possessed of lands,1 and learned in the law.2 III. MANNER OF SELECTING IN UNITED STATES.-In most of the United States, justices of the peace are chosen at the general election. In the following States and territories the justices are elected: Alabama,3 Arkansas, California, Colorado Connecticut, Dakota, Georgia, Illinois,10 Indiana,11 Iowa,12 Kansas,13 Kentucky,14 Louisiana,15 Michigan,16 Minnesota,17 Mississippi,18 Missouri, 19 Nebraska,20 Nevada,21 New Jersey,22 New Mexico,23 New York,24 North Carolina,25 Ohio,26 Oregon 27 Pennsylvania,28 Rhode Island,29 South Carolina, quære,30 1. IS Henry VI, ch. 11; Holt, C. N. P. (Eng.) 458. See also 39 Vict., ch. 24. 2. 13 Rich. II, ch. 7. 3. Two for each precinct, who hold for four years. Const. Ala., art. 6, § 13, Code, § 754. 4. One for every two hundred votes, but two in every township, however small, hold for two years. Dig. Statutes Ark., §§ 4016, 4017. 5. In their respective townships or cities, and hold their office two years. 2 Code Cal., § 10113. 6. A justice in each precinct, who holds for two years. Gen. Stats. Colo., § 666, p. 274. 7. And hold office for two years. Gen. Stats. Conn., pp. 240, 373 to 375, 381, 607. 8. By the voters of the county and hold for two years. 2 Levissees, Dakota Code, p. 375. 9. In each militia district, hold for four years, unless removed. Code of Ga., 435; Hinton v. Lindsay, 20 Ga. 746. 10. In and for such districts as are or may be provided by law. Const. Ill. (1870), art. 6, §§ 21, 28; 1 Rev. Stats., pp. 135, 137. 11. In each township, and hold four years. Const. Ind. (1851), art. 7, § 14; Rev. Stats., § 174, p 26. As to justice's bond, see State v. Flinn, 3 Black. 72. Also Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106; and Dietricks v. Shaw, 43 Ind. 175. 12. In each township two justices, who hold two years. Rev. Code Iowa, §389. p. 84, and § 590, p. 162. 13. In each township two justices, who hold two years. Const. of Kansas, art. 3. §§ 1, 9; Phillips v. Thralls, 26 Kan. 780; Wilcox v. Johnson, 34 Kan. 655. 14. In each justice district designated by the county court of the county, two justices, who hold for four years. Gen. Stats. Ky., p. 376. 15. In each police jury ward, and hold two years. 16. In each township four justices, who hold for four years. Const. Mich. (1850), art 6, § 17; 1 Mich. Stats. (low. Ann.), p. 53. 17. In each town, at the stated town meeting, two justices, who hold two years. Rev. Stats. Minn., p. 109. 18. And hold two years. Const. Miss., art. 6, § 23; Rev. Code Miss., § 118. 19. In each municipal township, two justices (cities and incorporated towns may have more than two justices) hold for four years. I Rev. Stats. Mo., §§ 2807, 2813, 2816, 2805. 20. In and for such districts as may be provided by law. Const. Neb., art. 6, § 18, 2. 21. And are township officers, hold for two years. 2 Comp. Laws Nev., §§ 2216, 2620. 22. At annual meetings of the township and wards in the counties, hold one year. Rev. Stats N. J., p. 534. 23. In such manner as the legislature prescribes. Comp. Laws New Mexico, p. 60. 24. And hold four years. Rev. Stats. N. Y., p. 358. 25. Here justices are elected by the general assembly and are not required to give official bonds. 1 N. C. Code, § 819. 26. A competent number in each township, who hold three years. Const. Ohio (1851). art. 4, § 9. 27. One in each election precinct, who holds two years. Gen. Laws Oreg., p. 695. 28. And hold five years. Const. Pa., art. 5, § 7. 29. If trial justices, they hold three years. Pub. Stats. R. I., pp. 20, 74, 75, Tennessee, Texas,2 Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In the following States the justices of the peace are appointed by the governor Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Delaware,10 Florida,11 New Hampshire.12 IV. QUALIFICATIONS.-To be eligible to the office of justice of the peace, the person must be a citizen of the United States, a male13 citizen of the State in which he is elected or appointed, must be of good moral character, and generally must reside in the subdivision of territory to which the office is appurtenant,14 and must have his office located within that territory 15 A justice is disqualified to try a case when he is related to either of the parties to the suit, and this relationship which disqualifies differs in different States.16 senate, to appoint trial justices with full jurisdiction usually exercised by justices for each county, to hold for two years. Const. S. Car., art. 4, § 21; Rev. Stat. S. Car., p. 194. 1. Two in each civil district. Three at the county seat and more in the larger towns and cities. They hold six years. M. & V. Code Tenn., §§ 389 to 394 and § 5829. 2. Two for each precinct, who hold two years. I Pasch. Laws Texas, pp. 285, 286. 3. By the freemen of the towns and hold one year. Const. Vt. (amended), 18, 19; Rev. Stat. Vt., p. 47. 4. And hold for three years. Va., art. 7, § 2. Const. 5. And hold four years. Rev. Stat. W. Va., ch. 73, § 2. 6. Four in each township, two annually at town meeting, and hold two years. Rev. Stat. Wis., pp. 285, 286. 7. And hold for seven years. Me., art. 5, pt 1, § 8. 8. And hold for two years. Code Md., p. 520. Const. Wilcox v. Johnson, 34 Kan. 655. If 16. Disqualified by Relationship.—If related to a party in interest, though ignorant of the interest, it has been held the justice has no jurisdiction, and in issuing an execution on a judgment rendered under such circumstances, he is a trespasser. Birdsall v. Rev. Fuller, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 204. But the relationship must be so near as to raise of itself evidence of partialty. Eggleston v. Smiley.17 Johns. (N.Y.) 133, 191; Carman v. Newell, I Den. (N. Y.) 25. The relationship which disqualifies is held to include sister in law. Foot v. Morgan, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 654. Or son in law. Rivenburgh 7. Henness, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 208; Watterson 7. Ramsey, 2 Pa. County Ct. 137. Brother or son or son in law. See The Complete Digest (1887), "January to June," p. 1589. 9. By and with the advice of council. They hold for three years. Pub. Stat. Mass., p. 863. 10. And hold for seven years if they behave well. Const. Del., art. 6. § 24. 11. As many as he deems necessary. They hold four years subject to removal by the governor. Const. Florida (1875), art. 6. § 15. 12. They hold five years. Const. N. H., art. 75. See also Murfree's Justice, Practice, schedule "A" to § 8, from which the above synopsis is taken. 13. Anonymous, 107 Mass. 604; Opinion of Sup. Ct., 62 Me. 596; Murfree's Justice, Practice, §§ 9, 10, II. 14. Murfree's Justice, Practice, § 9 15. Phillips v. Thralls, 26 Kan. 780; In Connecticut, the justice is disquali fied where "he or his son, father, brother, father in law, son in law, partner, clerk or student, or any other person occupying the same office, shall act as attorney, or shall have drawn up the declaration or complaint." Pub. V. DE JURE OR DE FACTO JUSTICES.—A justice of the peace may be a de jure or a de facto officer.1 "The distinction between a de jure and a de facto officer is well settled and understood. Justices in common with other officers may be merely de facto justices, if their title to their offices is defective, but their possession and exercise of the function of the office is acknowledged and understood."2 VI. EX OFFICIO JUSTICES.-In some States, the acts incorporating cities make mayors or other city officers justices of the Acts Conn. (1887), ch. 50, p. 686. See also p. 681, where the justice is disqualified on reaching seventy years of age. See generally Edwards v. Russell, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 63; Travis v. Jenkins, 30 How. Pr. (N. Y.)_152; Spear v. Robinson, 29 Me. 531; Dawson v. Wells, 3 Ind. 398. After final judgment, held, too late to object that plaintiff and the justice are brothers in law. Rector v. v. Drury, 4 Chand. (Wis.) 24. See generally DE FACTO CERS, vol. 5, p. 93 et seq. OFFI 1. Rheinhart v. State, 14 Kan. 318; Laver v. McGlatchin, 28 Wis. 454; State v. Bloom, 17 Wis. 521; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163; Pool 7'. Perdue, 44 Ga. 454; Hinton v. Lindsay, 20 Ga. 746; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 616. 2. Murfree's Justice, Practice, § 13.— A person clected justice of the peace, but who has neglected to take the of ficial oath or give the official bond, is, nevertheless, in office by color of title, and his acts are valid as regards the public and third persons, and binding on the parties to the action brought before him, yet he could not recover his fees, and he would be a trespasser if he enforced the payment rendered in the action against the property of the defendant. In such a case he would be a de facto, but not a de jure, justice. Greenleaf v. Low, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 168; Snyder . Schram, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 404; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67, 84: s. c. 59 Am. Dec. 463; Weeks v. Ellis, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 320; Riddle v. Bedford Co., 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 386; People v. Peabody, 6 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 234; Morton v. Lee, 28 Kan. 286. See also Farrier v. State, 48 N. J. L. 613; People v. Colerick (Mich.), 34 N. W. Rep. 683; People v. Webber, 86 Ill. 283. But there can be no officer de facto as against the people in an action by the people to try the title to the office. The doctrine of de facto officers applies to and in favor of third persons, and to protect innocent parties who have trusted to the apparent title of an officer. People Albany etc. R. Co., 38 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 228, 267; s. c., 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 459; 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 204. If a person is sued for an act done by himself, and for the doing of it he justifies as an officer, he may show, in the first instance, by parol evidence, that at the time, he was such officer de facto, for such evidence is prima facie evidence that he is such officer de jure. Willis v. Sproule. 13 Kan. 257; Brown v. Connelly, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 390. There can be no de facto officer when there is no office to fill. In re Hinkle, 31 Kan. 717; Leach v. People, 118 Ill. 157; People v. Veuve, (Cal.), 3 Pac. Rep. S62. An officer de facto must be in the actual possession of the office and have the same under his control. If the officer de jure is in possession of the office, no other person can be an officer de facto for that office. Two persons cannot be officers de facto for the same office at the same time. M'Cahon v. Leavenworth Co. 8 Kan. 437 The legality of the appointment or of the election of the justice cannot be attacked collaterally. Baker v. State, 66 Wis. 42; State v. Brooks (La.), 2 S. Rep. 498, Hamlin v. Dingman, 41 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 132; s. c., 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 61. As to the rights of the de jure officer against intruders, and when they can be enforced, see Bier v. Gorrell, 30 W. Va. 95; Selby v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 243; Hannon v. Grizzard, 96 N. Car. 293; Andrews v. Portland, 79 Me. 384. But an oath administered by a de facto justice cannot be made the basis of a prosecution for perjury, yet the defendant must rebut the presumption that the officer is a de jure justice. Biggerstaff v. Commonwealth, II Bush (Ky.) 169. peace, ex officio. But, in such cases, the termination of the officer's term as city officer extinguishes his authority as a justice, and his jurisdiction is limited to the city's territory,1 and is, generally, limited to criminal causes, or misdemeanors. In other States it is decided that the mayor or other city officer of a city cannot exercise the functions of a justice of the peace.3 In Georgia, a notary public is, ex officio, a justice for his district.1 VII. BOND OF JUSTICES.—In nearly all the States a justice is required, by statutory enactment, to execute an official bond before entering upon the discharge of his official duties. Yet in some States an official bond is not required. The penalties of the bonds are not uniform in the various States, and the conditions of the bonds vary considerably.8 VIII. BREACH OF THE BOND.-Generally, if the condition of the bond is to faithfully discharge the duties of the office, it is broken only by gross negligence. An error in judgment or unskillfulness is not a breach of the bond. There is no distinction between the liability of principal and the sureties on the bond.10 1. Dunham v. Solomon, 1 Harr. (N. J.) 50. It is held in Indiana that within the city limits a mayor has jurisdiction and powers of a justice, but as a general rule an action may be brought before him upon a contract made or a tort committed without the city, if defendant lives in the city. Wabash etc. Co. v. Lash, 103 Ind. So. 2. Honeyman's Practice (N. J.), § 23; Weeks v. Forman, 1 Harr. (N. J.) 237. constitutionality of the right to confer power upon the mayor, etc., to try civil causes, has been questioned, but sustained. Hutchins v. Scott, 4 Halst. (N. J.) 218; McGear v. Woodruff 4 Vroom (N. J.) 218. As to mayor's authority to deputize a justice to act in case of his absence or inability, see County v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. 282. 3. Edenton v. Wool, 65 N. Car. 379; Wilmington v. Davis, 63 N. Car. 582. 4. Pool v. Perdue, 44 Ga. 454; Hinton v. Lindsay, 20 Ga. 746. 5. Murfree's Justice. Practice, § 8 schedule A and statutes cited. See the statute of the several States. 6. Rev. Code Md. (1878), p. Code N. Car. (1883), § 819. 520; I 7. In Illinois, not less than $2,000. 1 Ill. Rev. Stat., pp. 135, 137. In Iowa, $500. Rev. Code Iowa, § 678. In New Jersey, not less than $500, nor more than $3,000, as judges of common pleas may deem sufficient, or any three of them. Rev. Stat. N. J. 535, § 10. In Kansas, a bond must be executed with sufficient sureties conditioned "to pay on demand, to each and every person who may be entitled thereto, all sums of money as the said justice may become liable to pay, on account of moneys which may come into his hands by virtue of his office." Comp. Laws Kan. (1885), ch. 110, § 19, p. 986. 8. In Kansas, see preceding note. In Texas, faithful payment of public and private money to the person entitled to it. I Pasch. Laws Tex., art. 1175, p. 285. In Illinois, to secure_the discharge of their duties. 1 Ill. Rev. Stat., pp. 135 to 137. In Ohio, see Rev. Stat. Ohio, § 579, p. 30, Supplement. In Indiana, see Rev. Stat. Ind. p. 271. State v. Flinn, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 72. Also Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106; Widener v. State, 45 Ind. 244. In New Jersey, for the payment on demand, to the person authorized to receive the same, of all moneys that come into his hands as justice during his term. Rev. Stat. N. J., p. 535, § 10. Honeyman's Practice (N. J.), p. 34. 9. Alexandria v. Corse, 2 Cranch (U. S.) 363; Knell v. Briscoe. 49 Md. 414. But see Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106. 10. Seaver v. Young, 16 Vt. 658. As between claimants he who first sues and obtains judgment is entitled to the whole penalty, if his claim amount to so much, to the exclusion of the others. Christman v. Commonwealth, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 381. While the surety is liable only for acts of the principal done subsequent to the time of the giving of the bond, yet he is liable for money coming into the principal's hands before he executes the bond, when the money is in the principal's hands, at the time the bond is given.2 The acts of the justice are either judicial or ministerial, and the discrimination between them is very important because of the consequence of an error in their performance, yet the distinction is not clearly marked. And as a justice is called upon to perform many acts judicial and ministerial, he should have a knowledge of their difference. A judicial act is "the act of a public functionary, who, being clothed by law with authority to act in the premises, and having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the persons to be affected, exercises his judgment and discretion, not merely obeying a prescribed formula which leaves him no alternative, and pronounces a decision which must be obeyed by the parties interested, or issues an order which must be carried into effect by other officials."3 And whenever a justice acts within the scope of his jurisdiction he is not liable, however erroneous his acts may be. But being invested with special and limited jurisdiction he must, at his peril, keep within his prescribed authority, for if he exceeds his jurisdiction he is answerable to anyone who is injured thereby.5 A ministerial act is "one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the acts being done.' If a ministerial duty is annexed to a judicial office, and the officer perform that duty wrongfully, whether by mistake or fraud, he is liable to the party injured. 1. Jeffers v. Johnson, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 382. 2. State v. Van Pelt, 1 Ind. 304. 3. Murfree's Justice, Practice, § 975. 4. Clark 7. Spicer, 6 Kan 440; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 394, note and cases cited; Evans 7. Foster, I N. H. 377; Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 1; Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 396; Barhyte . Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 242; 7. Jordan v. Hanson, 49 N. H. 202; Kibling v. Clark, 53 Vt. 379; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; Mangold v. Thorpe, 33 N. J. L. 134. But see Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106. English Cases.-Barnardiston v. Soame, 2 Lev. 114; Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23; Garnett v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 611; Dicas v. Brougham, 6 C. & P. 249; Brittian v. Kennaird, 1 B. & B. 441; Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld. Raym. 454; Ackerley v. Parkinson, 3 M. & S. 411; Marshalsea Case, 10 Coke 65. See also 5. Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 6. Murfree's Justice, Practice, § 975; 2 7. Beaurain v. Scott, 3 Campb. 388; Holden v. Smith, 14 Q. B. 841; Taylor 7. Doremus, 16 N. J. L. 473; Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347; Fox v. Meacham, 6 Neb. 530. A ministerial act is to be carefully distinguished from a judicial act, for "not all acts performed by a judicial officer are therefore judicial, since such an officer may be enjoined by law to |