not to be held to confine the benefits of the statute to a service which has been noncontinuous. The expression is satisfied by considering it as an extension of the benefits of the statute to interrupted noncontinuous service, and by crediting the officer with the actual time of such service, as if it had been continuous service. Otherwise the statute cannot be carried out. It says that "all officers of the navy shall be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer army or navy or both;" and the benefits of such actual service are to be received where the service has been continuous in the regular navy. United States v. Mullan, 8 Supreme Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 79.

Last Examination.-In an action of debt brought against the marshal of the Marshalsea prison for the escape of one while committed to his custody in execution, on the ground that he had brought White before the commissioners in bankruptcy for examination under the act of 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, § 13, it appeared that White did not pass his last examination at that time, but 'after attending the commissioners, he was carried back to prison by the defendant, and continued in custody from that time on, except when he was carried before the examiners for further examination under warrant at various times, until he passed his last examination. It was contended that the commissioners in bankruptcy had no authority to bring the bankrupt before them, except when he was in custody at the time of his last examination, and consequently the fact of his being out of the rules of the prison at an earlier date, constituted an escape, for which the defendant was liable. The court held that there was no escape, and gave judgment for the defendant, ABBOTT, C. J., saying: "The question in this case depends entirely on the construction of the 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, § 13. That section recites that great inconveniences had arisen from the necessity which then existed of the attendance of commissioners of bankrupt in prison to take the examination of bankrupts charged in executions; and then it enacts, 'that every bankrupt, being in custody at the time of his last examination, although charged in execution, shall be brought before the commissioners, to be examined by them, in the same manner as is now practiced with respect to bankrupts in custody on mesne process.' Now, this is a reme

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dial law, and ought to be so construed as to extend to the whole mischief intended to be remedied. If we were to hold the words last examination to mean only the last day or time of examination, a great proportion of the mischief recited in the statute would not be remedied. For, it is obvious that the examination of the bankrupt must frequently continue for several days, and it may be impossible, in many instances, for the commissioners to know beforehand what may be the last day of examination. Supposing the bankrupt not to be in custody, it is clear the commissioners might bring him before them as often as they thought necessary for the purposes of examination, and there can be no reason why they should not do so where the bankrupt is in custody in executions. Geo. II, ch. 30, § 6, it is enacted: That in case the bankrupt is in execution, the commissioners are to attend him in prison, and to take his discovery as in other cases, and the assignees are empowered to appoint persons to attend the bankrupt, being in custody as aforesaid, and to produce to him his books, in order to prepare his last discovery and examination, a copy of which the bankrupt is to deliver to the assignees ten days at least before such last examination. It is quite clear that in this statute the word examination, being coupled with with the word discovery, means that discovery and examination which may become final by a full and satisfactory discovery and disclosure of his estate. The words last examination seem to have been copied from this statute into the 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, § 3, and these provisions being in pari materia ought to receive a similar construction. I am, therefore, of opinion that the words last examination mean that examination made from time to time, which is ultimately to be the final discovery of the bankrupt's estate and effects. That being so, the commissioners in this case were authorized to have the bankrupt brought before them on the occasion in question." Spence v'. Jones, 5 Barn. & Ald. 705.

Last Past. Where a date is stated and this is followed by a date in the same month which is described as of the said month last past, this latter date will be held to be in the same year as the antecedent date, not in the previous year, the words last past referring to the day of the month, and not to the month. The King v. Crisp. 7 East 389.

Thus of a lease, in a declaration of ejectment, is stated to have been made on July 7th, 1825, to hold from "the 6th day of July then last past," it will be construed to mean July 6th, 1825, and not July 6th, 1824, when the earlier date is prior to the accrual of the title of the plaintiff's lessor; for where the words may be rendered in either way that construction which renders the demise useful to to the action will be adopted rather than that which would destroy it. Doe v. Vanness, 5 Halst. (N. J.) 102.

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So where arbitration bonds were executed August 21st, 1813, and the award was dated August 23d, 1813, reciting bonds dated "the 21st of August last past," in an action of debt upon the arbitration bonds, it was pleaded "no award," the award was objected to, as not pursuing the authority conferred by the bonds. Upon this point the court decided against the defendant, SUTHERLAND, J.. saying: "The objection taken to the award below was, that it bore date the 23d August, 1813, and purported to be made by virtue of a bond of submission, which bore date "August 21st, now last past," whereas the bond declared on and produced in evidence bore date August 21st, 1813, being August instant instead of past. bitrators also awarded general releases between the parties, from the beginning of the world until the "21st day of August last past, being the day of the date of the arbitration bond," thus showing that the award was made under a bond of submission of August 21st, 1812, whereas the bond declared dated August 21st, 1813; and consequently no authority was shown to make the award. The strict grammatThe strict grammatical construction of the award is. perhaps, as contended for by the plaintiff in error. But the intention of the arbitrators is perfectly clear. They run into a mere inaccuracy of expression. To avoid such an expression we may, without any great violence, suppose that the words last past were intended by the arbitrators to refer to the day and not to the month. Vid. Dy. 376 c; Ord on Usury, 61 n, Cro. Jac. 646. These awards are frequently made and drawn up by illiterate men, and it will not do to test them by the strict rules of grammar. If there had, in truth, If there had, in truth, been another bond of submission in 1812, it was competent for the defendant to show it." Brown v. Hankerson, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 70.

was

Last Legal Settlement.-This expression was construed under the New York poor laws upon the question as to the settlement of a bastard, when it was decided that the last legal settlement of the bastard's mother, howeverobtained by her, and whether before or after the bastard's birth, was the settlement of the bastard. This case arose on a question between the overseers of the poor of Canajoharie and those of Johnstown. It appeared that the pauper was a bastard, about 14 years old. At the time of his birth the mother was about 16 years of age and lived with her father in Johnstown, where he had a legal settlement. When the child was a year old the mother's father removed with his family, including the mother and child, to Canajoharie. where he acquired a legal settlement; and the mother and her child continued to live with him. It was contended that the time of birth fixed the settlement of the child, but the court held that the common law rule was altered by the statute, saying: "The town of Canajoharie was the place of the last legal settlement of the pauper's mother. The pauper was an illegitimate child. At common law, a bastard child was settled where it was born; but our statute (1 N. R. L. 280, Sess. 36, ch. 78, § 3) has altered the common law and declares, that every bastard child shall be deemed and adjudged to be settled in the city or town of the last legal settlement of the mother.' It is, however, urged that the statute contemplates a settlement acquired by the mother; and not one that is derivative, or in consequence of the acquisition of a new settle-ment through the father of the pauper's mother as in this case. mother as in this case. We are not at liberty to proceed on such an ingenious distinction; the language of the statute is clear and precise, that the last legal settlement of the mother, however acquired, is that of her illegitimate child. The very expression last legal settlement supposes that the settlement of the mother might be changed.' The Overseers of the Poor of Canajoharie v. The Overseers of the Poor of Johnstown, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 41; See also DOMICIL, vol. 5, p. 866.

Last Sickness. -See NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. This phrase, as used in the Pennsylvania act of February 24th.1834. in regard to preferred claims, has been held to refer only to the illness of which the patient dies. Consequently where a person received a severe injury.,

and called in a physician to attend him, but partially recovered, so as to be able to attend to his business, the physician's bill was held not to be a preferred claim, although the patient subsequently became ill again from the same injury and died. During the latter part of his illness he had a different doctor. In re Reese's estate, 2 Pearson (Pa.) 482.

Even where death results, if the illness be a lingering one, the phrase last sickness will not be extended to the whole of it, so as to make the medical attendance therefor a preferred claim. It will include the services of the physician only after the patient is virtually prostrated, and the services constantly necessary. Duckett's Estate, I Luzerne Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 227. Compare these decisions with that in Rouse . Morris, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 328 (1828), under the prior act of 1794 upon the same subject. In Maine, on the other hand, under a similar statute, it has been held that the sickness which is terminated by the death of a patient, is his last sickness, and the physician attending him therefor is entitled to be paid as a preferred creditor, no matter how long its duration. Huse v. Brown Exr., 8 Me. 167.

tors interested in sustaining the administration, contended for its validity, counsel saying: "But it is urged that the petition of the public administrator did not state facts sufficient to give the probate court jurisdiction. The essential jurisdictional facts are, first, the death; second, the intestacy; third, the residence of the deceased at the time of his death or immediately previous thereto. . . . All of these are stated. But it seems to be supposed that the residence of Beckett is not sufficiently alleged under the expression 'James Beckett, late a resident of this state and county, etc.' Webster defines late, among other definitions, as meaning 'last' or 'recently in any place or office.' It is a legal term, in fact, and is as such in the superlative degree and means last. In ancient times, when the addition of a man's residence was necessary in an indictment for a crime, the term 'late' was always used as descriptive of his last residence, and was held a sufficient allegation of his residence in the most technical terms of the common law." This was confirmed by the court, BURNETT J. saying: "The jurisdictional facts in this case were the death and residence of the deceased. words of the statute are that 'administration shall be granted, first, in the county of which the deceased was a resident at or immediately previous to his death, in whatever place his death may have happened, etc. The meaning of this provision is, that administration must be granted in the county of which the deceased was a resident at the time of his death; and the words or immediately previous to' must be considered as mere surplusage. A man cannot reside at two places at the same time, and unless the intention was to allow two administrations to be granted, the statute must receive the construction given. The public administrator, in his petition, described the deceased as 'late a resident of San Francisco county,' and it was objected that this was not sufficient, as it did not follow the words of the statute. But this objection would not seem to be fatal. There is no provision of the statute requiring the very words of the law to be used, as no precise form of petition is given. In such cases, though always safe to follow the words of the statute literally, it

1. In California, under the statutes of 1851, p. 448, making it the duty of the public administrator to take charge of the estate of any stranger, or person without known heirs, dying intestate, and to account for the same subject to the control of the probate court, and further authorizing the court to make him special administrator, and to direct him to take charge of the estate, it appeared, in the case of the estate of one James Beckett, that the public administrator filed his petition for letters of administration, which stated that the said Beckett, late a resident of the state and county, died etc., and asked that he be appointed a special administrator. This petition was granted, and subsequently the widow and heir of the said Beckett intervened on the ground that the words of the statute had not been complied with, which are that adminfstration must be granted in the county of which the deceased was a resident at or immediately previous to his death, etc., and therefore the probate court never had jurisdiction, and grant of administration was void. Certain credi

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used in the sense of "6 dead." 1

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is not absolutely necessary, but equivalent words will answer. And from the authorities cited by defendant's counsel, the term 'late' would seem to be full as strong as the words of the statute. the connection in which it is found, the evident meaning is that the deceased was 'last' a resident of San Francisco county." Beckett . Selover, 7 Cal. 215, 226, 233; see also 1 Chit. Cr. L. 209; Stark Cr. Pl. 65; King v. Yandell, Term 521, 541.

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A rule was obtained upon the plaintiff to show cause why the bail bond should not be delivered up to be cancelled on the defendant's entering a common appearance, which was founded upon an objection to the affidavit for holding the defendant to bail, wherein the plaintiff described himself as "late in the counter prison of Giltspur street in the city of London." And it now appeared upon affidavit that the plaintiff, for some time prior to the 28th of January last, was a prisoner there, but had been discharged on that day, and having no particular place of residence in town was by the courtesy of the jailor permitted to lodge at night in the prison, and had done so up to the 31st, on which day the affidavit in question was made. It was thereupon objected that "late of the counter prison" was not a proper addition of the place of residence of the deponent as required in every affidavit by the rule of court of M., 15 Car. 2, by which it is ordered that the true place of abode and the true addition of every person who shall make affidavit in court here shall be inserted in such affidavit. It was contended that the deponent stating himself to be late of such a place was not a compliance with the rule which required him to state his place of abode at the time of making the affidavit, for the word late might be used at any time after the party has changed his abode to avoid being traced. The court, however, thought the description applied well enough to the peculiar situation of the deponent at the time, he having then recently been discharged out of the custody of the keeper of the prison, and therefore having ceased to be a prisoner, though by permission of the keeper, he had up to the day of making the affidavit lodged at night within the

prison, and had acquired no other determined place of residence, there appearing to be no intention to mislead. But LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., observed that when a party had left one residence and resided in another at the time of making the affidavit, his describing himself as late of the place where he had ceased to reside would be considered as an evasion, and would not satisfy the rule. The rule to show cause was, therefore, discharged. Sedley v. White, 11 East 528.

Where a bequest was made in a will, "to the children of R. II., late of Norwich, and now of London," it was objected to as a mistake, R. H. having left Norwich at the age of fourteen or sixteen, and died in in London several years before the will, while G. II., formerly of Norwich, resided in London at the testator's death. The court refused to reform the will and give the legacy to the children of G. H., Sir WILLIAM GRANT, M. R., saying: "First, as to the description, 'late of Norwich,' not answering to Robert, who had not resided there for many years, every one knows the sense of late" is, not recently, but formerly, of Norwich. Then, as to the circumstances, that he was not living at the date of the will; he was at a distance; and the testator might not have known of his death, or might have forgotten it." Holmes v. Custance, 12 Ves. 279.

1. A slave was indicted for murder and the indictment charged him to be a slave, "the property of the late William Copeland." It was moved in arrest of judgment that the ownership of the accused was not sufficiently alleged.

The court reversed the judgment, DARGAN, C. J., saying: "It is necessary to prove the ownership of a slave when indicted for a capital offence, and being necessary to prove it, of course the ownership must be alleged, if the owner is known to the jurors. Is the ownership of the accused sufficiently averred? averred? The allegation is that Pleasant, a slave, the property of the late William Copeland.' In the sense in which the adjective late is here used, it means existing long ago, but now departed this life. This is the meaning all would give it, and no doubt is the meaning intended to be attached to it by the pleader. The accused is there