The Illinois, White and Cheek. lege (or lien) takes rank immediately after legal costs or expenses. Such preference, no matter how the premium is to be paid, exists only for an amount corresponding to two annual premiums." The law of Portugal, for which the reporter is indebted to the U. S. consular agent at Oporto, is as follows: "The underwriter has a lien on vessels for unpaid premiums of insurance, if the policy, on account of which the premium is due, has not expired." Through the courtesy of Chapman Coleman, esq., second Sec'y of the Legation U. S., at Berlin, the following statement of the German commercial law on the subject has been received. The same was furnished by Baron Judge DIEPENBROICK-GRUTER, President of the Senate of the Kammer Court (the highest tribunal in Prussia.) "The German Commercial Law book (Hendelsgesetzbuch,) article 757, designates under ten heads the persons, who for certain claims, are entitled to the rights of creditors of a vessel (Schiffs-Glaubiger); ¿. e., who have a lien against the vessel as against a third party. (Art. 758.) Assurers, as regards claims, do not belong to the category enumerated; nor is there any other provision of law which gives a lien of the character in question. As against a third party no such claim can therefore be enforced." According to the law of Holland (letter received from D. Eckstein, esq., Consul at Amsterdam,) "there is no Dutch law giving underwriters a lien on vessels for unpaid premiums of insurance." Christian Bors, esq., Consul of Sweden and Norway at New York, writes, "that, according to the laws of Sweden and Norway, underwriters have a lien on vessels for unpaid claims; certain other claims, such as seamen's wages, etc., have, however, preference." From the U. S. Consulate (Henry B. Rydert, esq.,) at Copenhagen, the law of Denmark is ascertained to be: "The underwriter has no more lien for unpaid premium on a vessel than any other person." "The insurer, or the party who insures for another party, is liable for the premium." "The premium is payable immediately on entering or signing an agreement for insurance. If the premium is not paid immediately the underwriter has the option of cancelling the agreement for the time the premium is unpaid, provided the policy has not been handed over with a clause that the same is in force, whether the premium is paid or not." Sec. 285 of the Italian maritime law reads as follows: "Privileged debts on vessels, their tackle, apparel and furniture are the following, (and the same are entitled to the priorities in which they are placed in this section.) * * * * * * * * * 10. Premiums of insurance on a vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture for the last voyage, or on a time policy, and for steamers navigating at stated periods and insured on time policies the premium corresponding to the last six months and the adjustment and contribution of mutual The Illinois, White and Cheek. insurance associations during the previous six months, are liens on vessels as above." The Austrian law follows the French law. "Codice Commercio francese. Artic. 191.-Sono privilegiati í debiti indicati qui appresso secondo l'ordine in cui sono collocati. “(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.) "10. L'ammontare dei premii d'assicurazione fatta sul corpo, chiglia, attrezzi, arredi, e sull' armamento e corredo del bastimento dovuti per l'ultimo viaggio." "The debts which follow are privileged (have a lien) according to the order in which they appear." "10. The amount of the premium of insurance made on the hull, keel, rigging, furniture, apparel, outfit (or armament, armamento) and equipment." The Spanish law, Sec. 598, of the Code of Commerce, reads as follows: "Privileged liens on vessels, in their order, are the following: 1. Debts to the State. 2. Judicial expenses. 3. Tonnage, anchorage and port duties. 4. Expenses of keeping vessel in repair-sanctioned by the competent commercial court. 5. Wages of captain and crew. 6. Debts contracted during the last voyage to meet the exigencies of voyage and crew. 7. Debts for the construction of the vessel. 8. Debts for provisioning vessel. 10. Premiums of insurance. 11. Other liens and debts. * Para gozar de la preferencia que en su respectivo grado se marca á los creditos de que hace mencion el articulo 596, se han de justificar éstos * * en la forma siguente: 1. Los creditos de la Real Hacienda *. 2. Las costas judiciales * *. 3. Los derechos de tonelados, * * 4. Los salarios y gastos de conservacion del buque * * *. 5. Los empenôs y sueldo del capitan y tripulacion * * *. 6. Los deudas contraidos para cubrir las urgencias de la nave durante el ultimo viage * * *. 7. Los creditos procedentes de la construccion 6 venta del buque * *. 8. Los provisiones para el apresto * *. 9. Los prestamos a la gruesa * *. 10. Los prémios de seguros, por las polizas y certificaciones de los corredores que interveniaron en ellos. * * * Though making endeavors in that regard the reporter was not able to procure satisfactory information as to what is the law, on this point, in Russia, Greece or Turkey. THE YOUNG SAM. CIRCUIT COURT-DISTRICT OF MAINE-APRIL TERM, 1857. 1. The party claiming a lien on vessels for materials, under Rev. Sts., ch. 125, sec. 35, must show that the contract under which the materials were furnished, had reference to some particular vessel, for the construction or repair whereof such materials were to be used. The Illinois, White and Cheek. 2. Whether any case can come within this statute, if the particular vessel has not been begun to be built before the sale of the materials, quære. Butler, for the appellant. Shepley, for the claimant. CURTIS, J.-This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court, dismissing a libel filed in that court to assert a lien on a vessel for the price of materials used in its construction. The material facts which I deduce from the proofs are, that in January, 1855, the claimant contracted in writing with one Edmund Merrill, for timber for the keel, shoe, floor timbers, naval timbers, foot-hooks and risers, sufficient for a ship of about 900 tons, and agreed to pay therefor by conveying to Merrill in fee a certain ship-yard and the buildings thereon. To enable himself to perform this contract, Merrill contracted with the libellant for the timber, for the price whereof the lien is claimed. This timber was put on to railroad cars by the libellant, consigned to the claimant at Portland, who obtained a delivery order from the railroad company, and directed the cars to be taken to Westbrook, and there received the timber, and used it in the construction of the vessel in question. It does not appear that when this timber was delivered, this vessel had been begun to be built. The inference from the fact that, among the timber were keel pieces, is, that the vessel was not then begun. There is no evidence that the libellant and claimant ever met at all concerning the timber, save that the libellant was present when the tim ber was unladen, and assisted in unloading that and other timber from the railroad cars. It is not shown by the libellant that when he contracted to sell the timber to Merrill, he relied on any lien on this vessel, nor that he even knew it was intended for any particular vessel. He neither produces his book of accounts to show a charge to any vessel, nor offers any evidence of the terms of the contract between Merrill and himself. He relies solely on the facts that he was once the owner of the timber; that whatever contract he may have made with Merrill, he himself was present when the timber came into the actual possession of the claimant, and that it was used in building the vessel libelled. The local law, (Rev. Sts. ch. 125, sec. 35,) gives to any person who shall furnish materials for or on account of any vessel, building, or standing on the stocks, or under repairs after being launched, a lien for the price of such materials. But the materials must be furnished for or on account of some particular vessel, building or standing on the stocks, or undergoing repairs. It has been repeatedly held in this district, and I concur in the correctness t ) The Illinois, White and Cheek. of the decision, that the parties must have reference to some particular vessel in the construction or repairs whereof the materials are to be used, and upon which the lien is to be created. The Calisto, Davies' R. 29: S. C. on appeal, 1 Story's R. 244; Sewall v. The Hull of a New Ship, Ware's R. 565. I entertain great doubt whether any case can come within this law, if the particular vessel had not been begun to be built before the sale of the materials. But it is not necessary to decide this point, because it is not shown by the libellant that his contract with Merrill had reference to any particular vessel, and I consider the burthen rests on him to prove this. It was urged at the argument, that in case of materials furnished for a foreign vessel, the admiralty law presumes they were furnished on the credit of the vessel. But in such a case it must first appear that there was a particular vessel in the contemplation of the parties whose necessities were to be supplied; and, according to the correct doctrine, as expounded by the Supreme Court at the last term, it must not only appear that the supplies were necessary for the particular vessel, but that it was also necessary that the master should have a credit to obtain them. The liens given by the local law do not depend on the same requirements. But whatever requirements are made by the local law as prerequisites for a lien, must be shown by the libellant to have been complied with, before he can claim a preference over other creditors, or entitle himself to assert an interest in the property of a third person. Whether one who agrees to sell materials for building or repairing a vessel, and who contracts with another for the means to enable him to comply with his agreement, can, thereby, give a lien to a sub-contractor, under this law, it is not necessary in this case to determine. As was suggested in The Keersage, (2 Curtis' R. 421,) the case of a sub-contractor for labor is not necessarily the same as that of a sub-contractor for materials. I mention it here, only to exclude the conclusion that anything is intended to be decided respecting this question. The decree of the District Court is affirmed with costs. Calhoun v. The Memphis & Paducah R. R. Co. P. C. CALHOUN v. THE MEMPHIS & PADUCAH RAILROAD COMPANY. CIRCUIT COURT-WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 1. RAILROADS - ACCRETIONS-MORTGAGES-WHAT ARE INCLUDED. Where a railroad company makes a general mortgage of the railroad this does not pass after-acquired lands, unless they are used in connection with the actual operations of the road as a part thereof. 2. The doctrine of accretions does not extend to such lands. 3. THE RULE AS TO AFTER-ACQUIRED LANDS.-If the intention is to include in the mortgage lands which the company expects to acquire, they should be described with reasonable certainty. They would not pass under a mortgage, where the property is described as “the railroad then constructed and to be constructed, etc., and all other corporate property, real and personal of said railroad company, belonging or appertaining to the said railroad, whether then owned or thereafter to be acquired." The Paducah & Memphis Railroad Co. executed a mortgage, now foreclosed. The foreclosure was had in this cause, and grew out of a mortgage "on all the railroad of said company, as well that part then constructed and completed as the part thereof which should thereafter be constructed and completed; and all and singular the right of way of said company, and the lands, real estate, rails, tracks, bridges, buildings, depots, station houses, shops, warehouses, structures, erections, fixtures and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining, whether then owned and possessed, or thereafter to be acquired by it; and also all the locomotives, engines, tenders, cars, carriages, shop-tools and machinery, and all the franchises, rights and privileges, and all other corporate property, real and personal, of said railroad company, |