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ating implements of housebreaking, would comprehend a skeleton key, and any kind of key capable of being employed for purposes of housebreaking."
The keys of a house follow the inheritance, but they are not fixtures so as not to be the subjects of larceny.2
The delivery of the key of a warehouse in which goods are lodged is good as a symbolical delivery of the goods, so as to divest the vendor's possession and lien.3
KIDNAPPING—(See ABDUCTION; FALSE IMPRISONMENT).
1. Definition.—Kidnapping is the unlawful removal of a man, woman or child from their own country or state against their will.4
Force.—The use of physical force is not necessary to constitute the offence; it is sufficient if the person be coerced by threats,5 or induced by fraudulent representations to give consent.6
Consent.--The consent of a person of mature years, in the absence of duress, fraud or mental incapacity, would negative the
1. Reg. v. Oldham, 14 Eng. L. & offence. Click 7. State, 3 Tex. 282; Eq. 568; s. C., 2 Den. Cr. C. 472, where Moody v. People, 20 Ill. 315; Smith v. it is held that keys are implements of State, 63 Wis. 453; State v. Whaley, 2 housebreaking within 14 and 15 Vict..ch. Harr. (Del.) 538; Hamilton v. Com., 19, § 1; for though commonly used for 3 Pa. 142; Thomas v. Com., 2 Leigh lawful purposes they are capable of being (Va.) 741. employed for purposes of housebreak- The taking of a prisoner in another ing, and it is a question for the jury State or country without a requisition is whether the person found in possession kidnapping. Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U. S. of them by night had them without 436; Com. 7. Blodgett, 12 Met. (Mass.) lawful excuse, and with the intention of 56. using them as implements of house- In New Ham;"shire, it was held that breaking
removal from the State was not necesIt is not housebreaking to enter by sary to constitute the offence. State r'. means of the key left in the door locked Rollins, 8 X. II. 550. on the outside. Alston v. Forrest, I See also Hadden v. People, 25 N. Y. Swint. (Sc.) 433.
372. 2. Hoskins 2. Tarrence, 5 Blackf. 5. In an indictment for kidnapping, (Ind.) 417
it is not necessary to constitute the 3. Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East 192; crime that physical force or violence Benj. on Sales, § 1043 (6th Am. ed.). should be used on the person kid.
4. 3 Bla. Com. 219; 1 Russ. Cr. (9th napped. Falsely exciting her fears by ed.) 962; 1 Whart. C.L. (8th ed.), 590; threats, fraud, etc., amounting sub2 Bish. C. L. (7th ed.), $ 750.
stantially to a coercion of the will, is At common law, the offence of kid- sufficient.
sufficient. In determining the guilt or napping is an aggravated species of innocence of the accused, the jury false imprisonment, and all the ingre- should take into consideration the condients in the definition of the latter are dition of the person kidnapped, her necessarily comprehended in the former. age, education and state of mind at the The requisites in an indictment would time, the object of the defendants in seem to be an allegation of an assault removing her from the State, and all and the carrying away or the trans- the circumstances surrounding the case porting of the party injured, from his as detailed in the evidence. Moody v'. own country into another, unlawfully People, 20 Ill. 315; Payson v. Macomand against his consent. It is not ber, 3 Allen 69. enough to charge the defendant with 6. People v. De Leon, 109 N. Y. 226; kidnapping generally; the indictment Schnicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 192. should allege specifically the facts and Procuring the intoxication of a sailor circumstances which constitute the with the design of getting him on shipcharge of kidnapping. The consent of a person of unsound mind, or of a child, would not avail.1
2. The Indictment. See note 2.
KILL.—A Dutch word signifying a channel or bed of the river, and hence the river or stream itself.3
KIN--(See NEXT; KINDRED; ISSUE; RELATIONS).—The word “kin,” in its strictest sense, includes only relations by blood; but, in a general sense, it is used to include both relations by blood and marriage.4
KIND.—A payment of money, the delivery or deposit of an object, as of rent, or services rendered, are made or rendered “in kind," when of a thing or services which correspond in class or general nature to that intended. (See note 6.) board without his consent, and taking Language of Statute.-An indictment him on board in that condition, is kid- for kidnapping, under the statute of napping, under our (N. Y.) statute (2 R. Indiana, is sufficient, if the offence is s., p. 664, § 28); and it is immaterial described in the language of the statute. whether the offender did the acts, or any State v. McRoberts, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) of them, in person, or caused them to be 178. done. Hadden v. The People, 25 N. Y. An indictment which charges that 372.
the defendant, with force and arms, 1. A child of the age of nine years is took a negro slave from the field and incapable of giving a valid assent to a possession of the owner, does not forcible transfer of him by a stranger, charge an indictable offence. State v. from the legal custody of his mother, Watkins, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 256. who had no right thereto; and evi- Harboring and Concealing.--An indence of such assent is incompetent in dictment for kidnapping a child may defence to an indictment for an assault contain counts charging the kidnapand battery upon him in making ping, and also the harboring and consuch
transfer. Com. Nicker- cealing it with a knowledge that it son, 5 Allen (Mass.) 518; Gravett v. was enticed away. Com. v. WesterState, 74 Ga. 191; Com. v. Daven- velt, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 461. port, I Leigh (Va.) 588; State 7. 3. French 7. Carhart, i N. Y. 96. It Farrar 41
has no definite legal meaning. Aucarola, 17 Blatchf. 423; State ?'. 4. Ilibbard 7'. Odell, 16 Wis. 635, Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; Com. 7'. Robin- where a justice of the peace was held son, Thacher Crim. Cas. 488.
disqualified from trying a
to 2. State v. Backarow, 38 La. An. 316. which his son in law was a party.
Intent.-In Wisconsin, it is held that One whose father was a second cousin the intent must be alleged. Smith v. to defendant's mother was held to have State, 63 Wis. 453.
See also Mayo v. been properly rejected as a juror under State, 43 Ohio St. 567.
a section of the Rev Stat. prohibiting Where Indictment should be found.
any person "of kin” to the defendant In Delaware, on an indictment found from serving.
from serving. State v. Walton, 74 Mo. and tried in Kent county, for aiding 271. and assisting to kidnap and carry away
5. Anderson's Law Dict. a negro man froin the State, it was In Wilson v. State, 51 Ark. 213, it is proved that the negro was seized in said: “The commission is payable as Kent and carried through Sussex into the statute expresses it 'in kind' which Maryland. Held, that the indictment means that it shall be paid in the same was properly found in Kent county. kind of funds that the collector has leThe State v. Whaley, 2 Harr. (Del.) gally received in payment of the tax, 538.
thereby making each fund bear its proFreedom.—The allegation of freedom, portion of the expense of collection. as contained in an indictment for kid- 6. In Francis v. Maas, ? Q. B. D. 341; napping, is a substantive allegation, and s. C., 26 W. R. 422, it is said: “Now, must be proved. State v. Griffin, 3 construing the word 'kind' according to Ilarr. (Del.) 539.
the meaning given to it in the standard
KINDRED.--A man's kindred, in the proper signification of the word, means such persons as are related to him by blood.1 But the word is not always necessarily confined to blood relations, but may include a relation in law. It has, however, been held to mean lawful kindred.3
dictionaries, the act cannot be taken to kindred” in the Rev. Stat., extending apply to something done with the ob- only to kindred by consanguinity. ject of improving the appearance of the Farr v. Flood, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 24. seed without introducing foreign sub- So in Leigh v. Leigh, 15 Ves. 107, it stances in it, and passing it off as a thing is said: “In a general sense the being substantially different from that which of a man's kindred is being of his blood: it is... Without express words as the word 'consanguinity,' which is I do not think that we can treat the the same as 'kindred,' imports.” word 'quality as synonymous with 2. Power v. Hafley (Kr.), 4 S. W. ‘kind.'” For the point decided in this Rep. 683, where it was held to include case, see ANOTHER.
children by adoption. In Whitehall Mfg. Co. v. Wise Bros., In Delano v. Benerton, 148 Mass. 610 119 Pa. St. 484 (s. C., 21 W. N. C. (s. C., 20 N. E. Rep. 309), it was held 268; 13 Atl. Rep. 299), it was held no that an adopted child who is at the same error for the court below to use the time the grandson of the adopting word "grade" as synonymous with father, cannot inherit the property of "kind.” “We can see no difference in his grandfather in a twofold capacity. the words themselves as expressive of as his son and as his grandson. The the same idea. The word 'grade' is court said: "He claims the right to inperhaps somewhat more technical, but herit, under the first part of the section, it is perfectly manifest that the classifi- as his son, and under the last clause cation of the lumber into numbered because he is included among his ‘kingrades, as Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, was in the dred,' when the legislature provided trade a practical division of it into dif- that no person should, by being ferent kinds. At any rate this was the adopted, lose his right to inherit from sense in which the witnesses and the his natural parents or kindred. We do court used the word 'grade, and the not think it understood or intended jury could not be misled by it. It is a that ‘kindred' should include the adoptmere play upon words to say that be- ing parent. It intended to save the cause grade' means also‘quality,' there- right of inheritance from other parties, fore only quality was meant when the having already provided as to the right word grade was used, and the context of inheritance from the adopting parboth of the testimony and charge fully ents.” illustrates that no such confusion was 3. Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153, intended or expressed."
where the mother of an illegitimate “Kind of property,” in an act referring child was held not to be of its “kindred." to exemptions from rating, “refers to Half-blood.— Massachusetts Gen. St.. the sort of property, not to its locality.” ch.91, § 5, providing that “kindred of Tate v. Carlisle Board, 2 El. & Bl. 512. the half-blood shall inherit equally with See also Toxteth Park Guardians v. those of the whole blood in the same deToxteth Park Board, 1 B. & S. 167, 176. gree," must be construed as meaning
1. Wetter v. Walker, 62 Ga. 144, to admit the kindred of the half-blood quoting 2 Wms. Exrs. 815.
relation in the different degrees to The kindred by affinity of a poor per- participation in personalty with those son cannot maintain
a complaint of the whole blood in the same deagainst the father of such person for gree. Larrabee v. Tucker, 116 Mass. expenses of support, the term “any562.
KNOW-KNOWING.1—(See KNOWLEDGE; KNOWN).
Knowingly, in an indictment, is a sufficient averment of knowledge. Its presence is frequently supplied, however, by the use of other words ; 3 but not by “unlawfully.” ” 4 It ordinarily refers to guilty knowledge. The offence of “knowingly and wilfully”
1. In a statute that provides that "it to or from an illicit distillery, the court shall not be lawful for any person or said: “The distinction in this case is persons to geld any animal knowing sought to be founded on the absence of that such animal is kept, or intended to the word “knowingly. But it would be be kept, for covering mares,” the word more in harmony with the purview of “knowing” does not imply exact the whole section and with the natural knowledge. “I think that notice in its meaning of the words 'suffer' and 'perlegal acceptation is what the statute re- miť to hold that the word “knowingly,' quires. It is such information as would where it occurs, can have no reasonable lead a prudent man to believe that the meaning as adding to the force of the fact existed; and that if followed by en- words 'suffer' and 'permit,' and should quiry must bring knowledge of the fact be rejected there as surplusage. home to him.” Tucker v. Constable, 16 Every definition of 'suffer' and 'permit Oreg. 409; s. C., 19 Pac. Rep. 13.
includes knowledge of what is to be In a statute rendering the officers of a done under the sufferance and permiscorporation liable for its debts who sign sion, and intention that what is done is an annual report “knowing it to be what is to be done." false,” these words “import a wilful “Knowingly permits” implies consent misrepresentation with actual knowl- as well as knowledge. State v. Stafford, edge of its falsity and not merely such 67 Me. 125. constructive knowledge as can be im- “This appeared from the general puted from the presumption that the scope of the act and from the nature of officer signing the report knew the law the evils to be avoided, and I am not and comprehended the precise import aware of any other way in which it is of the language used, when construed possible to determine whether the word with reference to statutory provisions.” “knowingly' is or is not to be implied in Pier v. Hanmore, 86 N. Y. 95.
the definition of a crime in which it is Where it is made an offence to bring not expressed.” 2 Steph. Dist. Cr. L. a “poor and indigent” person into an- Eng. 117. other county, “knowing him to be poor 4. State v. Stalls, 37 Tex. 440; State and indigent,” the knowledge spoken of V. Arnold, 39 Tex. 74. implies a culpable intent. Sullivan Co. Nor by "fraudulently and unlawfully.” 7. Grafton Co., 55 N. H. 339; Merri. Rex. 7!. Jukes, 8 T. R. 536. mack Co. v. Sullivan Co., 45 N. H. 5. Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. 181.
S.) 114, where in interpreting the exThe statement "we know them to be pression in an act, “If any owner, congood,” on which some promissory notes signee or agent shall knowingly make were sold, held to constitute a guaranty an entry of goods by means of any false that the notes were good and collectible invoice," the court held that this meant at maturity. Un. Nat. Bk. v. ist Nat. if such person shall make such entry of Bk., 45 Ohio St. 236.
goods knowing that the invoice does “Well knowing" in a will is sufficient not express their actual market valueto create a trust. Bardswell v. Bards- swearing falsely and knowing it. well, 9 Sim. 323.
In the charge of the court below it is 2. i Chit. Crim. L. 174; 2 Stra. 904, said: “I do not feel at liberty when the
legislature has left out the word 'fraud3. Commonwealth v. Hulbert, 12 ulently' and inserted the word 'knowMetc. (Mass.) 446, where the words ingly' to reinstate the word 'fraudulent.' used were "designedly and unlawfully At the same time I am bound to say did falsely pretend,” etc.
that I cannot conceive any case where In Gregory z'. U. S., 17 Blatchf. (U. an entry could be knowingly made by S.) 325, in construing a statute forfeit- means of a false invoice unless it were ing the property of one who has per- fraudulently made. ... What, then, mitted or suffered his premises to be shall we understand by this word used for purposes of ingress or egress ‘knowingly' as here employed? It is
that in making out this invoice and in Whereas, in construing the expresswearing before the consul that such sion in a statute, “Any person who shall was the actual market value of the knowingly vote at any election not goods the claimant knew better and being at the time a qualified voter, etc.," that he was swearing falsely.” Upon the court said: “If we
conjec this the upper court remark: "The ture that the word 'knowingly' in the court below was pressed to instruct the mind of the legislature had some referjury that “knowingly' is used in the ence to the qualifications of the voter, statute as the synonym of fraudu- we deem it safest to suppose, as well as lently. The instruction given was emi- most probable, that they did not intend nently just, and we have nothing to add to violate a fundamental principle of to it.”
the criminal law, but to provide that if There was held to be no real differ- the party voting know the existence of ence in meaning between “knowingly” a state of facts which disqualify him in and "with intent to defraud the reve- point of law (and that law he is held not nue," in 1209 Quarter Casks etc., 2 to be ignorant of), then he shall be guilty Ben. (U. S.) 249.
of a misdemeanor. If the voter believe And see U.S. v. Baker, 5 Ben. (U. himself to be twenty-one years of age S.) 25, 32.
when he is not, and vote, he does not See contra, U. S. v. McKim, 3 Pittsb. know the existence of the disqualifying (Pa.) 155.
fact and may on that ground be excused. In interpreting an act imposing a But if he know that he is only twenty penalty on any inspector of elections years of age yet believes he is old who “shall knowingly receive or sanc- enough in point of law to vote, such tion the reception of a vote from any ignorance of the law will not excuse person not having all the qualifications him."
him.” McGuire v. State, 7 llumph. of an elector, the court said: "The most (Tenn.) 54. See to the same effect that reason or justice could require of State z'. Boyett, 10 Ired. L. (N. Car.) them was a bona fide effort to discharge 336, where the words in the statute were their duties according to the best of “knowingly and fraudulently." their knowledge and ability; and if in so In U. S. 7'. Highley man, 22 Int. Rev. doing they committed an obvious but Rec. 138, the court charged: “The lansincere mistake of the law or error of guage of the law is, 'who knowingly dejudgment they are not criminally re- mands or receives any greater sum than sponsible therefor. The law only re- he is entitled to by law. By the use of quired of them true candor and sincer- the word 'knowingly? something more ity, and it will only punish them for is meant than what is implied in the corruption and falsehood—for acting legal presumption that every man must contrary to their own sense of duty and know the law. In order to find the the dictates of their own consciences. defendant guilty of demanding or receivIn this sense we understand the word ing greater sums than he was entitled ‘knowingly' to be used in the statute; to under the law you should be satisfied that is, knowing that their duty and the that he knew he was violating the law, obligation of their oaths commanded and the fact that he demanded or rethem to act otherwise. It is the wicked ceived the several amounts charged in intent or corrupt motive which the laws the indictment is not of itself sufficient punish as a crime, and it cannot be sup- to sustain the indictment." posed that it was the intention of the Where a statute provided that "Every legislature, in this instance, to substitute person not standing in the relation of for them the upright but misdirected husband or wife, parent, etc., to another efforts of the mind or judgment of one who shall have committed any offence, whose action was not voluntary but in etc., who shall be convicted of knowobedience to the requirements of the ingly harboring or relieving such other law. The maxim that ignorance of the person with intent that he shall escape law will not excuse could only be ap- or avoid detention, etc., shall be implied to this case so far as to prevent prisoned,” it was held that to constitute the plaintiffs in error from setting up a violation of this statute the person their ignorance of the penalties inflicted harboring must know that such other by it as an excuse for their wilful viola- person has committed an offence, and tion of the duties which it imposed upon must intend to shield such other person them. This they clearly could not from the law. State 2'. Davis, 14 R. I. do." Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519, 281. The court said: "If the statute is 527.
not to be so construed the word 'know