receive attention on appeal.1 It has been held that a bill of exceptions must, and could be, signed by the judge who tries the case, although he has gone to another circuit, or the term of court has expired,3 and even though the judge be a special judge.4 In North Carolina, it was held that if the party seeking a new trial has not been guilty of laches, the supreme court will, ex debito justitiæ, order a new trial if the judge who tried the case has gone out of office without having settled the bill. This accords with the English practice. A similar decision was made in the United States circuit court.7 For a bill of exceptions signed by another than the trial judge, the latter's official term having expired, is a nullity, with or without consent of the parties.8 In Wisconsin, it has been held that the trial judge shall settle the bill even after he has retired from office.9 This, however, is exceptional.10 In Florida, In Florida, the successor may act,11 and the court of that State recognized power in the trial judge to order allowance of time after adjournment for settling a bill of excep was who presided when it was taken. Bullock. Neal, 42 Ark. 278. 1. Myers v. State, 9 Tex. App. 157. A statement of facts agreed to by attorneys, without the signature and approval of the judge, cannot be considered on appeal. There "is no reason why such a statement approved by a judge who did not preside at the trial should have any greater weight." Myers v. State, 9 Tex. App. 159. See also Ohms v. State (Wis.), 10 Cent. Law Jour. 465. See generally BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, vol. 2, p. 221. 2. Ex parte Nelson, 62 Ala. 377; here the same term was still open, being held by another judge. 3. Watkins v. State, 37 Ark. 370; Cowell v. Altchul, 40 Ark. 172. 4. Authorities in preceding note. Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 46. 5. Isler v. Haddock, 72 N. Car. 119; State v. O'Kelly, 88 N. Car. 609, 611. 6. Newton v. Boodle, 54 E. C. L. Rep. 795. 7. U. S. v. Harding, Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 127. 8. Connelley v. Leslie, 28 Mo. App. 551; Cranor. School District, 18 Mo. App. 397. The statute contemplates that the matter of exceptions comes under the personal observation of the trial judge, and that the error is called to his attention at the time and the exception then and there taken. Cranor v. School District of Gentry, 18 Mo. App. 397; Consaul. Liddell, 7 Mo. 250; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Corser, 31 Kan. 705. Compare authorities cited, infra. See generally BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, vol. 2, p. 221. Fraud.-Certificate of case made cannot ordinarily be attached on appeal. State v. Todd, 4 Ohio 351; Shepard 7. Peyton, 12 Kan. 616; State v. Noggle, 13 Wis 380. But in some cases of conspiracy where the judge's certificate is fraudulent, the supreme or appellate court may probably disregard it; if disregarded, it should be so in toto. Missouri etc. R. Co. v. Fort Scott, 15 Kan. 435, 480. Where signature of judge to certificate is obtained fraudulently, see Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Simpson, II Kan. 494. Louisiana.—Where a New Orleans district judge is absent, another district judge of that parish can grant appeal from a judgment rendered by the absent judge. Austen v. Scovill, 34 La. An. 484. California.-Settlement of statement for appeal should be made by a successor who heard and denied motion for new trial, and not by the judge who tried the case. Cummings v. Conlan, 66 Cal. 403, construing California Code Civ. Proc., § 653. 9. Oliver v. Town, 24 Wis. 512; Fellows v. Tait, 14 Wis. 156; Davis v. Menasha Village, 20 Wis. 194; Hale v. Haselton, 21 Wis. 320. 10. RANEY, J., in Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 46, 50. 11. Hays v. McNealy, 16 Fla. 406. Where the judge's sickness disables him, a judge of another circuit, in Florida, has power to act. Florida Code, tion.1 A judge may be empowered by statute to make finding in appeal cases tried before him, though his term of office has ceased.2 3. New Trials. It is the duty of a judge who tries a case to go through with it, and hear a motion for a new trial if made. He cannot refuse to hear such motion, or transfer the case and motion to a colleague.3 In Texas, the successor, in a proper case, can act.4 4. Opinions and Orders.-Orders, decisions, etc., have no dependence upon the accidental place of their preparation or signing, but upon the filing.5 The announcement of opinion need not necessarily be by a judge in commission.6 ch. 373; Bowden . Wilson, 21 Fla. 165. 1. Bacon v. State, 22 Fla..46. 2. Johnson v. Higgins, 53 Conn. 236; Connecticut act 1885, March 31st. Kansas. The Kansas statute authorizes signing and settling of case made by a judge after his term of office has expired, only when such term expired during a time fixed for such settling. The statute must be followed, and if no time is fixed, the judge cannot make and settle a case after his term of office has run out. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Corser, 31 Kan. 705, 707; Taylor v. Mason, 28 Kan. 381. In Thurber v. Ryan, 12 Kan. 453, the judge certified the case made within the time fixed therefor. It was accordingly validly done, although his term of office was at an end. Parties themselves cannot extend time for making case. Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Koons, 26 Kan. 215. Judge pro tem. may settle and sign such a case, though the term at which the case was tried has expired. Missouri etc. R. Co. v. Fort Scott, 15 Kan. 435, 475. And the statute in Kansas enabling judges to sign, etc., after their term has expired is to be applied liberally, and covers the case of a special judge just mentioned. Missouri etc. R. Co. v. Fort Scott, 15 Kan. 435, 476. And where a county was detached to a new district, so that it lost the old judge, the statute was held to apply. Thurber v. Ryan, 12 Kan. 453. 3. Motions for New Trials.-Voullaire v. Voullaire, 45 Mo. 602, holding that an unjust and scurrilous attack upon the judge by the newspapers will not afford him legal reason to send the cause to another judge. 4. Edwards v. James, 7 Tex. 372; citing Gross v. McClaran, 8 Tex. 341; Stewart. Jones, 9 Tex. 469; Mussina v. Moore, 13 Tex. 7. Independently of statute, a judge has no power to allow a motion for a new trial after he has gone out of office. Griffing v. Danbury, 41 Conn. 96. 5. Comstock v. Quicksilver Mining Co. v. Santa Cruz Co. Court, 57 Cal. 625; Early v. Oliver, 63 Ga. 11. ', 6. Reiber v. Boos, 110 Pa. St. 594. Decrees, etc., After Expiration of Term. -A circuit judge, after the expiration of his term of office, filed his decree. He had heard the cause and had written and dated the decree before the expiration of the term, and both he and others were ignorant of the fact that his official term had expired. His term was not until successor chosen. Held, he was a judge de facto and that the decree was a valid decree (SIMPSON, C. J., dissenting). Cromer v. Boinest, 27 S. C. 436. See also Knowles v. Luce, Moore 109; Rex v. Bedford Level, 6 East 356; Gilliam v. Reddick, 4 Ired. (N. Car.) L. 368; Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423; Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; s. c., 20 Am. Rep. 335; Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junction R. & D. Co., I Allen (Mass.) 552; McBee v. Hoke, 2 Spear (S. Car.) 138; Kottman v. Ayer, 3 Strobh. (S. Car.) 552. See infra, this title, DE FACTO JUDGES. But where there is no such mistaken impression as to the term of office not having expired, a decision and order filed by a judge after the expiration of his term of office is unauthorized, and will not support a judgment. Cain v. Libby, 32 Minn. 491. It is not enough that he had arrived at a conclusion before his term expired. Kissam v. Hamilton, 20 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 369; Ayrault . Sackett, 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 461; Putnam v. Crombie, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 232. 1 The legislature cannot invade the true and proper province of the courts and control the judges therein. Courts have held that the legislature cannot require judges to put their opinions in writing, or to give their opinion to either or both houses in matters not in that respect provided for by the constitution,2 or to syllabize their opinions for the official reports.3 Some courts, however, have complied with legislation of this sort.1 Of course a federal judge is not bound by State law requiring written opinions.5 5. Adjournment of Court.-A judge may adjourn his court from day to day for rest, refreshment, etc.6 Order to adjourn may be by telegraph. After the officers of court have lawfully adjourned the same till next term, the judge cannot appear and hold court.s 6. Powers During Vacation. It is a fundamental principle that courts can exercise judicial functions only at such times and places as are fixed by law, and that the judges of courts can enter no orders in vacation except such as are expressly authorized by statute.9 It has been intimated that unless legislation authorizes In Carli v. Rhener, 27 Minn. 292, the judge filed his decision in writing the same hour but after his successor qualified, and in ignorance of the latter fact, and while he was still in possession performing the duties of office. He was held to be an officer de facto, and his acts valid. And where a judge continues to hold court as judge after his term has expired, it was held that his conduct could not be questioned in that case, as he was at least an officer de facto. State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 538. Motion to set aside the judgment is the proper remedy. Cain v. Libby, 32 Minn. 491; Grant v. Vandercook, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 165, 175. 1. Speight . People, 87 Ill. 595; Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570. In Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 25, Mr. JUSTICE FIELD, speaking for the court, said: "If the power of the legislature to prescribe the mode and manner in which the judiciary shall discharge their official duties be once recognized, there will be no limit to the dependence of the latter. ... No such power can exist in the legislative department or be sanctioned by any court which has the least respect for its own dignity and independence." Approved in Vaughn v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160. See Coke's Rep., part 3, pref. 55. 3. Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83. See also Griffin v. State, 119 Ind. 520. Reasons for opinions are sufficiently stated under act requiring them, if those essential to full disposition are given, though some points presented are not introduced. Lake Shore etc. R. Co. v. Cincinnati etc. R. Co., 116 Ind. 578. 4. See Respublica 7. Doan, i Dall. (Pa.) 89; Com. v. Addison, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 225; Case of Spring Garden Street, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 192. 5. Martindale v. Waas, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 108. Federal Judge and State Laws.Georgia Code, § 3248, prohibiting trial judge from expressing opinion on the facts in evidence, is not regarded in the federal courts. Hathaway v. East Tenn. etc. R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 489; Vicksburgh etc. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545; Nudd 7. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426. 6. WHITE, P. J., Powers v. State, 23 Tex. App. 42, citing Barrett v. State, I Wis. 175; People v. Central City Bank, 53 Barb. (N. Ý.) 412; Tuttle v. People, 36 N. Y. 431. In the case of Revel v. State, 26 Ga. 275, it was held that it was competent for the judge to adjourn his court over to a future day or week, as he might see fit. 7. A telegram to clerk is a "written order" sufficient to comply with statute. State v. Holmes, 56 Iowa 588; s. c., 41 Am. Rep. 121. 8. Garza v. State, 12 Tex. App. 261. 9. Judge's Powers in Vacation.-Blair the same, consent or agreement cannot support proceedings or decrees in vacation.1 Consent cannot be given by infants, and decrees have frequently been made saving their rights. Virginia legislation has given decrees made in vacation a quasi-validity even as to infants, and after six months from obtaining his majority, such youthful party cannot open a decree entered in vacation.2 7. Powers at Chambers.-The term "chambers" has been thus defined: "The office or private rooms of a judge, where parties are heard, and orders made, in matters not requiring to be brought before the full court, and where costs are taxed, judgments signed, and similar business transacted."3 Jurisdiction at chambers is incidental to, and grows out of, the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is the power to hear and determine, out of court, such questions arising between the parties to a controversy as might well be determined by the court itself, but which the legislature or the usage of courts has seen fit to 7. Reading, 99 Ill. 600; Tyson . Glaize, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 800; Northwestern etc. Ins. Co. v. Wilcoxon, 64 Ga. 556. A judge has no power in vacation to discharge a garnishee from a judgment in the absence of agreement. Laughlin v. Peckham, 66 Iowa 121. To appoint a receiver in Illinois. Hammock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 105 U. S. 77, 83. But the Nebraska code allows a district judge to confirm a sale in vacation. McMurtry v. Tuttle, 13 Neb. 232. Application for remedial writs may be made in Louisiana to a judge thereof when the supreme court is not in session. State v. Judges, 35 La. An. 1075. Judgment of nonsuit may be granted out of term time in North Carolina. Bynum v. Powe, 97 N. Car. 374. Compare as to taxing costs, State v. Ray, 97 N. Car. 510. 1. Powers in Vacation by Consent. Tyson v. Glaize, 33 Gratt. (Va.) Soo; Hardin v. Ray, 89 N. Car. 364. See also Bynum v. Powe, 97 N. Car. 374 Consent to judgment out of term time should always appear certain, in writing, signed by the parties or their counsel, or the judge should recite the fact in the judgment or order. Bynum v. Powe, 97 N. Car. 374, citing other North Carolina cases. An agreement for a hearing in vacation is voluntary and cannot bind except so far as executed with the parties' consent and in strict accordance with the terms of the agreement. The judge is powerless to enter any order in vacation changing the status, and such power cannot be conferred by mere agreement. Agreement does not authorize consideration of application to dismiss as to a particular defendant, nor to require answer to cross-bill, nor to make order for a decree pro confesso for want of a further answer. Blair v. Reading, 99 Ill. 600. Authority to dissolve injunctions in vacation authorizes circuit judges to dissolve the same in a county of his circuit other than that where the cause is pending, reasonable notice being given. Hayzlett . McMillan, 11 W. Va. 464; Horn 7. Perry, 11 W. Va. 694. "Vacation" refers to the court of the county of the cause. Hayzlett v. McMillan, 11 W. Va. 464. Change of Members of Court.- Where it was agreed that a case might be decided in vacation, it was held that a new judge, added after the agreement, and to whose circuit the county of the suit was added, and to whom the other judge sent the cause, could decide. Manning v. Mathews, 66 Iowa 675, following Hall v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 65 Iowa 713. 2. Until six months afterwards, the infant can take proceedings to set the same aside as having been rendered in vacation, if he can show prejudice. But ordinarily the matter of entry in vacation is of convenience merely, and not of substance; and where no prejudice to the infant appeared, but benefit, the court refused his petition to set aside a decree so entered. Morriss v. Virginia Ins. Co. (Va.), 8 S. E. Rep. 383. 3. Burrill's L. Dict.; Pitts. Ft. W. entrust to the judgment of a single judge, out of court, without requiring them to be brought before the court in actual session. It follows that the jurisdiction of a judge at chambers cannot go beyond the jurisdiction of the court to which he belongs, or extend to matters with which his court can have nothing to do.1 Jury trials must be open in the presence of the parties. When the court is adjourned, the judge carries no power with him, and has no more authority over the jury than any other person. Any direction from him to them, either verbal or written, is improper.2 & Chicago R. Co. v. Hurd, 17 Ohio St. 146. 1. Pitts. Ft. W. & Chicago R. Co. v. Hurd, 17 Ohio St. 146; Whoreath v. Ellis, 65 Wis. 639. Powers of Judges at Chambers.-The origin and English practice in proceedings before judges at chambers are explained in Chitty's Gen. Practice 19, et seq. See also Bagley's Chamber Practice 47-55. By long established usage at common law, and independently of any legislative authority, each of the judges of the king's bench, common pleas, and exchequer, exercised at his chambers a very extensive jurisdiction. It would, says Mr. Chitty, be difficult, if not impracticable, to trace the inception of this practice. Probably it originated either in the overflow of the business of the full court in term, or the expediency of certain matters; probably much of course, though sometimes obstinately disputed by the parties, being decided upon or transacted before a single judge, as well to avoid the expense of formal rules as to save the time of the court, and, in vacation, to protect the process of the court from abuse. Chitty Gen. Pr. 19. or The jurisdiction is very extensive over certain minor and practical proceedings, especially irregularities that arise in conducting an action defence, in term or in vacation. By abuse of process, or irregularities, as by illegal arrest, or execution under irregular or insufficient proceedings, a party might, but for this power at chambers, continue in imprisonment, or have his goods irretrievably sold under an execution, sometimes without any redress, or at least so that they would not otherwise be redeemable until the next term. Chitty Gen. Pr. 19. In the United States, the powers of judges at chambers are more or less regulated by statute or rules of court. In South Carolina, under a provision of the code (§ 402) providing that "motions may be made to a judge or justice out of court, except for a new trial on the merits," it was held that he might hear and determine a motion to vacate a warrant of seizure issued by the clerk of court to enforce an agricultural lien. Segler v. Coward, 24 S. Car. 119; or to amend a complaint, under statutory authority to make interlocutory orders and to direct "other proceedings whatever" preparatory to hearing. Ellen v. Ellen, 26 S. Car. 99. See also Edwards v. Edwards, 14 S. Car. II. Perjury at Chambers.-Under Massachusetts superior court, rule 48, allowing motions for new trial to be made at chambers, it was held that an averment in an indictment for perjury for false swearing on the hearing of such a motion "at his chambers" was satisfied by proof that the hearing took place in an apartment appropriated to the use of the court for the transaction of business not requiring the presence of a jury. "We must suppose," said the court, "that the motion in this case was so heard, and not at the private lodgings of the judge." Minutes of court in Louisiana may be corrected by the judge at chambers, to make them conform to truth, on giving due notice to parties. Picard v. Prival, 35 La. An. 370; State v. Folke, 2 La. An. 744; State v. Revells, 31 La. An. 387. See 1 Chitty's Crim. Plead. 335, 336; 4 East 173. Official vested with powers of the judge at chambers does not himself become disabled because the judge is disqualified in a cause. A circuit court "Commissioner in Michigan" may therefore order change of venue for the disqualification of the judge. Whipple v. Judge of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 342. 2. Sargent v. Roberts, I Pick. (Mass.) 337; Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 37, 47. |