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first and last, a Republican, and the few negro Democrats scattered here and there are the exceptions who prove the rule. This being the case, it seems more in keeping with President Roosevelt's character to believe that his stand toward the negro is due to his instinctive desire to treat all deserving men with equal consideration and without regard to the color of their skin, rather than to suspect him of political demagoguery. In the section of the South where the negroes predominate, Mr. Roosevelt has unquestionably become most unpopular; but I know from personal knowledge that in the mountain regions of North Carolina and Tennessee, where the population is almost entirely white, the race question is practically ignored. From a political point of view, all the consideration which Mr. Roosevelt has shown the negro cannot lose a single Republican vote in any locality where the Republicans had any hope of victory, and it may be helpful elsewhere. If he was actuated by political motives, he was wise; but it is certainly more characteristic of him to have been guided in his action by his own sense of fairness and justice. HENRY LITCHFIELD WEST.


In the last number of this review, commenting upon the military operations in the Far East and the crushing defeat administered by the Japanese to the Russians at the crossing of the Yalu and the capture of Kiuliencheng - which resulted in the turning of the Russian position, the precipitate retreat of the Russians, and the loss of forty guns - I compared that battle to the battle of Marathon, as it was the first time in two thousand four hundred years that Asiatics in equal numbers and under equal circumstances had met Europeans face to face on the field of battle, and the Europeans had gone down to defeat before them. That battle, I pointed out, definitely fixed the status of Japan as one of the great Powers of the world; it established her position as a nation advanced in military arts a nation scientific, resolute, courageous; it clearly demonstrated that the Japanese had learned all that was to be learned from contact with white civilization, and were a mighty race to be feared and respected.

The belief then entertained that Japan would continue her triumphant march has been justified. In the history of the world nothing more marvellous has been witnessed than the steadily advancing progress of Japan and the continued disasters that have overtaken Russian arms on both land and sea. Whatever small victory the Russians have gained has been the result of accident and not of skill. The Russian soldiers have fought well; they have fought with a courage and tenacity that has aroused the admiration of every observer, including their generous foe. But in civilized warfare mere bravery no longer counts, and sheer animal strength is of all qualities the least important. Qualities rarer than these are needed to lead an army to victory on a modern battlefield.

In the closing days of August and the opening days of September, the world watched the titanic struggle for the possession of Liaoyang, which, after ten days of perhaps as desperate fighting as modern history knows, culminated in the capture of that important stronghold by Field Marshal Oyama, and the retreat on Mukden, amounting almost to a rout,

of General Kuropatkin, who was compelled to put the torch to vast quantities of military stores to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, and to leave behind many guns. That battle, called for the sake of convenience the battle of Liaoyang, although its terrain began twenty miles or more to the east of the city and ended approximately the same distance to the north, and although it was in reality a series of battles with the purpose of compelling General Kuropatkin either to fight or to flee, the battle which history will perhaps record as one of the bloodiest since the time when accurate records were kept of battle's harvest of death, has again proved that against the Japanese the Russian is powerless.

In nothing that goes to make a soldier is the Japanese deficient. Persistence, physical endurance, capacity to withstand severe punishment without destruction to his morale, blind confidence in and obedience to his superior officer, utter fearlessness, great intelligence, ability to live on a smaller quantity of, and more simple, food than any other soldier, and less subjection to the illness inseparable from the hardships of a campaign these are the qualities that have won for the Japanese private the admiration and envy of every military observer. The Japanese officer has shown equal military capacity. Both in strategy and in tactics he has proved himself superior to his foe. The campaign in Manchuria has been largely a campaign of strategy, and on every occasion the Japanese commanders have demonstrated their greater ability in this respect. Whenever the two armies have met, the Russians have either permitted themselves to be outflanked, or, by neglecting to occupy proper positions, they have given their adversaries a point d'appui which the latter have always quickly seized. Liaoyang fittingly comes after the Yalu, Angtun, Nanshan, Telissu, Tashikiao, and Yushulintzu. All tell the same story of superior Japanese strategy and superior Japanese fighting power.

Liaoyang is the most disastrous blow to Russian military pride since the Alma, to which it bears enough general resemblance to serve as a portent. At the Alma, Prince Mentchikoff selected the southern bank of the river to receive the attack of the enemy. At Liaoyang, General Kuropatkin was on the southern bank of the Taitse, which flows north of the city. Here Kuropatkin elected to do battle; here he believed the tide of battle that had run against him without check from the first day of the war would be turned. Nor was he unwarranted in so believing. After that astounding series of disasters, when with glacier-like pressure the Japanese drove their foe always to the north and it became obvious that Kuropatkin must at last attempt a stand, the ablest Russian mili

tary engineer had for months been at work fortifying Liaoyang and making it, as he believed, impregnable. Its position is excellent for defence and is of great strategic importance. The topography admirably lends itself to defensive operations; and Kuropatkin, behind his outposts of rifle pits and trenches, protected by his bastioned walls and many guns of large calibre, with some 200,000 men fighting under the cover of entrenchments, believed the capture of the city to be impossible, and intended, when the Japanese had broken themselves upon his walls of stone and steel, to rush out and drive the enemy in hopeless confusion to the south. Evidently Kuropatkin thought that for once the Japanese would be unable to outflank him, for the Taitse rolled to his rear.

But that is exactly what Oyama did, and, in so doing, again displayed superb military genius. Whether the frontal attack was merely a feint on a gigantic scale or the real attack, we shall not know until the Japanese general staff writes the official history of the war; but while the issue hung in the balance, Kuroki threw his entire army across the river, which was the beginning of a wide turning movement that left Kuropatkin no alternative except to retreat, as his position, with the armies of Oku and Nodzu on his front and flanks and Kuroki on his rear, was untenable. Kuropatkin managed to extricate himself, and, after fighting a series of rearguard actions, found shelter with his badly demoralized army behind the walls of Mukden.

The impartial historian will do justice to Kuropatkin and to Oyama, to Russia and to Japan, and the verdict of history will be that, although the Russians fought with great desperation and courage, they were outfought by the Japanese and were defeated because the Japanese were their masters in strategy. So far as we can ascertain, the forces were about even. Perhaps the Japanese had 230,000 men to the 200,000 Russians. But the numerical superiority gave the Japanese no preponderating advantage; in fact, the odds were heavily on the side of the Russians fighting behind walls. After Liaoyang one can see no hope for Russia. St. Petersburg in its bitter shame talks of continuing the war next year, and the year after, and the year after that, if necessary. But what can it avail? Given two nations at war, one the superior of the other in military skill and fighting power, and what hope for success can the other have? Its only hope is to make numbers and wealth compensate for inefficiency and a lower fighting capacity. But the disparity in wealth and numbers between Russia and Japan is not so great as it appears on paper. It is true that Russia is large and Japan is small; but we must remember that Japan has a larger population than the United States had during

the Civil War. Japan is not a rich country, but Russia is mortgaged to the roof-tree, and every defeat makes it more difficult for her to raise a new foreign loan.

The war may run into next year, but no longer. Russia cannot stand the drain and the strain. Internally and externally the Russian Empire is being strained as it never was; it is laboring like a huge ship in an angry sea. Every defeat makes Pole and Finn take heart of grace; every Russian bayonet that falls into the hands of Japan is one less Russian bayonet between Poland and her long-cherished dream of freedom. Russia is propped on her bayonets; bayonets stand between her and revolution. Russia no more dare denude the empire of her troops than a hunter who has climbed a tree to escape a savage bear dare cut down the tree because above him is a nest of hornets. It is impossible for Russia to send a million men to Manchuria. I doubt if she will find it advisable to put half that number in the field, in view of the situation at home and the necessity of guarding her European frontiers.

To explain their astounding series of defeats the Russians assert that they have always been outnumbered, and that the Japanese commanders hold life so cheaply that they wantonly sacrifice their men. The first of these assertions is correct, as the Japanese probably, at the present time, have 300,000 troops in Manchuria opposed to not more than 200,000 Russians. But as the Russians have fought behind entrenchments, which the Japanese have been compelled to take at the point of the bayonet, the advantage has not been so entirely on the side of Japan; and even in actual numbers the disparity is not so great as it would appear, as, roughly speaking, almost one third of the total Japanese forces has been engaged in the operations in front of Port Arthur. The impression so industriously fostered by Russia that the Japanese have no regard for life and that their commanders ruthlessly send their men to destruction is not substantiated by facts. An official statement furnished by the Japanese Legation, covering the military operations from March 28 to August 1, shows that the total casualties have been 12,055, which cannot be regarded as excessive in view of the number of men engaged and the desperate nature of their work. This statement does not include the losses before Port Arthur or the naval casualties.

It would be laughable were it not too grim for mirth that Russia, a sprawling colossus whose great bulk all the world has felt and feared, should now cry baby in the face of Japan. For years we have been told that Russia has an army of 1,000,000 men on a peace footing, which can be raised to 3,000,000 in time of war; yet now that she is en

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