Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the failure of the United States to press the various issues more vigorously was the menace of the European war, and the realization that sooner or later America must become involved in it. When finally this occurred, Carranza's ill-concealed sympathy for the German cause led to increased coolness on the part of President Wilson for a government whose very existence was dependent upon American favor, and whose actions he had previously condoned, even when such a policy exposed him to vigorous criticism from many quarters.

Critical Issues: Domestic difficulties were also thickening around Carranza's head. After the constitutional convention an election was held in which he, as a matter of course, was chosen to the presidency, thus ending the necessity of styling himself, as he had done up to that time, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. The demands created by the war in Europe led to a great revival of Mexican industries in those regions where comparative peace prevailed, and because of this prosperity, Carranza was able in some measure to provide for his pressing financial needs. Taxes and duties were increased and multiplied, so that the public revenue showed a marked increase over anything Mexico had ever known before. The failure to meet interest payments on the national debt also aided the treasury to make a favorable showing.

But Carranza had need of all the funds he could lay hands on. The army, or rather the military chiefs, though unable to restore order, demanded and received most of the government revenue. Carranza's refusal to meet their requests would have led to defection and additional revolutions. The banking system and the currency were so demoralized that no sound financial basis could be reached until their complete reorganization.

Most of the state governments, professedly loyal to the executive, were following their own choice in matters of any moment. In Yucatán, Governor Alvarado had set up an extremely socialistic administration which to all intents and purposes was independent of federal control. In lower California, Governor Cantu collected the revenues, granted concessions, and raised or lowered export duties without thinking it worth while to obtain consent of the central government. Plutarco Calles and de la Huerta in Sonora were nominally somewhat more inclined to submit to federal oversight; but Carranza seldom ventured to impose upon them anything which they opposed. Similar conditions prevailed in almost every other state which made a pretext of supporting the executive.

Nor can it be said that the Carranza government ever attained a hold upon the Mexican people. His promised reforms were not forthcoming. Graft in its most obnoxious forms flourished among federal officials, from the highest to the lowest. Elections

were no more free than under Diaz. Life and property were insecure. The overthrow of the Cientificos had been succeeded by the formation of a new class of overlords, high in political and military office, who were becoming rich by devious ways and at whose hands the common people fared no better than before. As though these grounds of unpopularity were not sufficient, Carranza's own personality failed to inspire any loyalty or enthusiasm in the popular imagination.

So, in spite of the administration's organs to the contrary, the government was never very secure in its position, and with the beginning of 1919 unmistakable signs pointed to its overthrow. Several of Carranza's most faithful supporters in his contest with Huerta and afterwards against the Villa-Zapata faction, began to show open opposition. Governor Alvarado of Yucatán acquired a newspaper in the capital in which Carranza was lampooned and criticised severely. But the most dangerous combination developed in Sonora. Here Alvaro Obregón, a onearmed hero of the revolution whose support had made possible Carranza's success, was the recognized leader of an ambitious, active following known as the Sonora group. This included General Plutarco Eliás Calles, former military governor of the state and later a member of the federal cabinet; Adolfo de la Huerta, civil governor of Sonora; and General Benjamín Hill, a revolutionary officer of much distinction.

More than a year before the time set for the presidential election, numerous aspirants began to lay plans for the coming campaign. Carranza, though not a formal candidate himself, was determined to choose his own successor. For a time, his favor seemed to rest on Pablo González, a general of ability and good reputation who enjoyed a certain popularity with the common people. Carranza's actual choice, however, as it afterwards proved, was Ignacio Bonillas, a diplomat and politician of some shrewdness, who was then ambassador to the United States. His candidacy was especially urged on the ground that he was a non-military man who would deliver the country from the curse of army domination. But the candidate most likely to succeed, unless Carranza could manipulate the election, was General Obregón.

The End: At the beginning of 1920 it was perfectly obvious that Carranza had no intention of permitting the election to take its natural course. On various pretexts obstreperous members of congress, as well as influential supporters of Bonillas' rivals on the outside, were arrested by the president's orders. This led Obregón to threaten a revolution in case Carranza prevented a fair election. The climax came when federal troops were sent to invade Sonora and displace de la Huerta by a new governor named Soriano. About the same time Carranza moved to seize

the chief railway line on the west coast, the Southern Pacific of Mexico, because of a threatened strike of the employees.

In both instances, the president was forestalled by the Sonora officials. The only feasible gateway to the state was occupied by local troops, making a federal invasion impossible except by bringing soldiers through American territory. The permission required for this could not be secured from Washington, where Carranza's conduct had finally exhausted the patience of an overpatient man.

At the time the governor of Sonora prepared to resist the entrance of Carranza's troops, he also seized the railway, took over the customs house and other government buildings at Agua Prieta on the Arizona border, and secured the consent of the legislature to proclaim the "Republic of Sonora." Independence, however, was to be maintained only so long as the rights of the state were endangered by the federal government.

From this beginning in Sonora, the revolution spread down the west coast with a speed equal to the success of Madero's movement against Diaz. Obregón, escaping in disguise from Mexico City where he was under nominal arrest, organized the movement in the southwest. Chihuahua, never Carranzista except in name, joined the Sonora leaders. In the oil fields Pelaez, as well as many of Carranza's former officers, espoused the new cause with enthusiasm, thus shutting off the export taxes on oil, one of the chief sources of the government's revenue. Pablo González and Obregón also effected a temporary alliance. From the outlying states the movement spread until little more than the capital remained under Carranza's control.

The Liberal Constitutional party, as the revolutionists were now called, at this juncture formally demanded Carranza's resignation and published the Plan of Agua Prieta. Under the terms of this declaration, de la Huerta was created temporary commander of the revolution until the states accepting the movement could elect his successor. When the Plan had been adopted by the army, a provisional president was to be elected. Foreigners were promised protection in their persons, property and legal rights. Assurance was given that the economic development of the country would constitute one of the chief objects of the new régime. Lastly, the emphasis upon representative government was embodied in the phrase, "Effectual suffrage, no reelection."

By May the revolution had grown so strong that Carranza's overthrow was only a matter of a few days. As it was impossible to remain longer in Mexico City, the government prepared to move to Vera Cruz, where a temporary capital was to be established, or, failing this, where refuge might be found on board some foreign vessel. The flight began in twenty-one trains packed with troops, treasure, equipment and officials. But Car

ranza was destined never to reach the desired haven. González had already cut the railroad between Mexico and Vera Cruz, and other revolutionary bands attacked the convoy. Poor management and confusion delayed the expedition at every stage; supposedly loyal garrisons at critical points along the route went over to Obregón.

When it became impossible to travel longer by train, Carranza with a few of his closest followers sought to escape to the Puebla Mountains, but fate had other plans. One night as he slept in a miserable mountain hut, the fleeing president was betrayed and killed. The assassination was hurtful to Obregón's cause and certainly contrary to his repeated orders. It may be safely said that he had no hand in it.

The New Régime: The country, tired beyond description of ten years of revolution and conditions closely bordering upon anarchy, turned with relief to the new administration. De la Huerta served as provisional president from June 1 to November 30. On December 1, Obregón assumed the reins of office. The character and past performances of the new executive did much to recommend him to the outside world, as well as to his own people. He was generally acclaimed the hope of Mexico, and his early public utterances seemed to assure an earnest attempt, at any rate, to solve the domestic problems of his country in rational spirit, and to compose its many difficulties with

other nations.

So far, however, the path of Obregón has not been free from obstacles. The Mexican people, with their lack of education and political training, were not remade by the revolution. Widespread depression, following the stimulus given by the war to Mexican industries, has brought hard times and made the problem of government finance more difficult. National credit has not yet been reestablished in foreign markets; the railroads have not been restored to normal efficiency; the effects of revolution have not been effaced from many aspects of Mexican life. Widespread corruption in public office, so long the accepted feature of Mexican politics, cannot easily be overcome. Promised reforms will be difficult of execution. The combination which placed Obregón in power has already shown signs of disintegration; and it will require both tact and firmness to hold even his own cabinet in line. The provisions of the Querétaro constitution, to which foreign governments objected when the document was framed, still nominally remain in force, and over these and the question of proper safeguards for American property and citizens in Mexico, the United States and Obregón cannot agree. Following the lead of Wilson's administration, President Harding has refused to accord Obregón recognition until these matters are satisfactorily adjusted. The latter, either on grounds

of principle, or because he fears such concessions to the United States would weaken his hold on the Mexican people, has so far refused to comply with the Washington demands. Yet no administration across the border can expect to acquire permanent stability without the formal recognition and moral support of the American government.

It is undoubtedly true that Obregón today commands more confidence than any Mexican leader since 1911. This feeling, however, is not one of unmixed optimism. More than a century and a quarter ago a great English statesman voiced a truth which today represents the attitude of thoughtful men toward the existing government in Mexico and the decade of revolution from which it springs.

"I should, therefore, suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France," wrote Edmund Burke in 1790, "until I was informed how it had been combined with government, with public force, with the discipline and obedience of armies, with the collection of an effective and well distributed revenue, with morality and religion, with solidity and property, with peace and order, with civil and social manners. All these things (in their way) are good things, too; and without them, liberty is not a benefit while it lasts, and is not likely to continue long."

If Obregón's administration can meet these tests, no man since the dawn of Mexican history will have deserved greater honor at the hands of his countrymen. If his government fails in these particulars, it will assuredly not prove "a benefit while it lasts, and is not likely to continue long."

AUTHORITIES

In addition to the general histories of Mexico, both in English and Spanish, the following works will be found especially valuable to American readers for material relating to particular subjects:

Bolton and Marshall, Colonization of North America (Expansion of New Spain).

Bourne, Spain in America (Colonial Institutions and Policy). Chapman, A History of California: the Spanish Period (Contains much relating to the general colonial history of Mexico.

Humboldt, Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain (Indispensable for the period prior to Independence).

Prescott, The Conquest of Mexico (Not altogether reliable, but widely read and extremely fascinating).

Priestley, José Gálvez (Reforms and Institutions under Charles III). Ibid., The Carranza Debâcle (The best account of the Obregón revolution yet published).

Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848 (An authoritative and readable account of international relations).

Trowbridge, Mexico Today and Tomorrow (The best of recent short narrative histories).

Ward, History of Mexico (Excellent for conditions immediately following Independence).