the 14th of November ridded us of these enemies; and a similar array, brought against us a fort night afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provision and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means in the way of treasure to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, Shah Soojah's sappers, garrison engineer, and Captain Abbot, of the Artillery, a commissary of ordnance. Captain M'Gregor, po litical agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures our dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected, whilst the unremitting and almost incredible la bours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbott made the artillery disposition in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to and encourage our resources, in the way of gun and musket ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to 200 rounds per man. It is to be remarked that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh-Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Jazalchees, under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful

retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabul, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

"On the 9th of January, I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the political and military authorities at Cabul; but, as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this, and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital, and their annihilation in the Ghilzee defiles, by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time, it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments marched to my succour from Hindoostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur. My position was most critical; and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabul, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber; but I resolved at all hazards on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of eastern Affghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our Government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their alle

giance. But their fidelity was unshaken; and their serenity amidst labours and privations, unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Jezalchees, and a few of the Affghan sappers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed Khan. Works had in the meantime been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens, and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth, and twelve feet in width, around the whole of the walls. The place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy, not provided with siege artillery.

"But it pleased Providence, on the 19th February, to remove in an instant this ground of confidence: A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabul gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It

savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

"The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls; but, at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdhar Mahomed Akbar Khan, Burukzye, the assassin of the late Envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabul force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse, on the 21st and 22nd of February, and soon after establishing his head-quarters to the westward two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at a disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of those affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Soojah's 2nd Cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Singh's 5th Light Cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C. B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the

24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot (who was severely wounded), and Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne, on the 30th and 31st of January, and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akhbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattison, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st inst. These successes were crowned by Providence, by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdhar, on the 7th inst."

This last event took place as follows:

On the evening of the 5th of April, information was brought into Jellalabad by spies from the Affghan camp, that the force under General Pollock had been enabled to force the Khyber Pass, and had retreated towards Peshawur; and next morning a feu de joie and salute of artillery were fired by Akbar Khan in honour, as was pretended, of the event. It was also reported that the Affghans were sending additional reinforcements to defend their frontier passes.

General Sale accordingly determined to make an attack upon the Affghan camp, in the hope of relieving himself from blockade, and facilitating the advance of General Pollock to the fortress:

On the morning of the 7th of April, three columns of infantry were formed; the central mustering 500 strong, under BrigadierColonel Dennie; the left of the same strength, under LieutenantColonel Monteath; and the right, amounting to 360 men, under

Captain Havelock. These were to be supported by the fire of some field artillery, and by the small cavalry force which was in Jellalabad.

The account of the attack had better be given in Sir R. Sale's own words:

"The troops issued from the Cabul and Peshawur gates at daylight this morning. So far from the Sirdhar (i. e. Akbar Khan) having made any dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force (not falling short in all of 6,000 men), was formed in order of battle; for the defence of his camp, its right resting on a fort, and its left on the Cabul River; and even the ruined works within 800 yards of the place, recently repaired, were filled with Ghilzie marksmen, evidently prepared for a stout resistance. The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain Havelock, which drove the enemy, in the most satisfactory manner, from the extreme left of his advanced line of works, which it pierced, and proceeded to advance into the plain; whilst the central column directed its efforts against a square fort upon the same base, the defence of which was obstinately maintained. With the deepest regret I have to record, that, whilst nobly leading his regiment to the assault, Colonel Dennie, C. B., of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, received a shot through his body, which shortly after proved fatal. The rear of the work having been finally gained by passing to its left, I gave orders for a combined attack upon the enemy's camp. It was in every way brilliant and successful. The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire upon the Affghan centre;

whilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated his line near the same point; and the third forced back his left from its support on the river, into the stream of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance, by a smart fire of musquetry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened in force the detachments of Foot under Captain Havelock, and by opening on us three guns screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of the Sirdhar; but in a short time they were dislodged from every point of their positions, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman, by about seven, A.M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards; recaptured four guns lost by the Cabul army and Gundamuck forces -the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation among our troops -seized and destroyed a great quantity of materiel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.”

This was indeed an important victory, and reflected the greatest honour upon General Sale and his gallant band. It was, however, purchased at a costly price, by the fall of Brigadier-Colonel Dennie, whose loss was truly described by Sir R. Sale, in his dispatch, as "a public calamity."

After his signal defeat, Akbar Khan retired in the direction of

Cabul, but his troops dropped off from him until he was almost entirely deserted by them. His prisoners, male and female, were confined in separate forts within the valley of Tezeen, and were, upon the whole pretty well treated. Here General Elphinstone died on the 23rd of April. When the junction between the forces of General Pollock and General Sale took place at Jellalabad, the garrison was suffering severely from want of provisions; but plentiful supplies began to pour in from Peshawur.

In the meantime, the monarch whom we had placed on the throne of Cabul, Shah Soojah, had been murdered near his capital. It is by no means certain whether he was or was not implicated in the insurrection which broke out on the 2nd of November; but afterwards, in the month of April of this year, he was persuaded by some of the Sirdhars of the Barukzye family, to order a general levy of troops to be made at Cabul, and to march on Jellalabad. It is not clear what was the object of this -nor what was the real intention of Shah Soojah. He gave, however, great offence to these chieftains, by appointing as commander of the army one whom they disapproved of. Perhaps, there were other causes of disgust; and there is no doubt that Shah Soojah was by no means popular at Cabul. The Barukzye Sirdhars, at any rate, as relations of the deposed king, Dost Mahommed, must have regarded him with dislike. Whatever was the cause, it is certain, that when Shah Soojah was on his way to join the troops he had levied, who were mustered at Seea Sung, not far from Cabul, he was fired upon by fifty Juzdilchees, who

were placed in ambush, and died immediately. His youngest son, Futteh Jung, escaped to the Bala Hissar, and was proclaimed king by one party while the Barukzye Sirdhars formed another party, and opposed him. But the accounts of what really took place at this juncture in Cabul, are by no means clear; and we know little more than the fact that Shah Soojah was murdered, and that great confusion ensued upon his death.

General Pollock remained at Jellalabad upwards of four months, and it was not until the 20th of August that he commenced his march towards Cabul. In the meantime the troops suffered severely from sickness, owing to the heat and general insalubrity of the climate. Dysentery and fever carried off great numbers. There was a want of proper clothing for the men, and their state for a long time is described as one of great discomfort. It was requisite also that a large supply of camels should be procured to carry the camp equipage, and it was found impossible to collect a sufficient number of these animals. The long period of inaction was felt by the troops to be very trying, and the utmost anxiety was felt to march forward on Cabul. The heat was so great, and the want of tents such, that holes were dug in the ground and covered over with flat roofs, and in these officers and soldiers took refuge and lived. Forage also was very scarce, and the cost of it enormous. In the meantime Akbar Khan sent one of his prisoners, Captain Mackenzie, to Jellalabad, to treat for the liberation of those whom he detained. But his proposals were such as could not be entertained. He wished to make our evacuation of Aff.

ghanistan the condition of restoring the prisoners. To this no other answer than a refusal could be given, as, independently of any other consideration, it would have been in the highest degree derogatory to our honour to have purchased the freedom of those who were unjustly detained by abandoning the country where we had recently experienced so signal a disaster. Afterwards, in the month of July, Akbar Khan again sent another British officer with proposals, which were equally abortive. All negotiations, therefore, for the liberation of the British officers and ladies who fell into the hands of Akhbar Khan during the calamitous retreat from Cabul, failed. They were afterwards removed from Tezeen, where they had been originally confined in different forts, to places of security between Cabul and Bameean. The accounts given of their treatment are such as reflect honour upon the Affghan chiefs. An extract from a letter written by one of the captives states, "The Sirdhar's (ie. Akbar Khan's) treatment of us as been, from first to last, most kind: no European power could have treated prisoners of war better." Akbar Khan himself fell back upon Cabul, where for some time he kept Futteh Jung closely besieged in the Bala Hissar. The state of affairs at this time in Cabul was one of anarchy and confusion, and it is difficult to know what was really the position of parties. It appears, however, that Akbar Khan got possession of the Bala Hissar, and allowed Futteh Jung to retain the title of Shah while he acted as his Vizier. But the successful Sirdhar was by no means all-powerful, as much jealousy of him was felt by some powerful Cabul fami