cution sale, the right of creditors to redeem from the purchaser at the sale, or of one creditor to redeem from another who had previously redeemed from the purchaser, cannot be cut off by a sale of the land by the judgment debtor. McClean v. Harris, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 510. 1. Herman on Executions 437, §

264.

The right of redemption, given by statute to judgment creditors, cannot be extended by a court of equity to creditors by simple contract only, although their debts are ascertained and adjudged by the decree. Seals v. Pheiffer, 77 Ala. 278. See also Woods 7.McGavock, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 133; Hopkins 7. Webb, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 519.

The assignee of a judgment creditor is said to be a judgment creditor, in contemplation of law. Sweezey v. Chandler, 11 Ill. 445; Stein v. Chambless, 18 Iowa 474.

2. Couthway v. Berghaus, 25 Ala. 393. See also Julian v. Beal, 26 Ind. 220; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365; s. c., 70 Am. Dec. 655.

Who May Redeem in Particular Cases. -The vendee of an execution defendant, whose lands are sold at execution sale, may redeem the lands to which he holds title from such sale, although the judgment defendant may have appealed the case. Thayer v. Coldren, 57 Iowa

I 10.

In the same State it is held that where the plaintiffs and others obtained a decree subjecting certain premises to the payment of their judgments in the order of their priority, and one execution issued in the name of all, and the execution sale was for the benefit of all, but the proceeds were exhausted in paying prior judgments, the plaintiffs would not have the right to redeem from such sale. An execution creditor cannot redeem from his own sale. Hayden v. Smith, 58 Iowa 285. And where a party conveys his real estate with the intent to defraud his creditors, the conveyance is absolute as to him, and he attains no equitable interest therein which is the subject of a lien, under our statute, in favor of a subsequent judg

ment creditor of the grantor; and hence, such judgment creditor has no statutory right to redeem the property from a sale thereof, made under special execution, at the suit of other creditors, who have had the conveyance set aside in a proceeding in equity. Howland v. Knot, 59 Iowa 46.

In Alabama, a tender, or offer to redeem, on compliance with the terms of the statute, by the judgment debtor himself, "reinvests him with the legal title;" but the statute does not extend to his alienee or assignee, whose rights, if any passed by the assignment (a question which is not decided), can only be enforced in equity. Searcey v. Oates, 68 Ala. III.

If

In Illinois, it is held that the mere act of redeeming from a judicial sale may be done by one not having the right to redeem, as well as by one having such right, provided the purchaser sees proper to accept of the amount of the charge or encumbrance,and the effect of such redemption will be to divest all the rights acquired under the sale. the redemption be made by a judgment creditor, in order to be availing to him under his statutory right to redeem, and to pass the title in case of a second sale in satisfaction of his own judgment, he must have a valid execution, followed by a sheriff's deed executed in conformity with the statute. It does not follow that because a redemption in fact has been effected, the redeeming creditor will get a good title to the land, without the existence of the conditions named. Meyer v. Mintonye, 106 Ill. 414. Compare Bennitt v. Wilmington Star Mining Co., 18 Ill. App. 17.

In Indiana, the statute mentions five classes of persons who may redeem, but they are all either owners of the real estate or some interest therein, their personal representatives and assigns, or creditors holding junior liens of record thereon. 2 Works Ind. Pl. & Pr.; § 1191. See also Green v. Doane, 57 Ind. 186; Fletcher v. Homes, 25 Ind. 458; Whisnand v. Small, 65 Ind. 120.

The statute should, however, be liberally construed. Green. Doane, 57

Ind. 186. See also Hervey v. Krost (Ind.), 19 N. E. Rep. 125. See generally upon this subject Rorer on Judicial Sales, 1157, 1180; Herman on Executions, 264; and as to the right of those interested to redeem in case of a mortgage, see 2 Jones Mort., § 1055, et seq.

1. Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 511; Morss v. Purvis, 68 N. Y. 225; Davis v. Seymour, 16 Minn. 210; Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 193; Wilcoxson v. Miller, 49 Cal. 193; Ex parte Bank of Monroe, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 177; s. c., 42 Am. Dec. 61; Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. (N.Y.) 555; s. c., 32 Am. Dec. 590; Miller v. Lewis, 4 N. Y. 560. Compare Hall v. Thomas, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 58; People v. Ransom, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 58.

The following case arose in Indiana, under a statute allowing one year for redemption: A recovered a personal Judgment against B in 1870. C afterwards also recovered a personal judgment against B, and on execution thereon bid off B's land, after which A foreclosed an older mortgage upon the same lands, not making C a party to his foreclosure suit. After C received his After C received his deed from the sheriff, the land was sold to A by the sheriff upon an execution on A's judgment and on his decree jointly, and in due time A received a sheriff's deed. Held, that C, after the lapse of a year from A's purchase, could not redeem; aliter, if A's purchase had been upon his decree of foreclosure only. Cummings v. Pottinger, 83 Ind.

294.

Formalities may, however, be waived by the parties. People v. Ransom, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 148; Blair v. Chamblin, 39 Ill. 521; s. c., 89 Am. Dec. 322; In matter of Eleventh Avenue, S1 N. Y. 436, 452; Kell v. Worden, 110 Ill. 310; Kilbride v. Munn, 55 Iowa 445; Taggart v. McKinsey, S5 Ind. 392; Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 129; Allen v. McGaughey, 31 Ark. 252.

2. Teucher Hiatt, 23 Iowa 529; Ex parte Bank of Monroe, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 177, S. C., 42 Am. Dec. 61; Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 1183; Herman Executions, 438, § 265. See also Per12 C. of L.-16

on

ham v. Kuper, 61 Cal. 331; Gross v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 392; People v. Luther, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 42.

This period begins to run on the day that the purchaser completes his purchase by the payment of his bid. Liggett v. Firestone, 96 Ind. 260. See also Maina v. Elliott, 51 Cal. 8; York v. Briscoe, 67 Ill. 533.

Redemption After Statutory period.The court cannot ordinarily extend the time for redemption beyond the statutory period. Hughes v. Feeter, 23 Iowa 547. Compare Carroll v. McCullough, 63 N. H. 98; Rose 7. Mead, 5 Gilm. (Ill.) 171; Lowry v. McGhee, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 242.

But it may be done by agreement of parties. Miller v. Lewis, 4 N. Y. 554; Rector v. Shirk, 92 Ind. 31.

It is competent for the purchaser of real estate at sheriff's sale to suffer the land to be redeemed from such sale, after the expiration of the year allowed by law for such redemption and before the execution of the sheriff's deed, and if he agree to such redemption, and accept the redemption money, he will be estopped to deny the right to redeem. Taggart v. McKinsey, 85 Ind. 392. See also Goddard v. Renner, 57 Ind. 532; Phyfe v. Riley, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 248.

Such an agreement, although verbal, is not void under the statute of frauds. Butt v. Butt, 91 Ind. 305; McMakin v. Schenck, 98 Ind. 264. See also Marlatt v. Warwick, 18 N. J. Eq. 108; Southard v. Pope's Exrs., 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261: Turner v. King, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 132; s. c., 38 Am. Dec. 679.

The following facts were alleged in the complaint in a recent case: A owned a certain lot upon which was a mortgage debt due B. The lot was sold under an execution for another debt and was purchased by B, who represented to A, who was a foreigner and uninformed on the subject, that the lot was not subject to redemption unless the mortgage debt was also paid, but promised to hold the same in trust until the rents and profits paid the judgment and ten per cent. interest, and also the mortgage debt. These representa

tions are alleged to have been false and fraudulent. Repairs being required on the premises, B was let into partial possession and made repairs, which, by agreement, were to be included in the debt. Subsequently the lot was sold under the mortgage without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, although the mortgage did not authorize this, and the property was purchased by B, who had been let into full possession and who now claims to hold an absolute title to the property, although the time for redemption has not yet expired. It is alleged that the rents and profits since the property has been in possession of B, have more than paid both debts, interest and repairs. A offered to pay any balance due on an account being taken, and demands judgment for any excess of payment and possession of the property. Held, that the complaint contains a good cause of action. Scheffermeyer v. Schaper, 97 Ind. 70. See also Felton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485.

In another recent case, arising in Illinois, it appeared that land was sold on execution, at a grossly inadequate price, and bid in by one who was the family physician of the debtor, and regarded as an intimate friend and advisor, the debtor being an aged, illiterate person, almost wholly ignorant of his legal rights. The purchaser promised to give the debter all the time he wanted to redeem, telling him he had fifteen months in which to redeem, and by artifice and misrepresentation lulled him into a sense of security until the time of redemption had passed, with the knowl edge and participation of the assignee of the certificate of purchase, to whom a sheriff's deed was made. It was held, that the debtor, under these circumstances, was entitled, on bill in equity, to redeem from the sale, and have the sheriff's deed set aside as a cloud on his title. Palmer v. Douglas et al., 107 Ill. 204. See also Fletcher v. McGill, 110 Ind. 395.

But where a purchaser at an execution sale, after the sale, offered to convey to the execution debtor the land purchased, upon being paid a certain amount within a certain time, which amount the debtor agreed to pay within the time named, if he could raise it, but failed to perform on his part, it was held, that these facts would not support an action by the debtor against the pur

chaser and his grantee to redeem the land. Tarkington v. Conley, 59 Iowa 28.

1. Dougherty v. Postgate, 3 Iowa 92; Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 1181; Lytle v. Etherly, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 389; People v. Mayhew, 26 Cal. 655.

The holder of a sheriff's certificate of purchase of real estate sold on execution cannot defeat a redemption in a case where the clerk receives in good faith the amount necessary to redeem in bank notes, deposits them in bank and has continuously, from the time of the receipt, lawful money ready for the holder of the certificate, which he is willing to deliver, and does tender, to him; and where such facts appear in the complaint, in an action to set aside the sheriff's deed executed after such redemption, and to quiet title to the land, the complaint is sufficient on demurrer. Boyd v. Olvey, 82 Ind. 294. See also Webb v. Watson, 18 Iowa 537; Hall v. Fisher, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Buford v. Henzier, 8 Biss. (U. S.) 177. But compare People v. Hays, 4 Cal. 127, People v. Baker, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 602. 2. In some States it may be paid to the officer who made the sale. Elkin v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 207; People v. Baker, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 602. In others to the clerk of the court. Webb

. Watson, 18 Iowa 537. In others it is sufficient to offer to credit the debtor with the amount where the creditor redeems. deems. Moore v. Gore, 35 Ala. 701. See also Elkin v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 207; s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 541, and note; Freeman on Executions, § 318.

The holder of the certificate of sale, and not the assignee of the judgment, is entitled to the redemption money. Brown v. Harrison, 93 Ind. 142.

A, B and C, in consecutive order of time, obtained judgments against D, which became liens on the debtor's real estate. A's judgment was satisfied by sheriff's sale of the real estate to A, and B, within the proper time, redeemed by virtue of his judgment, paying the proper sum to the clerk, which the clerk, upon demand, paid to A as for such redemption. B's judgment was afterwards reversed for error, and remanded, and another trial resulted in another judgment in his favor. B then brought suit against A, C, D, and the sheriff, alleging these facts, and that D still owned the land, and was otherwise

sold.3

insolvent. Held, that the complaint as against C and D was good on demurrer. Held, also, that A, having accepted the redemption money, waived any irregularity in the redemption, and that Can D could not question the regularity of the redemption. Held, also, under the Indiana Redemption act of 1879, that a judgment upon the facts stated in the complaint for costs against C and D, and that the plaintiff have execution on the original judgment in favor of A, was not erroneous. Carver v. Howard, 92 Ind. 173.

Under the Indiana redemption law of March 31st, 1879 (acts 1879, p. 176), the owner of land sold by the sheriff, at the time of the sale, may redeem the land from such sheriff's sale, but the statute does not give such owner any lien upon the land for the amount of money paid by him in such redemption. Groves v. Barber, 98 Ind. 309.

Where a judgment debtor has a naked right to redeem certain real estate, by the payment of a certain sum of money, the lien of the judgment, if any, on such right to redeem, will not entitle the judgment plaintiff to demand from the owner of the fee, in such real estate, an accounting for rents and profits thereof. Wilhelm v. Humphries, 97 Ind. 520.

The plaintiff had a suit pending to foreclose a mortgage on real estate on which A had a junior lien by judgment. A valid agreement was made between the debtor and W & S by which W & S undertook to pay the judgment, whereupon the plaintiff dismissed its suit as against A. Execution was issued on A's judgment, upon which I purchased the property, satisfying the judgment and taking a certificate of purchase, and then W & S paid him what he had bid, and thereafter he held the certificate as their trustee and to indemnify himself as their surety on another matter. At the proper time he received a sheriff's deed, and then, having been released as surety, he conveyed to W, with the consent of

S, and W, by deed of quitclaim, conveyed to the appellant. The plaintif finally obtained a sheriff's deed upon sale to satisfy its mortgage, and brought this suit for possession.

Held, that the transaction between W & S and H was in equity a redemption of the property from the sale upon the judgment, and a payment by them of the judgment, and that the paper title acquired by them, under the circumstances, could not be interposed against the plaintiff. Shanklin τ'. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 77 Ind. 268.

The owner of land sold under execution may redeem it without paying the taxes paid on it by the purchaser since his purchase. They are no part of "the lawful charges" required by the statute. The purchaser's remedy for them is by action at law. Fuller . Evatt, 42 Árk. 230.

1. Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 1194. See also Stein v. Chambless, IS Iowa 474; Titus v. Lewis, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 70; State v. Sherill, 34 Ind. 57; Taggart v. McKinsey, 85 Ind. 392; Bodine v. Moore, 18 N. Y. Moore, 18 N. Y. 347; Warren v. Fish, 7 Minn. 432.

2. Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 1195; Freeman on Executions, § 321. See also and compare Clayton v. Ellis, 50 Iowa 590; Allen v. McGaughey 31 Ark. 252; Settlemire v. Newsome, 10 Oreg. 446; Fischer v. Eslaman, 68 Ill. 78; Rice v. Puett, 81 Ind. 230; Eldridge v. Wright, 55 Cal. 531.

Authorities for Judicial Sales.-Rorer on Judicial Sales; IIerman on Executions; Freeman on Executions; Freeman on Void Judicial Sales; and for particular branches of the subject, see Jones on Mortgages and the various text books on Executors and Administrators, Guardian and Ward, and Trusts and Trustees, besides valuable notes in many of the American Decisions.

3. A store where old metals, ropes, rags, etc., are bought and sold, is a junk-shop, within the meaning of a licence act. City Council of Charleston v. Goldsmith, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 470.