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gently started by himself, is one that has attracted no little attention in judicial circles, and led to some difference of opinion. In New York it is held that while the culpable party would be liable to the owner of an adjoining house to which the fire had spread, he would not be liable to one to whose house the fire should spread from the burning of the first; the court apparently being more influenced in their decision by the fact that the oppo

not the proximate cause of the injury, the injured man having acted delibera'ely and without excitement or compulsion in taking his position where he did. Henry v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 76 Mo. 288. Defendant's cars ran off a siding belonging to a third person by reason of its defective construction, and injured plaintiff's boat. Its act in running on the defective track, not the defect in the track, was held the proximate cause. Fawcett v. Railway Co., 24 W. Va. 755. Damage from loss of market is not the proximate result of delay in delivery of freight by collision of vessels. The Notting Hill, L. R. 9 P. D. 105. A man knocked another down who was thereupon killed by the kick of a horse. The assault was not the proximate cause. People v. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503. So where the jar caused by the sudden starting of a horse car threw a passenger to the pavement where a runaway horse struck her. South Side, etc. Co o. Trich, 11 Atl. Rep. 627 (Pa.) A mule getting upon a railroad track from lack of a fence, ran along and caught its foot in a very small hole between the ties and was injured. Failure to fence was held not the proximate cause. Nelson v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 74. See Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 10 Lea, 432. A railway company unlawfully obstructed a highway with cars. While a traveller was waiting to pass, a train came in on the other side of the cars in a lawful manner. His horse

took fright and he was injured. The obstruction of the street was held not the proximate cause. Selleck v. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 58 Mich. 195. So, where to avoid the obstruction one drove around it where there was no crossing. Jackson v. R. R. Co.. 13 Lea, 491; and where cattle stopped on a track and were struck by another train properly handled, running on a parallel track. Brown v. Wabash, etc. Ry. Co., 20 Mo. App. 222. See Railway Co. 0. Staley, 41 Ohio St. 118, where after passing round the end of the train a woman went upon another street and slipped in the dark on a pile of ice. The sale contrary to statute of a pistol to a boy is not the proximate cause of his injury by it. Poland . Earhart, 70 Ia. 285. Contra, Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, without reference to statute, where cartridges were sold, and the boy's brother afterward shot him. The sale of liquor is not the proximate cause of the death of the buyer resulting from a wound received in an attack, when drunk, upon a house some miles from the place of sale. Schmidt . Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195. It is not the proximate result of furnishing liquor to a minor that the clerk of a hotel where the minor boards injures his hand in knocking the latter down for assaulting him. Swinfin v. Lowry, 34 N. W. Rep. 22 (Minn.) See, also, McCandless v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 36 N. W. Rep. 620 (Wis).

site doctrine "would subject to a liability against which no prudence could guard, and to meet which no private fortune would be adequate," than by a strict regard to the logic of cause and effect.'

In Pennsylvania the same conclusion has been reached, and from similar considerations.' But a different view prevails in England and in most of the American States. [*77] The negligent fire is regarded as a unity: it reaches the

1Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210. This decision does not appear to have been entirely satisfactory in New York; at least, the courts in subsequent cases have not been very positive in planting themselves upon it. See Webb v. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420, 427-8; Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200, 206. Coals from an engine on an elevated railroad fell on a horse in the street below. The horse ran and injured a traveller. The latter was allowed to recover from the railroad, distinguishing the Ryan Case and Penn, etc. Co. v. Kerr, 63 Pa. St. 353. Lowery v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 99 N. Y. 158. But where sparks from a mill set fire to another and from the latter the fire spread through several buildings to plaintiff's, he was not allowed to recover from the mill owner. Reiper v. Nichols, 31 Hun, 491.

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 63 Penn. St. 353. We should say that the weight of this case as a precedent was somewhat diminished by Oil Creek, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keighron, 74 Penn. St. 316, and Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 373; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 100. In the last mentioned case, proximate cause is held to be a question for the jury. To the same effect are also the following: Lehigh, etc. R. R. Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St. 122; Lake ʊ. Milliken, 62 Me., 240; Willey v. Belfast, 61 Me. 569; Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Adams v.

Young, 4 N. E. Rep. 599 (Ohio); Green Ridge R. R. Co. v. Brinkman, 64 Md. 52, and see cases ante, p *74, note 2. A train upon a track, over which ten minutes before an engine had safely passed, ran into a land slide and was wrecked. Oil upon the train ignited, ran into a river, then unusually swollen, which flowed by the side of the track and was carried down stream some distance, where it set fire to plaintiff's building. In a suit against the railroad company, held that defendant's negligence in not seeing the land slide and stopping in time was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage; that the consequences could not have been foreseen as likely to flow from the act. Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc. R. R. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293. But where the oil was ignited by a collision, the opposite conclusion has been reached. Kuhn v. Jewett, 32

N. J. Eq. 647. Where one has negligently set his building on fire, if by reason of the wind as a new and independent agency another's house is burnt, the negligence has been held not the proximate cause of the latter's injury. Penn. Co. v. Whitlock, 99 Ind. 16. By a fire negli gently lit adjoining property was set on fire. The injury received by a person in trying to put it out is not the proximate result. Seale v. Gulf, etc. Co., 65 Tex. 274; Hinchey . Manhattan Ry. Co. 49 N. Y. Super. Ct. 406.

last building as a direct and proximate result of the original negligence, just as a rolling stone put in motion down a hill, injuring several persons in succession, inflicts the last injury as a proximate result of the original force as directly as it does the first; though if it had been stopped on the way and started anew by another person, a new cause would thus have intervened back of which any subsequent injury could not have been traced. Proximity of cause has no necessary connection with contiguity of space or nearness in time. The slow match which causes an explosion after much time and at a considerable distance from the ignition, and the libelous letter which is carried from place to place by different hands before publication, produces an injurious result which is as proximate to the cause and as direct a sequence as if in the one case the explosion had been instantaneous, and in the other the author had called his neighbors together and read read to them his libel.'

'See Smith . London, etc., R. R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P., 98; Perley v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Clemens . Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 366; S. C. 14 Am. R. 460; Poeppers v. Miss., etc., Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 715; Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181; Fent v. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ill. 349; 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 13; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Muthersbaugh, 71 Ill. 572; Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. 117; Kellogg v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Wis. 223; Atkinson v. Goodrich, Tr. Co., 60 Wis. 141; Crandall v. Goodrich, Tr. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 75; Hooksett v. Concord R. R., 38 N. H. 242; Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354; S. C. 15 Am. R. 362; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. 299; Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351; Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 57; Small v. Chicago, etc., R.R.Co., 55 Ia. 582; Krippner t. Biebl, 28 Minn. 139, where a fire smouldered for two days in a slough.

In Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co. e. Gantt, 39 Md. 115, 141, BARTOL, Ch. J.. says: "It is contended on the part of the appellant that, for such injury, the company is not liable under the code, because it was the remote, and not the proximate, consequence of the defendant's negligence. In support of this proposition we have been referred to Ryan v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210, and Penn. R. R. Co.. v. Kerr, 62 Penn. 353.

"In those cases it was held that 'where the fire is communicated by the locomotive to the house of A., and thence to the house of B., there can be no recovery by the latter,' and the decisions are based upon the ground that the fire from the locomotive is not the proximate cause of the destruction of B's house; and his injury being only the remote and indirect result of the wrongful act of the defendant, he cannot maintain an action, according to the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur. There is no rule of the law better established or more universally recognized.

*4. A fourth proposition may be stated thus: That if [*78] the damage has resulted directly from concurrent wrong

ful acts or neglects of two persons,

Whether it was correctly applied in the cases above cited, it is not material for us now to consider; because it is obvious that the facts in the present case clearly distinguish it from those.

"It may be proper to observe that the decisions in 15 N. Y. and 62 Penn. are not supported by any English case that we have seen, and are in conflict with several decisions both in England and in this country, which have been eited in argument by the appellee. Among them we may refer to Piggott. Eastern Counties R. Co, 3 M. G. and S. 229; Smith v. L. & S. R. R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 98; Perley v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 418; Hart . Western R. R. Co., 13 Met. 99; Fent . Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ill. 349.

“Without attempting to reconcile the various decisions, which would be a fruitless and unprofitable task, or undertaking to define for all possible cases the exact limits and extent of the liability of railroad companies under our code, for damages by fire occasioned by their engines and carriages, we may safely state the rule to be, that when their liability arises it extends to all the near and natural consequences of their wrongful act, and not to those which are remote, incidental or exceptional.' Law Reg. Sep., No. 1873, p. 560, Judge Redfield's note. The rule is thus stated by Parsons: The defendant is held liable for all those consequences which might have been foreseen and expected as the results of his conduct, but not for those which he could not have foreseen, and was therefore under no moral obligation to take into consideration.' 2 Pars. on Cont. 456.

each of these acts may be

The rule is laid down substantially in the same terms by POLLOCK. C. B., in Rigby . Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240. Other definitions might be cited from Judges and text writers; but this would serve no useful purpose. The rule is one which, from its nature and the class of cases where it applies, is incapable of precise definition. It has been correctly said by MILLER, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, 'If we could deduce from the cases the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain after all to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations.' He adds, 'One of the most valuable criteria furnished us by the authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered as too remote.' Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 52. To apply this criterion to the case before us, it seems too plain for argument that * the injury to the plaintiff's property was the direct consequence of the fire occasioned by the defendant's locomotive. The fact that the fire began on the side of the railroad and spread to the plaintiff's land, cannot in any just sense be said to render the injury suffered by him of a nature merely remote and incidental within the meaning of the rule. The fire consumed his property in its natural and direct course, without any intervening force or power to stand as the cause of the misfortune.' and the injury suffered was therefore its proximate effect.

*

counted on as the wrongful cause, and the parties held re[*79] sponsible, either jointly *or severally, for the injury.' Thus, if two persons wrongfully block up a street, so that

'No case has been cited which sustains the defense here made by the appellant. In Woodruff's Case, 4 Md. 212, the fire happened in the same way, and neither court nor counsel thought of applying the rule of causa remota. So in B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 19, the fire originated in the same way, and it was not pretended that the injury to the plaintiff was not a proximate consequence of the defendant's negligence. The language of the court (p. 24) would seem conclusive of the question, as it is here presented.

We may refer also

to Field v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 339, where the question was ruled in the same way by the same court which subsequently decided Ryan v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210." See, also, Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494. An ordinary wind is not an independent cause. Poeppers v. Miss., etc., Ry. Co, 67 Mo. 715; Krippner v. Biebl, 28 Minn. 139. Nor is the leaving of shavings in a mill yard. Atkinson v. Goodrich Tr. Co., 60 Wis. 141; Crandall v. Goodrich Tr. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 75. Nor the failure of the person damaged to extinguish the fire. Wiley v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 44 N. J. L. 247.

1 Lynch . Nurdin, 1 Q B. 29; Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190; McCahill. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 413; Chapman v. N. H. etc., R. R. Co, 19 N. Y. 341; Colegrove v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Barrett v. Third Av. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush, 300; Lane v Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104; Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93; Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420; S. C. 9 Am.

Rep. 267; Lake . Milliken, 62 Me. 240; S C. 16 Am. Rep. 456. A man entitled to the use of 400 inches of water in a stream was by the action of the several defendants independently deprived of his rights. No one defendant would perhaps by his use of the water have so reduced the amount as to injure the plaintiff. Held, they were jointly liable to him. Hillman

v. Newington, 57 Cal. 56. So where defendant negligently allowed water to run into a cellar into which by another's independent negligence other water ran. From the cellar the water came into plaintiff's cellar to his inju. ry. The defendant was held liable for the whole damage. Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138.

So in cases of injury to passengers of one carrier by collision with cars or vessel of another where both are at fault, each is liable. Kellow . Centr. Ia. Ry. Co., 68 Ia. 470. Pittsburgh etc., Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind.186; Tompkins v. Clay St. R. R. Co., 66 Cal. 164; Wabash, etc., Co. v. Shacklett, 105 Ill. 364; Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596. So where the injury arises from a defective joint station platform, Wabash, etc., Co. v. Wolff, 13 Ill. App. 437. So, though as between themselves one carrier was wholly to blame, a joint action has been sustained. Cooper v. Eastern Tr. Co., 75 N. Y. 116.

Servants of a railroad company needlessly and negligently placed signal torpedoes on the track where the public had been accustomed to pass. A lad picked one up and carried it away and in playing with it exploded it to the injury of plaintiff. Following Lynch . Nurdin and citing many cases, the court held that

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