehrgott o. Mayor
&c. 96 N. Y. 264; Atkinson v. Good-
rich Tr. Co., 60 Wis. 141; East Tenn.
&c. Co. v. Lockhart, 79 Ala. 315;
Pullman &c. Co. v. Bluhm, 109. Ill.
20; Drake . Kiely, 93 Pa. St. 492;
Crowley v. Cedar Rapids etc. Co., 65
Ia. 658; Savage v. Chicago etc. Ry.
Co., 31 Minn. 419, for applications of
the rule. But when the facts are un-
disputed and the influence of the in-
tervening cause is plain, the question
is for the Court. Hoag v. Lake Shore
etc. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; West Maha-
noy v. Watson, 9 Atl. Rep: 430; Henry
v. St. Louis etc. Co. 76 Mo. 288. See
Lewis v. Flint etc. Co. 54 Mich. 55.
In Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. 525,
529, it is said: 'Such nearness in
the order of events and closeness in
the relation of cause and effect must
subsist that the influence of the inju-
rious act may predominate over that
of other causes, and shall concur to
produce the consequence, or may be
traced in those causes. To a sound
judgment must be left each particu.
lar case.
The connection is usually

enfeebled, and the influence of the injurious act controlled, where the wrongful act of a third person intervenes, and where any new agent, introduced by accident or design, becomes more powerful in producing the consequence than the first injuri ous act. It is therefore required that the consequences to be answered for should be natural as well as proximate. By this I understand not that they should be such as, upon a calcu lation of chances, would be found likely to occur, nor such as extreme prudence might anticipate, but only that they should be such as have actually ensued, one from another, without the concurrence of any such extraordinary conjuncture of circumstances, or the intervention of any such extraordinary result, as that the usual course of nature should seem to have been departed from."

18 East. 1. Where a city negligently leaves a pit open in the street, it is not liable to one willfully thrown into it by another. Alexander . Newcastle, 17 N. E. Rep. 200 (Ind.)

2 See, also, Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; Tutein v. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211.

Thomas v. Winchester,' the defendant, who was a druggist, negligently sold a package of poison labelled as extract of dandelion, a harmless medicine, to another druggist, who re-sold it to a third, who sold it to the plaintiff, who was injured by making use of it, supposing it to be correctly labelled. The court distinguish the case from one in which two parties deal with each other under no obligations but such as their contract imposes, and charged with no duty to third persons, and hold that where one puts up drugs for a dealer, to be used not by him but by such person as may eventually purchase for use, he is charged with a duty towards every person [*76] who may become purchaser to label them correctly, and

the number of intermediate sales that, in the natural course of business, may take place is immaterial. There is a maxim that

16 N. Y. 397; S. C. Big. Lead. Cas. on Torts, 602. See, also, Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351; S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 543; Wheeler . Downer, etc., Co., 104 Mass. 64.

Lynch. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, is relied upon, and Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P., 190 distinguished. And, see, McDonald . Snelling, 14 Allen, 290. And compare Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507. If one innocently repeat a slander, the the slanderer may be held liable therefor. Keenholts v. Becker, 3 Denio, 346. Compare Hastings v. Palmer, 20 Wend. 225. As to the consequences that may reasonably be expected to follow a wrongful act, see Greenland . Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243, 248; Hoey v. Felton, 11 C. B. (N, s.) 142; Weatherford . Fishback, 4 Ill. 170; Young . Hall, 4 Geo. 95; Addington. Allen, 11 Wend. 375. In Vandenburgh . Truax, 4 Denio, 464, a man who chased a boy with an axe into a store, was held liable for injury done by the boy in the store while endeavoring to escape. If, through one's negligence, his mill-dam gives way, and the force of the water carries away a dam below, and the vol

ume thus increased inflicts an injury upon a proprietor below, the damage is chargeable to the original negli gence, and the party guilty of it may be held responsible. Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200. And, see, Gilbertson v. Richardson, 5 C. B. 502; Powell v. Deveney, 8 Cush. 300. So when a dam causes sand coming down the stream to be deposited on the land above it. Himes v. Jarrett, 2 S. E. Rep. 393 (S. C.). If defendant loosens a shoe put on a horse by plaintiff, a smith, with intent to make him ap pear a poor workman and deprive him of the custom of the owner of the horse and damage results, he is liable. Hughes v. McDonough, 43 N. J. L. 459. A fence about a field was burnt by fire from a locomotive. Cattle pastured near got in and damaged the crop. The railroad company was held liable. Miller v. St. Louis, etc. Co. 90 Mo. 389. A child by reason of a defective sidewalk fell into a ditch, in which was glass and was thereby cut. The city was held liable. Galveston . Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118. Water from a railroad tank ran upon adjoining land in winter and froze. The company was

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"fraud is not purged by circuity," and this is true of any wrongful act. If its influence must naturally, and without the interposition of any extraordinary event, produce to some one an

held liable for the damage done by

the freezing. Chicago, etc. Ry Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339. A defective brake broke as a train was increasing speed with the result that a coupling gave way and the train parted. After a little the forward portion stopped and the two parts collided and the conductor was killed. Held that there was no intervening cause and that for the use of the defective brake the company was liable to his representative. Ransier v. Minn. etc. Ry Co., 32 Minn. 331. From the breaking down of his carriage due to a defect in the road, a man received a shock. In getting another carriage and driving home he was wet through in a rain and became ill. The jury finding that he acted with reasonable prudence and that his disease was due to the shock aggravated by the exposure, the city was held liable. Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 264. A locomotive engineer, perceiving that the track had spread, reversed his engine, and in handling the lever injured his arm. The spreading of the track was due to defendant's fault. Held that the jury were to decide whether that fault was the proximate cause of the injury. "Reversing the lever is one of the ordinary hazards of plaintiff's employment; yet, if the negligence of the defendant required such act to be done at that particular time and the plaintiff **acted prudently, with due regard for his own safety and the safety of others, then the defendant is liable." Following the Squib case. Knapp . Sioux City, etc. R. R. Co. 65 Ia. 91 SEEVERS, J. See also, Drake v. Kiely, 93 Pa. St. 492; Crowley v. Cedar Rapids, etc. R. R. Co., 65 Ia. 659; Savage v. Chicago, etc. Ry Co.

31 Minn. 419. This question has frequently arisen where railway passengers have been put off cars at the wrong place and suffered from exposure. In one case a woman so put off, finding no means of conveyance, walked five miles and suffered in consequence, and the carrier was held liable. Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474. So where a man was made ill by an injury suffered by like negligence and caught a fever then prevalent of which he died. Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346. So where a pregnant woman was obliged to walk three miles and as a result miscarried, although the carrier did not know her condition. Brown. Chicago, etc. Ry Co. 54 Wis. 342. SeeLouisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 81 Ky. 624. An opposite conclusion is reached in Colorado where the injury came from the exposure of the woman in her peculiar condition. Pullman, etc. Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344. See, in line with this case, Francis v. St. Louis Tr. Co. 5 Mo. App. 7; and as to a man of 83, Louisville, etc. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea, 128; see also, Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Case, 66 Tex. 562. A lad negligently injured by blasting of rocks, after a partial paralysis lasting six months and while still unlikely to recover, contracted pneumonia and died. The attending physician was not prepared to state what caused the pneumonia. Held that the court could not charge that the injury was not the proximate cause of the disease, that it did not cause or largely contribute thereto. "It cannot be said that here was a second wrongful act, or a disease, wholly independent of the first

injurious result, it is immaterial what shall be the circuit of events or the number of successive stages.

How far one may be chargeable with the spread of fire negli

wrong, which caused the death of the boy." Beauchamp . Saginaw Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163. See Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 3 South. Rep. 902 (Ala.) To same effect where a woman was thrown against a car railing and afterward cancer developed. Balt., etc. Ry Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; and, see, Owens v. Kansas City etc., Co., 8 S. W. Rep. 350 (Mo.); Contra, Jewell v. Railway Co., 55 N. H. 84. If an arm is broken by defendant's negligence, he may be liable if a false joint is formed when the patient is treated by surgeons of ordinary skill. Pullman, etc. Co. v. Bluhm, 109 Ill. 20. A steerage passenger was in a lower berth when the upper tier fell down through defendant's negligence. This so frightened plaintiff that she became partially paralyzed and had to be removed from her berth by others in order that the upper tier might be repaired. Being unable to help herself after being placed on her feet, she was thrown against a door by the rolling of the vessel, was then picked up by the steward and put in a wet place till the berths were repaired. Held she could recover for the injuries suffered by her fall and wetting; that the jury could find her condition of mind to have been caused by the fall of the berths, and that when in that condition defendant did not take proper care of her. Smith v. Brit. tc. Packet Co., 86 N. Y. 408.

On the other hand recent cases illustrate the doctrine that there is no liability if a distinct cause intervenes between the defendant's wrong and the damage. By the wrong of defendant, plaintiff in the night was carried past a station where he had a

right to be left and beyond where he had a right, from the information given him by defendant's servants, to suppose he was when he left the car. Before he suffered any injury he discovered the mistake, and knowing the surroundings started back to reach the road he meant to take. He knew and sought to avoid a cattle guard which he had to cross before he could reach the road. Deceived by the looks of the ground he stepped into the cattle guard before he knew that he was so near it and was injured. Held that the falling in was the result of an accident and not the proximate result of being carried by the station and misinformed as to just where the train had stopped; that defendant's wrong was related to the injury only as it was the occasion of bringing plaintiff where the accident occurred. Lewis v. Flint, etc. Ry. Co., 54 Mich. 55. A man injured in a railroad accident became insane and eight months after the accident killed himself. The act of self-destruction was the proximate cause of the death. Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249. Between a street and a river a railroad had filled in a space used for its tracks. A house across the street burnt because the fire hose could not reach the river across the tracks. The filling and use of the space was not the proximate cause of the injury. Bosch v. Burlington, etc. R. R. Co., 44 Ia. 402. A traveler having changed cars at a station entered a car upon the train he proposed to take and was ordered out as the train was not ready. He stood for a time on a track in the yard near the car and was struck by a train. Held the order to leave the car was

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