between Cabul and Jellalabad runs, and which, therefore, it was necessary to keep open for the purpose of safe intercourse between Cabul and British India. The Eastern Ghilzies were the tribes which occupied this part of Affghanistan, and it was thought advisable on our part to purchase from these the right of traversing the Pass without molestation, rather than be compelled to force it on every occasion at the sword's point, or attempt to keep permanent possession of it. Accordingly, soon after we had seated Shah Soojah on the throne of Cabul, an agreement was entered into with the Ghilzie chiefs whereby it was stipulated, that a certain sum of money should be paid them yearly out of the Cabul treasury, if they would keep the Khoord Cabul Pass open, and offer no molestation to our troops on their passage between Cabul and Jellalabad.

There are various accounts of the cause of the events that fol lowed; but it appears that the whole amount of the money stipulated was not paid to the Ghilzies, whether owing to the financial difficulties of the Cabul treasury, or to some mismanagement on the part of the officer whose duty it was to disburse the money. They naturally felt aggrieved, and immediately rose in arms and closed the Passes. A Kafila valued at 20,000 rupees was seized at Tezeen, and all communication with British India was cut off. It is matter of deep regret that anything like the semblance of bad faith should have occurred in this instance, for British honour was pledged to the payment of the stipulated sum; and it was most unwise to give any occasion of offence to a population already far

too disposed to quarrel with us, whom it regarded as rapacious invaders of the soil. However, it was necessary that the Pass should be forced; and accordingly, early in October, Major-general Sir Robert Sale was sent by General Elphinstone from Cabul with a brigade consisting of companies of the 13th Light Infantry, and the 35th N. I. to clear the Khoord Cabul Pass, and open the communication. On the 12th of October, these troops commenced their entry into the Pass; near the middle of which, in the valley, the main body of the Ghilzies were posted behind a breastwork. As the assailing body, however, approached, the enemy withdrew from behind the breastwork, and occupied the steep and precipitous ridges of the mountains on either side, whence they opened a welldirected fire, and General Sale received a ball above the ancle, which compelled him to leave the field. Lieutenant-colonel Dennie then took the command, and skirmishing being thrown out on both flanks, who pressed gallantly on the enemy, as far as the nature of the ground would admit, while the main column and guns of the British were rapidly moved along the valley, the Ghilzies gradually retired: our troops got possession of the heights, and the southern gorge of the Pass was reached, where the 35th N. I. and guns were established in a deserted fort. The remainder of the troops marched back through the defile to the camp at Boothak, which they had left in the morning. The casualties in this affair were, unfortunately, not few, owing to the advantages possessed by the enemy in annoying our troops by their fire from the ridges. But although the Khoord Cabul Pass was thus cleared, there lay before the force under General Sale a difficult line of country to traverse as far as Gundamuck, consisting of narrow defiles and mountain Passes, with eminences on either side, occupied by an active enemy. It was not, therefore, until the 30th of October that General Sale, and the troops under his command, reached Gundamuck after having fought their whole way during a period of eighteen days.

We do not give details of this march, as the actions were not of sufficient importance to justify us in devoting much space to them; but, after leaving the Khoord Cabul Pass, both in the valley of Tezeen and that of Jugdulluk, severe encounters took place with the enemy, in which we were suecessful in driving them before us from all their positions. In the latter valley the contest was very severe. All the salient points of the hills were in possession of the Ghilzies, who were protected by breastworks; but by throwing out flanking parties, who gallantly won their way up the lofty heights, and dispossessed the enemy of their positions, while the main body advanced up the defile, the Pass was forced. After this, in the words of General Sale's despatch: "Our troops commanded the route to Sookhab, and the enemy seemed to decline any further opposition. The march was resumed, but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, the insurgents again appearing from beyond the most distant ridges renewed the contest with increased numbers, and the most savage fury."

In the same despatch General Sale states, that he is able "to

report with much satisfaction the cheerfulness, steadiness, and perseverance with which the troops have performed every duty required of them; since leaving Cabul, they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tezeen they have been invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, and throwing up intrenchments, and very severe out-post duty; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affairs, with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with juzails, which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery. Though compelled by the effects of my late wound to witness those conflicts with a doolie, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gal lantry of officers and men on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in sealing the tremendous heights above Jugdulluk."

After this, the brigade under the command of General Sale moved on to Jellalabad, which it reached on the 12th of November, after a series of further annoyances from the enemy; without, however, any serious encounter. In the meantime the fearful tragedy, which ended in the total destruction of our Cabul force, had commenced in that city. It may be useful to explain the position of our troops. They were placed in a cantonment, which seems to have been selected in defiance of every maxim of prudence and ordinary caution. It was on the north side of the city, and consisted of a

1

ow rampart and narrow ditch in the form of a parallelogram thrown up along the line of the Kohistan road, 1,000 yards long and 600 broad, with round flanking bastions at each corner, every one of which was commanded by some fort or hill. The "Mission Compound" where the Envoy (Sir William Macnaghten) and his suite resided, was attached to the cantonment on the north side, and surrounded by a single wall. On the eastern side, about a quarter of a mile off, the Cabul river flowed in a direction parallel with the Kohistan road. Between the river and cantonments, about 150 yards from the latter was a wide canal. There was before the outbreak of the insurrection a small camp, occupied by our troops, to the east of the cantonment, and separated from it by the river and the low range of hilly ground called Seeah Sung. Here Brigadier Shelton

manded.

com

General Elphinstone threw a bridge over the river so as to render the communication between the Seeah Sung camp and the cantonment more easy. But the most extraordinary oversight was the allowing the commissariat stores to be placed in an old fort detached from cantonments, and in such a state as to be wholly indefensible. A number of small forts commanded the cantonment in various directions, and on the north-west was the village of Beymaroo (i. e. "husbandless," from a beautiful virgin who was buried there), which lay at the base of some hills completely overlooking the "Mission Compound." The Bala Hissar (or Royal Citadel) is situated at the eastern extremity of the city, and lay to the south-east of the British cantonments. Here

his majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk resided.

On the 2nd of November, 1841, the rebellion burst forth.* The two chief leaders were Ameenoollah and Abdoollah Khan; Mahommed Akbar Khan + had not yet arrived at Cabul. It com. menced by an attack of 200 or 300 men on the dwellings of Sir Alexander Burnes and Captain Johnson (paymaster of the Shah's force), who resided in the city of Cabul. Sir Alexander Burnes thinking at first that it was a mere riot would not allow his guard to fire, but harangued the attacking party from the gallery of his house. The assassins, however, burst in, and murdered him, his brother Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, who were with him. A report of these proceedings having reached the cantonments, and flames being seen to issue from that quarter of the city where Sir Alexander Burnes dwelt, General Elphinstone sent an order to Brigadier Shelton to march forthwith with a body of troops from the Seeah Sung camp to the Bala

* The following extract is taken from a memorandum written by the unfortunate Envoy, Sir William Macnaghten.

"The immediate cause of the outbreak in the capital was a seditious letter addressed by Abdoollah Khan to several chiefs of influence at Cabul, stating, that it was the design of the Envoy to seize and send them all to London! The principal rebels met on the previous night, and relying on the inflammable feelings of the people of Cabul, they pretended that the king had issued an order to put all infidels to death; having previously forged an order from him for our destruction, by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine paper with the

exception of the seal and substituting

Hissar. The rest of the troops in that camp were withdrawn into the cantonment. The forces at this time in cantonments consisted of the following:-The 5th regiment No. I., under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver; a wing of 54th N.1.; five 6-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the Shah's artillery; the Envoy's body guard; H. M. 44th foot; a troop of Skinner's horse, and another of local horse; three companies of the Shah's sappers, a body of the Company's sappers, with 2 horse artillery guns. This force was afterwards increased by the arrival of the 37th N.I. the next day from Khoord Cabul, where they had marched to support General Sale, but had been recalled by General Elphinstone. The number of camp followers, exclusive of women and children, amounted to 12,000.

Our space prevents us from giving details of the long and miserable siege which now took place. The Affghans surrounded the cantonments, and from every available quarter poured in a constant fire. The Commissariat fort was in a few days abandoned by the few troops left in the occupation of it, and all the stores upon the preservation of which the existence of the British forces depended, fell into the hands of the enemy. For some time supplies were obtained from the village of Beymaroo, the proprietor of which was largely bribed by the Envoy, but this was rendered very difficult by the active hostility of the Affghans, who occupied the heights during the day. Various sorties took place at different times, but no advantage was gained over the enemy; and, at last, famine stared the devoted garrison in the face.

On the 26th of November, an

offer was made on the part of the Affghan chiefs to negotiate, and General Elphinstone advised Sir William Macnaghten to accept it. Accordingly, next day, two deputies from the Affghans entered the cantonment, but the terms offered were such that the Envoy could not listen to them; and he stated in a letter to the chiefs, that if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to arms, leaving the result to the God of battles. At length, however, the provisions in camp being almost wholly exhausted, and there being no means of obtaining supplies, the Envoy resolved to try again the effect of a negotiation, and on the 11th of December he went out of cantonments, accompanied by three officers, to meet the insurgent chiefs in the plain towards Seeah Sung. A discussion then took place, and ultimately terms were agreed upon, written out and signed. They consisted of the following: -That the British should evacuate the whole of Affghanistan, including Candahar, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad; that they should be permitted to return unmolested to India, and that supplies should be granted to them on their road thither-certain men of consequence accompanying them as hostages; that means of transport should be furnished to the troops; that Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and every Affghan then detained within our territories should be allowed to return to their own country; that Shah Soojah and his family should have the option of remaining at Cabul, or proceeding with the British troops to Loodianah, in either case receiving from the Affghan government one lac of rupees per annum; that an amnesty should be granted to all who had taken the part of