DICTS.

1. A party cannot be permitted to lie by after having knowledge of a defect of this kind and speculate upon the result, and complain only when the verdict becomes unsatisfactory to him." Selleck v. Turnpike Co., 13 Conn. 453; Onok v. Ins. Co., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 457; Hubert v. Shaw, 11 Mich. 118; Bulliner 7. People, 95 Ill. 394; Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass. 41; State v. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357; Harrington v. State, 76 Ind. 112; Patton . Mfg. Co., 11 R. I. 188; Berry v. De Witt, 27 Fed. Rep. 723; Scott v. Waldeck, 12 Neb. 5; Polin v. State, 14 Neb. 540; Lee v. McLeod, 15 Neb. 158; Valiente . Bryan, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 302. The rule has even been applied to bribery. Tinkle v. Dunivant, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 503. But in Peiffer v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. St. 468, it was held that separation in a capital case vitiates the verdict even though the prisoner consent. See also State v. Hornsby, 32 La. An. 1268, and Thompson on Trials, § 2613.

2. One cannot take advantage of his own wrong. U. S. v. Salentine, 8 Biss. (U. S.) 404.

3. Cal. act of May 1st, 1851. Before this act, by the act of 1850, no fees were allowed to dissenting voters. See Mills . Dunlap, 3 Čal 94. Nevada Stat. 1864-5, 259 and 1871, 56. See, for their construction, Gillett v. Sharp, 7 Nev. 245.

Under the act of November 29th, 1869 (Nevada), a juror is entitled to compensation for every day's attendance upon the court, whether actually empanelled or not, except in certain cases when employed in hearing criminal

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trials. See Thornburg v. Hermann, 1 Nev. 473._ Pennsylvania, Purd. Bright Dig., tit. Fees, p. 48.

In Commissioners v. Hall, 7 W. 290, the county was decided to be liable for the expenses of boarding and lodging a jury empanelled and kept together in a capital case by order of the court.

In Ex parte Lopez, 7 Rich. (S. Car.) 123, it was held that there was no statute entitling the jurors of the city court of Charleston to be paid by the State.

The jurors in civil cases, attending the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, held entitled to $1.25 each for each day's attendance, in Ex parte Lewis, 4 Čranch (U. S.) 433.

In the United States courts, if a person is summoned as a juror and as a witness on the part of the government at the same term, he is entitled to compensation in both capacities, upon making the usual affidavit of attendance and upon his setting forth such facts by petition, and their admission by the marshal, a rule absolute will be entered directing the marshal to pay the amount. Edwards 7. Bond, 5 McLean 300.

Payment of the jury fee at the time the demand is made is not necessary to make the demand valid. Odello . Reynolds, 40 Mich. 21.

Authorities. The following authorities have been used in the preparation of this article: Proffatt on Jury Trial; Forsyth on Trial by Jury; Thompson on Trials; Thompson & Merriam on Juries; Bishop on Criminal Law; Rapalje on Criminal Procedure.

1. In holding that relief would lie in equity to have an agreement set aside which had been entered into by both parties under a mutual mistake as to the title to the subject matter of the agreement, LORD WESTBURY used the following language: "It is said, 'Ignorantia juris haud excusat, but in that maxim the word "jus" is used in the sense of denoting general law, the ordinary law of the country. But when the word "jus" is used in the sense of denoting a private right, that maxim has no application. Private right of ownership is a matter of fact; it may be the result also of matter of law; but if parties contract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the result is that that agreement is liable to be set aside as having proceeded upon a common mistake." Cooper. Phibbs, L. R., 2 H. L. 149, 170.

2. Just Claim.-An action was brought in which an attachment issued on an affidavit, and the defendant moved to discharge the attachment on the ground that the affidavit did not sufficiently show that the plaintiff's claims were just as required by law. The court sustained the motion, VALENTINE, J., saying, "The court below decides that the affidavit does not sufficiently show that the plaintiff's claims are just (Sub. 2, § 200, Comp. L. 155). All that the affidavit states upon this subject, as to claims numbered 1 and 2, is as follows: It states that the plaintiff 'ought justly to to recover the amounts thereof;' and near the close of the affidavit it states generally as to all the claims, six in number, 'that the several sums claimed by the plaintiff are justly due. That this is manifestly an informal way of stating the matter will be readily admitted, but whether this informality renders the affidavit insufficient is not so obvious. It is probably not such a defect as would authorize the court to arbitrarily dissolve the attachment without first giving the plaintiff ample opportunity to amend her affidavit. It is even probable that the defect is not so fatal, that this court would hold the affidavit insufficient if the district court had held it sufficient. We think, however, it is

such a defect as would authorize the district court to require the plaintiff to amend the affidavit so as to make the statement more formal and definite. Probably no one will contend that the affidavit should follow the exact language of the statute, but when it dif fers from the statute without any ap parent reason therefor, courts will be justified in requiring that the reason be made obvious, or that the affidavit be so amended as to conform to the statute. The statute requires that the affidavit shall show, first, the nature of the plain. tiff's claim; second, that it is just; third, the amount which the affiant believes the plaintiff ought to recover: and fourth, the existence of some one of the grounds for an attachment (§ 200. Comp. L. 155), which grounds are enumerated in another section of the statutes. § 1, Laws of 1866, 182. The words just and justly do not always mean just and justly in a moral sense, but they not unfrequently, in their connection with other words in a sentence, bear a very different signification. It is evident, however, that the word 'just' in the statute means just in a moral sense; and from its isolation, being made a separate subdivision of the section, it is intended to mean morally just' in the most emphatic terms. The claim must be morally just, as well as legally just, in order to entitle a party to an attachment. If the claim is morally unjust, but notwithstanding the owner thereof thinks he can legally recover the same by an action at law, provided he can obtain an attachment, and not otherwise, it is but natural, or at least the temptation is great, for him to try to make a compromise between his conscience and the rigid language of this austere statute, and so frame the language of his affidavit as not to do any great violence to either his conscience or the statute. He may think that it is easier to swear that the claim is justly due than to swear that it is morally just without any reference as to whether it is due or not, and where there are six different claims, as in this case, some of which may be just and some of them unjust, he may think that that it is easier to swear that the several sums claimed by the plaintiff are

justly due than to swear to each claim separately that it is just. If he had a legal right to recover an unjust claim for, say $100, he may think that it is easier to swear that he 'ought justly to recover that amount than to swear that the claim is just without any reference whatever as to his legal right to recover the sum of $100, or any other specific amount. In the one case his attention is called more particularly to the question whether the claim is due or not, and not to the question whether it is just. In the other case his attention is called more particularly to the question, What is the amount of the claim? and not is it just? Whenever there seems to be a disposition to evade the moral force of the statute by departing from its language or by inserting foreign or irrelevant matter which the statute has intentionally excluded, or by swearing to the propositions in the aggregate which the statute requires to be sworn to separately, or by swearing to the justness of the claim only inferentially, when the statute requires that it be sworn to positively, whenever there seems to be a studied effort to evade swearing to the bold and naked proposition that the claim is just in the abstract as well as in the concrete, there seems to be an eminent propriety in the court requiring that the language of the statute be strictly complied with, and particularly so when the natures of the claims themselves are not fully set forth." Robinson v. Burton, 5 Kan. 287, 293, 299. In this case the court permitted the plaintiff to amend her affidavit, within ten days, and did not then dissolve the attachment; but when the amended affidavit was filed it appeared that all its material averments were in the present tense and did not relate back to the date of the original affidavit, for which reason the court then dissolved the attachment. See also Drake on Attachment (6th ed.), § 95; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 902.

Just Compensation.-See COMPENSATION; EMINENT DOMAIN. "The etymology of the word 'compensation' presents the idea of balancing one thing against another. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word 'just' was not intended to have a mere liberal meaning as opposed to unjust, but as placing the matter upon a broad and equitable basis. 'It is difficult to imagine an unjust compensation; but the

word "just" is used evidently to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation," to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample; and no legislature can diminish by one jot the rotund expression of the constitution.' 'Just compensation,' therefore, as used in the constitution. means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the taking for public use. It may be more or it may be less than the mere money value of the property actually taken. The exercise of the power being necessarv for the public good, and all property being held subject to its exercise when and as the public good requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner more than a fair idemnity for the loss he sustains by the appropriation of his property for the general good. On the other hand, it would be equally unjust to the owner if he should receive less than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity the interests of the public and of the owner and all the circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken into consideration." Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 462, and cases there cited.

The work above quoted (published in 1888), in its twentieth chapter, on "Just Compensation and Damages," discusses this question so admirably and fully that the reader is referred thereto for further examination of the subject.

Just or Convenient. A judgment was recovered in an action at law for money lent. The judgment debtor, who was carrying on a business and was also possessed of certain household furniture, subsequently died. An order was thereupon made at chambers for the appointment of a receiver of the furniture and also of the business, and that the receiver should collect all debts due and owing to the business and all the other assets, property or effects thereof. By a subsequent order the receiver was empowered to sell the furniture and the assets, property and effects of the business, including the book debts. The executor, who had subsequently proved the will, appealed against both these orders, which were discharged in the queen's bench. The plaintiffs, judgment creditors, appealed, alleging that section 25, subsection 8 of the Judicature act 1873, empowered the court to appoint a receiver in cases

where it is "just or convenient." The court of appeal dismissed this appeal, LORD ESHER, M. R., saying: "Now the plaintiff had obtained judgment in an action at law, and the relation of judgment creditor and judgment debtor was thereby constituted. The judgment creditor had a right to have that judgment satisfied by means of an execution at law. He had a right to issue a writ of fi. fa. and seize and sell the goods of the judgment debtor, such as the furniture. The judgment debtor was also entitled to certain debts, and the judgment creditor had power to attach those debts. With respect to the business and the future profits thereof, it seems to me that he had no means of touching them. Under the circumstances, had the court any authority to appoint a receiver? It was said that the court had authority under section 25, subsection 8 of the Judicature act, which provides that a receiver may be appointed whenever it is "just or convenient." It was said that this subsection gives the court a larger power than either the court of chancery or a common law court possessed before the Judicature act. . . . It must,however,be just or convenient.' Dealing first with the furniture, can it be just or convenient' to act under section 25, when there is a sufficient remedy under a fi. fa.? In my opinion, where there is nothing to show that the ordinary mode of execution of a court of law cannot be carried into effect, it is not just or convenient' to substitute something else, namely, the appointment of a receiver, such an appointment being of no practical use unless it is followed up by an order giving leave to sell. Then with regard to the debts. There seems to me to be no difficulty in the way of reaching them by the ordinary mode of execution. The well known practice is to attach the debts. If it had been made out that the judgment debtor, by concealing the debts or otherwise, had rendered it impossible to find out what the debts were, it might be 'just or convenient' to appoint a receiver, though I do not decide that it would. But no such case was attempted to be made out here. It has not been made out that the debts cannot be discovered and attached. Lastly, as regards the business, it would be useless to make an order for a receiver unless he were made manager as well. Therefore, it has not been shown to be 'just or convenient, to appoint a receiver, and no

part of the order comes within the words of section 25, subsection 8, and apart from the section there is no authority either at common law or in equity for the appointment. The order, therefore, was wrong. That being so, the second order, giving the receiver liberty to sell, was wrong, too." Manchester and Liverpool District Banking Co. v. Parkinson, 37 W. Rep. 264.

In construing the terms of the same act (the Judicature act 1873. section 25, subsection S), which are as follows: "A mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made," SIR GEORGE JESSEL, M. R., after deciding that all the judges of the high court of judicature have jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to an inferior court, said: "If I can grant prohibition I can of course grant an injunction between. the parties, because the form is immaterial. By the Sth subsection of the 25th clause of the Judicature act of 1873 it is provided that a mandamus or injunction may be granted by the court in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient, that such order should be made. Now if I have the power to grant prohibition it certainly is just and convenient' to do the same thing by injunction inter partes instead of going to the great expense of granting a writ of prohibition against the magistrates. In other words, the jurisdiction now conferred on every judge of granting prohibition is a reason for granting an injunction which did not exist before the act of parliament was passed, and makes it just and reasonable to grant an injunction, which is a shorter and cheaper mode of attaining the same end and deciding the point between the actual parties to the dispute." Hedley v. Bates, 49 L. J. R. Ch. 170.

Just Debts.-See DEBT, 5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 155, and cases cited, as to rule that a devise for the payment of "all my just debts" will not revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations. See also Collamore . Wilder, 19 Kan. 67; Peck v. Botsford. 7 Conn. 172; s. c., 18 Am. Dec. 92; Martin v. Gage, 9 N. Y. 398.

But an unqualified and unconditional acknowledgment of a debt as originally just and yet subsisting removes the bar of the statute of limitations if made in