the charterer; he is not obliged to deliver the cargo to or receive it from the boat upon the demand or request of the captain, but may suit his own convenience for doing this, provided he does not exceed the specified number of days allowed him.1 But if he detains the vessel longer he will have to pay demurrage for such excess of time at whatever rate per day the charter party stipulates.2 Such days allowed for a ship to load or discharge, in the absence of any stipulation in the charter party or otherwise, as to their commencement, or as to the time to be allowed for loading or unloading, commence to run and are to be reckoned from the 1. Poland v. Maryland Coal Co., 14 Blatchf. 519; 8 Ben. 347. Where the consignee was to have twenty running days after the vessel arrived at the port of her destination for unloading, and if detained longer he was to pay the owners $50 per day demurrage for every additional day he detained her. The consignee detained the vessel longer than the stipulated lay days, and while she was held on demurrage she was lost with the cargo. Held, that as the consignee did not unload and discharge the vessel within the specified time, and there was no impossibility to prevent him from so doing, and that the loss occurred without the default of the master or mariners, the owners were allowed to recover freight as well as the demurrage. Brown v. Ralston, 9 Leigh (Va.) 532; s. c., 4 Rand. 504. Under an agreement between a charterer and the owners the charterer was to have twenty-five days for unloading. The boat arrived and there being opportunity to unload the captain offered to discharge the cargo. The consignee declined to accept the offer, and, in the meantime, but within the twenty-five days, the boat was lost by storm in the harbor. Held, that there was no freight earned, as the consignee had the right to receive the goods any time he chose within the twenty-five days. Lacombie v. Waler, 4 Binn. (Pa.) 299. 2. Brown v. Ralston, 9 Leigh (Va.) 532; 4 Rand. 504; Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268. According to a charter party the charterers or their assigns were to have five working days in which to receive the cargo. She arrived in port on the 9th of March, the cargo was sold on the 10th, and the vessel entered by the charterers for a meter. She was not ordered by the harbor master to proceed to the pool for unloading until the 20th, and on Monday, the 22nd, she began unloading her cargo, and was cleared on the 27th. It seems that according to the factor's certificate she was a metered vessel, and that if she had not been on the metered list she could have proceeded to the pool at once and would not have been obliged to be entered for a meter and would not have sustained the delay by waiting until the 20th before it was her turn to go to the pool. It also appeared that occasionally it was the practice for the factor not to enter such vessels in the meter's list, and that it was desirable that the cargo should be sold subject to metage by a sworn meter. Held, that the vessel did not arrive at her place of discharge until the 20th, and that the lay days did not begin to run until then, and that the owner could not recover demurrage. Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498; 12 L. J. Exch. 101. It was stipulated in a charter party that a vessel was to go to Plymouth, not higher than S or N, or as near thereunto as she can safely get, and deliver the cargo, having certain lay and demurrage days. When she arrived the consignee ordered her to proceed to M, it being an ordinary landing place, and not so high as S or N. The tides were neap, and she went as near M as possible in that state of the tide. She was obliged to lay on the sand for several days before the tide became high enough to proceed to M. Held, that the naming of any landing-place within the port of Plymouth was optional with the consignee, provided he kept within the limits stated in the charter party and that the lay days did not begin until the ship reached the place thus designated, and the delay in reaching it was caused only by the ordinary course of navigation in a tidal harbor. Parker v. Winlow or Winlo, 7 El. & Bl. 942; 4 Jur., N. S. 63; S4 L. J., Q. B. 49. time she arrives at the usual place of discharge in the port and not when she first arrives at the port. If the loading or unloading place is within a dock they begin to run from the time she enters the dock, and not from the time she reaches some particular place in the dock to receive or discharge her cargo.2 In this case the only ground for holding the charterer or consignee liable for demurrage is some fault on his part by which the loading or receiving of the cargo is delayed longer than is necessary. 3 Each party must use reasonable dispatch in performing his part of the contract; for this reasonable time will always 1. Breeton v. Chapman, 7 Bing. 559; Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268; Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498; 12 L. J., Exch. 101; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. S5; Weaver v. Walton, 1 Flip C. Ct. 441; Manson v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co.. 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448; McIntosh v. Sinclair, II Ir. C. L. 456; Alward v. Smith, 2 Low. 192; Parker v. Winlow, 8 El. & B. 942; Hodgdon v. R. R. Co., 46 Conn. 277. This is the case when the cargo is brought by a general ship. But it may be otherwise when the charterer or consignee assumes all the obligations of the charter party. Gronstadt v. Whitthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265. If a vessel wishes to protect herself against delays not arising from the fault of the shipper or his agents, she must do so by stipulating for a stated period of discharge after arrival or for dispatch. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201. The charterer is not liable for detention caused by the vessel having to wait her turn to unload when the goods are such that they have to be discharged into bonded warehouses. Rodgers v. Torresters, 2 Camp. 483; Brumester v. Hodson, 2 Camp. 488. 2. Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268; McIntosh v. Sinclair, II Ir. L. S. 456 Exch.; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 89; Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331; Kell v. Anderson, Id. 498; Nelson v. Dahl, 12 Ch. Div. 568; Gibbens v. Buisson, I Bing. N. C. 283; Balley v. De Arrogave, 7 A. & E. 919. When the delivery by the terms of the charter party was to be made alongside the vessel within reach of her tackle and the consignee directed the captain to take the vessel to a certain dock, the working lay days commenced from the time she was in readiness alongside the dock to discharge her cargo. Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268. According to a charter party a vessel was to proceed direct to any Liverpool or Berkenhead dock, and there in the usual and customary manner take on a full and complete cargo of coal, and that she should be loaded at the rate of one hundred tons per working day, but that loading should not commence until after July 1st. She was ordered to the Wellington dock (a Liverpool dock) by the charterers, and was ready to enter it on July 3rd, but was not permitted to enter the dock until July 11th, because the coal agent whom the charterers had employed to furnish the coal had three vessels at that time inside the dock and two others booked to enter. The dock regulations would not allow a coal supplier to have more than three ships inside the dock at the same time, it being the usual custom to employ coal agents to furnish cargoes, and it appeared that the charterers had not made an unreasonable selection of the agent. Although she entered the dock July 11th, her turn to proceed to the spout to receive the coal did not arrive until July 23rd and loading began the day after. It also appeared that it was the usual custom to load coal from the spout, and also that it was not unusual to load from lighters. Held, that the lay days began to run when she entered the dock, and that they were not postponed until her turn arrived to go to the spout. Tapscott 7. Balfour, 42 L. J., C. P. 16; 8 L. R., C. P. 46; 21 W. R. 245; 27 L. T., N. S. 710. . 3. Fish v. 150 Tons Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Hayden 7. Whitmore, 74 Me. 230; Rodgers v. Torresters, 2 Camp. 483; Burmester v. Hodgson, 2 Camp. 488; Henley v. The Brooklyn Ice Co., 14 Blackf. C. Ct. 522; Schroll Albany Iron and Steel Co., 101 N. Y. 602; Finney v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 171; The L. Z. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655; The Mary Riley v. 3000 Tons Railroad Ties (D. C., E. D., Pa.), be implied, and this is always a question for the jury to determine from all the circumstances legitimately bearing upon the case.1 (b) When Specified in Charter.-If the parties stipulate as to when the lay days are to commence, or limit the time in which the loading or unloading or one of these operations is to be performed, they will be governed by such stipulation, and such limitation is construed in maritime law as a stipulation for the benefit of the ship, designed to cast upon the charterer or consignee all risk of detention beyond the stipulated period; and if the stipulation is for the discharging of cargo, the lay days commence from the time she arrives at the port and notifies the consignee that she is ready to discharge, he is bound to find a suitable place of discharge, and is liable if, she is detained longer than the 38 Fed. Rep. 254; Sweeting v. Darthez, 14 C. B. 538; Eng. L. & Eq. 326; Harris v. Dresman, Exch. 1854, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 526; Clendaniel v. Tuckerman, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 184. If the vessel is unnecessarily delayed by the fault of the consignee he is liable, although the charter party does not contain an agreement for demurrage. The Norman, 16 Fed. Rep. 879. In the absence of express stipulation it is the duty of the consignees to furnish within a reasonable time a suitable place for her discharge, and also to complete it within a reasonable time; and that the fact that a considerable number of vessels consigned to the charterers had arrived with cargoes about the same time and there was a delay in consequence in assigning her a birth was a circumstance for which the ship owners were not responsible. It was a risk the consignees themselves took when they agreed to freight the schooner. Esseltyne v. Elmore, 7 Biss. (U. S.) 69. In the absence of any express agreement for discharging, a vessel had to wait its turn at a grain elevator, it being the only one in the place. Held, that the consignees were not liable for the detention. Finney v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 171. In the absence of any express agreement the consignee is not liable for delay caused by the vessel waiting her turn to be unloaded at an elevator where it is the custom of the port that all grain shall be unloaded at an elevaWeaver v. Walton, 1 Flip C. Ct. 441. Where it is impossible for the consignee to receive the cargo by circumstances over which he has no control he is not liable to pay damages for the delay. Ford v. Coles worth, 39 L. Q. B. 188; 18 W. R. 1169; 23 L. T., N. S. 165; 5 L. R., Q. B. 544 Exch. Cham. Where a bill of lading fixed no period for the discharge of the cargo, the only obligation of the consignee or his vendee was to use due diligence in procuring a berth and to discharge, according to the custom of the trade. The Z. L. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655. If no lay days are provided for in the charter party or bill of lading, and no stipulation is made as to the time of unloading, the consignee will not be held liable for delays occurring without his fault. The Glover, 1 Brown Adm. 166. But where a charter party did not stipulate a certain number of lay days at the expiration of which demurrage was to run, yet it indicated the rate at which the cargo was to be discharged, to-wit: "Not less than one hundred tons per day." The total tonnage of the cargo was 1,808 tons, and dividing this by 100 made nineteen working days. The court held that this period was fixed with as much certainty as though nineteen working days had been written in the charter party as the number of lay days. Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; citing Sanquinetti v. P. S. Nav. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. Div. 238. 1. Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; The L. Z. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655; Fish v. 150 Tons Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Brown v. Certain Tons of Coal, 34 Fed. Rep. 913. 2. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Northam, 2. Ben. 1; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Ping, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352; Hayden v. A Whitmore, 74 Me. 230; Manson v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., C. C. D., Conn., 24 Blatchf. 448; 31 Fed. Rep. 297; Tiis v. Byers, 34 L. T., N. S. 526. Where it was stipulated that a vessel was to load at a certain port and proceed to the port of destination, the lay days to begin on a fixed day in a certain month, by common consent another port for the loading was substituted. Held, that the rest of the charter party was not changed and the lay days began at the stipulated time fixed by the charter party. Jackson v. Galloway, 5 Bing. N. C. 71. Where the charter provided that the lay days for discharge should commence from the time the vessel is ready to discharge cargo, and written notice thereof is given to the charterer's agent, and it appeared that the charterer had no agent at the port to whom such notice could be given, it was held that the charterer could not avail himself of the absence of the written notice, because he was chargeable with negligence for having no agent to whom the notice could be given. Hatton v. De Belaunzaran, 26 Fed. Rep. 780. A charter party provided, among other things, that the cargo might consist of empty petroleum barrels and iron rails, to be carried to New York, and also provided that the cargo should be discharged in the same berth where the rails should be discharged. The respondent's barrels were shipped under a bill of lading which, among other things, provided that the barrels should be taken free from on board the vessel in four running days with demurrage at £10 per day for longer detention, and contained a clause, "all other things as per charter party." The vessel arrived at the port of New York on May 21st, ISSO, and upon the request of the owner of the rails went to the one basin to discharge her cargo, and not being able to reach the wharf, moored alongside another vessel. The barrels were above the rails. She remained practically in this position until the afternoon of May 31st, waiting to reach the wharf. The barrel owners having been notified on the 25th of her arrival, obtained an order for the delivery of the barrels on the 26th from the vessel's agent, and being informed that the vessel was at the Erie basin, said that they would send a lighter. On the 27th the owners notified the vessel's agent that there was no lighter alongside the vessel to put the barrels on the dock. The agent replied that he was willing to do so if the owners would arrange with the dock owners to receive them there (the wharf owners having refused to receive them on their wharf), and at the same time notified the owners he should hold them responsible for detention if they did not get the barrels out by the night of the 29th. Nothing more was done by the owners until the morning of the 31st, when they sent a lighter and the barrels were delivered over. Her four days were occupied in delivering to the lighter. It was held that the ship owner was not in fault, because in selecting a place for the delivery of the cargo in conformity with the contract of the parties, he selected one that was not altogether convenient for the barrel owners. That the lay days began to run after the ship reached the berth to which she was directed by the consignees of the rails, and that the detention of the ship was caused by the barrel owners' delay. The ship owner was allowed four days' demurrage. Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 21 Fed. Rep. 253; 15 Fed. Rep. 265. A ship was chartered to go to a certain point and there load with timber. The charter party provided that "from the computation of time allowed for delivering the cargo to the ship shall be excluded any time lost by reason of drought." It appeared that it was customary to float the timber down to this point for shipment from the interior in the creeks and rivers, and that by reason of an extraordinary drought the charterers' timber could not be floated down to this point, or at least necessitated transportation in such small quantities and with such delay the loading and shipping of timber at this point, and that while a drought did affect the interior creeks and rivers, it in no wise affects the waters at the point or the booms where the timber was kept or the transportation of it from the booms to the ship at anchor. Held, that the stipulation with reference to the drought applied to the creeks from which the supply of timber for shipment at this point came, and that in view of the particular port and trade to which the contract related and that the drought prevented or delayed the delivery of the cargo to the ship, the charterers and cargo are released from any liability for demurrage by the exceptions in the charter party. Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. Rep. 682. specified period, no matter from It was stipulated in a bill of lading that "cargo to be discharged with quick dispatch as customary or to pay demurrage at £5 per day. Held, that if the custom of the port made it the duty of the consignees to obtain a place for the discharging of the cargo, they were liable for demurrage occasioned by their refusing to do so after they had accepted the cargo. Terjesen v. Carter, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 193. It was provided in a charter party that the charterer was to be liable "for any detention of the vessel after the expiration of fifteen lay days." The lay days expired on Saturday and the loading was completed early Friday morning. But the charterer did not furnish the necessary documents for clearance until Monday afternoon just in time to clear at the custom house, but not in season to make it practicable to sail until Tuesday morning. Evidence was given by the charterer of a general practice and understanding in accordance with a rule of the produce exchange that allows charterers one day after loading to furnish the necessary papers and documents. Held, that the general clause giving demurrage was designed to bind the charterer for the neglect of any duty required of him to enable the vessel to sail, and that no custom was proved or could be sustained that warrants more than the allowance of one additional day to furnish the ship's documents after the loading is in fact completed, or until the end of the lay days if that be later, and that the ship cannot be detained after the lay days have expired without compensation when the loading has been actually and practically more than a day before. The charterers were held for one day's demurrage. Rumball v. Puig, 34 Fed. Rep. 665. Where a bill of lading had the following stipulation, viz: “In case consignee discharges cargo or any part thereof, they are to charge not to exceed ten cents per ton and to have four full working days after notice of arrival at dock of consignee and to pay master for any time (exclusive of Sunday) boat is detained for discharging after the expiration of said four days five dollars per day and at the same rate for portions of days." Held, that under Held, that under the bill of lading the consignees had an election, upon arrival of the boat, whether they would unload the coal or It was whatsoever cause,1 excepting a require the captain to unload. primarily the captain's duty to unload. That the consignees discharged all their legal duty upon the arrival of the boat by giving the captain notice that they would not unload the boat except in its regular turn, and in that case would pay no demurrage, and by offering the captain a berth where he could unload himself if he did not accept the offer; and that this notice to him was a rejection of their right of election to unload. That the final unloading by the consignees cannot be construed as done under the election in the bill, but as a subsequent favor to the captain, independent of the bill and imposing no liability under it. McLaughlin v. Albany and Rensselaer Iron and Steel Co., 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 439. See also opinion of CHOATE, J., in Tuttle v. Albany & Rensselaer Iron and Steel Co., to the same effect, reported in note, McLaughlin v. Same. 1. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Philadelphia & R. R. Čo. v. Northam, 2 Ben. 1; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Randal v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352; Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Manson v'. New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448; Tapscott v. Balfour, L. R., 8 C. P. 46; Jones v. Adamson, 35 L.T., N. S. 287; Barrett v. Dutton, 4 Camp. 333; Conner v. Smith, 5 Taunt. 654; Barker v. Hudson, 3 M. & S. 267. If the ship is detained in this way af ter the loading is completed the charterer is not liable. Pringle v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. So; Jamieson v. Laurie, 6 Bro. C. P. 674. When it is provided in the charter party that detention by ice is not to be reckoned as lay days, detention of the lighter by ice in bringing the goods to the ship is included. Hudson v. Ede, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 566; by act of government, Bessey v. Evans, 4 Camp. 131; Hill v. Idle, Id. 327; Bright 7. Page, 3 B. & P. 295; Hartman v. Clark, 4 Camp. 159; Harman v. Mant, Id. 161. If the charter party stipulates that the discharging of cargo is to begin within twenty-four hours after arrival and notice thereof given to the consignees. The lay days begin to run at the expiration of the said twenty-four hours. Manson |