effecting any result applies to those who know that the acts performed will have that effect, and perform them with the intention that such shall be their operation.1 ingly' in the statute is superfluous, having no meaning which is not necessarily implied without it. . . . The offence, therefore, subject to the alterations effected by the statute, ought to be deemed to have the character of the common law offence. If so, then knowledge on the part of the accessory, not only that the principal offence had been committed, but also that the person harbored had committed it, was a necessary ingredient in the accessory offence. We think there can be no doubt that the word 'knowingly, as used in the section, was intended to have that meaning. The section in its present form increases the punishment, but in another respect it mitigates the severity of the law. . . . It also expresses what was probably before implied, that the guilt is incurred only when there is an intent to shield the principal offender from the law. These are the only alterations worthy of note which are apparent. Now the question is whether by reason of these alterations, the word 'knowingly' has acquired a different meaning from what it previously had. It seems to us that we must assume that the old word has the old meaning until it is clearly apparent that it was meant to have another. We do not find any sufficient indication that a different meaning was intended." So, as to incurring a penalty for hindering or obstructing an arrest. Driskill v. Parrish, 3 McLean (U. S.) 631, 636. "He must act 'knowingly,' which presupposes a knowledge of such facts as authorize an arrest. If he act in ignorance of these facts he does not act knowingly.'" "And the same principle applies in the case of a rescue. To bring an individual within the statute he must have knowledge that the colored persons are fugitives from labor, or he must act under such circumstances as show that he might have had such knowledge by exercising ordinary prudence." Giltner v. Gorham, 4 McLean (U. S.) 402. In an action to recover penalties imposed by statute upon "whoever shall knowingly" do certain acts, it was held that knowledge could not be imputed to the defendant from the acts of others and their agency for or relation to him. "The term 'knowingly,' in an action like this, must undoubtedly be held to mean actual personal knowledge. The term 'knowingly' was used to designate the persons upon whom the penalty should be imposed; and it is not to be enlarged or extended so as to meet any supposed mischief which the statute was intended to guard against and prevent." Verona Cen. Cheese Factory v. Murtaugh, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 17, 22. 1. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482. And in U. S. 7. Claypool, 14 Fed. Rep. 127, it is said: "The terms knowingly and wilfully,' employed in the law and in the indictment, have the common and usual meaning attached to them, and are intended to signify that defendant ... at the time of committing the offence charged against him, must have known what he was doing, and that with such knowledge he proceeded to commit the violations of law with which he is charged. . The offence here denounced is the knowing and wilful obstructing the passage of the mail. I have already spoken of the meaning of the terms 'knowingly and wilfully,' and add, by way of further explanation, that they are used in contradistinction to innocent, ignorant or unintentional; so that defendant by the acts he did may have obstructed and retarded the mail in its passage yet he is not guilty under the law if he did it innocently and without intending to do so. There is a distinction between the act of obstructing done while in pursuit of a legitimate or innocent object, and being done while committing an unlawful act." And see Meireilles v. Banning, 2 B. & Ad. 909, where the offence of "wittingly, wilfully or knowingly" detaining letters, was taken "to denote acts done with a conscious mind that the party is doing wrong," and not to apply to the case of a postmaster who de livered letters to the assignee of a bankrupt believing bona fide that he was entitled to them. These words do not mean "that the person must be shown to have known what the law was and to have acted wilfully against it. Every man is presumed and must be held to know the law." A Quantity of Dist. Spirits, For the grammatical force of the word, see note I. 3 Ben. (U. S.) 559, where it was held that where a rectifier knew that stamps on barrels were not cancelled, and it was his will, freely exercised, that they should not be cancelled when the barrels were emptied, he had "knowingly and wilfully" neglected to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Act. Where the defendant was indicted for "knowingly and wilfully" cutting and carrying away trees on the land of another without his consent, and the court below charged the jury and "knowingly" and "wilfully" were in law synonymous terms, and that the defendant was guilty if he did the act "knowingly," it was held there was no "Whether the criticism on the language of the judge, in saying, in his charge, that the words "knowingly" and "wilfully" are in law synonymous, be just as a question of philology, is of no sort of consequence in this case, because the indictment follows the precise words of the statute, and that is entirely sufficient." Welsh v. State, II Tex. 368, 374. 1. An indictment, under Rev. St. U. S., § 3893, charging that the defendant did "knowingly deposit" for mailing and delivery certain obscene pictures, etc., is not open to the objection that it is not alleged that the defendant knew the character of that which he deposited. United States v. Clark, 37 Fed. Rep. 106. "Doubtless the question turns largely on whether the word 'knowingly, as used in the statute and the indictment, qualifies simply the adjacent verb 'deposit,' or the whole maiter described. It may be conceded that ordinarily an adverb is understood as qualifying its adjacent verb; and yet that is not always true; and in construing words and sentences used in an indictment we are to give them their ordinary significance, in the absence of some technical construction necessarily imposed upon them. Now, it is a familiar use of the adverb knowingly' that it qualifies both its adjacent verb and the full act thereafter described. A few simple illustrations will make this clear. I say that a party knowingly told a lie. Everyone understands from that that I mean that the party has stated that which he knew to be a lie, and not simply that he stated that which was in fact untrue, yet unknown to hiin to be untrue. And in the same way, when I say that a party knowingly de- See contra United States v. Slenker, which it is an essential element. The indictment is, therefore, fatally defective because it does not describe in apt and technical terms any criminal act for which the defendant can be held responsible, or upon which any valid judgment can be rendered." KNOWLEDGE (See BELIEF; CARNAL KNOWLEDGE; KNOWN). -The difference between "knowledge" and "belief" is in the degree of certainty. "Knowledge" is nothing more than a man's alleged in the indictment would be confined to the act of mailing. The adjectives 'dangerous and explosive' would intervene between the fact of which she is alleged to have knowledge, and separate it from the subject of which she must be charged with having guilty knowledge, and a description of that subject. The court is of opinion that the indictment does not set forth the offence with clearness and all necessary certainty, so as to apprise the accused of the crime with which she stands charged, and every ingredient of which the offence is composed is not accurately and clearly alleged. It is defective because it does not allege that the defendant knew that the writings, papers, etc., which she is charged with having deposited in the mail, for mailing and delivery, were of an obscene, lewd and lascivious character. This conclusion is clearly sustained by principle and precedent.' So in Commonwealth v. Boynton, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 499, it was held that an indictment for selling diseased, corrupted or unwholesome provisions, must distinctly aver that the vendor knew they were diseased, and that an allegation that he did "knowingly sell" such provisions, "without "without making fully known to the vendee that the same were diseased," was insufficient. "The word 'knowingly' does not apply to and qualify every act charged, essential to constitute the offence under the statute. Strictly speaking, and construing the language of the indictment according to the technical rules of pleading, it qualifies and gives significance only to the word 'sell,' so that in substance and legal effect, the averment is only that the act of sale was done by the defendant knowingly. But there is no allegation of any knowledge by him, at the time the sale was made, of the condition of the meat. The whole allegation might therefore be true, and yet the defendant might be innocent of any offence. The sale, of itself, is not made criminal, but it is the sale coupled with a knowledge of the diseased state of the thing sold which constitutes the offence. A person might well sell meat knowingly, and yet be wholly ignorant of its true condition. The averment of knowledge does not extend to each part of the description of the offence, in BREWER, J., in U. S. v. Clark, 37 Fed. Rep. 106 (cited supra) comments on these two cases as follows: "Can it be possible that the defendant was misled by the language of this indictment as to the exact offence with which he was charged? Did he for a moment suppose that he was charged with putting in the postoffice something of which he was entirely ignorant, or did he understand from the ordinary meaning of the language used that he was charged with putting in the postoffice an obscene picture-that which he knew to be obscene? I can have no doubt that he was fully informed as to the charge against him, and not in the slightest degree misled. I am fully aware that there are authorities which do not concur with this view, and yet I think those authorities adhere too closely to the rigor and technicality of the old common law practice, which, even in criminal matters, is yielding to the more enlightened enlightened jurisprudence of the present-a jurisprudence which looks evermore at the matter of substance and less at the matter of form. " And see U. S. v. Bennett, 16 Blatchf. (U. S.) 338, 352. In U. S. v. Chase, 27 Fed. Rep. 807, it was held that the omission of such an averment in the indictment was a defect that under § 1025 Rev. Stat. could not be taken advantage of at a late stage of the proceedings. In a complaint that an injury was caused "by the defendant negligently and carelessly omitting to keep its brakes on said train in good repair, and knowingly allowing the same to remain out of repair," it was held that the word "knowingly" qualified only the second clause. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Coulton (Ala.), 5 South. Rep. 458. "Knowingly" and "pass," as used in a statute denouncing the offence of uttering a forged instrument, are not words of technical signification, and the omission of the trial court to define the same to the jury was held not error. Peterson v. State, 25 Tex. App. 70. firm belief.1 Where "religion, morality and knowledge" are declared in the constitution to be essential to good government, the knowledge" referred to is "knowledge of the truth," and comprehends in itself all that is comprehended in the other two words "religion" and "morality."2 In the case of a bona fide purchaser there is a difference between the want of knowledge and the want of notice. He may have been notified without being made to know the prior right.3 The "knowledge" which renders the owner of a vessel liable for the negligence of the crew is some personal knowledge or means of knowledge of which he is bound to avail himself, of a contemplated loss, or of a condition of things likely to produce or contribute to the loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it.4 Personal knowledge of an allegation in an answer is a personal knowledge of its truth or falsity, and if the allegation is a negative one, this necessarily includes a knowledge of the truth or falsity of the allegation denied.5 KNOWN.-In order to constitute the exemption of coal lands contemplated by the pre-emption act under the head of "known mines," there must be ascertained coal deposits upon the land of such an extent and value as to make the land more valuable to be worked as a coal mine under the conditions existing at the time, than for merely agricultural purposes. So where in an 1. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. "Between mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference." Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, 124 U. S. 374. 2. Bd. of Educa. of Cincinnati z. Minor, 23 O. St. 211, where it was held that the constitution of the State did not enjoin or require religious instruction, or the reading of religious books, in the public schools of the State. 3. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert (Ala.), 1 South. Rep. 777. 4. Lord v. G. N. & P. S. Co., 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 292. 5. West v. Home Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 622. Where a party is allowed by the code to make supplemental pleadings alleging facts which may have come to his knowledge since the filing of the former pleading, he may allege a fact that could have been seen at a previous term of the court from other papers in the case on file, as the "knowledge" spoken of is actual, not constructive, knowledge. Peoples v. Carroll, I Heisk. (Tenn.) 417. An averment in an answer that defendant "hath no knowledge upon which to base a belief" was held defective in failing to state that he has also no information. "The two statutory words 'knowledge' and 'information' have not, as thus used, the same legal significance." Haney v. People (Colo.), 21 Pac. Rep. 39. An affidavit otherwise correct but closing with the words "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief," thereby qualifying the prior declarations contained therein, was held defective and insufficient but not void, so that the plaintiff was entitled after judgment, with the leave of the trial court, to make it positive and sufficient by amendment. Harrison v. Beard, 30 Kan. 532. "Means of Knowledge."- Constructive notice exists where a municipal corporation has had the means of knowledge for a sufficient time to have remedied a defect in the sidewalks. "It may be that the phrase 'means of knowledge' fairly includes case of neglect to anticipate and prevent certain defects, . but, with that exception we think the phrase applicable only to visible defects or obstructions. defects or obstructions that are open and notorious; so notorious as to be observable by all." City of Denver v. Deane (Colo.), 16 Pac. Řep. 30. 6. Colo. Coal Co. v. U. S., 123 U. application for a placer claim the failure to mention veins or lodes "known to exist" is made is made by statute a conclusive declaration that the applicant has no right to such veins or lodes, it is not enough that there may have been some indications by outcroppings on the surface of the existence of lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or other metal to justify their designation as "known" veins or lodes. To meet that designation the lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained and be of such extent as to render the land more valuable on that account, and justify their exploitation.1 Where an insurance policy contains S. 307 (s. c., 8 Sup. Ct. Repr. 140), where the court, after reviewing former cases, say: "It will thus be seen that, so far as the decisions of this court have heretofore gone, no lands have been held to be known mines' unless, at the time the rights of the purchaser accrued, there was upon the ground an actual and opened mine which had been worked or was capable of being worked. . . . It is not sufficient, in our opinion, to constitute known mines' of coal, within the meaning of the statute, that there should merely be indications of coal beds or coal fields of greater or less extent and of greater or less value, as shown by outcroppings. The circumstance that there are surface indications of the existence of veins of coal does not constitute a mine. It does not even prove that the land will ever be under any conditions sufficiently valuable on account of its coal deposits to be worked as a mine. A change in the conditions occurring subsequently to the sale, whereby new discoveries are made, or by means whereof it may become profitable to work the veins as mines, cannot affect the title as it passed at the time of the sale. The question must be determined according to the facts in existence at the time of the sale." And see the case of John Downs, 7 U. S. Pub. Land. Dec. 71. 1. U. S. v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 9 Sup. Ct. Repr. 195, 199; s. c., 128 U. S. 673. In Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, 124 U. S. 374 (s. c., 8 Sup. Ct. Repr. 603), it is said: "The question under this section, which must control and limit any conflicting exception expressed in the patent is, when can it be said that a vein or lode is known to exist' within the boundaries of a placer claim for which a patent is sought. The language of the statute appears to be sufficiently ntelligible in a general sense; and yet it becomes difficult of interpretation when applied to the determination of rights asserted to such veins or lodes from the possession, or absence, of such knowledge at the time application is made for the patent. At the outset, as stated when the case was here before, the enquiry must be whether the alleged knowledge must be traced to the applicant, or whether it is sufficient that the existence of the vein or lode was at the time of the application generally known. If general knowledge of such existence should be held sufficient, the inquiry would follow as to what would constitute such general knowledge, so as to create an exception to the grant, notwithstanding the ignorance of the patentee. Such suggestions indicate the difficulties of some of the questions which may arise in the application of the statute. The court below instructed the jury that it was unnecessary to declare what circumstances might be sufficient to affect a patentee with patentee knowledge as prescribed by the statute 'for, if, in any case, it appear that an application for a patent is made with intent to acquire title to a lode or vein which may exist in the ground beneath. the surface of a placer claim, it is believed a patent issued upon such application cannot operate to convey such lode or vein;' and further, that 'that intention could be formed only upon investigation as to the character of the ground, and the belief as to the existence of a valuable lode therein, which would amount to knowledge under the statute.' This instruction is plainly erroneous. The statute speaks of acquiring a patent with knowledge of the existence of a vein or lode within the boundaries of the claim for which a patent is sought, not the effect of the intent of the party to acquire a lode which may or may not exist, of which he has no knowledge. Nor does it |