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ating implements of housebreaking, would comprehend a skeleton key, and any kind of key capable of being employed for purposes of housebreaking.1

The keys of a house follow the inheritance, but they are not fixtures so as not to be the subjects of larceny.2

The delivery of the key of a warehouse in which goods are lodged is good as a symbolical delivery of the goods, so as to divest the vendor's possession and lien.3

KIDNAPPING—(See ABDUCTION; FALSE IMPRISONMENT).

1. Definition. Kidnapping is the unlawful removal of a man, woman or child from their own country or state against their will.4

Force. The use of physical force is not necessary to constitute the offence; it is sufficient if the person be coerced by threats,5 or induced by fraudulent representations to give consent.6 Consent.--The consent of a person of mature years, in the absence of duress, fraud or mental incapacity, would negative the

1. Reg. v. Oldham, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 568; s. c., 2 Den. Cr. C. 472, where it is held that keys are implements of housebreaking within 14 and 15 Vict..ch. 19, § 1; for though commonly used for lawful purposes they are capable of being employed for purposes of housebreaking, and it is a question for the jury whether the person found in possession of them by night had them without lawful excuse, and with the intention of using them as implements of housebreaking.

It is not housebreaking to enter by means of the key left in the door locked on the outside. Alston v. Forrest, I Swint. (Sc.) 433.

2. Hoskins v. Tarrence, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 417.

3. Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East 192; Benj. on Sales, § 1043 (6th Am. ed.).

4. 3 Bla. Com. 219; 1 Russ. Cr. (9th ed.) 962; 1 Whart. C. L. (8th ed.), § 590; 2 Bish. C. L. (7th ed.), § 750.

At common law, the offence of kidnapping is an aggravated species of false imprisonment, and all the ingredients in the definition of the latter are necessarily comprehended in the former. The requisites in an indictment would seem to be an allegation of an assault and the carrying away or the transporting of the party injured, from his own country into another, unlawfully and against his consent. It is not enough to charge the defendant with kidnapping generally; the indictment should allege specifically the facts and circumstances which constitute the

offence. Click v. State, 3 Tex. 282; Moody v. People, 20 Ill. 315; Smith v. State, 63 Wis. 453; State v. Whaley, 2 Harr. (Del.) 538; Hamilton v. Com., 3 Pa. 142; Thomas v. Com., 2 Leigh (Va.) 741.

The taking of a prisoner in another State or country without a requisition is kidnapping. Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436; Com. v. Blodgett, 12 Met. (Mass.) 56.

In New Hamshire, it was held that removal from the State was not necessary to constitute the offence. State 7'. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550.

See also Hadden v. People, 25 N. Y.

372.
5. In an indictment for kidnapping,
it is not necessary to constitute the
crime that physical force or violence
should be used on the person kid-
napped. Falsely exciting her fears by
threats, fraud, etc., amounting sub-
stantially to a coercion of the will, is
sufficient. In determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused, the jury
should take into consideration the con-
dition of the person kidnapped, her
age, education and state of mind at the
time, the object of the defendants in
removing her from the State, and all
the circumstances surrounding the case
as detailed in the evidence. Moody v.
People, 20 Ill. 315; Payson v. Macom-
ber, 3 Allen 69.

6. People v. DeLeon, 109 N. Y. 226; Schnicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 192.

Procuring the intoxication of a sailor with the design of getting him on ship

charge of kidnapping.

The consent of a person of unsound mind, or of a child, would not avail.1

2. The Indictment.-See note 2.

KILL.—A Dutch word signifying a channel or bed of the river, and hence the river or stream itself.3

KIN--(See NEXT; KINDRED; ISSUE; RELATIONS).—The word "kin," in its strictest sense, includes only relations by blood; but, in a general sense, it is used to include both relations by blood and marriage.4

KIND.-A payment of money, the delivery or deposit of an object, as of rent, or services rendered, are made or rendered "in kind," when of a thing or services which correspond in class or general nature to that intended.5 (See note 6.)

board without his consent, and taking him on board in that condition, is kidnapping, under our (N. Y.) statute (2 R. S., p. 664, § 28); and it is immaterial whether the offender did the acts, or any of them, in person, or caused them to be done. Hadden v. The People, 25 N. Y. 372.

1. A child of the age of nine years is incapable of giving a valid assent to a forcible transfer of him by a stranger, from the legal custody of his mother, who had no right thereto; and evidence of such assent is incompetent in defence to an indictment for an assault and battery upon him in making such transfer. Com. v. Nickerson, 5 Allen (Mass.) 518; Gravett v. State, 74 Ga. 191; Com. v. Davenport, I Leigh (Va.) 588; State v. Farrar, 41 N. H. 53; U. S. v. Aucarola, 17 Blatchf. 423; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; Com. v. Robinson, Thacher Crim. Cas. 488.

2. State v. Backarow, 38 La. An. 316. Intent. In Wisconsin, it is held that the intent must be alleged. Smith v. State, 63 Wis. 453. See also Mayo v. See also Mayo v. State, 43 Ohio St. 567.

Where Indictment Should be Found.In Delaware, on an indictment found and tried in Kent county, for aiding and assisting to kidnap and carry away a negro man froin the State, it was proved that the negro was seized in Kent and carried through Sussex into Maryland. Held, that the indictment was properly found in Kent county. The State v. Whaley, 2 Harr. (Del.) 538.

Freedom.-The allegation of freedom, as contained in an indictment for kidnapping, is a substantive allegation, and must be proved. State v. Griffin, 3 Harr. (Del.) 539.

Language of Statute.-An indictment for kidnapping, under the statute of Indiana, is sufficient, if the offence is described in the language of the statute. State v. McRoberts, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 178.

An indictment which charges that the defendant, with force and arms, took a negro slave from the field and possession of the owner, does not charge an indictable offence. State v. Watkins, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 256.

Harboring and Concealing.--An indictment for kidnapping a child may contain counts charging the kidnapping, and also the harboring and concealing it with a knowledge that it was enticed away. Com. 7. Westervelt, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 461.

3. French v. Carhart, 1 N. Y. 96. It has no definite legal meaning.

4. Hibbard . Odell, 16 Wis. 635, where a justice of the peace was held disqualified from trying a cause to which his son in law was a party.

One whose father was a second cousin to defendant's mother was held to have been properly rejected as a juror under a section of the Rev Stat. prohibiting any person "of kin" to the defendant from serving. State v. Walton, 74 Mo. 271.

5. Anderson's Law Dict.

In Wilson v. State, 51 Ark. 213, it is said: "The commission is payable as the statute expresses it 'in kind' which means that it shall be paid in the same kind of funds that the collector has legally received in payment of the tax, thereby making each fund bear its proportion of the expense of collection.

6. In Francis v. Maas, 3 Q. B. D. 341; s. c., 26 W. R. 422, it is said: "Now, construing the word 'kind' according to the meaning given to it in the standard

KINDRED.—A man's kindred, in the proper signification of the word, means such persons as are related to him by blood.1 But the word is not always necessarily confined to blood relations. but may include a relation in law. It has, however, been held to mean lawful kindred.3

dictionaries, the act cannot be taken to apply to something done with the object of improving the appearance of the seed without introducing foreign substances in it, and passing it off as a thing substantially different from that which it is.. Without express words I do not think that we can treat the word 'quality' as synonymous with 'kind.'" For the point decided in this case, see ANOTHER.

In Whitehall Mfg. Co. v. Wise Bros., 119 Pa. St. 484 (s. c., 21 W. N. C. 268; 13 Atl. Rep. 299), it was held no error for the court below to use the word "grade" as synonymous with "kind." "We can see no difference in the words themselves as expressive of the same idea. The word 'grade' is perhaps somewhat more technical, but it is perfectly manifest that the classification of the lumber into numbered grades, as Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, was in the trade a practical division of it into different kinds. At any rate this was the sense in which the witnesses and the court used the word 'grade,' and the jury could not be misled by it. It is a mere play upon words to say that because 'grade' means also 'quality,' therefore only quality was meant when the word grade was used, and the context both of the testimony and charge fully illustrates that no such confusion was intended or expressed."

"Kind of property," in an act referring to exemptions from rating, "refers to the sort of property, not to its locality." Tate v. Carlisle Board, 2 El. & Bl. 512. See also Toxteth Park Guardians v. Toxteth Park Board, 1 B. & S. 167, 176.

1. Wetter v. Walker, 62 Ga. 144, quoting 2 Wms. Exrs. 815.

The kindred by affinity of a poor person cannot maintain complaint against the father of such person for expenses of support, the term "any

kindred" in the Rev. Stat., extending only to kindred by consanguinity. Farr v. Flood, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 24.

So in Leigh v. Leigh. 15 Ves. 107, it is said: "In a general sense the being of a man's kindred is being of his blood: as the word 'consanguinity,' which is the same as 'kindred, imports."

2. Power v. Hafley (Ky.), 4 S. W. Rep. 683, where it was held to include children by adoption.

In Delano v. Benerton, 148 Mass. 619 (s. c., 20 N. E. Rep. 309), it was held that an adopted child who is at the same time the grandson of the adopting father, cannot inherit the property of his grandfather in a twofold capacity. as his son and as his grandson. The court said: "He claims the right to inherit, under the first part of the section. as his son, and under the last clause because he is included among his 'kindred,' when the legislature provided that no person should, by being adopted, lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or kindred. We do not think it understood or intended that 'kindred' should include the adopting parent. It intended to save the right of inheritance from other parties, having already provided as to the right of inheritance from the adopting parents."

3. Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153. where the mother of an illegitimate child was held not to be of its “kindred.” Half-blood.-Massachusetts Gen. St.. ch. 91, § 5, providing that "kindred of the half-blood shall inherit equally with

those of the whole blood in the same degree," must be construed as meaning to admit the kindred of the half-blood relation in the different degrees to participation in personalty with those of the whole blood in the same degree. Larrabee v. Tucker, 116 Mass.

562. 521

KNOW KNOWING.1-(See KNOWLEDGE; KNOWN). Knowingly, in an indictment, is a sufficient averment of knowledge.2 Its presence is frequently supplied, however, by the use of other words; 3 but not by "unlawfully." It ordinarily refers to guilty knowledge. The offence of "knowingly and wilfully”

1. In a statute that provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to geld any animal knowing that such animal is kept, or intended to be kept, for covering mares." the word "knowing" does not imply exact knowledge. "I think that notice in its legal acceptation is what the statute requires. It is such information as would lead a prudent man to believe that the fact existed; and that if followed by enquiry must bring knowledge of the fact home to him." Tucker v. Constable, 16 Oreg. 409; s. c., 19 Pac. Rep. 13.

In a statute rendering the officers of a corporation liable for its debts who sign an annual report "knowing it to be false," these words "import a wilful misrepresentation with actual knowledge of its falsity and not merely such constructive knowledge as can be imputed from the presumption that the officer signing the report knew the law and comprehended the precise import of the language used, when construed with reference to statutory provisions.' Pier v. Hanmore, 86 N. Y. 95.

Where it is made an offence to bring a "poor and indigent" person into another county, "knowing him to be poor and indigent," the knowledge spoken of implies a culpable intent. Sullivan Co. v. Grafton Co., 55 N. H. 339; Merrimack Co. v. Sullivan Co., 45 N. H. 181.

The statement "we know them to be good," on which some promissory notes were sold, held to constitute a guaranty that the notes were good and collectible at maturity. Un. Nat. Bk. v. 1st Nat. Bk., 45 Ohio St. 236.

"Well knowing" in a will is sufficient to create a trust. Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9 Sim. 323.

2. 1 Chit. Crim. L. 174; 2 Stra. 904,

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to or from an illicit distillery, the court said: "The distinction in this case is sought to be founded on the absence of the word 'knowingly.' But it would be more in harmony with the purview of the whole section and with the natural meaning of the words 'suffer' and 'permit' to hold that the word 'knowingly,' where it occurs, can have no reasonable meaning as adding to the force of the words suffer' and 'permit,' and should be rejected there as surplusage. Every definition of 'suffer' and 'permit' includes knowledge of what is to be done under the sufferance and permission, and intention that what is done is what is to be done."

"Knowingly permits" implies consent as well as knowledge. State v. Stafford, 67 Me. 125.

"This appeared from the general scope of the act and from the nature of the evils to be avoided, and I am not aware of any other way in which it is possible to determine whether the word 'knowingly' is or is not to be implied in the definition of a crime in which it is not expressed." not expressed." 2 Steph. Dist. Cr. L. Eng. 117.

4. State v. Stalls, 37 Tex. 440; State v. Arnold, 39 Tex. 74.

Nor by "fraudulently and unlawfully." Rex. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 536.

5. Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 114, where in interpreting the expression in an act, "If any owner, consignee or agent shall knowingly make an entry of goods by means of any false invoice," the court held that this meant if such person shall make such entry of goods knowing that the invoice does not express their actual market valueswearing falsely and knowing it.

In the charge of the court below it is said: "I do not feel at liberty when the legislature has left out the word 'fraudulently' and inserted the word 'knowingly' to reinstate the word 'fraudulent.' At the same time I am bound to say that I cannot conceive any case where an entry could be knowingly made by means of a false invoice unless it were fraudulently made. fraudulently made. . . . What, then, shall we understand by this word knowingly' as here employed? It is

that in making out this invoice and in swearing before the consul that such was the actual market value of the goods the claimant knew better and that he was swearing falsely." Upon this the upper court remark: "The court below was pressed to instruct the jury that 'knowingly' is used in the statute as the synonym of fraudulently. The instruction given was eminently just, and we have nothing to add to it."

There was held to be no real difference in meaning between "knowingly" and "with intent to defraud the revenue," in 1209 Quarter Casks etc., 2 Ben. (U. S.) 249.

And see U. S. v. Baker, 5 Ben. (U. S.) 25, 32.

See contra, U. S. v. McKim, 3 Pittsb. (Pa.) 155.

In interpreting an act imposing a penalty on any inspector of elections who "shall knowingly receive or sanction the reception of a vote from any person not having all the qualifications of an elector, the court said: "The most that reason or justice could require of them was a bona fide effort to discharge their duties according to the best of their knowledge and ability; and if in so doing they committed an obvious but sincere mistake of the law or error of judgment they are not criminally responsible therefor. The law only required of them true candor and sincerity, and it will only punish them for corruption and falsehood-for acting contrary to their own sense of duty and the dictates of their own consciences. In this sense we understand the word 'knowingly' to be used in the statute; that is, knowing that their duty and the obligation of their oaths commanded them to act otherwise. It is the wicked intent or corrupt motive which the laws punish as a crime, and it cannot be supposed that it was the intention of the legislature, in this instance, to substitute for them the upright but misdirected efforts of the mind or judgment of one whose action was not voluntary but in obedience to the requirements of the law. The maxim that ignorance of the law will not excuse could only be applied to this case so far as to prevent the plaintiffs in error from setting up their ignorance of the penalties inflicted by it as an excuse for their wilful violation of the duties which it imposed upon them. This they clearly could not do. Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519, 527.

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Whereas, in construing the expression in a statute, "Any person who shall knowingly vote at any election not being at the time a qualified voter, etc.," the court said: "If we . . conjec ture that the word knowingly' in the mind of the legislature had some reference to the qualifications of the voter, we deem it safest to suppose, as well as most probable, that they did not intend to violate a fundamental principle of the criminal law, but to provide that if the party voting know the existence of a state of facts which disqualify him in point of law (and that law he is held not to be ignorant of), then he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. If the voter believe himself to be twenty-one years of age when he is not, and vote, he does not know the existence of the disqualifying fact and may on that ground be excused. But if he know that he is only twenty years of age yet believes he is old enough in point of law to vote, such ignorance of the law will not excuse him." McGuire v. State, 7 IIumph. (Tenn.) 54. See to the same effect State v. Boyett, 10 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 336, where the words in the statute were "knowingly and fraudulently."

In U. S. 7. Highleyman, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 138, the court charged: "The language of the law is, 'who knowingly demands or receives any greater sum than he is entitled to by law. By the use of the word knowingly something more is meant than what is implied in the legal presumption that every man must know the law. In order to find the defendant guilty of demanding or receiving greater sums than he was entitled to under the law you should be satisfied that he knew he was violating the law, and the fact that he demanded or received the several amounts charged in the indictment is not of itself sufficient to sustain the indictment.”

Where a statute provided that "Every person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent, etc., to another who shall have committed any offence, etc., who shall be convicted of knowingly harboring or relieving such other person with intent that he shall escape or avoid detention. etc., shall be imprisoned," it was held that to constitute a violation of this statute the person harboring must know that such other person has committed an offence, and must intend to shield such other person from the law. State v. Davis, 14 R. I. 281. The court said: "If the statute is not to be so construed the word 'know

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